The production, distribution and marketing of fruit and vegetables for the urban market of Dar es Salaam by Lynch, Kenneth
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/30783/ 
 
 
Theses digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author  
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge  
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author  
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author  
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses  
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
The Production, Distribution and Marketing 
of Fruit and Vegetables 
for the Urban Market of Dar es Salaam
Thesis presented for PhD by 
Kenneth Lynch
Department of Geography and Topographic Science
University of Glasgow 
© Kenneth Lynch, 1992
I G lasgow"
I u n iv e r s i t y
I LIBRARY J
Abstract
This study reviews tour main approaches to the study of food supply for the urban areas of 
the developing world and finds them to be narrow in their foci and limited by the demands of 
the disciplines in which they have been developed. In order to overcome these difficulties, 
this study proposes a synthesis of the approaches for the study of the supply of fruit and 
vegetables to Dar es Salaam. This approach examines the problem of food supply through 
the evidence of price and volume data, of interviews and interview'surveys, of observations of 
the marketing process and it integrates interpretation of literature and the evidence of 
observers in the field. The only state control exerted on the marketing of fruit and vegetables 
in Dar es Salaam, has been that it must be sold through the Kariakoo Wholesale Market. This 
market’s role in wholesale trading has declined in favour of the emerging informal sector, during 
a period of more general economic liberalisation, which took place in Tanzania outwith state 
control during the 1980s. However, Kariakoo maintains a central role, handling approximately 
half of the city’s fruit and vegetables. The informal sector for wholesale trading of fruit and 
vegetables has moved to more peripheral markets, where it is possible to distribute the 
produce more rapidly and at less cost. At each stage in the marketing system the participants 
have a range of options open to them. The choice of channel into which they sell their 
prod uce, depends on a trade-off between costs and price, which varies according to the 
commodity to be sold. The result is that vegetables tend to favour Kariakoo Wholesale 
Market and the city council maintained retail markets, while fruit tend to be traded at the 
informal wholesale markets and may be sold retail either in a retail market or at a street stall. 
There is an increasing trend for produce to be sold to informal wholesale traders at th$ nearest 
market on entering the city. This is particularly the case for fruit. Some markets are beginning 
to specialise in the informal wholesaling of the produce from the regions connected to the city 
by the nearest main road. To the extent that the producing regions tend to specialise in the 
production of certain commodities, a commodity specialisation among these markets is 
beginning to emerge. This study also presents a method of modelling the information in order 
to assess the potential each supply area has for supplying the city with produce on the open 
market. Finally a number of policy considerations are discussed in the light of the results of 
this analysis.
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1Chapter One 
Introduction
1.1 The Context of the Study
Three main schools of thought exist in the study of urban food supply in Africa. In addition, 
Guyeris (1987) suggested a fourth, consolidating each of the three into an historical approach to 
urban food marketing. This thesis proposes that each has merit, although each is limited in its 
explanatory power by its particular approach and ideological basis. The approach adopted in 
this study, therefore, attempts to avoid these limitations by approaching the supply of food as 
a system. It therefore examines all aspects of the supply chain of fruit and vegetables for the 
urban market, drawing on the useful and relevant aspects of the three main approaches already 
established in the literature.
Third world urban areas are expanding, both physically and in terms of population, at a very 
rapid rate. Cities, such as Lagos, Kinshasa and Dar es Salaam, have been growing at about 10 
per cent annually over the last 20 years - the major component of this being massive rural-urban 
migration. Coupled to this is the situation in many countries where one, or perhaps two, cities 
have grown to dominate a particular country's political, economic, social and cultural life. Thist
phenomenon of urban primacy shows no sign of decline in much of Africa. The heavy 
concentration and focus of rural-urban migration, transport networks, and distribution systems 
can cause immense strain on the economy and infrastructure of the city, as well as that of the 
surrounding region. The results of this are urban unemployment, housing shortages, 
inadequate infrastructure and lack of general social welfare. The urban areas of most 
developing countries have experienced very rapid and concentrated urban, political and 
economic development, creating an ever swelling demand for food. The food supply systems 
become increasingly complex as the demand and the area required to supply this demand 
expands, such that it could be argued that an adequate and reliable food supply for the 
growing cities of Africa is the key urban problem today for that continent (Drakakis-Smith, 1991). 
As Sporrek (1985, p. 12) puts it: "Few conditions can so easily deteriorate into a situation of 
social unrest as a malfunctioning urban food system." Urban food supplies have crucial political 
implications, as in, for example, Sudan, Tunisia, Zambia and Egypt, where recent food riots 
have taken place. In the case of both Tunisia and Zambia the food riots have been linked to 
the raising of staple food prices in agreement with IMF recommendations (Bryceson, 1985; The 
Sunday Observer December, 1986). In each of these four examples, the urban unrest has 
placed enormous political pressure on the respective governments. The importance of this is 
explained well by Pletcher (1982) in his examination of Zambian agricultural policy.
2"Social power for the state lies with those who can topple it. In the 
short term farmers offer little of the immediate threat which strikers or 
angry crowds present. Therefore, when tight times come, it is easier 
politically to squeeze the farmer a little harder than the rest. The long 
run effect is to make farming so unattractive it deteriorates."
Pletcher (1982, p.220)
This is equally likely to be the case in Tanzania as it is in Zambia Indeed, Bryceson (1985, 
p.503) explains that "Dar es Salaam accounts for roughly 50 per cent of the national consumer 
purchases of (officially marketed) maize meal, rice and wheat flour." This figure can be revised 
upwards for the maize meal staple sembe, when Bryceson later reports that "By 1984/85, 70 per 
cent of National Milling Corporation (NMC) sales took place in Dar es Salaam and 30 per cent 
in the regions, whereas in 1974/75 these figures were reversed." (Bryceson, 1990, p.6) She 
goes on, "This may be explained by the fact that the city has the highest concentration of 
government officials, expatriates and diplomats and has the highest wage labour force. These 
three groups exert considerable pressure on the state to ensure the city's food supply" 
(Bryceson, 1985, p.504). Paddison et al (1990) suggest that the development and viability of 
cities in developing countries depends on the availability of sufficient food supplies for their 
population. The scarcity of the literature in geography on food supply is highlighted by 
Drakakis-Smith (1991, p.51) "The sparse nature of research of this topic stands in marked 
contrast to the literature on housing which is more voluminous, and yet urban social protest is far 
more likely to be initiated by food shortages or price rises than by housing problems."
There is evidence in Tanzania that the decline in agricultural productivity, which took place during 
the period from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, is characterised by the withdrawal of peasant 
producers from the cash economy and their reversion to subsistence agriculture to ensure 
household reproduction (Hyden, 1980; Griffiths, 1980; Raikes, 1986), or to producing for sale on 
an informal market or only within the local market (Bryceson, 1990). The benefit to the nation of 
this is that it ensures that the rural areas and nearby towns always have sufficient food supply, 
whatever happens in the urban formal markets. The disbenefit is that the agricultural potential 
of the country is not fully realised. This theme will be discussed later in Chapter Two, with 
reference to the broader impact on the nation. However, it is clear that politicians, planners, 
local authorities and participant groups must have a comprehensive understanding of the urban 
food supply system, including rural production, if they are to have any positive influence on it.
"The most important class conflict in the poor countries of the world today is not between 
labour and capital. Nor is it between foreign and national interests. It is between the rural 
classes and the urban classes." So begins Upton's (1977, p. 13) critique of rural-urban relations. 
Guyer (1987, p.5-6) argues that the city and its hinterland as a case study provides a 
"consistently isolable unit of analysis, carved out by their own administrative history from larger 
national structures." The study of the rural supply of food to the city involves broader social and 
economic as well as geographical processes at work in rural-urban interactions. The city, as an
3area of considerable food deficit, serves to focus the trade of food within the country. In this 
way the city serves as a focus for food distribution in the same way as it does for the political 
and economic life of the country. Thus a study of urban food supply may provide mo'e general 
insights into the nation's food production and distribution system. As has been discussed 
earlier, the study of urban food supply in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) countries is of 
crucial political and economic significance. It will also be of great benefit in reaching a more 
general understanding of food distribution and marketing by providing detailed knowledge of 
the case study of a contained example of a system supplying food to an area of food deficit.
In his contribution to Bohannan and Dalton's (1962) major reference on marketing in Africa,
McCall (1962) distinguishes two types of 'market'. Firstly, he refers to "the production and 
distribution of goods (predominantly, but not solely foodstuffs) for local consumption and 
(secondly) the export of commodities which form part of the network of world trade." (McCall, 
1962, p.667) In addition to these definitions, the word ‘market’ may also refer to the place 
where marketing, as defined above, takes place. (Epstein, 1982) The word ‘marketing’ has also 
been adopted more recently for the much more sophisticated activities which take place in 
advanced economies, which includes planning and executing the product conception, pricing, 
promotion and the distribution of ideas, goods and services "to create exchanges that satisfy 
individual and organisational objectives" (Kaynak, 1986, p. 12). These latter two definitions will 
not apply in this discussion, although Kaynak's concept of marketing as an important catalyst of 
economic development in Less Developed Countries is worth brief consideration. He argues 
that in the past the trading functions (in this case he is referring to the general meaning’of 
buying and selling) in Less Developed Countries have been ignored in favour of extractive or 
manufacturing activities and attempts at capital formation. Paddison et al (1990) suggest that this 
is due to the assumption among economists that investment in the productive sectors of the 
economy would encourage the development of consumption. Kaynak argues that this has 
resulted in neglect of marketing activities for three main reasons. Firstly, he argues that "traders 
are widely regarded as 'parasites' and as such, trade has a low esteem as a profession". 
Secondly, in many developing countries, trade, and especially wholesale trade, is dominated 
by ethnic minorities. Finally, because of these negative attitudes towards trade "government 
policy makers tend to underestimate its contribution to the national economy. In most cases 
trade accounts for some 20 per cent of the GNP of these countries" (Kaynak, 1986, p. 17).
These three arguments may be contested, but what is clear is that trading in many developing 
countries is a highly adapted, dynamic sector of the economy, and that its contribution is often 
underestimated or taken for granted by policy makers and governments. By describing trading 
in developing countries as the economic bridge between production and consumption, Kaynak 
goes on to argue that marketing stimulates development rather than is dependent on it, and 
improvements in marketing "in any economic system can aid in economic development by 
leading to a more efficient use of existing productive resources" (Kaynak, 1986, p. 17).
4Bohannan and Dalton (1962), in their introduction, distinguish further between marketing and 
trading. The word ‘trade’ has a variety of uses: "(1) any commercial transaction regardless of its 
site, the kinds of goods transacted, their destination or their personnel (2) Those activities 
done only by professional specialists which provide them with their livelihood. (3) Any external 
transaction (foreign trade)" (Bohannan and Dalton, 1962, p. 12-13). With these distinctions in 
mind, the following discussion will use the words "market place" to refer to the location of 
trading and marketing activities in the rural and urban areas studied. ‘Marketing’ will refer to the 
selling of produce as part of the economic activities of a household, in other words the selling 
of surplus foodstuffs for cash (as in McCall's first definition). Trade’ will refer to the buying of 
produce with the intention of reselling as a method of earning income, as in the case of 
professional traders (in Bohannan and Dalton's second definition). Other definitions of these 
latter two words, which refer to foreign trading or exporting and the more vague activities of 
buying and selling, will be avoided.
In their very thorough examination of Tanzania’s “second economy”, Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa (1990) find that there is a very broad range of definitions and overlapping terms 
applied in the literature to this phenomenon. These include criteria relating to the legality of the 
activities, whether they operate inside or outside of the state benefit and regulation system, 
whether they escape taxation, whether they are included in gross national product calculations, 
or whether they are monitored by official statistics or by those activities which lack formal 
transactions (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990). They go on to distinguish five food marketing 
channels outside the official market channel. Firstly, the ‘traditional’ channel, involving direct sales 
between peasants, which may be regarded as part of subsistence consumption, although 
traders purchasing from rural markets, where this form of trading predominates, are well 
concealed from official detection. Secondly, there is what Maliyamkono and Bagachwa describe 
as ‘shuttle’ marketing, where small quantities of food, perhaps one to three sacks, are carried 
by bus or lorry to a nearby town where a better price may be expected, and where consumer 
goods may be more cheaply purchased. One could include in this, peasants visiting urban 
relatives and carrying with them foods and returning with consumer goods, or the other way 
around. Thirdly there is the ‘inter-regional’ trade involving large quantities of foods carried by 
lorry from surplus regions for sale in areas of high demand. This channel usually involves trading 
specialists, in other words, people whose sole or main occupation is inter-regional trading. 
However, some are occasional traders, who may own or drive lorries transporting other goods, 
and which only occasionally have space which can be used to transport some food. Fourthly, 
there is the urban open market, which has been in existence for some time. This is often fed 
by the 'inter-regional trade channel, but may also be fed by informal urban and peri-urban 
production of foods. Foods are sold in both processed and unprocessed forms. Finally, there 
is the ‘export’ market where goods are smuggled out of the country. This, according to 
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa has arisen out of adverse producer prices and poor management
of the export crop marketing boards, making smuggling a more lucrative way of disposing of 
produce. This study will be concentrating on the third and the fourth channels as these appear 
to account for a large proportion of unofficial supply of foods to the urban markets. Mention 
will be made to other channels where relevant, particularly the first and second.
This chapter will go on to review approaches to the study of urban food supply in Less 
Developed Countries. It will begin by identifying four distinct approaches to the subject. It will 
move on to analyse three urban food market case studies: the city of Mysore, India; the city of 
Kampala, capital of Uganda; and the city of Dar es Salaam, primate city and former official of 
Tanzania. Finally, conclusions will be drawn in the light of these approaches to the study of 
urban food supply, as well as areas of focus for the present study.
1.2 Approaches to Urban Food Supply Studies
What becomes clear from an initial review of the literature is the recent tendency to attempt to 
fuse perspectives of the various disciplinary approaches to food marketing, or food policy 
(Hansen and McMillan, 1986; Gittinger et al, 1987; Guyer, 1987). This seems to be as a result 
of two factors. Firstly, previous strictly disciplinary research has arrived at erroneous, or 
simplistic conclusions because of an incomplete analysis of the food systems under 
consideration. For example, an economic approach to rural markets may demonstrate that it is 
not profitable for many of the sellers to attend them. This conclusion does not take into account 
the immense social and cultural importance of such a market, which can make a purely economic 
gain at the market less than relevant to the participants. This is what Jones (1972) describes as 
one of African markets' malfunctions. He describes this phenomenon as groups of 
"participants in the market (who) are unproductively employed or are not seeking economic 
gain. Many social, political and administrative activities, in addition to the purely economical 
ones of buying and selling, typically characterise each marketing meeting" (Jones, 1972, p. 10). 
Indeed, one of the interviewees in the current study described how women in Lushoto District in 
Tanzania may purchase produce from a neighbouring producer, if they themselves had run out 
of produce for selling at the periodic market, even if this meant they would be out of pocket at 
the end of the day. The reason was that immense social and cultural importance was placed on 
attending the markets.
It may also be argued that it is extremely difficult to monitor accurately the volumes, prices and 
transactions prevalent in such rural periodic markets. The units of measurement are not uniform, 
with sellers frequently selling produce in arbitrary piles, but also in containers which vary in size 
depending on the commodity. In the protracted discussions over the price which can often take 
place, both parties may suggest various rates of exchange, varying both the price and the 
volume. In addition, preferential rates may be offered to, or obtained by, customers known to
6the seller or those purchasing larger quantities, and increased rates to those who appear able 
to afford a higher price. Additional variations in price may be obtained by either the seller or 
the buyer according to the variety, origin or quality of the produce. Finally, with reference to the 
production of food crops in Africa, many are produced on mixed-crop plots, where trees may 
be mixed with one or two other crops. This provides a variety of vegetative input to the soils, 
while extracting different nutrients and the trees provide shelter for the lower crops from both 
direct sun and tropical rain storms. This makes the estimation of crop yields per unit of land 
extremely problematic.
Secondly, food systems themselves - due to the importance of food to survival - are the 
subject of study in such diverse disciplines as agriculture, anthropology, economics, geography, 
government policy, marketing, medicine, sociology and, doubtless, more besides. The result 
is an approach to food supply systems which highlights the aspects of particular interest, or 
which is easier for the disciplines to study, given the different acceptable research methods 
available to them. "In studying market place trade as an aspect of economic development 
different social science disciplines have focused on different aspects of the problem." (Epstein, 
1982, p.209) For example, anthropology approaches its subject from the perspective of the 
groups of people involved in the system, requiring the researcher to visit and live in the rural 
producing area making observations and interviewing the participants. Economics, on the other 
hand is interested in the variations in price and supply and role of capital in the system and will 
collect data measuring these factors, or at the very least approach the subject from this point of 
view. Legitimate though these approaches are within their discipline, they do not provide an 
overall view of the food supply system. Guyer (1987, p.6) argues that although this diversity 
has provided researchers with varied insights into food supply, a juncture has been reached in 
its study where "..particular dynamics cannot be studied without a recomposition of the field." 
Drakakis-Smith (1991, p.51) comments that research on food supply in "...geography, but also in 
related social sciences, has been patchy so that although some elements, such as the nutritional 
problems resultant from inadequate diets or the operation of markets, are reasonably well 
covered, it is difficult to formulate a comprehensive framework."
Because of its highly complex inclusion in human life, "a broadly based integrated policy 
approach to supply, distribution and consumption is essential if everyone is to be assured 
access to food." (Gittinger et al, 1987, p .ix) Previous attempts have been limited by their 
more narrow approach. In his book Marketing Staple Food Crops in Tropical Africa. Jones 
(1972) took up the subject from an economic perspective, concentrating on an analysis of four 
African marketing systems. He compares each of these systems, measuring their performance 
using variables of price and volume, against his idea of a free market, focusing on what he calls 
'imperfections’ in the African market systems. As a result, the conclusions Jones reaches are 
preoccupied with this way of examining food marketing systems. This may result in problematic
7conclusions unless backed up with additional data. Price data alone are open to interpretation, 
as discussed above, and are, therefore, insufficient for the purposes of policy analysis without 
additional evidence. For example, the result of an analysis may show price stability of a 
commodity. However, without additional evidence this may equally be the result of 
monopolistic control or competitive conditions. There is no way of deducing a conclusion in the 
event of equifinality such as this, without corroboration from sociolpgical or political data. In 
addition, there can be serious questions regarding such secondary data as are available for 
wholesale and retail activities. Frequently they concentrate on the formal structured market and 
ignore the unstructure informal market. Samiee (1990, p.36) reports that, according to 1980 UN 
data, Egypt, with a population of over 41 million, has only 1,018 retail establishments.
Jones (1972) examines the workings of the market and the ways in which government can 
intervene to improve its efficiency, such as disseminating price information, forming commodity 
exchanges (he quotes the success of such exchanges in the United States of America) and 
geographical production specialisation. Guyer (1987) reviews a series of works associated with 
Jones and the Stanford Food Research Institute, which put forward price analysis as a method 
of research, and which employs historical and sociological evidence ad hoc to strengthen price 
analysis interpretations. However, Guyer argues that the integration of historical and 
sociological study is indispensable to a comprehensive food market analysis, and that rather 
than being peripheral, this evidence should be examined in conjunction with quantitative price 
data. There are two reasons for elevating qualitative data to a status similar to that of economic 
data. Firstly, although qualitative data may be considered to be less objective, questions may 
also be easily raised regarding the accuracy and representativeness of the price data. Indeed, 
the immense difficulties of collecting such data in developing countries increase the necessity of 
handling them with extreme caution. Secondly, Sen (1982, p. 159) argued that there is a "need 
to view the food problem as a relation between people and food in terms of a network of 
entitlemet relations.” in other words, the political dimension to food supply is fundamental to 
an understanding of food supply problems and food security. Such factors are not readily 
quantifiable, particularly in the context of a developing country.
Polly Hill (1963) demonstrates the difficulties of approaching the subject of markets in Africa 
from such a quantitative point of view:
“It is not so much the heat, the glare, the bustle, the over-crowding, the 
noise, the shouting, (and consequent hoarseness), or even the sneezing 
caused by open bags of pepper and maize (for all this is compensated 
by the very courteous behaviour of Africans in markets) -- the difficulties 
are rather the extreme fluidity and complexity of the undocumented 
situation and the need to trouble informants at their moment of 
maximum anxiety, when they are concluding transactions. Perhaps one 
day economists will devise new techniques, presumably involving
8teamwork, for tracking and identifying the variables in these anti­
laboratory conditions. Meanwhile it is to be hoped that the hardships 
endured in market places by individual anthropologists will not have 
been in vain."
(Hill, 1963, p.445)
Guyer (1987) describes the social anthropological approach to marketing as ‘Francophone 
themes’ and goes on to distinguish a further approach to the study of food supply systems, 
which she describes the ‘British themes’, although their proponents-are by no means confined 
to these nationalities. These approaches seem to have arisen out of the different perspectives 
of the researchers and the different colonial government priorities, both partly as a result of the 
distinct historical experiences of Britain and France. For example, the French colonised large 
expanses of sparsely populated countries in the Sahel and central Africa, whereas the British 
governed the densely populated areas such as the Gold Coast and Nigeria. In addition, the 
distinction in these approaches may have come out of the different national histories of the 
colonial powers themselves. There is a long history in France of criticising the government use 
of control of staple food supply to Paris, creating tensions between the state, the consumer, 
producer and the intermediaries. In Britain, on the other hand, there was wage unrest after 
World War II resulting in the construction by government of wage subsidies. Furthermore, 
French scholars have tended to approach the question of food supply as a highly colourful 
anthropological phenomenon, describing how food is traded, whilst British scholars have 
tended to approach the question from the point of view of who food is supplied to, as 
exemplified by Sen (1982) in his book Poverty and Famines.
"..., if we look at the food going to particular groups, then of course we , 
can say a great deal about starvation. ...one is not far from just 
describing the starvation itself...clearly, they didn't have enough food, 
but the question is why didn't they have enough food? What allows one 
group rather than another to get hold of the food that is there? These 
questions lead to the entitlement approach...”
(Sen, 1982. p.154)
The French tradition, which approximates to a social anthropological approach, concentrates on 
the various forms of social organisation which deliver the goods. As such, this school focuses 
on certain issues, such as the sources of the food, the types of transport, the locations and 
number of the various transfers of the provisions. This approach also makes certain 
assumptions, such as "the institutions of distribution take precedence over market principles as 
the subject of research" (Guyer, 1987, p. 15). The state, in this case, becomes not the initiator 
of beneficial policies for the workings of the market, but simply another social institution, which is 
potentially, and often actually, in conflict with indigenous organisations or groups of the 
population. However, there are problems with this approach. It is swamped with enormous 
and graphical descriptive detail, but lacks focus. This approach is exemplified in the workd of 
Piault (1971), Cohen (1971) and Amselle (1971) describing aspects of modern-day West African 
markets. There are questions left unanswered concerning the method of the definition of 
research priorities and the most important issues involved. The means by which the institutions,
9involved in food supply, have influenced policy and prices is rarely covered. Finally, there 
appears to be no generalised framework and no strategy for further investigation.
The alternative approach, associated with British researcher perspectives, may be described 
as a consumer-oriented approach, focusing on urban real incomes and poverty in relation to 
food supply. It links prices and marketing institutions to real incomes and standards of living. It 
investigates the access of lower income households to food markets and the sources of their 
supply. It examines social class and local social structures and their impact on food distribution 
and consumption. Its focus is on social welfare, and although it may analyse production, 
distribution and consumption, it will always return to the income implications for the producer, 
the trader and the consumer. This is most clearly explained by Croll (1983, p.7) when she says 
it "examines both access to national and local food circuits and the demands that food policies 
make on the material and labour resources of the household so that it produces, purchases and 
processes sufficient food for its members' subsistence." This concentration on class (or 
occupation as an indication of class) allows questions of the class implications of the economic 
process to be addressed, and brings relative poverty into focus. There is a concern with the 
acceptability of income levels under certain political conditions, and the allocation of access to 
those food supplies which do exist. For example, it may view state intervention in terms of 
economic welfare, and therefore political stability, rather than market efficiency (Sen, 1982; Croll, 
1983; Ellis, 1983). This approach appears to appease Guyeris (1987) demand for an historical 
dimension, by referring to post- Independence or immediate pre-Independence experience,t
although it tends to be limited in this by the short time-period over which such data have been 
collected. This approach neglects the question of rural-urban interaction or bias, because of its 
concentration on class. Its objectives are narrow, though generally explicit. "It is concerned with 
how acceptable, or at least livable, income levels have been established in different areas, 
under different conditions." (Guyer, 1987, p. 18)
The fourth approach may be termed an historical approach. It attempts to incorporate some 
elements of the above three traditions into an historical approach to urban food supply 
analysis. It is characterised by Guyer, where she argues for the integration of "the three 
dimensions which have tended to be separated in Africanists’ work; market prices, the social 
and political organisations of production and trade, and the class implications of incomes"
(Guyer, 1987, p.19). She argues later that a focus on local areas, where all these dimensions 
meet, is one step towards building an understanding of the organisation of the society, by 
allowing them to be examined on a small scale. "Understanding the influence which former 
organisational rubrics and material conditions exert throughout a particular region's...(history)...is 
an agenda with which...case studies engage, but which is, ultimately, a far broader social 
scientific problem" (Guyer, 1987, p.47).
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However, rather than answer questions, this approach raises them. An historical approach is an 
important method of contextualising the problem and raising the questions which require tq be 
asked. Rather than introducing (or imposing) an agenda for research, one finds that questions 
are raised and directions for seeking answers suggested. For example, Bryceson (1985,1987) 
describes the development of the food supply in Dar es Salaam through periods of crisis and 
balance. She concludes that it is simplistic to promote the balancing of Tanzania's external 
trade and finance and the lifting of government controls as solutions to Tanzania's food deficit 
problem. There are long-term goals which must be considered, not least of which are the 
socio-political impacts of such measures. Straightforward economic measures, she argues, are 
steeped in ideological debates concerning the role of the state in the economy, whilst attention 
should be paid to the impacts of such measures on the stability of the economy, and ultimately 
on the people. She suggests that a series of policies be implemented which are aimed at 
curbing rural-urban migration, at firing the initiative of the trader and producer, and at 
encouraging a sense of professionalism in the bureaucrat. However, what are these policies to 
be? How would they achieve their objectives? What parts do government, as well as the 
traders, producers and consumers play in them?
It would appear that each of the above traditions tend to concentrate on one or two areas of 
research at the expense of the rest. The first three approaches provide us with detailed 
analyses of different aspects of the food supply chain. An approach concentrating on 
quantitative economic data has inherent problems involved in the data collection and 
interpretation, as it tends to focus on prices, volumes and values of formal market transfers. An 
anthropological approach tends to focus on empiricist presentations of the markets and fairs 
where the food is bought and sold with an emphasis on the cultural importance of markets to a 
variety of interest groups and institutions in the societies. An approach concentrating on the 
impact of the food marketing system on the urban population's welfare can over-emphasise the 
role of the state at the expense of the already efficient marketing system. It can identify 
institutional defects in the allocation of accessibility to the supply of food for the urban poor. 
The historical approach provides a good starting point, contextualising the problem of food 
supply by setting in place the cultural and institutional legacy of the society. Each of these four 
approaches to the study of urban food supply, may reproduce a valuable view of an urban 
food supply system. However, any picture of urban food supply which is painted in only one 
of these dimensions will ultimately lack the overall depth which can be achieved using a far 
broader conceptual framework.
Meanwhile, a further approach can be distinguished which has had a more limited impact 
outside geography, but within the discipline is widely regarded as being of great influence in its 
time. These approaches are applied mainly to rural marketing systems, with some 
considerable interest in attempting to explain the phenomenon of periodic marketing. There is
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a limited number of studies which examined the case of urban marketing, but these will be 
examined in more detail in the next section. Barrett (1986) distinguished two explanations pf 
market development within a geographical approach to market systems in developing 
countries: central place theory and the diffusionist approach. The central place explanation is 
based on Skinner’s^ 964) study of trade and marketing structures in rural China Skinner 
identified systems of market towns connected through flows of goods and services, and 
movements of traders and consumers. These spatial linkages resulted in hierarchical systems of 
markets with overlapping hexagonal hinterlands. The explanation of this hierarchical system is 
that trading takes place between small peasant centres and these evolve at varying rates 
depending on their relative locations in relation to their hinterland.
The diffusionist approach is based on the work of Hagerstrand (1952) on historical records of 
innovation diffusion in central Sweden. This follows a three stage process, where first multiple 
centres of adoption emerge; secondly, new centres grow up and compete with the initial 
adoption centres; and finally additional increments are not feasible as all centres have adopted 
the innovation and a stage of saturation is reached. The adoption of an innovation is more likely 
close to an early adoption centre and reduces with distance from it.
The first theory assumes the importance of the evolution from peasant-to-peasant trading to 
rural-to-urban trading. The second sees a process of ‘top-down’ penetration of the market 
system. Barrett suggests that each theory may have greater power of explanation dependingt
on the local conditions. For example, she argues that studies where the diffusionist 
explanation has been successfully applied, the growth of the market system has taken place 
relatively recently, and has occurred in conjunction with many other changes such as improved 
socio-economic conditions and transport provision. In areas where central place theory has 
been successfully applied, markets are already in place, and the adoption of the market system 
moves outward from established centres, forming hierarchical relationships between centres of 
differing importance in the marketing system. This process tends to strengthen the position of 
the established markets and results in a hierarchical pattern of rural-to-urban trading. Further 
dimensions exist within most market systems, however, and these must be examined in order 
to explain, rather than describe the development of market systems.
Ideally, the study of an urban food supply system should address itself to issues of efficiency 
of supply to all sectors of the population. Put slightly differently, the ability of all sectors of the 
population to get access to food supply should be assessed and the real cost of that access 
investigated. The study which follows addresses itself to the role of the various actors and 
structures involved in the food supply chain, such as the government, city or state marketing 
authority, the national infrastructure, the immigrant traders, the producers, the consumers and
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those involved in all stages of buying and selling in between. The relations between these 
institutions requires examination. An assessment is also required of the effect of the relative 
power or influence of these institutions in the system. Clearly this investigation must 
incorporate the formal and informal aspects of the food supply system, since the estimates of 
the informal sector's role in food supply, even in countries with heavily managed food markets, 
are relatively significant. Sporrek (1985) estimates that the informal sector accounts for 50 per 
cent of food marketing in Dar es Salaam. This requires an economic analysis of the price and 
volume data held by formal marketing agencies as well as attempts at data capture within the, at 
times, elusive informal sector. In calling for an overall framework for the study of urban food 
distribution systems in Africa and Asia, Drakakis-Smith suggests that geographers are well 
placed to investigate the broad issues involved, since they “must focus not just on the 
commodity itself but also on the economic, social, cultural and political factors which affect the 
system” (1991, p.51).
1.3 Case Studies of Urban Food Supply
The section above discussed the main approaches to food marketing in general. Guyer (1987) 
suggested using the city and its hinterland as a case study which is relatively self-contained. This 
section will examine three examples of such an approach, although in each case they have 
concentrated on the contemporary situation of the marketing system, particularly concerned with 
the locational aspects of the marketing outlets. In this sense this offers a fifth, geographical, 
approach to food supply in Third World cities. Although these approaches do not attempt to 
reproduce an urban version of the Skinner-Christaller approach to market location, much of the 
underlying preoccupations of explanation in terms of spatial location, are still present, as 
attempted by Skinner in Nigeria (1962) and then in China (1964) and Christaller (1966) in 
southern Germany. The more recent studies adopting this approach have moved on to 
attempt to incorporate interpretations of the marketing process into the analysis of the supply 
and distribution patterns in terms of the supply chains, the relative roles of the wholesale and 
retail elements, or formal and informal sector, the importance of the different groups of supply 
chain participants, from producers to consumers (Lavrijsen and Sterkenburg, 1976; Tarimo, 1977; 
Epstein, 1982; Boekholt and van der Veen, 1986). The value of these case studies will be 
discussed later.
Mysore, India
Boekholt and van der Veen (1986) present results of field research carried out in 1980 and 1981 
into vegetable and milk marketing in the city of Mysore Karnataka in south-west India, although 
this paper only deals with vegetables marketing. The city had a population of 500,000 in 1981.
It has mainly developed through tertiary activities, such as tourism, education and research. The
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majority of its inhabitants live in the central neighbourhoods, where population densities are 
high. The lower socio-economic groups have tended to live in the higher density residential, 
neighbourhoods, while the higher status groups tend to live in the more spacious, recently built 
neighbourhoods in the city’s outskirts. Within the city, vegetable production is limited. The 
most perishable leafy vegetables, such as curry, radish, and coriander leaf, which have a low 
value to volume ratio, and are most profitably grown on a small scale in a private garden or on 
horticultural land at a short distance from the consumer. The bulk of vegetables are supplied 
from outside the city. Farmers growing in a zone with a 25 to 35 kilometres radius, bring their 
produce in to the city and sell either direct to the consumer, or, more frequently, to marketing 
agencies. Alternatively vegetables may be supplied from a considerable distance such as 160 
kilometres south (Nilgiri Hills) or 120 kilometres north-east (Bangalore, state capital and a major 
vegetable collecting and redistributing centre in South India).
Figure 1.1 Model of Food Marketing Channels in Mysore, India .
Source: Boekholt and van der Veen (1986, p. 118)
The main flow of vegetables is distributed through the open market and the dominant form of 
marketing is via commissioning agents. These generally act as intermediaries between sellers 
(farmers) and buyers (wholesalers or sometimes retailers). The majority of farmers find this less 
time-consuming than the alternative of retailing the vegetables themselves. The commissioning 
agent, although charging a commission, generally accepts any amount, kind or quality of 
vegetables. Figure 1.1 describes the main institutions involved in the fresh food trade, 
delivering to the Mysore market. However, it does not give any indication of the varying levels 
of importance each institution plays in the overall supply. For example, in their paper,
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Boeckholt and van der Veen (1986) indicate that the most important group for supplying the city 
are the private traders, although no data are presented to explain this statement. It appears 
to rest solely on the argument that by selling to commissioning agents farmers are saving time 
and they are assured of a sale if they approach a commissioning agent because "he generally 
accepts any amount, kind or quality of vegetables" (Boeckholt and van der Veen 1986, p.117). 
The Cooperative does not have as important a role to play in terms of volume of supply, but 
again no data are offered to give an indication of the Cooperative's relative role in the food 
distribution system. We can only assume from the facts that the Cooperative has "some" 
regional centres where it assembles rural produce and it has one central godown from where it 
supplies its own shops with two mobile vans, and that it operates on a modest scale in 
comparison with the open market.
The retailers can be divided into three broad categories: street sellers, market place retailers 
and specialised shops, the last being of relatively low importance. The first two generally buy 
relatively small amounts from wholesalers, or, in some cases, they may approach farmers at the 
assembly point. The cooperative chain is relatively small-scale. The cooperative society was 
begun in 1968 and it collects its vegetables at its own assembly point and transports it to its 
own shops. It makes up on short supply by buying from the private market.
With regard to vegetable shopping, there are differences in the demand patterns of the 
inhabitants in different areas of the town. Mysore can be split into three neighbourhood types 
according to population density. Each has a different pattern of shopping behaviour.
(i) The older, centrally located and densely populated neighbourhoods 
have a fully developed retail structure with markets, generally very 
proximate, as the predominant outlet. Consumers tend to buy on a 
daily basis.
(ii) The less densely populated areas have a less developed retail 
structure. A local market is of importance for daily purchases, but a 
large market is generally visited less frequently, for example 
weekly, for larger quantities. The importance of door-to-door 
vendors depends on status. Lower and middle class are likely to 
find them more important than the higher class, where transport 
costs are less restraining.
(iii) The fringe neighbourhoods have the least developed retail 
structure. With an absence of local markets, centrally located 
markets and door-to-door vendors, hawkers and shops complement 
each other. The central markets will be visited on a less than daily 
frequency, while local retailers meet daily needs.
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The authors come to the conclusion that the ‘informal sector’ plays a dominant role in vegetable 
retailing. ‘Informal’ is not explicitly defined, although it is implied to be retailers who do not sell 
from fixed retail outlets. The ‘informal’ sector under this definition has demonstrated an ability 
to react in a flexible and adequate way to changing circumstances. This the authors put down to 
‘satisficer’ behaviour rather than profit maximisation. This sector is particularly important, where 
it has adopted to supply the urban poor who are not resident near.a retail outlet or who cannot 
afford to travel to one on a regular enough basis.
Kampala, Uganda
Temple (1969) in an attempt to fill the dearth of information on urban markets in Africa wrote of 
Kampala, capital of Uganda This study focused on the retail markets themselves, attempting 
to assess their nature, size, structure, relationships with one another, as well as consumer habits 
and the supply side. The fieldwork was carried out in 1964. The spatial distribution of the 
market places was found to be closely adjusted to the distribution of consumers. Urban 
expansion led to increasing spread of market places, while increased population led to growth 
in the size and number of markets. Within the city of Kampala, the development of market 
places was carefully supervised and regulated. However, outside the city, in related urban 
areas, market development was allowed to carry on unchecked. Despite planning controls 
inside Kampala city, the advantages of proximity to the urban core, of wholesale functions, of 
greater effective demand and of a better developed transport network have combined to make 
these markets larger and place them at the top of the market hierarchy for the whole urban 
area.
Outside the Kampala city boundary, but still within the urban area, markets tend to locate 
according to two factors. First, the attraction of main road intersections has served to attract 
suppliers and consumers on their way home from work. Second, the markets have tended to 
gravitate towards the Kampala city boundary. This location takes advantage of the more lax 
planning and sanitary supervision, lower dues and more flexible marketing arrangements, while 
still able to serve city centre residents as well as commuters and residents outside the city 
boundaries. Bye-laws restricting the selling of certain goods within a mile of the market 
boundary has further affected the spread of markets outside the city boundary. Within Kampala 
the markets were arranged according to an orderly plan, constructed of permanent materials, 
furnished with concrete benches and stalls, with roofs and with car parks alongside.
Temple attempted to rank the markets according to size using three different variables, 
although he readily accepted that each had their drawbacks. First, market revenue was used, 
showing Nakasero (the oldest market) as the dominant market place. However, Temple 
pointed out that there were different procedures for collecting market revenue. Whilst within 
Kampala, the city authorities collected a regular rent, the markets outside the city boundary
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collected dues on Items sold, in addition to a small charge for occupying the space in the 
market. The result of this is that the measurements are variable in time and, because of the 
differing procedure for collection of dues, in space. Secondly, Temple applied the 
measurement of stall numbers to the markets. Nakivubo comes out on top under this criterion 
(it is close to Nakasero, in the centre of the city). However, Temple makes the point that, 
although these data are accurate for inner city Kampala, they remain ambiguous elsewhere. 
Outside the city a seller may set up a pitch simply by paying his or her fee and unrolling a mat 
with goods. These were what the survey would count. This however, tends to omit intermittent 
trading and thus no account can be taken of the petty traders whose contribution is important, 
particularly outside the city boundary. Thirdly, physical size of the market place was used as a 
measure of size. This indicated a relationship between size of market and distance from the 
urban core, although some anomalies were recorded. This measure was not considered in any 
depth, but it was pointed out that this may have been deceptive because the physical size of 
the markets may not have been a good indication of the volume of goods passing through. 
Some markets located on small and apparently chaotic sites may in fact have a far greater 
turnover of volume than larger, more organised markets. This may simply be the result of 
necessity because of a large demand.
Finally, Temple examined the markets by level of consumption. He found that in the inner 
Kampala markets green vegetables and fruits of all kinds formed over 51 per cent of the value 
of commodities offered, while fresh meat formed another 41 per cent. In the markets of 
Mengo, Nakawa and Kawempe (outside the Kampala city boundary) non-perishable 
commodities formed the largest single group (33 per cent) of which much was charcoal. This 
was followed by matoke, the Ugandan staple meal (22 per cent), then beef and goat meat (22 
per cent). Dried fish formed 10 per cent and green vegetables and fruit accounted for only 6 
per cent. Temple points out that matoke is the most significant commodity in terms of income. 
These markets concentrate on different commodities and also offered a poorer quality and a 
cheaper equivalent to the inner Kampala markets.
Temple's description of the daily pattern of activity points to problems in data collection in such 
markets which he himself admits. Activity in the market places varies throughout the day 
reaching peaks at times such as at mid-morning, when most produce arrives from the central 
wholesale market, lunch-time, when workers enter the market in search of cooked meals, and 
between 4pm and 5pm, as people travel home from work. The last is particularly important 
where informal sector employment is common as these employees are often employed and 
paid on a daily, or piece-meal basis. The peaks in market activities may depend on the 
coincidence of both suppliers and consumers arriving at the market, for example matoke usually 
arrives in time for the 4pm to 5pm peak as workers return home. These variations make reliable 
measurements difficult to make. Temple also expressed his suspicion that the variety of peak
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times throughout the day and in different markets suggested that the markets operated to 
complement each other in location, commodities and in peak hours.
The majority of market vendors were Baganda (60 per cent), the main tribal group in the city. 
There was a range of much smaller tribal groups, the main distribution of which reflected their 
residential distribution within the city. Super-imposed on this werejqertain tribal specialisms, 
resulting from tribal customs, dietary habits, control over supply of certain goods or contact with 
a certain group of consumers.
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Sporrek, in 1985 (although based on fieldwork carried out in 1976) identified the duka, or ‘swahili’ 
shop at the front part of a house with a rudimentary selection of goods, as the dominant selling 
outlet for food in Dar es Salaam. In 1973 it accounted for 90 per cent of food shops and 44 per 
cent of food traded in Dar es Salaam (at estimated retail prices). 50 per cent of them were run 
by people of Arab ethnic origin, while 29 per cent were held by Africans (Sporrek believed this 
signified an increase since Independence). Although the category "special shops, street and 
market sellers or producers" accounted for one quarter of all food marketed, Sporrek believed 
that street and market sellers were of strategic value. The food sold through them is the source 
of the population's protein, trace elements and vitamins. Also a significant number of the city 
population are employed and earning from this trading.
Sporrek argued that the location of selling points resulted from four main factors. The first of 
these factors is related to the location of the market places in relation to the distribution of the 
city's population. In the case of Dar es Salaam, the majority of the customers are private 
households distributed around the city. Secondly, a factor influencing the location of food trade 
is where the customers will eat. In Dar es Salaam it is common to cook and eat breakfast and 
the main meal of the day at home, while in other African cities, such as Accra (Lawson, 1971), it is 
more common to purchase cooked foods to eat in the market place or to take home to eat. It is 
interesting to note that Sporrek here dismisses the purchase of cooked meals in Dar es Salaam 
as insignificant. This he bases on personal communication with an economist of the university of 
Dar es Salaam 1. However, based on observations and discussions with several researchers 
living in Dar es Salaam, reservations must be expressed of such wholesale dismissal of this 
form of food trading 2 The social acceptability of purchasing cooked food (the basis of 
Sporrek's personal communication) only applied to people who were married or who at least 
had someone at home to prepare food. In addition, since the liberalisation of trading
Personal communication with R Mabele, Director, Economic Research Bureau,
University of Dar es Salaam.
Field observations and interviews with G Jambiya and D Mwamfupe of the Department 
of Geography, University of Dar es Salaam.
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regulations within Dar es Salaam, the number of street traders has increased dramatically, 
including in their ranks large numbers of cooked food vendors.
A third factor of location is that most inhabitants of the city have low and relatively irregular 
income. Indeed in 1988 the minimum wage earner's wage was 29 per cent of its 1973 value 
when measured in terms of the quantity of maize it could purchase at the official price 
(Bryceson, 1990, p.9). Briggs (1990, p.191) reports that the minimum monthly wage in 1986 was 
TShs 860 and a middle range civil servant's salary was about TShs 2,000, which he compares 
with the cost of a stem of bananas at TShs 200 or a 4 gallon tin of rice at TShs 300. Those 
employed in the informal sector tend to be paid on a daily or piece-meal basis. This suggests 
that those with regular, but low formal sector income and those with highly irregular informal 
sector income, are limited to frequent purchases of food. In addition, it is likely that most have 
no facilities to store food at home, which is particularly important in Dar es Salaam's hot and 
humid climate, as this effectively eliminates the possibility of making larger purchases and 
storing. The result of these factors on the location of the markets is to ensure that they are 
easily accessible on the main commuter routes.
Fourthly, transport is important as a factor of location of food trade. In Dar es Salaam at that 
time buses were few, were generally unreliable, very expensive and served only some parts 
of the city. In 1976 Sporrek (1985) reported that 175 buses out of a total of 325 owned by 
Shirika la Usafiri Dar es Salaam were road worthy. These were serving a population of 600,000, 
who may have to travel up to 9 kilometres to work. Cars were and remain very expensive and 
generally limited to the more affluent sector of the population. Bicycles, although they would 
be ideal, were, and still are, in relatively short supply - as are spare parts for them. The 
remaining option is to walk, easily the most common method of movement about the city. The 
issue of the transport system is as important to consumers making their way to the market as it 
is to the retailers making their way to their market from the source of their produce. The 
transport system has improved considerably since Sporrek's survey and many people now 
travel by bus, but shortages of spare parts and increasing fuel prices can seriously affect the 
ability of the bus companies to maintain reliable services.
These four factors added up to create a relatively dispersed pattern of selling points, giving 
easy daily access to low to middle income residents travelling about the city on foot. The 
exceptions to the dispersed pattern are the higher class residential areas, where people 
generally go elsewhere (usually the city centre) to purchase larger and less frequent quantities 
of food, often by car. Two anomalies, however, appear. First, on the periphery of the city an 
unplanned, low-income residential area has a surprisingly low density of selling points for the 
concentration of potential buyers. Sporrek puts forward as a possible answer, that the 
inhabitants of the area are growing produce to meet their own needs. Secondly, in the city
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centre there occurs an extremely high number of sellers for the relatively low resident 
population. The explanation for this is likely to be that this area has a generally high day-time 
population, with people commuting into the centre, thus increasing the potential day-time 
demand.
1.4 Discussion
In each of the three cases, referred to above, the researchers present graphic and sometimes 
highly detailed description and empirical evidence. There is, however, some difficulty in 
discovering any explanation in these studies. Each describes details and patterns of food 
retailing and marketing across their chosen city with reference to issues such as wholesaling, 
source of supplies, official versus unofficial supplies and fixed outlet versus mobile sellers. 
None analyse any of the aspects of food marketing raised in the four approaches described 
earlier in any detail. For example, only in Boekholt and van der Veen's (1986) study was there 
reference to the role of the various institutions in the supply process, such as traders or 
middlemen, but particularly producers. Even in this study there was very little detail provided 
about the roles of these groups in the food supply system and less data concerning their 
relative importance in the food supply chain. These groups are responsible for the movement 
and transfer of the food supplies and they are thus fundamental participants in any food supply 
system. It is of utmost importance, that their relative roles and priorities be assessed. Each of 
the three case studies above appears to be an attempt to freeze the food supply pattern in 
time, in order to describe it. As a result, this produces a detailed description of food marketing 
and consumption, which are ultimately lacking in any sense of change or development over time.
Boekholt and van der Veen (1986) conclude in their study that most of the vegetable retailing 
sector consists of ‘informal’ retailing, although they do not make it entirely clear what the 
distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ trading is. Sporrek (1985) is clearer, defining the 
'informal sector’ as market and street trade in the case of Dar es Salaam, characterised by 
factors such as ease of entrance, reliance on indigenous resources, family owned and small scale 
enterprise, intensive labour, little need for formal education and the sellers operating in an 
unregulated and competitive market. The duka referred to by Sporrek do not, he argues, 
correspond entirely to the ‘formal’ sector, characterised as they are by relatively difficult entry, 
by requiring capital to set up, and by being larger scale and far more regulated than the 
‘informal’ sector. Sporrek goes on to elaborate on the relationship between the two sectors, 
describing them as complementary and mutually dependent, with goods transferring from one 
to the other and one supplying where the other does not (Sporrek, 1985). For example, 
Sporrek (1985) describes the Dar es Salaam marketing structure as contrasting with the structure 
described in many West African cities. Dukas, which concentrate on sales of processed foods 
and food products, such as cereals, bread, sugar, salt, tea, coffee, dairy products and sweets,
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accounted for 44 per cent of total food turnover in the city in 1973. Shops specialising in one or 
only a few products (mainly meat), what Sporrek calls ‘special shops’, and markets, selling fruit, 
vegetables, fresh and dried fish, accounted for an estimated 20 per cent of the city's food 
turnover. Sporrek acknowledges that this figure is a rough estimate, but he does not attempt 
to separate these last two quite different categories.
In his recent review of the geographic literature on urban food supply systems, Drakakis-Smith 
(1991, p.52) identified two contrasting supply systems:-
1. "the petty-commodity sector which, as with all such activities, is organised not 
only to supply food to low-income households, but also to meet the 
demands of the urban market for low cost items, such as staples or fresh fruit 
and vegetables".
2. "the capitalist sector which usually comprises a combination of domestic and 
(increasingly) international interests involved in all aspects of the supply 
system viz production, processing, distribution and retailing."
The second sector has not penetrated the Dar es Salaam market to the extent of Drakakis- 
Smith's examples, such as Harare, Singapore and Hong Kong. He expects this sector to 
grow rapidly in most Third World cities in the near future. He also gives considerable attention 
to a particularly problematic aspect of the informal food supply sector, that of the production 
of food by urban dwellers in plots of land within the city or in the peri-urban fringe. This is a 
source of food which city authorities in many countries have often tried to play down, but which 
Drakakis-Smith argues, ought to be promoted "as much for its contribution to the social 
development of the city as for its contribution to the health of the household" (Drakakis-Smith 
1991, p.60). Providing urban gardens gives the urban poor the means with which to feed 
themselves even if they are unable to obtain sufficient cash through employment. It also makes 
efficient, and more attractive, use of otherwise derelict land (see Rakodi, 1986; Sayeed, 1992; 
Sawio, forthcoming).
Although this may be an important aspect in the supply of fruit and vegetables in Dar es 
Salaam, due to the size of this subject it will not be specifically examined in this study. The 
various points of entrance of produce from this source onto the Dar es Salaam market will be 
referred to at relevant places in the discussion. This subject is covered in detail in an on-going 
study, the results of which appear elsewhere (Briggs 1990,1991).
The three studies above represent a more case-study oriented approach in contrast to the 
theoretical approaches referred to earlier, in this chapter. Guyer in her criticism of the neo­
classical economists, and the French and the British traditions, aims to integrate these
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approaches to the study of aspects of society in an historical view. Bryceson (1985) sets out to 
do this in the case of Dar es Salaam, but while reconstructing the supply of food to the city over 
a long period of history, appears only to raise more questions. Temple (1969), Boekholt and 
van der Veen (1982) and Sporrek (1985) all set out to study their chosen cities based on field 
evidence through observation, survey questionnaires and official statistics. The danger in this 
approach, however, is to lose sight of the theoretical implications and simply describe a frozen, 
two-dimensional picture of a chain of food supply. It is not clear if there is any process of 
change,either long term or seasonal. The challenge for future researchers is to incorporate 
adequately the historical dimension of a food supply chain which is part of, acts on and is acted 
upon by the wider society, and within which people's livelihood and survival are at stake.
1.5 The Scope of The Study
The economic approach, characterised by Jones and the Stanford researchers, relies heavily on 
economic data alone, making little attempt to integrate historical and social analysis. However, 
economic data do provide a valuable base with which to complement the more qualitative data 
of social analysis. Therefore, economic data such as prices, volumes and market margins will be 
used as a part of the analysis of this study, which will have broader social interpretation. The 
social anthropological approach, characterised by the French authors such as Vennetier (1972), 
results in a large amount of detailed description and observation, and a focus on the role of the 
various institutions involved in the food supply systems, including the state. However, 
reviewers complain of a frustrating lack of focus, a lack of explanation, lack of a generalised 
framework and of the role of the state ironically not being covered in sufficient detail. Therefore 
descriptive detail should be incorporated into an overall framework which refers directly to the 
more quantitative analysis. The various groups and institutions participating in the system will 
be identified and incorporated into a general framework of investigation, but the role of the 
state should be examined in sufficient depth. In addition, the overall study should refer back to 
a more general framework of analysis.
The consumer-oriented approach, characterised by British authors such as Lawson (1967,1971), 
concentrates on the impact of the marketing system on the consumer, and since the system is 
there to supply the consumer, this is an important point at which to assess its success. It tends 
to polarise political and academic stances, investigating the role of incomes in the relative 
access gained by different urban classes to the food supplied. Its aims are often described as 
narrow, if well-defined, studying the standard of living of the consumer classes, perhaps at the 
expense of other dimensions, such as the rural-urban divide. Finally, it is often accused of not 
taking into account a sufficiently long time scale. This study should therefore incorporate an 
examination of the relative access of different classes to the food market, within the more 
general issues. It should ensure, where the availability of data allows, the integration of an
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historical dimension to the analysis. It will fulfil its objectives of assessing relative access within 
a broader set of aims concerning the overall food system and the other groups participating in 
it.
Any study of food marketing must therefore set out clearly the objectives and the focus of the 
research, and refer back to these throughout the investigation. It should incorporate the 
important elements of the approaches identified in this review, concentrating on only those 
relevant to the research objectives. It should also contain an explanation of its focus of 
research.
The focus of this research will be the fruit and vegetable sector in Tanzania. More specifically, it 
will examine the fruit and vegetable production and the rural-to-urban marketing linkages which 
bring this produce to the retail markets in the city. This focus has been selected for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, the 1976/77 Household Budget Survey of Dar es Salaam (Government of 
Tanzania, 1977) showed that 15 per cent of total household spending on food and drink was 
spent on fruit and vegetables alone. This demonstrates the importance of this sector to urban 
consumers. This importance may be under-estimated when one considers the consumption of 
informally obtained fruit and vegetables. Secondly, efforts are being made to encourage 
Tanzanians to increase their nutritional intake. One of the ways the state is encouraging this 
increase to be brought about is by the increased consumption of fruit and vegetables. This 
demonstrates the importance placed on these foods by the state and, if these efforts are 
successful, a possible increase in the demand for fruit and vegetables, not to mention the on­
going increase in demand discussed above, as the result of the rapidly increasing population of 
Dar es Salaam. Several areas in Tanzania with favourable location for the production of fruit and 
vegetables and in relation to Dar es Salaam have become dependent on the continued 
production and sale of fruit and vegetables to the city's inhabitants. Clearly, this sector is 
important to the survival of some of Tanzania's rural fruit and vegetable supply areas.
Fruit and vegetables marketing and distribution have tended to fall between the remit of 
different government departments and agencies such as the Marketing Development Bureau, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Food Strategy Unit, each of which is entrusted with 
the task of enabling and encouraging food production and distribution in Tanzania. These 
institutions have had other important priorities that have absorbed their limited resources, 
resulting in a paucity of established knowledge of the operation of the fruit and vegetables 
production and distribution system. This has equally been the case in the academic literature, 
with discussions on agricultural marketing focusing on staple foods and export crops (Ellis 1983, 
1984,1988; Griffiths, 1980; Raikes, 1986) and research on food concentrating on staple food 
(Bryceson 1985,1987,1990; Gordon, 1988). The Tanzanian Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Cooperatives is reported to have included specific sections on fruit and vegetable crops in
23
Tanzania’s Second Five Year Development Plan (1969-74) in response to a speech by Julius 
Nyerere in 1969 in which he exlained the importance of fruit and vegetables to the nation’s diet 
and economy, and how these crops were not being utilised to their fullest potential (Mlambiti, 
1977). These sections did not have much real impact on the support for the fruit and vegetable 
sector. "Despite the importance of fruits and vegetables in the food profile of a country, data 
and information on the demand for and supply of these items are notoriously scanty in most 
African countries. The situation is only slightly better in Tanzania" (Mascarenhas, 1984, p.1).
With this statement in mind, Mascarenhas, at a workshop on food self sufficiency in sub-Saharan 
Africa, argued that "...we cannot afford to carry on ignoring these two important elements of the 
national food basket" (Mascarenhas, 1984, p.1). Mascarenhas acknowledges the work already 
carried out in Dar es Salaam by himself and Mbilinyi on orange (Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi, 1971) 
and banana (Mbilinyi and Mascarenhas, 1973) marketing channels, and by Sporrek (1985) on 
more general retail patterns, and the efforts of Kariakoo Market Corporation (KMC) to try to 
record systematically statistics on fruit and vegetables sales. However, Mascarenhas and 
Mbilinyi's studies each concentrated on only one commodity and were based on field work 
carried out in 1969/70. Sporrek's fieldwork, carried out in 1976, concentrates on the location of 
retailing in the city. The KMC data has other problems which will be discussed in depth later in 
Chapters Three and Four, but briefly these record only what is received in Kariakoo Wholesale 
Market, where KMC admits it only handles a maximum of 60 per cent of the city's consumption 
(it will be argued later that in fact this proportion is much less). Mascarenhas describes these 
sources a s " a start (in) the process of filling in a vital gap in Knowledge" (p.1) and " an 
important data base" (p.4). He goes on to conclude that "a survey of the fruit and vegetables 
in the rural and urban areas is urgently needed" (Mascarenhas, 1984, p. 15).
The foregoing discussion has identified key actors in the urban food supply system, namely: 
state organisations, producers, rural traders, urban wholesalers, urban retailers and urban 
consumers. It has also identified key elements and issues important to the functioning of the 
system, namely: the political economy context, the cultural and social forces involved, the market 
economics, the relationships between the various actors in the system. Each of the approaches 
discussed above neglect one or more of the actors or issues listed, and all neglect the 
perspective of the producers. Few focus on the role of the private traders in the absence of 
state-controlled marketing boards, an issue of increasing importance in countries, such as 
Tanzania, where these institutions are currently having their activities restricted.
An assessment of the fruit and vegetable marketing channels requires an approach which 
addresses the relative roles of the public and the private sectors. This study will involve an 
analysis of the variety of regional origins of the commodities and of those groups and 
institutions involved in the marketing process, such as the state, producers, traders, consumers, 
transporters, and the marketing authorities. Some assessment will be made of the degree of
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integration (both horizontal and vertical) within the marketing system; for example, the 
producers who transport and sell their own produce in Dar es Salaam, or, less formally, 
arrangements between the transporters and the traders in Dar es Salaam. An analysis of the 
variation in prices, volumes and market margins over time will be made, firstly, to assess their 
role and secondly to assess the development of the system over time. A second objective, 
concerning flows of information and the producers' decision-makincj.-will be partly assessed by 
the analysis suggested above. In addition, some assessment of producers’ priorities, and the 
motivations behind these priorities, will be carried out. Finally recommendations for the future 
management of the system will raise questions about the management of the system. For 
example, who should manage or control the different elements of the system, and how and 
according to what principles and priorities. This requires a review of the priorities of the system 
and what any form of management or intervention is intended to achieve. For example it may 
be to ensure efficient and comprehensive supply of food requirements which are accessible 
both in terms of cost (in relation to income) and in terms of physical availability. If this is so, 
what impact does this system have on the producing community and on the consuming 
community? How does it cope with surpluses or shortages? In what direction is it currently 
moving? Finally, the question of whether the system should be managed at ail must be 
addressed, particularly if the results of the investigation demonstrate that the system survives 
regardless of state involvement.
Therefore the research objectives of the current study may be summarised as follows:-
1) To identify and analyse the fruit and vegetable distribution channels to 
Dar es Salaam, from producer to consumer.
2) To analyse market information flows to the producer and the extent to 
which these influence their decision-making processes in the 
producing areas.
3) To provide recommendations for the management of a more efficient 
food marketing system for Dar es Salaam.
This thesis attempts to analyse the system of supplying food to a primate city in a developing 
country. It presents the results of analysis of both primary data, collected by the author, and 
secondary data, obtained from other sources, and integrates them into a structure of analysis, 
which draws on a range of conceptual frameworks.
For this type of study the socio-economic and political context of the system under examination 
is of crucial significance to the historical and future development of the system. Chapter Two 
sets out to provide the context in which the Tanzanian fruit and vegetable production and 
distribution systems have developed. It will also set out the current agenda for the existing
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government, giving background to the most recent changes likely to have impact on the 
different parts of the systems.
f
The supply of food in the case of Tanzania involves a wide range of strategies employed by 
the consumers for obtaining food and by the producers and traders for supplying food. This 
ranges from formal, state-controlled production, marketing and distribution, through to urban 
subsistence production and informal food exchanges. Obtaining meaningful data therefore can 
be problematic. This research set out to employ a variety of data capture techniques at as 
many points on the system of supply as possible given the resource restrictions, from rural 
production to urban retailing. The different areas of case study, as well as the techniques of 
data capture are described in Chapter Three.
As already described the food supply system involves a variety of supply channels. Chapter 
Four concentrates on an analysis of the formal sector of supply, using time series data collected 
from the company with responsibility for the regulation of the legal monopoly wholesale market 
in Dar es Salaam, the Kariakoo Market Corporation.
An analysis of informal sectors has the problem of a differential in the availability of data. In the 
case of the formal sector the regulating authority maintains statistics on supply, price and value 
of commodities passing through their control. Indeed, KMC has a Statistical Officer in its 
wholesale market, who proved extremely helpful in the collection of data for this research. This 
type of monitoring is of course lacking in the informal sector, where most participants are at 
least wary of anyone asking any form of question concerning their trading activities. In order to 
obtain a point of entry into the question of informal sector trading, a questionnaire survey of six 
retail markets was conducted. The analysis of this survey is presented in Chapter Five.
Chapter Six presents the analysis of a dataset compiled by a bureau of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Livestock Development. This comprises a price survey of a selection of 
commodities in a selection of retail markets around the country twice every month. This is 
intended to provide an overall picture of the pattern of supply to Dar es Salaam. These retail 
prices are used in this thesis to produce an index of the price margins in Dar es Salaam's main 
supply areas. This index is then used to build a picture of the monthly geographical pattern of 
supply sources for the urban market.
The rural purchasing of fruit and vegetables is considered in Chapter Seven. This is done using 
the analysis of a series of interviews with a sample of wholesale buyers in Lushoto District, 
Tanga Region and focuses on the their motives and behaviour when purchasing fruit and 
vegetables to transport to Dar es Salaam. In Chapter Eight patterns of production in the rural 
study areas of Lushoto, Tanga Region and Morogoro, Morogoro Region are examined. This is
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done by means of the analysis of a questionnaire survey of 271 producers of fruit and 
vegetables drawn from these two main areas. This survey is reinforced with detail from in-
t
depth interviews of a small number of key informants. The different strands of the study will be 
drawn together in a broad discussion in Chapter Nine. This will draw overall conclusions on the 
development of the nature and pattern of fruit and vegetable production and distribution for 
Dar es Salaam. The final Chapter Ten will briefly present the study's ultimate conclusions and 
any recommendations for future monitoring and assistance of the system. This chapter will also 
set out areas for future research.
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Chapter Two
f
The political economy of Tanzania 
since Independence
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a context for the study by reviewing the major policies, problems and 
events of the Tanzanian economy since the publication of the Arusha Declaration in 1967. There 
will be a brief description of the economic and political situation leading up to 1967, followed by 
an outline of the Declaration. The results of the adoption of the Arusha Declaration will be 
discussed, with an assessment of the relative impact of external factors, such as global 
economic variations and environmental changes, and internal factors, such as the implementation 
and development of government policy. A review of the literature will provide a critique of the 
policies and problems of the Arusha Declaration. The final section will highlight developments 
in the economy during the 1980s, focusing particularly on the changes to government policy in 
the light of the incorporation of International Monetary Fund prescriptions in Tanzania's most 
recent set of economic programmes (O'Neill, 1990). The chapter concludes with an assessment 
of the impact of these broad economic and political developments on production and marketing 
of fruit and vegetables for the domestic urban market, the subject of this study.
According Kaynak (1986) the level of economic development and the level of development of 
the marketing processes in a country are closely and causally linked. He demonstrates this by 
comparing classifications of Arab nations and finds that the most useful and accurate method of 
classification is one based on the level of development of their markets. He goes on to 
suggest that previous approaches to economic development, involving improved technologies, 
changing expertise or government control of the major means of production, did not address 
the key issues of development. "Marketing research methods and techniques prove to be the 
best means for determining the controlling factors of changes in the marketing environment" 
(Kaynak, 1986, p. 162). In this statement Kaynak makes clear the interdependence between the 
economy, and by implication the political economy, and the marketing and distribution of 
commodities within that economy.
In Tanzania most of the distribution and marketing of food has been controlled by the 
government for most of its post-Independence period, and especially so after the Arusha 
Declaration in 1967. More recently, the government policy of socialist transformation has been 
abandoned and food markets, along with many other markets, have been liberalised. In the 
case of fruit and vegetables, however, little formal government control or support was 
effectively extended to their marketing and distribution. The fruit and vegetable production and 
marketing system, contrary to the experience of all other agricultural commodities, operated in a
relatively free market, the only restrictions being the establishment of regional trading 
corporations. These corporations were given monopolistic control of inter-regional trading not 
already controlled by the marketing boards. In Dar es Salaam the responsibility for fruit and 
vegetable marketing was given to the Kariakoo Market Corporation. In effect, this meant that 
legally all fruit and vegetable produce entering Dar es Salaam had to pass through Kariakoo 
Wholesale Market and be dealt with by one of Kariakoo's licensed independent dealers. No 
price controls were imposed, however, the only efforts to influence prices being the Kariakoo 
maximum and minimum guideline prices, which were not binding on the dealers, and which were 
frequently undercut or exceeded, depending on market conditions at any one time. The most 
recent developments in the political economy of Tanzania, namely the liberalising of markets, 
have resulted in the legitimising of the illegal trading of staples and fruit and vegetables. It is, 
as yet, premature to assess the effect of these changes, although Gordon (1988) has begun an 
assessment of the effects of liberalisation on the marketing of staple foods in Tanzania's main 
urban areas. This study attempts to assess the impact of liberalisation on the fruit and 
vegetable supply for the Dar es Salaam market. The following discussion presents the details 
of the political economic context for the development of the fruit and vegetable market since 
Independence.
2.2 Tanzania 1961 to 1967 - The Status Quo
Tanzania achieved independence in 1961, and for its first six years broadly maintained its 
colonial economic policies, although significant political changes were made. There was an active 
policy to increase the number of Tanganyika citizens in government and management positions. 
When the country achieved Independence "nearly three quarters of the middle and high level 
manpower positions in the civil service were held by expatriates" (International Labour 
Organisation, 1978, p.2). Tanzanian industry, which tended towards a policy of import 
substitution, experienced an investment boom, underwritten by an increase in personal savings 
encouraged by improved rates of interest offered by the banks. The banks offered improved 
interest rates in an attempt to reduce the flight of capital after the political uncertainty of early 
Independence (Loxley, 1979). A more likely explanation for the increased investment, 
however, is the large influx of funds from businesses already established in Kenya and 
Uganda. These investments were made by large Asian family businesses and some 
multinational companies in a move to spread their investments around the East African 
Common Market countries. This strategy was intended to spread risks in case the market broke 
up, as well as reflecting the potentially more acute political instability of Kenya and Uganda at 
that time (Coulson, 1982).
The exceptionally good performance of the Tanzanian agricultural sector in the early 1960s, which 
may have been exaggerated by the unusually good 1966 season, also contributed to the high 
levels of capital formation and of personal savings. However, investment from the other East 
African countries tended to be capital intensive rather than labour intensive (Green et al, 1980).
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It generally took the form of mechanised final assembly industries, or of processing industries 
concentrating on imported raw materials, including metals, and various chemical products. 
However, the lack of integration and co-ordination which characterised the industrial sector,
t
particularly between government interests in export production and foreign interests in imports 
before the mid 1960s, meant that some cotton used in Tanzanian textile factories was imported, 
while the locally produced raw cotton was exported (Coulson, 1982). The result was that, 
although Tanganyika exported raw cotton to the value of £6,794,000 in 1961, its gross textile 
output was only £212,000. The reason for this was a ban on the establishment of spinning mills 
imposed by the East African Industrial Council (EAIC), mainly influenced by two large spinning 
mills in Kenya and Uganda (Bierman, 1990). Until independence Tanganyika was considered to 
be an agricultural exporter only. This situation changed as the influence of the EAIC was 
lessened as a result of Tanganyika’s independence and as the government set out to develop 
industry along import substitution lines.
Even before Independence, regional disparities were evident across the country. In terms of 
social trends, Woods (1975, p.41) identifies, what he calls the "historical development of 'area 
based' peasantries." He argues that colonialist penetration of African territories introduced a 
number of locationally focused economic activities, which altered the structural positions of 
individuals and groups within the already numerous and differing local societies. The locations of 
these individuals and groups in relation to the foci of colonial activities became important in 
terms of distance and accessibility to these new labour and agricultural markets. The imposition 
of taxes affected ail, and was extracted in different ways. If employed or in business, income 
tax was taken; if producing for the market, levies were taken. However, the ability to raise 
taxes in different ways depended mainly on the climatic and environmental suitability of the area 
to produce the export or food crops demanded. According to Woods (1975), this divided the 
country into areas of net cash crop export, as the settlers established plantations in areas best 
suited for producing their desired export crops; net food crop exporting, as settlers or 
peasant farmers began producing food to export to the main urban centres of the country; or 
net labour export, as people left areas unsuited for crop production to work on the plantations. 
For example, areas such as Kigoma, Songea and Mtwara, which are distant from organised 
commodity markets and without a ready cash crop, became areas of net labour export, as 
people left in search of ways of earning cash. Areas such as Ulanga and Njombe Districts 
became both cash crop and labour export areas, depending on local and seasonal variations of 
climate (Woods, 1975). The highland areas nearest to Dar es Salaam, namely the Uluguru 
Mountains and the Usambara Mountains, provided the environment for temperate fruit and 
vegetables for the urban market, and hence became net food crop exporting zones.
Climatically, the highlands of the south, north and north-east are more suited for intensive 
agriculture. This can be seen in the patterns of the map in Figure 2.1, which shows the location
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Figure 2.1 Map of the Distribution of Principal Export Crops c. 1967.
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c. 1967 (Source: Berry 1971)
of export crop production. This resulted in them becoming export crop areas. These 
highlands were also the main areas of missionary activity for two reasons. Firstly they 
possessed cooler and more pleasant climates, with frequent and reliable rainfall, which attracted 
missionaries in the first place. Secondly, the more settled population which inhabited these 
areas made missionary work easier. As a result, the people of the highlands benefited from 
education, health provision and the experience of a more organised society, with the 
introduction of churches, parish councils, schools, other organisations and so on. This had the 
effect of making the highland population more receptive to the economic and political 
opportunities of more recent times. The main export crops are grown in clearly discernible 
areas of the country, partly as a result of the influence of the location of the early settlers. 
"Coffee is grown only in Kilimanjaro and Bukoba, cotton is grown only in Mwanza and 
Shinyanga. The pattern emerged early in the colonial period and has persisted for colonial 
reasons to the present." (Hill, 1975, p.223) Areas of net cash or food crop exports benefited 
from the income generated by the sales of these commodities. Their benefits were reinforced 
by the improved infrastructural provision and investment attracted to the crop exporting areas, 
in order to facilitate the easy exporting of the commodities, and by the other benefits 
associated with the missionary activity. By contrast the net labour exporting areas lost out as 
their labour, their only cash income generating resource, left in search of cash generating 
employment. Their environments and generally more dispersed settlement pattern made them 
unattractive for missionary work or infrastructural investment. This process fits closely to 
Slater's (1974) model of the process of integration and the spatial structure of 
underdevelopment. Slater describes the evolution of the spatial structure of Tanzania under 
colonialism, producing a typology of socio-economic zones, which he describes as follows: 
those areas which specialised in production for export; surrounding zones which supplied the 
export-producing regions with food and other services; and, finally, extending beyond these 
two zones, were peripheral zones, either supplying migrant labour or in near-isolation from the 
dominant areas. These zones identified by Slater, clearly were the fore-runners to Woods’ 
area-based peasantries.
The main body of 'progressive' farmers were mainly in the cash crop exporting areas and the 
colonial government support for agriculture on the whole benefited these producers in these 
already well-developed areas. In addition to the economic and developmental advantages 
gained by the cash crop producing areas, Coulson (1982) reports that the senior positions in 
the government office have tended to be filled by people originating there, a further 
contribution to the process which Hill (1975) describes as 'economic stratification'. Hill further 
argues that the colonial system benefited areas that provided the ecological conditions to 
produce whatever it required. Those areas which were unable to produce what was required 
contributed their productive labour to the economy and received little in return. As Hill (1975, 
p.223) explains: "Areas that were ecologically unsuited for cash crop production were not 
ignored so much as they were exploited to sustain a colonialism of selective incentives. Such
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regions paid more than their fair share of taxes and received far from a commensurate return in 
government services."
f
This colonial legacy has been played down by the post-Independence government, perhaps 
for fear of similar tribal troubles, which have affected Tanzania's neighbours and which may result 
from favouring tribes in some areas at the expense of others. The government has set out 
explicitly to try in some way to redress the imbalance, although it is still argued that many of the 
top positions are held by people originating from the advantaged areas and this has an implicit 
effect on the directions of government investment.
The period from Independence to 1967, can be characterised as a period during which the 
government tried to establish its main priorities. It inherited a legacy from colonial times of 
large plantation agriculture and a small industrial import substituting sector. Politically it wanted 
to shift the investment balance towards the rural peasantry, but economically it needed the 
foreign exchange generated by the economic structure established under colonial rule. 
Agricultural policy was focused on the developed sector, identifying 'progressive farmers' and 
large scale agriculture for support, in order to boost export earnings, most of which were 
generated by the export crop production. There was some divergence between the motives 
of the various groups involved in governing and administering the country. On the one hand the 
middle and upper level civil servants had strong nationalist sentiments, but were against any 
changes which may jeopardise their position. On the other hand the TANU Party ideologues, 
led by Nyerere, were beginning to express their socialist sympathies. Shortly after 
Independence, Nyerere resigned from office in order to write a number of Party discussion 
documents and papers. These covered his thoughts on the future of education in Tanzania and 
the role the co-operative movement could play in a newly independent Tanzania. The thinking 
and writing Nyerere did during these months formed the basis of the Arusha Declaration which 
was adopted by TANU in 1967.
2.3 Tanzania 1967 to 1980 - Socialist Transformation
On 5th February 1967, after much discussion and the final approval of the National Executive 
Committee of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the Arusha Declaration was 
published. The underlying theme of the Declaration was the proposal of a philosophy of 
development based on the needs and abilities of the mass of rural producers. The people 
were seen as Tanzania's greatest resource and as 90 per cent of them lived in rural areas:
"...the land is the only basis for Tanzania's development, we have no other" (The Arusha 
Declaration, quoted in Okoko, 1987, p.85).
This was a radical policy based on a combination of socialist and traditional African principles 
(although a challenge to the validity of this basis is discussed later in this chapter: Lofchie, 1978; 
Connell, 1974; Sender and Smith, 1986). It set out to stimulate productive forces in peasant
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agriculture and to enhance political participation by the peasantry, so as to improve their 
material and cultural well-being and to contribute resources for national development The 
Declaration sets out four main policies. Firstly, it sets out its intention to transfer to public 
ownership all major means of production and exchange. Secondly, rural and agricultural 
development was to be coupled with a movement towards rural socialism that stressed the 
building of ujamaa villages (defined as co-operative and communal), rather than state farms or 
estates or individual peasant farms. Thirdly, it included a new educational policy fitted to the 
framework of socialism and emphasising primary education and education better suited for rural 
existence. Finally, the Declaration set out a policy of self-reliance with respect to the 
international economy.
The adoption of this document by TANU, and its subsequent publication, was to prove a 
turning point in Tanzania's history. The policies contained in the Declaration were not 
revolutionary, but they flowed out of government thinking since Independence. However, the 
national popularity of the ideals of the Declaration and the response from governments and 
interested individuals and organisations abroad made the Declaration into an historic document.
"Before the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania was an ex-colony, much like 
other ex-colonies in Africa. After the Declaration, rightly or wrongly, it 
was frequently listed alongside Cuba, North Korea and North Vietnam.
While such comparisons were obviously premature - as Nyerere himself 
pointed out - the Arusha Declaration was undeniably a step in the 
direction of socialism."
(Coulson 1982, p. 176)
Coulson argued that Nyerere's critics, and even Nyerere himself, were surprised how popular 
the Declaration was to become, both in Tanzania and among foreign academics (Loxley, 1979; 
Coulson, 1982; Yeager, 1982). Dominant bureaucrats and Party leaders, who had reservations 
about socialism, were persuaded of the value of the Declaration through their nationalist concern 
and by its commitment to taking public control of the main means of production. They felt that 
the public ownership of the main industries was a "legitimate means of combating the threat to 
the independence of the nation, which reliance on foreign governments and foreign businesses 
seemed to pose by their failure to provide capital and jobs in Tanzania" (Loxley, 1982, p. 79).
Parastatal organisations were seen to have a crucial role to play in the practical workings of the 
policies of the Arusha Declaration, these organisations being government-owned industries and 
institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, and public utility companies. According to 
Coulson (1982, p. 274) they fulfilled three roles. The parastatals were expected to limit 
transfers of profit out of the country; they were expected to invest in productive sectors of the 
economy, especially manufacturing, but also agriculture and tourism; and, finally, they were 
expected to strengthen the productive infrastructure, especially through investment in 
transport, construction and power generation. The National Milling Corporation was therefore 
given responsibility for purchasing from producers at government-set producer prices,
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investing in some production, transporting staple foods to areas of deficit and selling at 
govemment-set retail prices.
The day after the Declaration was published President Nyerere announced that al! the 
commercial banks in the country were to be nationalised. Within a week eight firms involved in 
grain milling and the six largest import-export houses were also nationalised (Coulson, 1982).
In 1967 there were 64 parastatal organisations; by 1974, after nationalisations and some 
consolidations, there were 139. However, although firms were nationalised, this did not mean 
complete takeover, but a partnership between the National Development Corporation and the 
original foreign firm. For example the National Development Corporation has a 50 per cent 
holding in the Metal Box Company of Tanzania Ltd., the foreign partner being Metal Box 
Company (UK). The National Development Corporation also holds a 50 per cent stake in 
Tanzania Publishing House, the partner being Macmillan and Company, and the NDC holds 60 
per cent of BAT Tanzania Ltd., in partnership with British American Tobacco Company Ltd. 
(Nursey-Bray, 1980). Nyerere promised full and fair compensation for all the assets acquired by 
the government, and Scandinavian auditors were provided to assist the Tanzanian treasury in 
scrutinising claims for compensation from nationalised banks (Crouch, 1987).
It was expected that public ownership of the production corporations would help the policy of 
self-reliance. Despite this policy, however, even in the publication of the Second Five Year 
Plan in 1969, foreign aid was acknowledged to take an increasingly large part of the nation's 
income. The proportion of the development budget received from external sources increased 
from 35 per cent during the First National Development Plan (although it was planned to be 78 
per cent), to 48 per cent during the Second National Development Plan (although it was 
planned to be 43 per cent) (Resnick, 1981). Annual foreign borrowing and aid grants increased 
from US$ 75.8 million in 1967 to US$ 238.4 million in 1975. By 1979, this official development 
assistance had gone up to average approximately US$ 588 million per annum, such that in 
1980, Tanzania was in the “top two or three countries in Africa south of the Sahara in terms of 
receipts of non-military ‘aid’ per capita” (Coulson, 1982, p.301) Svendsen (1986) argues that 
the policy of self-reliance was more the expression of a wish to define the priorities for 
development, rather than having donors define them, and that it was only over the long term 
that external sources of income were to be reduced. He cites Tanzania's protracted 
discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), even in the face of national economic 
crisis, from 1980, when the agreed ceilings on government expenditure were exceeded, until 
1984, when the government devalued the shilling to $1 = TShs 17, thus meeting part of the 
IMF's conditions (Bevan etal, 1987). An agreement with the IMF was finally signed in 1986 
(Ellis, 1988). During this time the Tanzanian government and the IMF argued over producer 
prices for export crops, the principle and practice of devaluation of the Tanzanian Shilling and 
the level of interest rates.
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Most significantly, however, the Arusha Declaration advocated emphasis on the development
of the rural sector, as this contained the vast majority of Tanzania's population and also
produced the bulk of the nation's wealth. The following discussion will consider six main issues
/
raised in the literature in relation to the Arusha Declaration and its impact on the rural agricultural 
population: the policy of self-reliance; the philosophy of communal - or ujamaa - socialist 
villages; the villagisation programme; the issue of class; the results of, or the impact on, 
agricultural production after the Declaration; and the spatial dimension of the Declaration's 
implications. In addition, the influence of the Arusha Declaration on the policies of agricultural 
marketing will be discussed. Finally, the results of the Declaration and subsequent policies will 
be assessed, by examining briefly the effect on the economy between 1970 and 1980.
In spite of the stated emphasis on national self-reliance, Coulson (1982) and Svendsen (1988) 
both point out that Tanzania's economic policies were not developed in isolation. Svendsen 
argues that adjusting official foreign assistance to account for increases in import prices, shows 
that Tanzania's foreign aid increased by 500 per cent in real value between 1970 and 1980. This, 
he argues, indicates Tanzania's wish to remain self-reliant in prioritising expenditure, bu t, 
naturally, willing to accept assistance. However, Coulson (1982) points out that shortly before 
TANU's adoption of the Arusha Declaration, negotiations with Tanzania's three most important 
donors, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States of America had broken down. It 
was therefore politically inevitable that her policy documents would incorporate a more ‘self- 
reliant’ outlook, even if this was not what occurred in practice, or even what was intended in 
private.
Okoko (1987) argues that Tanzania cannot avoid the need for external trade and aid, but if it is 
to continue on the socialist path, it should select its partners accordingly. This means dealing 
with partners who will either encourage the development of socialism, or those who will allow 
Tanzania to develop in its own direction. In view of recent events in Eastern Europe, and in 
view of Tanzania's experience since Independence, neither of these options is likely. What is 
clear, however, is that Tanzania's ability to trade in the international market is crucial to its ability 
to achieve any form of sustained economic or social development.
Coulson (1982) argues that agricultural settlement schemes set up under the government's 
'transformation' approach to rural and agricultural development did not work because of low 
commitment to the schemes from those involved and, therefore, the work input from the 
settlers was low. In a speech as early as 1968,. Nyerere accepted that mistakes had been 
made in its previous approach to settlement schemes. "What we were doing in fact was 
thinking of development in terms of things, and not of people." (Nyerere, 1974, p.36) Nyerere 
argued that in very few cases was any form of ideology involved and that the new policy of 
ujamaa villages is not the old policy under a new title, but a new conception, based on the 
post-Arusha Declaration understanding that what should be developed is people, not things, 
and that people can only develop themselves. The communal basis for ujamaa, as Nyerere
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saw it, was "a voluntary association of people who decide of their own free will to live together 
and work together for their common good." (Nyerere, 1974, p.37) The concept of ujamaa is 
linked by Nyerere to traditional African values of familyhood, equity, hospitality and 
responsibility. According to Nyerere, this linking of the communal basis to a committed 
voluntary rural population was what would make ujamaa work, where the previous settlement 
schemes had failed. A questioning of this basis comes from three directions.
Firstly, Lofchie (1978) questions the claim that community is a concept native to the African 
continent. He argues that the Tanzanian government's reversion to the use of force to form 
ujamaa villages is proof that this policy is inappropriate. Connell (1974) and Ergas (1980) set 
aside this question of ujamaa's roots to point out that the use of such a blanket policy, with little 
in the way of detailed guidelines, is not appropriate to the highly mixed social and physical 
environment of Tanzania. Connell (1974) questions such a blanket policy when enormous 
variations exist across the country. He points out that the country has 120 tribes of very 
different sizes and which are at different levels of development and assimilation in the market 
economy. The country has a mixture of varied ecological circumstances and agricultural systems, 
with very different potentials and carrying capacities, and a combination of different kinds of 
subsistence and commercial agriculture. "Local situations are quite different and it would be 
improbable that the same kind of cooperation would be generally suitable" (Connell, 1974, 
p. 17). To take extreme examples, the form of cooperation developed by a pastoral area 
would have to be different from the form of cooperation in a semi-arid environment, not simply 
because of the differing ecology, but also because of the differing social and economic 
relations which will have developed in these areas over time. However, this was already 
accepted by Nyerere in a section of Socialism and Rural Development, entitled "No simple or 
single answer for all circumstances." (in Cliffe et al, 1975). Nyerere points out that "...it would 
be foolish for someone in Dar es Salaam to try to draw up a blue print for the crop production 
and social organisation which has to be applied to every corner of our large country...
Principles of action ... must take into account the different geographical and geological 
conditions in different areas, and also the local variations in the basically similar traditional 
structures... Local initiative and self-reliance are essential" (Nyerere, 1975, p.11).
What Connell (1974) seemed to be arguing for was some degree of flexibility within the ujamaa 
system. This seems to be what Nyerere was also arguing for in a 1968 speech, when he 
explains the importance of the members of the ujamaa village to decide their own priorities. 
"They and no one else will decide how to use the money they earn jointly - whether to buy an 
ox-plough, install water, or do something else. They and no one else, will make all the 
decisions about their working arrangements." (Nyerere, 1974, p.37) However, this required a 
significant degree of motivation and commitment from those who have decided to form an 
ujamaa village. This is a point Nyerere felt was important. "Unless the purpose and socialist 
ideology of an ujamaa village is understood by the members from the beginning - at least to 
some extent - it will not survive the early difficulties." (Nyerere, 1968, p.37) "No one can be
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forced into an ujamaa village and no official - at any level - can go and tell the members of an 
ujamaa village what they should do together and what they should continue to do as individual 
farmers." (Nyerere, 1968, p.36) Clearly, the type of committed communal unit Nyerere argued 
for in this booklet was dropped when the enforced villagisation programmes began. At the 
early stages of the promotion of ujamaa, many of the dangers of enforced blanket national 
settlement schemes had been addressed by Nyerere. What must be concluded is that the 
policy of ujamaa was dropped in the rush to form villages during the.early 1970s. The voluntary 
and committed participation in the rural productive process through democratically agreed 
cooperative and communal production arrangements, which were crucial aspects of ujamaa 
policy, were no longer an element of the villagisation campaign.
In addition to this, Briggs (1980) argues that the physical and spatial aspects of villagisation 
were disregarded. The emphasis was placed on clustering the population to enable the 
government to provide basic needs and services and this took place at the expense of 
production. Farmers were moved to live much greater distances from their land. Settlements 
were located giving no consideration to the type or quality of the surrounding land. This went 
further with the government dictating the type of crops to be grown in certain areas, rather than 
relying on economic incentives to encourage certain crop types and ignoring Nyerere's 
statements quoted earlier. The subsequent government failure to provide the promised 
seeds, inputs, crop prices and credit, as well as in some cases the health, education and 
consumer goods, produced an apathy within the peasantry towards the production of cash 
crops (Hill, 1975). Many reverted to subsistence production or producing for the black market, 
resulting in a massive fall in cash crop and food production sold through the formal market 
channels and disillusionment among the rural producers. What is interesting, however is that 
many of the original villages have remained together. Even in situations where villages have not 
stayed together, they have tended to form smaller, more ideally located satellite settlements 
around the original village location.1
Ergas (1980), on the other hand, makes the distinction between economic and social behaviour. 
He argues that in the process of 'modernisation' economic behaviour is more susceptible to 
radical change. Social behaviour, which responds to need, is likely to be more resistant. Thus 
the more productive areas, such as the central northern and coastal areas for the production of 
sisal and the highland areas of Kilimanjaro for coffee, which have had greater contact with the 
colonial cash economy, have become economically more individualist, competitive and profit- 
oriented. The more marginal areas, whose first contact with 'modernisation' was communal 
settlement schemes, are more likely to adapt their economic behaviour to fit. From the 
villagers' perspective, the marginal settlers are more likely to see benefit in cooperative 
activities, whereas the already successful private producers are more likely to see 
disadvantages.
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From a discussion with Mr G Jambiya, University of Dar es Salaam.
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Briggs (1980) and Raikes (1986) identified heavy-handed use of compulsion and regulations to 
'encourage' peasants to move into villages. These were seen to have a short term negative 
effect on agricultural production and also on the villagers willingness to adopt communality, 
which became politically linked with enforced villagisation. This in turn relates to the theory that 
villagisation was a policy to enable the government to meet its promises on the provision of 
services, on the one hand, and the setting up of an infrastructure to.control the peasantry on the 
other. Both have been at the expense of production. Other factors such as pricing policies, 
or the failure to provide inputs compounded and aggravated the problem.
Hyden (1980) and Okoko (1987) see the problem of ujamaa as lying in the fact that the 
Declaration did not tackle the question of class and class conflict. The problem of the regional 
differential in the levels of development already achieved by the time the villagisation policy 
was brought into effect, is reflected, according to Hyden (1980) and Coulson (1982), in the 
different types of response that villagisation received. Coulson argues that three distinct types 
of village were created as a result of the villagisation policy. First, the early villages such as 
those under the TANU Youth League or the Ruvuma Development Association, which were 
highly politicised and committed to making the villages work. Second, there were villages set 
up in order to obtain the aid on offer, or to gain access to land in areas of high population 
density. In some cases these villages ran estate workers off land and encroached on reserved 
forest land (Raikes, 1979). These villages have little commitment to the communal aspects of 
the village settlement campaign. Finally, there are those villages formed by various 
government and Party 'operations' many under the threat, or indeed the use, of coercion, 
regardless of the motivations of the village 'participants' (Coulson, 1982).
In the three types of village described above there are two conflicting flows of motivation, in 
terms of the class structure within Tanzanian society. In the first case there is a definite 'grass 
roots' organisation in the form Nyerere may have originally intended. This involves village 
members in empowering their lives by taking an active part in the life and development of the 
village through the communal tasks they carried out. In the second case the village members 
band together in an opportunist coalition to take advantage of the prevailing policy in order to 
accrue personal gain. Coulson reports that the communal element of these villages did not 
exist beyond what was required by the village settlement regulations. The advantages 
obtained by these articulate, progressive 'peasants’ were often gained at the expense of 
other, less fortunate individuals, usually estate employees or landless labourers.
Okoko (1987) argues that the Arusha Declaration in particular, and Tanzanian policy in general, 
does not challenge adequately the power of the bureaucratic class as distinct from the Party 
ideologues. The bureaucrats were essentially against communal production, socialism and self- 
reliance. Okoko argues that the lack of socialist guidelines for the management of the economy 
and business, therefore, has allowed this class to entrench its privileged position in society,
and this has undermined the achievement of the goals of the Arusha Declaration(Coulson, 1982; 
Connell, 1974). This is particularly obvious in the case of the acceleration of the villagisation 
campaign into the operations of various branches of the government and the Party. Coulson 
(1982) suggests that the initial aims of Nyerere and his fellow theorists were hijacked by 
bureaucrats in the government and senior party officials, who saw the villagisation programme 
as an ideal way in which to gain a greater control over the large dispersed rural population. This 
hardly seems surprising as some of the top party cadres increasingly looked towards, and 
indeed were trained in China and North Korea, for example, where rural development was 
practised in this way with the notion of ‘party supremacy’.
Coulson points out that there was a lack of planning and assessment of the impact of the 
villagisation on such things as the agricultural production, soil conservation, farming practices 
(especially those developed to suit a dispersed settlement pattern), building construction, 
property protection and the spread of disease. This lack suggests that the rural population's 
priorities were not paramount in the planning of the accelerated villagisation operations, and 
that other motivations were at stake. The main ones to which Coulson is prepared to give 
credence are to do with the economies of scale in health and educational provision. The 
grouping of the rural population made the ambitious promises of primary health care and 
education for development for the Tanzanian people more economically viable. However, the 
lack of account taken of the impact on production resulted in a fall in cash crop production and 
increasing food insecurity, leading to the increased importation of food and greater 
dependence on foreign aid and grants. Clearly this was contrary to one of the pillars of the 
Arusha Declaration, that of self-reliance.
Lofchie (1978) and Briggs (1980) both reported that the operation to move the entire rural 
population into villages, begun in 1971 and peaking, with an estimated 7 million people 
'villagised' in 1975, disrupted agricultural production. Lofchie claims a direct relationship 
between the application of ujamaa and the increase of the food crisis. Briggs (1980) refutes 
this, pointing out that the principles of ujamaa had been dropped from the villagisation 
programme three to four years before the peak of the agricultural disruption, in 1975-6. This is 
confirmed by the fact that of the first type of village described, the highly politicised ujamaa 
village, almost all were registered before the end of the 1960s. Evidence presented by 
Raikes (1979), Briggs (1980) and Coulson (1982) indicate that the number of fully communal 
villages which closely followed ujamaa principles, were so few as to be unable to have the 
impact on national agricultural production with which Lofchie credits them. It was, therefore the 
trauma caused to the rural population by the enforced villagisation programme, and not 
ujamaa, which caused the drop in Tanzanian agricultural production, in both food and cash crops, 
such as sisal, coffee and cashews. This was further exacerbated by the drought, which affected 
most of sub-Saharan Africa.
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The issue of class has already been discussed above. However, Connell (1974) suggests 
further that some progressive fanners were able to use the villagisation programme to their 
advantage and some moved out of agricultural production and into cooperative management. 
This, in effect meant that highly productive farmers were encouraged to stop producing and to 
move into activities which were not directly productive (Ergas, 1980). Examples of this are to 
be found in the plethora of new Party and government positions opened up by the 
decentralisation of the government apparatus, forming a hierarchy of Ten-Cell Units 
(organisational units of ten families), Wards, Villages, Divisions, Districts, and Regions and also 
some marketing cooperatives.
In the colonial period the marketing of export and food crops was the responsibility of private 
traders, licensed with the colonial authorities. However, as the colonial government only 
generally licensed one trader for each region, there was little competition. During the 1950s, 
the government licensing became less rigid, and competition was allowed. Marketing 
cooperatives began to emerge, and these were encouraged by the colonial government as a 
way of supporting commercial peasant production, "while diverting the energies of rising 
Tanzanians away from politics" (Raikes, 1986). The Independent government saw the 
cooperatives as a means of implementing their development programmes. The cooperatives, 
which had already been given statutory monopolies for the purchases of crops in their areas, 
began to be given additional responsibilities. The nationalisation of wholesaling incorporated 
them as official state buying agencies, they were given the added role of administering aid 
grants, operating tractor services, and providing other services defined for them from above. 
Their inadequate accounting systems and the lack of training of their members, resulted in 
widespread mismanagement and corruption. In 1975 the cooperative unions were abolished in 
favour of crop authorities, which also replaced the former marketing boards. These authorities 
were given full responsibility for the production and marketing of a specific crop, although in the 
case of the National Milling Corporation, it was also given responsibility of all the grains and of 
famine relief programmes. These authorities were also given responsibility for extension 
advice, financing, input distribution, grading, procurement from villages throughout the country, 
storage, transportation, processing and marketing. The crop authorities were not efficient and 
became increasingly expensive to run, registering a combined loss of about TShs 5,000 million 
by 1981 (Katona, 1988). Where the previous cooperative unions had been area-based they 
were able to fulfil their transport and purchasing responsibilities, relatively easily. The new 
authorities had to provide transport, buyers and administrative staff for each area in which their 
crops was produced, often resulting in overlapping provision. The increased numbers of 
administrative staff required and lack of appropriate qualifications diluted the available skilled 
workforce and resulted in poor administration, poor maintenance of vehicles and machinery, 
delayed crop collection and payments, inappropriate grading of crop yields, delayed and 
untimely delivery of inputs and poor support of extension services, which had been taken over 
from the Ministry of Agriculture.
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Katona (1988), in a review of agricultural policies in Tanzania contrasts the stated aims of the 
Arusha Declaration of developing the agricultural sector with the systematic reduction in funding 
and investment in the sector, while at the same time increasing the burden of taxation borne by
t
the sector. In Table 2.1 Katona compares the proportion of stated development budget in 
each development plan which was to be allocated to the agricultural and the manufacturing 
sectors.
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Table 2.1 Development Budget Allocation of Agricultural and Manufacturing as a 
Percentage of the Whole in the Mid-Term Plans of Tanzania
Sector Three Year First Five Second Five Third Five
Plan Year Ran Year Plan Year Plan
Agriculture 24.0 5.9 23.1 14.9
Manufacturing 4.6 a 13.6 b 1.2C 24.2
Source: Katona, 1988
a. Figure contains also the development of commerce.
b. Figure contains all the industrial branches and energy.
c. Figure contains all the industrial branches and commerce.
Although the manufacturing figures are not entirely compatible, what is clear is the oscillating 
trend in the two sectors and the overall increasing trend in manufacturing and decreasing trend 
in agriculture. Katona (1988) goes on to report that between 1970 and 1980 the overall gross 
marketing margin for agricultural crops increased by 652 per cent while the producer value grew 
by only 127 per cent. In addition, taxes, expressed as a percentage of total sales value, rose 
during the 1970s from 6.5 per cent to 19.9 per cent. This squeezing of the peasantry through 
dwindling resource allocation, on the one hand, and intensified surplus extraction, on the other, 
appears to have been recognised more recently. "Since the early 1980s, the Government has 
continuously raised the share of agriculture in its development expenditure: in 1982-83 it was
12.7 per cent, in 1984-85 to 1987-88 it has been constant at 30 per cent." (Katona, 1988, p. 147).
In 1986 a new cooperative marketing system was introduced on a similar basis to the one which 
was dissolved in the early 1970s, whereby the local village-based primary cooperative societies 
are responsible for the purchases of the crops in their area and selling them to the relevant 
crop authority, marketing board or directly to the processing factory. The co-operative 
societies' role has not been entirely made clear, although they have been given responsibility 
for crop purchases, they are also expected to have additional roles, such as adopting and 
running the village communal farms, which had been unsuccessful under the villagisation 
programme.
Lofchie (1978) argued that the low food production, which caused the 1974/75 crisis, came about 
as a result of the inhibition of the producers' individual motivation to produce as a direct result 
of the ujamaa policy. Raikes (1986) however, warns that official production figures are generally
based on marketing authority purchases. This, unfortunately, does not include subsistence 
production and what has become euphemistically known as the 'informal market1, that proportion 
of food produced outwith subsistence and sold outwith formally marketed channels. This 
element of produce distribution has become more important recently, but because there are 
no figures available assessment of this can only take the form of estimates and impressions 
(Gordon, 1988). However, an indication of the importance of the informal market can be gained 
by considering the fact that most of the imported food is distributed in the urban areas, and 
predominantly to the Dar es Salaam population, while starvation or famine in the rural areas has 
been to a large extent avoided (Bryceson, 1990).
Sender and Smith (1986) have argued that the concentration on food production in order to 
maintain and increase economic self-reliance is erroneous for three reasons. This concentration 
may result in a reduction of overall economic consumption, because the food would have to be 
obtained at higher than necessary domestic resource costs. Historically, rapid economic growth 
can be associated with rising food imports (they quote Kenya, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast as 
cases in point.) Where emphasis on food production causes reallocation from production of 
other goods, this may result in forfeiting self-reliance for these other goods. Where these 
other goods are important elements of the economy's infrastructure, such as machinery, lorries, 
medicines or chemicals, this may leave the economy more vulnerable. By not concentrating on 
export production the economy is not generating foreign exchange with which to import such 
goods.
Okoko (1987) has argued that the continued and increased foreign aid to Tanzania has tended to 
extend foreign influence, control, technology and decision-making into the national economy. 
Since the goals of foreign interest have tended not to be in line with the Arusha Declaration this 
has perpetuated underdevelopment within the country. He substantiates this by pointing out 
that aid given by donors is rarely, if at all, given for purely altruistic motives. It is usually 
granted to gain strategic advantage, conditional on political or economic sympathy, or with 
strings promoting exports from the donor. Tanzania has a number of important examples 
when actions it has taken, which were disliked by aid donors, were penalised by cuts in aid. For 
example, Britain froze £7.5 million in aid as a result of diplomatic dispute between Britain and 
Tanzania after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 
1965. Assistance from West Germany was curtailed in 1965, when Tanzania refused to close 
down its East German consulate in Zanzibar after the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union. The USA 
withdrew the large cohort of Peace Corps working in Tanzania, particularly in education, when 
various branches of the Party criticised the USA, and accused it of being involved in a coup plot 
against the newly formed Nyerere government.
Almost all the literature has pointed to the large, inefficient crop authorities and other 
parastatals as having a significant negative effect on official purchase figures. Raikes (1986)
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describes a situation where producers in Arusha, the main maize growing area, began selling 
maize ‘unofficially’ across the closed Kenyan border from 1979.
The importance of considering geography when evaluating the impact of the Arusha Declaration 
on Tanzania has been referred to above. The social and economic environment varied 
regionally before independence. The different areas of Tanzania responded differently to the 
various policies, incentives, opportunities and restrictions. Connell (1974) particularly pointed to 
the rich regional diversity of Tanzania and suggested that perhaps the problem which ujamaa 
socialism did not consider was that it expected uniform committed response particularly from 
the peasant farmers. As we have already discussed above, the diverse social, economic and 
agricultural conditions responded to the equally diverse manifestations of the ujamaa, then 
villagisation and, finally, coerced village settlement.
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Table 2.2 The Number and Population of Registered Villages in Tanzania
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
No of Villages 1,956 4,484 5,586 5,628 5,008 n/a 7,684
Population of 
Villages
0.53m 1.55m 1.98m 2.03m 2.56m 7.0m 13.0m
(90%)
Source: Briggs 1980
The beginning of the 1970s saw a consolidation of the Arusha policy. 'Ujamaasation' continued 
on a voluntary basis, although the pace brought frustration to some government officials and 
Party members. In 1969 the President ordered government departments to give priority in 
spending to villages in an attempt to encourage their formation. During 1970 and 1971 ujamaa 
became a top priority, for the central organisations of the Party and the state. As Hill (1975) 
described, these efforts focused on Dodoma Region, where Nyerere hoped to show that rural 
socialist transformation would increase local production in a region which was marginal to the 
national economy. In March 1970 Nyerere ordered that the entire population of the Region 
should form socialist villages within 14 months. The government began encouraging the 
formation of ujamaa villages, but dropped this to invest its resources simply in the formation of 
villages. 'Operation Dodoma' used a certain amount of force in ‘helping’ peasants to form 
villages. The use of force spread, particularly after 1973 when the government committed itself 
to having the entire rural population 'villagised’ by 1976. In 1973 the villages were described as 
'planned villages'. The notion of ujamaa was dropped and villagisation was described as an 
interim step towards ujamaa socialist villages. Table 2.2 demonstrates the acceleration in the 
formation of registered villages, so that by 1977 90 per cent of the rural population had been 
moved into registered villages. In 1974 and 1975 the country experienced a drop in agricultural 
production. This was blamed on the oil price increase which occurred at about that time and 
there was a drought across the whole of Sahelian Africa in 1973-75, which was claimed to have 
stretched to Tanzania Rainfall figures do not bear this claim out (Coulson, 1982) and the reality
is that the massive disruption of the villagisation programme had a serious detrimental effect on 
food production (Briggs, 1980; Coulson, 1982). This meant a large importation of food and this, 
together with the drop in agricultural export crops, tipped Tanzania's balance of payments into 
deficit.
In 1975, Tanzanian policy moved towards increased investment in industry. Manufacturing 
investment accounted for 10-15 per cent of planned expenditure in 1970, but had increased to 
35-40 per cent by the end of the decade. This investment was intended to increase domestic 
production of commodities which, until then, had been imported. In agriculture, the government 
increased producer prices for the main staple grain foods, but it is argued that concurrent 
increases of producer prices for export crops were not sufficiently high to stipulate production 
(Sharpley, 1985). The support of food crops was part of the emphasis placed on self-reliance, 
which expected that a concentration on domestically produced food would result in reduced 
imports.
There was some alleviation of Tanzania's economic problems because of a frost in Brazil in 
1975, causing a global shortage of coffee and increasing coffee prices by a factor of three 
between then and 1977. This drop in supply from Brazil resulted in increased coffee purchases 
from Tanzania. All Tanzania's main export crops experienced rapid rises in price in the second 
half of the 1970s, with cashewnuts increasing by 16.2 per cent, coffee by 14.2 per cent and tea 
by 12.2 per cent. However, Tanzania was unable to take full benefit of these improved 
international economic conditions because its overall terms of trade had not recovered since the 
1974/75 crisis. The main problem was a shortage of foreign currency and this was further 
exacerbated by the optimism of official estimates of the results of the policy of food self- 
sufficiency, which led them to underestimate the foreign exchange requirement for the late 
1970s (Sharpley, 1985). In addition, the increased attention paid to manufacturing and industry, 
as well as the on-going expansion of education and health provision, left agriculture with a much 
lower proportion of development investment. "Agriculture, hailed as the focus of the country's 
development efforts, has been ignored" (Kahama etal, 1986).
In addition, to the deterioration in the terms of trade, two major set-backs came with the break­
up of the East African Community and the subsequent closure of the border with Kenya in 
1977, and the war with Uganda, which began at the end of 1978. These latter were estimated 
to have cost the Tanzanian government an estimated US$ 200 million and US$ 500 million 
respectively (Lipumba, 1988). It was also argued that the abolition in 1975 of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Development Planning, which previously had co-ordinated all the other 
ministries and agencies in the economic and development planning of the nation, led to a 
period of uncoordinated and weak national planning. (Katona, 1988)
Due to internal pressure and external advice, import restrictions were relaxed towards the end 
of the 1970s (imports grew 54 per cent in 1977-78). Oil prices increased again as Tanzania
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approached the 1980s, and 1980 itself brought drought. At the turn of the decade official 
foreign development assistance had risen to the equivalent of over half the total annual level of 
imports, from only 15 per cent in the first three years of the 1970s. The Economic Recovery 
Programme in 1986 reinforced the trend of external dependence by stating that external 
assistance "will have to be increased over the medium term if the recovery programme is to 
lead to renewed growth in the country" (Quoted in Katona, 1988, p.142). It may be argued that 
Tanzanian planning and development has adopted an almost instinctive reliance on external 
donors; indeed, the fiscal aspects of the development budget have what is called a "foreign 
component" built in to them, implying a strong degree of foreign assistance.
2.41980 to the present
The 1980s began with an increasing deficit and worsening food production crisis. On 7th July 
1981 the Financial Times carried a report that Tanzania had the equivalent of two days' worth of 
government reserves left (Financial Times 7/7/81) and reports of impending doom came from 
other quarters. In 1979 Tanzania engaged in negotiations with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) which became heated and continued for long periods of time with both sides at 
loggerheads. In particular the Tanzanian side opposed devaluation of the Tanzanian Shilling.
In his New Year address in 1980, President Nyerere publicly denounced the IMF for attempting 
to take advantage of Tanzania's weak economic position to interfere in its domestic economic 
policies (Lipumba, 1988). This public denunciation made negotiations politically very difficult.
Any acceptance of the IMFs conditions would appear as a submission to IMF pressure. This 
coincided with a period of relaxation of the IMFs conditions to all borrowers. Many commercial 
banks had begun offering credit to developing countries without the conditionality required by 
the IMF. Tanzania's other aid partners stepped back to wait for the outcome of the IMF 
negotiations. Despite the difficulties, the negotiations continued and in 1980 an agreement was 
reached, with Tanzania gaining concessions from the IMF. No policy adjustments were 
specified before the release of the credit, as in other IMF-sponsored agreements, only broad 
policy objectives. However, the credit ceilings for the first nine months were exceeded and the 
agreement frozen within the first quarter.
In 1981 Tanzania published the first of its emergency economic policy programmes, the National 
Economic Survival Programme (NESP), abandoning the established five year plan system. The 
aim of this programme was to boost exports and increase industrial efficiency. However, this 
proved to comprise a series of economic targets based on unrealistic and over-ambitious 
economic projections, few of which were reached. The NESP was written by the newly 
reinstated, but weaker Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning. The new 
ministry did not have the widespread operational support it had previously enjoyed in the 
sectoral ministries (Lipumba, 1988).
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In 1982 the Tanzania Advisory Group, set up by the Tanzanian government and the World Bank 
and consisting of three independent experts (the so-called Three Wise Men'), produced an 
analysis of Tanzania's economic problems and a set of proposals. This became the Structural
f
Adjustment Programme (SAP), a "short-term emergency programme to combat the existing 
crisis." (Kahama et al 1986). The SAP, which was closer to IMF thinking, proposed tighter 
control on foreign exchange allocation, measures to improve the efficiency of parastatals, many 
of which had run up enormous debts, and efforts to promote industry and exports. Tanzania 
introduced a 10 per cent devaluation, from TShs 8.32 per dollar in December 1981 to TShs 9.41 
in March 1982. This was followed by further devaluations of up to 40 per cent at a time to TShs 
17.17 in June 1984 (Marketing Development Bureau, 1987). However, the SAP assumed that 
the main constraint to the nation's economic recovery was a shortage of foreign exchange. The 
government clearly expected the IMF negotiations to be more fruitful, perhaps as a result of 
this programme. The foreign exchange shortage was expected to be made up by additional 
foreign exchange inflow. In spite of the series of currency devaluations and other voluntary 
measures of economic discipline on the part of Tanzania, no agreement with the IMF and the 
World Bank was immediately forthcoming.
Export earnings continued to decline initially in the early 1980s, from US$ 554 million in 1981 to 
reach a low of US$ 286 million in 1985. In spite of the decline in import expenditure from a 
peak of US$ 1,219 million in 1980 to US$ 815 million in 1983, this could not be maintained, and 
the import bill increased again to US$ 999 million by the end of the SAP and further to an 
estimated US$ 1,150 million in 1987, resulting in an estimated trade deficit of US$ 770 million 
(Marketing Development Bureau, 1987). Inflation, based on the National Consumer Price 
Index, was erratic over the period of the SAP (Table 2.3). The large increase in inflation 
between 1983 and 1984 is considered to be the direct result of the reduction in control over 
prices of such things as agricultural inputs, and decontrolling maize flour and consumer goods' 
prices (Lipumba, 1988).
Table 2.3 National Economic Indicators during the SAP years
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Exports 1 554 415 380 388 286
Imports 1,161 1,113 815 874 nry-i
Balance (607) (698) (437) (486) (713)
Inflation 22.7 32.6 19.2 44.0 28.2
1 US$ million Source: Marketing Development Bureau, 1987
In the latter period of the SAP, the government introduced policies liberalising imports, by 
waiving restrictions which had been placed on merchants and the import of certain consumer 
goods. For example, restrictions on private traders' ability to bank export revenue abroad 
were relaxed, and private trading between producers and consumers was encouraged by lifting 
the previous limit of 30 kg on food grain sales to 500 kg. SAP did not achieve the targets it set
out, mainly because of the lack of expected foreign exchange inflows, in the form of foreign aid 
and credit. The SAP did begin to address some of the long term problems such as parastatal 
inefficiencies and low export revenues, to a limited extent. These moderate achievements 
were at the expense of inflation. The gap between urban wage increases and soaring inflation 
widened.
However, agreement with the IMF had to wait until November 1985after the state Presidency 
had passed from Julius Nyerere to AN Hassan Mwinyi in what has been described as one of 
the most peaceful transitions of power in post-colonial Africa. Final agreement was reached 
after the publication of the details of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in May 1986. 
The continued problems of the Tanzanian economy, indeed its almost total collapse, 
encouraged intense debate on the types of policies which could be adopted to recover the 
situation (Lipumba, Msambichaka and Wangwe, 1984). The discussions intensified in early 1986, 
as the foreign exchange situation worsened, fuel shortages became acute and the government 
was criticised for over-valuing the Shilling. The final outcome of these discussions was the ERP, 
a programme of more liberal policies, developed in close consultation with the World Bank, 
moving the government's development strategy more in line with IMF prescriptions. The 
intention of the ERP was to increase the output of export and food crops, rehabilitate the 
infrastructure, raise industrial capacity utilisation and redress the balance of payments (O'Neill, 
1990). In addition, the government, under pressure from the IMF and its major donors, 
devalued the Shilling from TShs 15.49 in March 1986 to TShs 40.34 to the US dollar by June 
1986 (Marketing Development Bureau, 1987). The Bank of Tanzania expressed its expectation 
that it would have to adjust periodically 'the exchange rate during the period of the ERP in 
order to account for the effects of inflation. This, along with the low producer prices and the 
liberalisation of the market system, was the key to achieving agreement with the IMF. The ERP 
prompted agreement with the IMF the same year it was adopted. The following year the 
World Bank agreed to lend US$ 50 million to assist in financing the first year of the ERP and the 
donors Consultative Group pledged additional support of US$ 1,930 million in total financing 
for the period of 1987/88 (O'Neill, 1990). The measures contained in the ERP were intended to 
increase agricultural production through increased producer prices, improved access to inputs 
and increased supply of consumer goods, through restored industrial output. However, the risk 
involved in the ERP was the high inflation which followed as a result of the devaluation of the 
Shilling. As the Shilling was devalued, the cost of imports, such as chemicals used in the 
production of agricultural inputs, rose. These costs were passed on to consumers through the 
increased prices paid for food, in addition to the general inflation. The Marketing Development 
Bureau estimated that the foreign exchange component required for imported inputs for maize 
production was US$ 68 per US$ 100 output, largely accounted for by the cost of transport.
This is compared to a foreign exchange cost for the export crops ranging from US$ 8 for hard 
coffee up to the maximum of US$ 67 for sisal and tobacco (reported in Marketing 
Development Bureau, 1987). As foreign exchange became more expensive, this component 
became increasingly significant. The liberalisation of the food grain markets and removal of the
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sembe subsidy has resulted in the consumer bearing the entire burden of the cost of production. 
The removal of subsidy and increasing cost of sembe purchases is contrasted by Bryceson 
(1990) with the declining value of minimum urban real wages. Her estimates, based on Ministry 
of Agriculture data show that urban real wages have decreased to 29 per cent of its 1973 value, 
or 24 per cent when valued as the amount of sembe a day's wages could purchase (Bryceson, 
1990).
Exports rose by 8 per cent in 1986, the first year of the ERP, (Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs, 
1989), although 1986 was a year of favourable rainfall (Ellis, 1988). Imports reached US$ 1,092 
million in 1987 and exports, US$ 347 million. The GDP increased by 3.8 per cent in 1986, and 
with a population growth rate of 3.3 per, this cent meant a real per capita GDP growth for the 
first time in the 1980s (Marketing Development Bureau, 1987). By 1987 economic growth was 
3.9 per cent, and in 1988 the growth rate reached 4.1 per cent, but still falling short of the ERP's 
expectation of 4.5 per cent. Export income grew over the ERP period and the contribution of 
'non- traditional' exports has shown particular promise. Export revenues are estimated to have 
been nearer to the expected US$ 686 million than the official figure of US$ 362 million, 
because of the substantial quantity of exports going unrecorded. Employment rose, except in 
mineral production. Inflation, which was planned to be reduced to 20 per cent by 1988, 
remained stubbornly at 28.2 per cent (Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs, 1989). However, there is a 
possibility that this estimate of economic growth underestimates the true position, as a result of 
the emergence of small scale and informal activities, which are not adequately represented in 
the published statistics. On balance, the ERP has been considered as a successful 
programme, although problems remain. In November 1988, the value of the Tanzanian shilling 
was reduced from TShs 98 per dollar to TShs 120. This appears still to over-value the shilling in 
relation to the informal market rate, although the informal rate also reflects an additional premium 
because of the demand for dollars which are restricted in the formal market. In addition, these 
informal markets are illegal and therefore conducted in cash and in secret, and are therefore 
impossible to estimate.
Since the development of the Economic Recovery Programme, initiated in 1982, the 
government appears to be turning a "blind eye" to much of the parallel food crop marketing, 
since, especially in urban areas, food would otherwise be almost prohibitively expensive. 
(Gordon, 1988) Bryceson argues that the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture had begun 
collecting parallel maize market price data was an indication of the importance of this sector of 
the economy. The parallel market for maize and other staple grains was effectively legalised 
with the removal of the sembe subsidy in the 1984 budget, the removal of road-blocks set up to 
check black marketing of grain and raising the restrictions on grain transporting by private 
individuals up to 500 kgs. These moves were reinforced, when in 1987 all restrictions on the 
transport and movement of food grains by private traders were removed. The traders were 
still not allowed to purchase from peasants or cooperative unions, but the National Milling 
Corporation's activities were limited in order to reduce its deficits and unions with deficits were
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not permitted any further credit finance for crop purchases, further restricting the official market’s 
sources of supply and ability to distribute. By 1984-85, the Marketing Development Bureau 
estimated that 70 to 75 per cent of all marketed maize grain went through parallel market 
channels, although, Bryceson argues that, in view of the severe transport constraints throughout 
the country at this time, this figure seems exceptionally high (Bryceson, 1990).
According to Bryceson (1990), one of the successful outcomes of government policy aimed at 
redressing the regional imbalance, was that of the pan-territorial crop prices paid by the 
National Milling Corporation to producers during the 1970s and early 1980s. It encouraged 
tremendous growth in food production in the southern, previously neglected regions of 
Ruvuma, Rukwa and Mbeya. This achievement, however, "was overshadowed by the 
problems arising from the enormous transport costs required to sustain it." (Bryceson, 1990) 
Indeed, it was the immense burden of transport costs which brought about the recent limitation 
of the NMC’s activities. This had the result of promoting food crop production in ecologically 
suited areas, which previously, due to the economics of transportation, had not produced food 
commercially in such large quantities. Ruvuma, Rukwa, Iringa and Mbeya, known as the 'Big 
Four' became major production regions for maize, accounting for 17 per cent of national maize 
purchase. By 1981/82 this figure had increased to 87 per cent, whereas previously most of the 
marketed grain came from the north and central parts of the country (Bryceson, 1990). "In 1981 
the government began to move away from its previous commitment to pan-territorial prices and 
introduced regional price differences for some domestic crops. The basis for these price 
differences was comparative advantage in production ..." (Ellis, 1988, p.72) From 1982 to 1988 
the price policy invoked the principle of comparative advantage, giving a premium price to 
climatically suited areas. The expectation was that this more narrow concentration would lower 
the cost of transport as the NMC's purchases focused on the so-called 'Big Four', rather than a 
more diffused national purchasing regime. The outcome was in fact to increase the costs of 
transport still further as almost all the NMC's purchases were focused in the southwest of the 
country and a large part of its sales were focused on Dar es Salaam in the east of the country. 
The result was to force the government to arrest the continued rise in costs by limiting the NMC 
to take transport costs into account in its purchase prices, and operate on a strictly commercial 
basis. The most recent change in policy has resulted in disillusionment among producers from 
the 'Big Fourt. The government's original policy had been to encourage producers in these 
areas to go into production by the government's flat price policy allowing them to take 
advantage of their environment suitability to maize production. Now, as a result of recent, 
more pragmatic government policy, their grain production is no longer profitable.
Additional changes in state involvement in the agricultural sector have reduced the burden of 
costs on government budgets and at the same time allowed private sector rehabilitation. The 
government has been reducing its role in direct production and marketing of agricultural 
commodities. For example, National Agricultural Food Corporation land has been leased to 
the private sector in Arusha for food production, while some coffee estates in Kilimanjaro and
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Arusha have been transferred to the private sector (Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs, 1988). Some 
sisal estates have attracted foreign investment and recruited personnel to manage sisal 
production, while some have been sold. This process appears to have encouraged investment 
in new equipment and the rehabilitation of the land. In addition, the National Milling 
Corporation's legal monopoly in purchases of wholesale food grains was withdrawn, and the 
NMC instructed to operate on a strictly commercial basis. This has resulted in a shrinking of the 
activities of the NMC mainly to purchases for the urban market, to the management of the 
strategic grain reserves, and to external trade in grain. By 1988 open market channels in 
Tanzania were estimated to account for 65 per cent of total marketed quantities of maize and 94 
per cent of rice, but the importance of the open markets is likely to increase (Gordon, 1988). 
Indeed, in Bryceson's (1990, p.13) survey of urban household consumption in Arusha, Mwanza, 
Dar es Salaam, Mbeya and Songea, "informants reported that virtually all purchases of maize 
were made in the open market, even in Dar es Salaam”, where 70 per cent of the NMC's sales 
take place. Thus by the time the sembe subsidy was removed, it seems likely that the people 
most likely to benefit from it had already been forced in to the parallel market in search of food, 
because of the shortages in the formal market. Bryceson (1990) argues that this already 
present reliance on the parallel market and its higher prices, is the reason there was little public 
unrest as a result of the austerity measure taken by the Tanzanian government in the early and 
mid 1980s.
The budget of June 1989 announced a further devaluation in the Shilling from TShs 137 per 
dollar to TShs 145, and also that the minimum monthly wage was to be increased from TShs 
1,645 to 2,075. The government was still under pressure to repay its foreign debts. In 1970 
Tanzania's external debt accounted for an equivalent of 5.3 per cent of its export earnings, but 
by 1987 this had risen to 18.5 per cent. Discussions were under way with the IMF and World 
Bank to extend repayment periods and some bilateral donors had converted some previous 
loans into gifts, releasing Tanzania's obligation to repay, and hence reducing its debt burden.
In a continuing effort to encourage all forms of export production, the government announced in 
1990 that producers were now free to export some non-traditional export crops directly. This 
meant that crops other than cotton, coffee, tea, tobacco, sisal, cashewnuts and pyrethrum could 
be exported without having to use a marketing board. These crops include some vegetable, 
fruit, flowers and spices. (Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs, 1990). New regulations were laid down 
to encourage foreign and domestic investors, offering tax incentives, particularly for investment 
in strategically important sectors for the Tanzanian economy. This has arisen from a recognition 
of the importance of attracting foreign investment into the economy. Limits on investment will 
still be enforced, but the process will be streamlined through the establishment of the 
Investment Promotion Centre to take ultimate responsibility for coordinating the assessment 
and regulation of foreign investments.
The 1980s have been characterised by 'crisis management*: that is, measures such as currency 
devaluation, to improve producer prices; increased wages to alleviate the pressures of 
devaluation on those not producing for export; the abolition of the sembe (maize flour and main 
staple food) subsidy; and the return of marketing co-operatives, as the larger parastatals were 
seen as large and inflexible. The economic future of Tanzania will depend on the ability of 
parastatals, which still dominate the economy, to become more flexible and efficient and to 
control their costs. This is considered the key to the control of credit and monetary expansion, 
which in turn influences the inflation rate (Lipumba, 1988). However, the answer is not the 
abolition of public enterprises, because, costly or not, they fulfil important roles in the economy 
and there is no alternative to them at present. At the current time the economy is caught 
between the necessity to maintain its public sector and to reduce its credit and inflation, in order 
to continue to meet IMF and World Bank criteria.
The SAP was based on the assumption of continued and increased foreign income, which did 
not materialise. More recent budgetary modifications have not rested on this assumption and 
appear to have had some measure of improvement (Raikes, 1986). This type of more recent 
'stabilisation policy' has been seen as a necessary facing up to the reality, and, it is argued, not 
a turning away from the socialist path for good. The country seems set for some measure of 
relaxation of the price marketing and import controls in an attempt to restructure the economy 
towards "greater allocative efficiency" (Amani, 1984).
2.5 Summary
In 1967 Tanzania chose a radically alternative path of development concentrating on policies 
developed to provide for the needs of the majority. Clearly this has to some extent been 
successful. Tanzania has one of the highest literacy rates in Africa, it is widely regarded as 
having one of the lowest disparities in standard of living and, despite the chronic economic 
crisis, has remained one of the continent's most politically stable countries. However, 
Tanzania's economic crises have been exacerbated (some would say caused) by high 
government expenditure and high recurrent budget costs. The government stretched itself to 
become sole banker, sole trader of food and export crops, sole transport provider, and the 
main manufacturer and provider of industrial and agricultural inputs. Production and government 
income have not been able to keep pace with government spending, even with increased 
foreign assistance, to the extent that Tanzania is one of the largest recipients of foreign aid in 
sub-Saharan Africa Tanzania has had, most recently, to approach its economic situation in a 
more pragmatic manner. It has had to withdraw from many of its command roles in the 
economy, such as agricultural production, by selling, leasing or reducing central control over 
export crop estates. It has reduced the role of the National Milling Corporation, formerly the 
sole buyer of maize, to manager of the strategic grain reserves and external trading agent. 
Despite these large reductions in direct state involvement, many open market operators had 
already preceded them by informally taking part of some parts of the economy. For example,
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before the National Milling Corporation's domestic monopoly was revoked, there was already a 
substantial informal market for staple grains. Indeed, there still is an informal market for the 
exporting of staple foods. The informal sector is acknowledged privately by the government 
to play an important role in the survival strategies of the majority of urban households 
(Bryceson, 1990).
Initial attempts at economic improvement foundered under ERP and SAP, both of which 
assumed increasing foreign income. This foreign income was not forthcoming and foreign aid 
was slowed by the negotiations and re-negotiations with the IMF, which were fraught with 
difficulties. Budgetary adjustments, such as devaluation, revoking of the parastatal monopoly of 
certain markets and the re-introduction of crop marketing co-operatives have given more 
flexibility to the economy and allowed an active parallel free market to be legitimised, continue 
and expand.
It is within the economic and political context that has been identified above that the Tanzanian 
production of fruit and vegetables has developed. Fruit and vegetable production has never 
been under the direct control of any parastatal marketing body. The only state mechanism with 
any form of fiscal control over the domestic fruit and vegetable market is the Kariakoo Market 
Corporation (KMC), which controls the Kariakoo wholesale market, through which all fruit and 
vegetables entering Dar es Salaam are required by law to pass. This wholesale market is 
managed by the KMC, although the dealers in the market are all private traders. The KMC 
provides the market with premises in return for a licence fee paid by the dealers and a 
commission levy paid by those delivering their produce.
In addition to this, the city authorities have had an indirect effect on the fruit and vegetable 
retailers. In the early 1980s the government went through a period of blaming its immense 
economic woes on factors beyond its control. One of the factors which it highlighted were 
informal sector traders, these people being portrayed as unemployed parasites, living off 
legitimate urban dwellers. This reached a peak in 1983 with the Human Resources 
Redeployment Act, which allowed the police to arrest any male they suspected of not having 
legitimate formal employment. If the police suspicions were proven, then these individuals 
were expelled from the city and returned to their village of origin. The effect of this on the 
informal sector was to create an atmosphere of intense suspicion. Many traders, who had no 
other form of income laid their produce out on a small piece of cloth, which could be quickly 
gathered up and carried easily if the police appeared. The mid to late 1980s saw a moderation 
in the government's attitude towards these people as many prominent economists pointed out 
that rather than being parasites these people were providing crucial services to many of the 
formally employed urban residents. Indeed, the informal sector was providing employment for 
the urban poor, who had no other alternatives. This change in attitude has allowed much more 
stable street trading as the retailers have become increasingly confident. However the
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uncertainty remains, as will be explained later, and many of the fruit and vegetable retailers 
remain suspicious of the government's motives.
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The overall effect of the economy on the ability of the government to provide the agricultural 
sector with the required infrastructure and inputs is significant. The adverse effect of the 
economic crisis on those on low incomes in the urban areas has adverse effects on the 
producers in the rural areas. Unlike in the case of staple foods, where demand is inelastic, 
demand for fruit and vegetables tends to vary much more. If a household earns less one 
month, they still require the same amount of maize. They may, however, do without their 
vegetable dishes or their fruit snacks. The more fluctuating demand varies through the year.
The period from the adoption of the Arusha Declaration to the end of the 1970s may be 
characterised as a period of socialist transformation and planning, and policy centralisation. This 
resulted in the government taking centralised control of the main food crop marketing and 
production support. However, the combined effects of poor accounting systems and the lax 
controls resulted in mismanagement and individuals taking the opportunity of their position for 
self-aggrandisement. The immense economic burden which the crop marketing system became 
towards the end of the 1970s began to force the government and many prominent Tanzanian 
economists to question seriously some of the policies made early in the post-Arusha euphoria. 
This became particularly important as it became clear that agricultural production, on which the 
economy depended for a large proportion of it foreign exchange, was not going to recover 
easily from the mid 1970s agricultural crisis. The broader economic difficulties brought about by 
external factors such as the war with Amin's Uganda, the break up of the East African 
Community and increases in fuel costs had additional effects on agricultural marketing, most 
significantly through the increased cost of transportation. The poor condition of the formal 
sector encouraged the development of a black market in many staple food crops, and, although 
this met with outrage at first, gradually an awareness grew of the importance of this sector in 
maintaining the supplies of basic foods to consumers, for whom the state sector could do little. 
The informal sector was legitimised through various policies from 1984 including the revoking of 
the National Milling Corporation's monopoly and the removing of the restrictions on private 
traders’ movements of grain shipments.
Against this background the production and marketing of fruit and vegetables have remained 
largely uncontrolled, and relatively unsupported. There were a number of small initiatives 
involving cooperative societies in the purchase and marketing of fruit and vegetables during the 
mid 1970s, for example the Primary Cooperatives supported by the Lushoto Integrated 
Development Programme and the Tchenzema Vegetable Farmers' Cooperative Society, both 
of which had retail outlets in Dar es Salaam. However, these appeared to be unable to 
withstand the competition with private traders who operated legitimately in competition with 
them. The only restriction to fruit and vegetable traders bringing produce to Dar es Salaam, 
was the legal requirement to deposit their delivery at the Kariakoo market, where they were
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subject to a sales commission on their deliveries. However, within the market, the dealers were 
operating in open market conditions, with prices varying according to supply and demand.
In parallel with the economic restriction on the official grain marketing institutions, the Kariakoo 
market appears to have been unable to cope with the increases in volume of fruit and 
vegetables demanded by the increasing Dar es Salaam population. As the private grain 
market traders sought alternative outlets for their grain, so the fruit and vegetable traders 
sought to avoid the congestion and the commission charges of Kariakoo by selling to parallel 
wholesale dealers in the retail markets elsewhere in the city.
There is already a considerable body of literature which has been generated concerning the role 
of crop authorities and marketing boards in the marketing and distribution of the main staple 
grains during Tanzania's socialist transformation era (Bryceson, 1985; Ellis, 1982,1983,1984; 
Lofchie, 1978; Shao, 1986). A growing body of literature exists on the informal sector and open 
market for grain trading as Tanzania entered its period of economic recovery (Ellis, 1988, 
Bryceson, 1990, Gordon, 1988, Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990). However, very little is 
known of the conditions under which fruit and vegetables have been produced and marketed 
under the socialist transformation (Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi, 1971; Mbilinyi and Mascarenhas, 
1973; Sporrek, 1985), and even less is known about the their supply during the period of 
economic recovery (Mascarenhas, 1984). The lack of control or monitoring of the fruit and 
vegetable sector before the 1980s has resulted in sparse evidence with which to build a profile 
of this period. This study sets out to address the lack of information concerning the recent 
period of fruit and vegetable production and marketing, within the context of the liberalising of 
Tanzania's socialist economy. As has been discussed already, it will examine the entire system 
of supply, from the production through to the retail sector.
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Chapter Three 
Survey Areas and Survey Methods
3.1 Data Sources
This chapter describes the areas in which the research for this study was carried out, focusing on 
their socio-economic background, providing a geographical context, and explaining their role in 
the national economy and how this has developed over time. The research methods are also 
presented as they were applied in each of the areas. In order to meet the research objectives, 
this study involved fieldwork in two rural production areas and several market locations within Dar 
es Salaam. The fieldwork was intended to examine the entire chain of fruit and vegetable 
supply, from the production to the retailer. In order to assess the different elements in the 
supply process a variety of techniques were adopted, including questionnaire surveys, the 
collection of secondary data, and field observation. Finally, several in-depth interviews carried 
out with participants at all levels of the supply system, as well as outside observers, in order to 
provide additional qualitative data to contribute to an interpretation of the quantitative data and 
to provide a background to the analysis.
3.1.1 Primary Sources of Data
Data used in this study include both primary and secondary sources. The primary data were collected 
by both extensive questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interviews. According to Hill (1963) 
markets have been surprisingly unimportant in East African towns, such as Dar es Salaam, until 
relatively recently. Currently, however, Dar es Salaam has a wide range of retail market outlets where 
fruit and vegetables can be purchased. These range from individual fruit sellers who have set up their 
own stall on a street corner, to the large modem Kariakoo Market complex incorporating the city 
wholesale market, a food retail market and a shopping centre. This study focuses on the main city 
council run retail markets, where the retailers are grouped in numbers of about one hundred or more 
and provided with facilities, such as stalls, a roof, and an office. These market places tend to be the 
foci for purchases for the population, and all are generally close to the main transport arteries of the 
city. They are therefore of considerable importance to the Dar es Salaam population as sources of 
food. The intention of this survey was twofold. Firstly, it was intended to investigate the level of 
direct transactions between rural producers and the urban retailers, which would be wholly informal 
sector trading. Secondly, it was intended to obtain data of the sources of produce from within the 
city. Dar es Salaam retailers have a range of channels from which to obtain food for retail. These 
include Kariakoo wholesale market, informal wholesalers at a retail market and urban, or peri-urban, 
production. The produce obtained from Kariakoo is entirely within the formal sector. However, the 
latter two channels are what may be described as informal sector sources, since legally fruit and 
vegetables which enter Dar es Salaam under commercial conditions should pass through Kariakoo's
Figure 3.1 The City of Dar es Salaam
(showing principal roads and the markets surveyed)
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wholesale market. These data will provide a basis from which to estimate the relative importance of 
these channels.
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A group of six markets were selected in order to produce a representative sample of the 
market retailers. As can be seen from Figure 3.1, there are four principal roads entering Dar es 
Salaam: Bagamoyo Road, to the north of the city; Morogoro Road, entering from the west;
Pugu Road, in the south west; and Kilwa Road to the south. The survey set out firstly to ensure 
that the retail markets visited were relatively close to one of these main roads. Ubungo was 
chosen because it is located on Morogoro Road, Mwenge is on Bagamoyo Road, while 
Tandika is near to Kilwa Road and llala is near to Pugu Road. In addition, the markets reflect the 
broad range of roles in the urban food economy, llala, Tandale and Tandika are important 
sources of food for the poorer residential areas located nearby, while Mwenge and Ubungo 
are located near to the university where academic staff and middle ranking public employees 
often reside. Kinondoni reflects the top end of the market catering for the higher quality 
demands of those living in the Msasani and Oyster Bay areas, mainly high ranking civil servants, 
diplomats and much of the expatriate community. Ubungo, Mwenge and Tandale are known to 
be relatively recently established, while Tandika and llala are more mature markets. Finally 
Kinondoni, Mwenge, Ubungo and llala are known to be predominantly important retail markets, 
while Tandale and Tandika are also known to have important wholesaling functions.
The market survey was restricted to one week, due to the limited resources available. Each 
market was allocated one day for survey. On each day the author and a Tanzanian assistant 
visited the market place beginning with an interview of a market official. In most cases this 
official was the Market Secretary. The interview took place with the help of the assistant as 
interpreter, where necessary. This had the dual purpose of obtaining qualitative descriptive 
information about the market place and the fruit and vegetable distribution system, as well as 
gaining the confidence of the market official. It was found that when the market official 
accompanied the author and the assistant, the traders were more forthcoming.
The survey took place during the month of August, which is a relatively busy time for all the 
urban markets. The sampling strategy, therefore had to rely on the willingness of the retailers 
to answer questions. In order to reduce the refusal rate, to limit the interference in the retailers 
market activities and to maximise the sample size in the time available, the questionnaire was 
limited to eight basic questions (see Appendix 3.1). These concerned the length of time the 
trader had been in business, and the type and source of the produce sold, as well as the 
method of transporting the produce to market and to whom they sell. Lists of the retailers were 
not available, therefore, the sampling was based on the traders who were free to answer 
questions. The only condition for inclusion in the survey was that the retailer should sell fruit 
and/or vegetables. This narrowed down the population, as many retailers sell other 
commodities, such as herbs and spices, fish, meat, poultry, drinks, containers (such as bags, 
tins or buckets), and were therefore excluded from the survey. As a result, the survey is more
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representative than may initially be concluded from the proportion of sampled retail traders 
from each market surveyed. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.
It should be noted that throughout the survey of retail markets, market officials and traders were 
reluctant to admit that retailers purchased their wholesale produce from anywhere other than 
Kariakoo. Although the legal monopoly is not currently enforced, those involved in informal 
sector trading are acutely aware that while Kariakoo’s monopoly status remains on the statute 
books, they are extremely vulnerable, should it be enforced. Most traders remember only too 
well the strict enforcement of the short-lived Human Resources Deployment Act of 1983. This 
meant that all males not employed in formal sector employment were liable to be arrested and 
sent back to their village of origin. This effectively made any informal retailing an extremely risky 
business to be in. It has been estimated that of the city's 1.3 million population in 1983, 
approximately 166,000, or 12 per cent were formally employed. If it is assumed that each of 
these has an average of four dependents, then this only accounted for 830,000, or 64 per cent 
of the city's population. The remaining 36 per cent depended on the formal sector (Bulletin of 
Tanzanian Affairs, 1984).
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Table 3.1 The main Open Market Supply Regions for Dar es Salaam and 
Coast Regions 1984/85
Region Distance Commodities
(km) staples fruit and vegetables
Morogoro 200 rice, cassava bananas, Irish potatoes, onions, 
cabbage, tomato, pineapples
Tanga 350 maize, rice beans, Irish potatoes, cabbage, 
tomatoes, oranges, apples 
and pears
Iringa 500 maize, wheat, millet beans, cowpeas, Irish potatoes, 
onions, cabbage, tomatoes
Moshi 570 maize, bananas beans, cowpeas, Irish potatoes, 
tomatoes
Arusha 650 maize, wheat bananas, cowpeas, onions, 
cabbage, peas
Mbeya 900 maize, rice bananas, beans, Irish potatoes, 
cabbage tomato, peas, carrots
Source: Marketing Development Bureau, 1986
Two case study areas, known to be important fruit and vegetable supplying areas for Dar es 
Salaam, were selected for a producers’ questionnaire survey (Appendix 3.2). The Marketing 
Development Bureau, a department of the Tanzania's Ministry of Agriculture, identifies six 
regions as being important for supplying Dar es Salaam with food, although their relative 
importance is not indicated (Marketing Development Bureau, 1986). These are Arusha Region, 
almost 650 kilometres by road north of Dar es Salaam; Moshi Region, to the east of Arusha, 
and about 570 kilometres by road from Dar es Salaam; Morogoro, which is 200 kilometres from 
Dar es Salaam; Tanga, 350 kilometres from Dar es Salaam; Iringa, which is just over 500 
kilometres from Dar es Salaam in the southern highlands; and Mbeya, located just under 900 
kilometres by road from Dar es Salaam. The crops supplied by these regions to Dar es
Salaam are presented in Table 3.1. It should be noted that this survey was carried out at the 
peak of the Tanzanian economic crisis in the early 1980s; it can, therefore, be expected that, as 
a result of an easing of economic difficulties and the liberalisation of inter-regional trading 
regulations, the trading of a wider range of commodities on the open market from these regions 
will have increased. In addition, a number of areas around the city of Dar es Salaam, are also 
increasingly important as sources of supply for the city, although they were not picked up in the 
study of inter-regional trade.
Further interviews were earned out, including informal discussions with Dar es Salaam residents, 
to narrow down the list of sources to two locations in order to provide a manageable survey. 
The intention of the field-based part of the research was to carry out both a major questionnaire 
survey of producers of fruit and vegetables, and to carry out longer interviews with a small 
number of producers, market officials, local government officers, traders and agricultural 
extension workers. The choice of the two survey areas was based in part on the evidence of 
the secondary data, and partly on the evidence collected from in-depth interviews carried out in 
Dar es Salaam. The data collected from Kariakoo Wholesale Market and the Marketing 
Development Bureau suggested that Morogoro Rural District’s advantageous location, 
relatively close to Dar es Salaam, with the environment to produce both tropical fruits and 
temperate vegetables makes it an extremely important source of food for the main city. It is in 
fact the closest area with an environment capable of producing temperate vegetables, and at 
only 200 km distance, along good roads, is about a three hour lorry drive from Dar es Salaam.
In contrast, Lushoto District in Tanga Region is a 350 km drive from Dar es Salaam, along 
relatively poor roads, or the equivalent overnight lorry drive. However, its higher altitude 
village environments are even closer to the temperate conditions required to grow such 
vegetables as cabbage, Irish potatoes, apples and tomatoes. These two areas are 
considered of enormous importance to the supply of fruit and vegetables to the urban market 
of Dar es Salaam.
Complications arose with the author's permission to visit certain parts of Morogoro Rural 
District, as the District has a number of sensitive establishments, including a refugee centre and 
training college for the African National Congress of South Africa, a military airfield and a 
munitions factory. As a result, although the research assistant was able to carry out one 
questionnaire survey in Matombo village and one in Mgeta Division, the author was only able to 
visit and carry out interviews in Mgeta. It is difficult, therefore, to balance the results in each of 
the districts, since there were greater restrictions on the study activities in Morogoro, where 
only two village surveys were possible. By contrast, there were minimal restrictions on 
research activities in Lushoto, and so four villages were surveyed there. The breakdown of 
response rates is presented in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2 Breakdown of the Respondents to Producers’ Survey by Village
Village (District) Frequency Per Cent
M atom bo 42 15.5
f
Mg eta 43 15.9
Morogoro 85 31.4
Lukozi 48 17.7
Lwandai 49 18.1
Soni 47 17.3
Malindi 42 -.15.5
Lushoto 186 68.6
Survey Total 271 100.0
Source: Author’s Survey
The study focused on the producers of fruit and vegetables for selling to the urban markets. 
The ability to carry out any form of random or stratified sample was severely restricted by the 
lack of any lists of fruit and vegetable producers. As a result, such producers were chosen, with 
the help of village government officials and agricultural extension officers. The results of this 
questionnaire survey cannot, therefore, claim to be representative of the agricultural producers 
of the areas visited. This questionnaire survey set out to obtain a representative view of those 
agricultural producers who are involved in fruit and vegetable production, and who sell their 
produce to traders. This sampling ’strategy’ is not bias-protected, in the sense that it prevents 
unconscious bias on the part of the surveyor, but it has sampled a higher proportion of the 
population of fruit and vegetable producers than a similar-sized sample of general agricultural 
producers, because, although the number of fruit and vegetable producers is not known, it is 
known that the population of these producers is smaller than that of general agricultural 
producers. In view of the time and resources available to the author, and the importance of 
such quantitative data, this was considered to be the only option for obtaining meaningful 
primary data.
Finally, Hollier (1990) argues that it is important to distinguish between the different types of 
market participants. He identifies four basic categories: local consumers; producers-sellers; 
bulk-buying commodity traders; and traders of manufactured items. The commodity traders are 
of enormous importance in the fruit and vegetable marketing system, therefore, a detailed 
questionnaire survey was carried out of traders purchasing crops in Lushoto District (Appendix 
3.3). The survey of traders in Lushoto District comprised a detailed questionnaire sample of 
thirty traders active in commodity purchasing at three of the most important periodic markets in 
villages in Lushoto District, namely Soni, Mlalo and Lukozi (see Figure 6.1). These markets 
were selected because they are all located on the main road running through Lushoto District 
and are, therefore, foci of commercial activity in the District’s wholesale system. The three 
markets are located within three of the four agro-ecological zones defined by the Soil Erosion 
Control and Agro-Forestry Project (SECAP), discussed in Chapter Three. Obtaining 
permission to carry out a similar survey in Lushoto town proved difficult, although no direct
reason was given for why this was the case. In Lushoto, however, the author was able to 
interview a number of key informants, who gave some qualitative insights into the fruit and 
vegetable trade in the area. These individuals included the local Kilimo horticultural extension 
officer, the Lushoto Market revenue collector and secretary, two party officials, a small number 
of local farmers and business people and the local secondary school geography teacher.
3.1.2 Qualitative Data Collection
In addition to the questionnaire interviews, the author conducted in-depth interviews with key 
informants in the producing areas and in the city. These were participants in the production, 
purchasing, transportation, distribution, trading and regulation, of the fruit and vegetables 
production and marketing system. They also included village government officials, teachers, a 
prison governor, market officials, expatriate extension workers in the areas concerned and the 
general manager of Kariakoo Market Corporation. These informants also occasionally provided 
valuable secondary data, in the form of reports, published and unpublished datasets and 
production estimates, which have been included, where relevant, in the analysis. The interviews 
took an informal approach, although a set of eight key questions had been identified before 
beginning the fieldwork, concerning the informant's role or outlook on the production and supply 
system. These eight questions form an interview schedule around which the interviews were 
loosely structured. A copy of this schedule is in Appendix 3.4 and a list of interviewees in 
Appendix 3.5. Observations made during the course of the field visits were also recorded by 
the author and the research assistants. These have been used to confirm reports from 
informants and as evidence in the study
3.1.3 Secondary Sources of Data
A problem encountered in the analysis of the data obtained was the difficulty in converting local 
units of measurement to the more standard measure of kilograms. Table 3.3 is an attempt to 
achieve a conversion table from the local units to the metric equivalent. The high degree of 
variability comes principally from varying types and sizes of commodity and container, but 
differences also come from the degree of efficient packing of the goods and the different 
varieties, size, and the degree of estimated wastage as a result of transportation. For 
example, a market official at Mwenge market in Dar es Salaam estimated that out of one 
hundred oranges arriving at his market, via Kariakoo or Tandale, up to twenty-five may be spoilt.
Figure 3.2 is a scattergram of the local units plotted against the metric tonnes for the entire 
period of the sample of daily records and for all the commodity types. The various 'fingers' of 
plots extending from the origin at different gradients represent different conversion factors. It 
can be seen from this that there are four main 'fingers', and within these the conversion factors 
tend to be relatively consistent. In fact, the lowest correlation coefficient of local units against 
metric tonnes is for limes with 0.90 (p>=0.001). The next lowest is tomatoes from Lushoto and 
Mbeya, followed by tomatoes from Iringa, with correlation coefficients of 0.95 and 0.96
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Figure 3.2
Scattergram Rot of the Local Units Against Metric Tonne Conversions
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Figure 3.3
o
respectively. The rest of the commodities have correlations of not less than 0.97. The 
relationship is clear as the tonnage is estimated by KMC staff from the local unit. This simply 
gives a measure of the consistency in the calculation of the tonnage from the local unit. Of the 
three units mentioned above, the limes' lower coefficient may be explained by the fact that 
both gunia and mfuko are used as containers for transportation. This is indicated in Figure 3.3, 
where two main 'fingers' of distribution extend from the origin representing the different 
conversion factors.
6*
Table 3.3 Approximate Conversion Table
Container Description Approx. Metric Volume 1
gunia large canvas sack 80-100 kg
tenga oval woven basket 40-50 kg (small) 
60-80 kg (large)
mfuko discarded fertiliser bag 40-50 kg
ndoo plastic bucket (20 litres.) 16-18 kg
ridebe 5 gallon cooking oil tin 16-18 kg
mkungu bunch of bananas on the stalk 70-100 kg
1 the volumes vary depending on the size and type of commodity.
Source: various interviews and consultants' reports
On the whole, the correlations suggest that the conversions from local unit to metric tonnes 
assume an acceptable level of variation. Only limes score an r2 value of less than the 90 per 
cent level of explanation. In all cases the level of statistical significance is less than p=0.00001. 
Conscious of these problems, and in the absence of an alternative, the estimates produced by 
these data nevertheless provide useful patterns and questions for purposes of analysis. 
Kariakoo is the most important wholesaling market in Dar es Salaam, therefore any patterns in 
supply which occur within the market are of crucial significance to the whole urban market. In 
addition, the patterns occurring in Kariakoo provide a basis on which it is possible, with 
additional evidence to make inferences about the rest of the city’s fruit and vegetable market.
When produce arrives at the market, the volume is measured using these containers as a single 
unit. Pineapples, papaya and melons, although the latter are rare, are counted as single fruit 
units. The metric tonnage are calculated from these various local units by KMC staff using their 
experience and judgement. No facilities or space are available to weigh every batch of goods 
delivered at the wholesale market. The weight of the produce found in each sack or basket may 
vary for two reasons: firstly, the size of the containers is not consistent; and secondly, the 
density and size of fruit, and therefore the container, varies according to its age and variety. The 
agreed price will make allowances for the proportion of goods estimated to have been 
damaged.
These problems make calculating the weight in kilograms or metric tonnes from the number of 
local units very difficult. However, the problems of the data will be borne in mind in the analysis
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and they will be balanced by use of alternative primary and secondary sources both in this 
chapter and later.
t
Data on the daily tally sheets available at Kariakoo indicate the origin of each batch of produce 
arriving at the market, along with volume of the batch, the types of produce, the registration of 
the vehicle and the name of the person delivering. However, the indication of the area of origin 
can be vague and inconsistent, ranging from reporting a village to a region.
The only indication of the area of origin available in the monthly and daily delivery reports, from 
which the data for this study was taken, were for tomatoes. A group interview of operations 
staff and their manager produced the following list of Kariakoo's sources of tomatoes, in order 
of importance: Lushoto, Iringa, Mbeya, Morogoro, and, finally, Dodoma and Ruvu were 
considered to be roughly equal in importance. The latter two areas, Dodoma and Ruvu tend to 
supply only rarely, accounting for approximately 50 matenga per year. Tomatoes from Lushoto 
mainly come from Mkeiya in Lushoto District. KMC divide the tomatoes into the following four 
groups: Lushoto/Mbeya; Moshi/Dodoma; Morogoro/Ruvu/Mkaiye; and Iringa. These divisions 
reflect the four different tomato varieties, rather than any geographical factors.
The quantitative data collected from Kariakoo are taken from daily and then monthly composites 
of the forms which tally clerks complete as they count the commodities entering the market. All 
of the data handling for the wholesale market is carried out by hand and the records are kept on 
paper in one of the wholesale market's store rooms in the basement. The only use made of 
these data is in the calculation and monitoring of commission charges. The monthly and daily 
data are rarely used when it is beyond one year old and their records are subject to the very 
humid conditions found in Dar es Salaam, and particularly in Kariakoo's basement. Paper left in 
these conditions for a long period mildews and, after some time, becomes unusable.
A representative, but manageable dataset was required for processing. Therefore, a sample 
of data from one randomly selected day from each week from January 1987 to August 1989 was 
taken. The data before this time were incomplete and often difficult to read because of the 
physical deterioration of the records due to high humidity levels in the storeroom. A table of 
random numbers was generated using a pocket calculator with the relevant function (Appendix 
3.6). Using this table, a day from each week was selected as follows: a number 1 would select 
a Monday, a number 2 a Tuesday, and so on up to number 7 selecting Sunday. Any numbers 
greater than 7 were ignored. Using these randomly selected days, data from each day were 
extracted for the the sixteen fruit and vegetable commodities Kariakoo Market Corporation 
consistently record data. A number of minor commodities, such as limes, paw paw, peas and 
ladies fingers (okra) were amalgamated with other commodities or only appeared on the 
records on a seasonal basis.
ee
Data were also collected for the aggregated monthly figures from January 1981 to August 1989. 
This gives a broader, longer term view of Kariakoo Market's commodity deliveries. These data 
are limited to the same sixteen commodities used in the daily samples, for the same reasons.
t
The monthly volumes in local units are used by Kariakoo staff to calculate the volume in metric 
tonnes. However, the mean monthly price refers to the price for the commodities measured in 
local units. In order to obtain comparable data, the author calculated a mean monthly price per 
metric tonne using the monthly value and monthly volume data and this is what will be referred 
to in this study as Kariakoo's mean monthly price. The Kariakoo Market Corporation data on 
mean monthly price based on the local unit will be ignored for the purposes of this study. The 
results of the analysis of this data are presented in Chapter Four.
A considerable quantity of secondary data was also obtained from the Marketing Development 
Bureau, a department of the Ministry of Agriculture. These data comprised monthly reports 
from records of retail market prices for a selected range of fruit and vegetables in Dar es 
Salaam and the markets of Dar es Salaam's chief supply regions. The data used in this analysis 
are collected by the Marketing Development Bureau (MDB), a Food and Agriculture 
Organization and United Nations Development Programme funded office within the Tanzanian 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development (KILIMO). The collection of the monthly 
prices constitutes part of the activities of the Market Information Service (MIS) run by the 
Marketing Development Bureau. This involves approximately 30 KILIMO personnel, in 30 
market towns throughout Tanzania, in the collection of fortnightly prices of 21 food commodities. 
The monthly mean of these is then calculated and recorded in the MIS's Monthly Market Bulletin.
This analysis will examine price data collected for the seven commodities which this data set 
shares with the data already obtained from Kariakoo Market Corporation. These commodities 
are onions, tomatoes, ripe bananas, cabbages, oranges, coconuts and Irish potatoes. In 
addition, the data examined here will be limited to six towns, representing the main supply 
areas for the city of Dar es Salaam; these are Iringa, Lushoto, Mbeya, Morogoro, Moshi and 
Tanga. The data have been recorded on a monthly basis since June 1983, except in the case of 
ripe bananas, where the series begins in November 1984. The data presented in this chapter 
include data collected up to July 1989, shortly before the dataset was obtained by the author 
from the Marketing Development Bureau.
As the time series of the data is relatively short, price variations across time will be analysed by 
highlighting the long term trend through analysis of the mean annual commodity prices. The 
price obtained from the Marketing Development is transformed using United Nations published 
Tanzanian Consumer Price Indices as a deflator to measure the price changes in real terms by 
calculating the prices at 1983 Tanzanian Shilling values. The method of calculation involved the 
calculation of a 1983 Tanzanian Shilling in the subsequent years of the time series. The annual 
mean prices are then multiplied by this value to produce the deflated 1983 prices (TShs(1983)) 
for all the commodities for the entire series. These mean annual real prices are then used to
calculate a mean annual market price margin by subtracting the market town prices from their 
equivalent Dar es Salaam prices.
Seasonal price changes are analysed by calculating the monthly mean price using the current -* 
price values. These monthly means are then used to calculate the monthly mean margins by 
subtracting the market town means from the Dar es Salaam monthly means.
3.1.4 Data Analysis
All the data, both primary and secondary were entered on mainframe computer and analysed 
using SPSSX statistical analysis package. Some data, particularly the results of the analysis of 
the Marketing Development Bureau database were summarised using Microsoft Excel, a 
spreadsheet package. In addition, the data have been presented in graphical form, using 
Cricket Graph, where it was considered this form of presentation would enhance the clarity of 
the discussion.
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3.2 The Rural Producing Study Areas
The rural section of the field research took place in two different locations in Tanzania. Both are 
considered of significance in the supply of fruit and vegetables to the city of Dar es Salaam. 
There follows a description of the two study areas, with particular attention to their potential in 
the production of fruit and vegetables.
Morogoro Rural District
The first of the selected rural field areas is located 200 kilometres west of the city of Dar es 
Salaam. The areas of interest to this study are located on either side of the Uluguru mountain 
block, and ranges in altitude from 1,200 metres to 1,800 metres. They have been described as 
being very similar in ecology to areas of Lushoto in Tanga region in the north of Tanzania, "with 
vegetable growing offering about the only major possibility for a cash crop" (Marketing 
Development Bureau, 1973). The monthly mean temperatures range from 10 °C to 30 °C at 
Langali village (1,200 metres) and from 4 °C to 18 °C at Tchenzema village (1,800 metres). 
Rainfall reliability can be a problem, particularly in lower altitudes where drought has been 
experienced. In the higher altitudes, however, ample water is available in the rainy season in 
the form of the rainfall, and from the springs and rivers in the dry season. Highly developed 
systems of terraced irrigation are evident in the area from below Langali Village up to 
Tchenzema Village, where irrigation makes it possible to obtain up to 3 crops per year 
depending on the vegetable (Marketing Development Bureau, 1973). For example, it is 
possible to grow cabbages all year round at altitudes up to 1,800 m, according to Paul (1988), 
although harvesting between November and January is limited. Given an assured supply of
inputs and good weather conditions, it is possible to produce three cabbage harvests per 
year.
r
During the British colonial period British, Afrikaans and some French settlers brought more 
‘exotic’ fruit and vegetable varieties into the area, including peas, carrots, and salad vegetables 
(such as Chinese lettuce and cucumbers), increasing the diversity of commodities being 
produced and sold to the Morogoro market, where the settlers held the monopoly. As the 
settler economy became more established, with indigenous children requiring school uniforms to 
attend the missionary schools and some consumer goods becoming more available, cash 
became increasingly important to the previously subsistent peasant households. Thus, more 
were persuaded of the value of entering the cash economy. In the late 1940s, missionaries 
began selling fruit and vegetable seedlings cheaply encouraging an expansion of production. 
This coincided with the encouragement of the use of terraces to protect the soils and the 
introduction of yet more varieties of produce.
Traditional systems of production began to disappear as more modern techniques were 
encouraged. The Waluguru had already begun an expansion of the cultivated land area into the 
natural forest of the mountains, to the extent that little of the original forest remains, and the 
leopards who once inhabited the forests are no longer seen in the area. The increasing 
population had also begun to exert pressure on the land's ability to sustain the traditional 
agricultural practices. When the colonists arrived with new innovations for increasing the 
productivity of the land the Waluguru were receptive. With the advent of the market economy, 
in particular, land transactions for money slowly became more common. It has been argued that 
the conversion of the Waluguru to Catholicism served to emphasise individualism and male­
headed family kinships at the expanse of the matrilineal clan system (Paul 1988). The result has 
been that payment of rent in cash by tenants has increased. Intense competition for land has 
been reported, with tenants planting trees on land to add to claims for rights of ownership, 
where previous agreements had been vague. Delobel et al (1989) reported that an 
unexpected 33 per cent of farmers gave this as their reason for planting trees, and that more 
recent evidence suggests this is an increasingly important motivation.
Intensive production of fruit and vegetables began in the Mgeta area in the early 1950s (Paul, 
1988; Hadjivayanis, 1987; Marketing Development Bureau, 1973), this expansion roughly 
coinciding with the departure of most European producers from the region. In the 1960s, a 
second major expansion in production came about after the opening of the Kireka Fruit 
Nursery, in Morogoro town. Sales of seedlings from this nursery, which is now of national 
importance in the stocking of fruit seeds, increased from 12,000 in 1966 on its opening, to 70,000 
in 1971. According to the Ministry of Agriculture extension workers in the Division, this level of 
sales has been more or less maintained since then. Estimates of vegetable production, for 
example, show increases of 25 per cent each year from 1966 to 1970, from 1,760 tons to 3,740 
tons (Table 3.4).
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The Marketing Development Bureau estimates that Tchenzema was producing up to 90 per cent 
of Morogoro Region's total production by 1971 (Marketing Development Bureau, 1973). Much 
of the Region's fruit production is accounted for by the area around Matombo where citrus 
fruits, mangoes and bananas are produced in large quantities. No data were available to aliow 
an estimate of the level of production of fruit in Matombo; however, the area is considered in 
Dar es Salaam to be an important source of these commodities.
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Table 3.4 Tchenzema and Morogoro Fruit and Vegetable Production-1967-71 (Imperial Tons)
1967
Veg Fruit
1968
Veg Fruit
1969
Veg Fruit
1970
Veg Fruit
1971
Veg Fruit
Morogoro Region 6,911 800 6,911 914 9,177 4,116 5,000 4,000 8,000 5,500
TVFCS* 400 250 720 900 650
Private Purchases** 750 2,100 2,000 2,500 1,950
Total Tchenzema
Production! 1,100 2,400 2,980 3,740 2,840 60ft
TVFCS - Tchenzema Vegetable Farmers' Cooperative Society 
Estimates.
t  These estimates includes an estimated 10 per cent of produce consumed on the farm, 
t t  Fruit production is relatively less important in this area because it is suited to the
production of sub-tropical and temperate fruit. There is not a great deal of demand for 
this type of fruit in the country.
Source: Marketing Development Bureau, 1973
The most recent data available showing the Region's output are taken from the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s regional office report to the National Horticultural Seminar in 1983 (Table 3.5). It 
can be seen that the Region produces significant quantities of fruit and vegetable, particularly 
when compared to the volume of fruit and vegetables which passes through Kariakoo wholesale 
market, which is around 70,000 metric tonnes; indeed, it was estimated in 1973 that the Region 
was capable of producing 60 per cent of Dar es Salaam's vegetable requirements (Marketing 
Development Bureau, 1973).
Table 3.5 Morogoro Regional Fruit and Vegetable Production 1980-83 (metric tonnes)
Crop 1980 1981 1982 1983
Vegetables 82,780 68,743 126,510 161,213*
Fruit 54,575 52,695 70,626 75,500*
Estimated
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 1983
The original rationale behind the choice of the Rural District of Morogoro is clear, it is the closest 
high land area to Dar es Salaam, which provides sub-tropical and temperate climates for the 
production of fruit and vegetables. After interviews and discussions with market officials, 
retailers and consumers, it was clear that Mgeta was an important producing district for 
temperate vegetables such as cabbage, lettuce, carrots and peas, and that Matombo was 
equally important for citrus fruits and mangoes.
Lushoto District
The second producing district selected was that of Lushoto in Tanga region. Lushoto District can 
be divided into two distinct zones according to physical geographic characteristics, the West 
Usambara Mountains and the Umba Rains. The Umba Rains are a continuation of the plains 
which stretch from the coastal area through Muheza and are broken by the sharp rise of the 
dome-shaped peaks and ridges of the Usambara Mountains. The Umba Rains are, like the 
plains in Muheza and on the coast, relatively warm, but they are in the rain shadow of the 
mountains and therefore have little rainfall, recording only 500-600 mm annually (TIRDEP, 1985). 
These are not suitable for sustainable agricultural production, and most of the area is bush land 
with occasional areas of swamp. They are mainly given over to the Mkomazi Game Reserve 
and were, therefore, not considered in the study.
The West Usambaras can be comparatively cool, with temperatures dropping as low as 0 °C 
during the cold season between April and August. Mean monthly temperatures lie between 
16 °C and 22 °C. The Usambara Mountains range from 800 metres to 2,000 metres in altitude, 
with mainly natural forest cover on the peaks and ridges of the mountains. Non-laterite red and 
grey loamy mineral soils are to be found on the mountain slopes, while grey to black, fresh 
mineral soils are found in the valley. The natural vegetation has been cleared for cultivation from 
almost all of the area except for the very mountain tops, with slopes even of up to 80 per cent 
gradient being cultivated (Sender and Smith, 1990, p.9). The occurrence of frost is rare, but, 
nonetheless, a possibility. Mean annual rainfall ranges from 1,200 mm to 1,400 mm (Sender and 
Smith, 1990) but rainfall levels as low as 600 mm and as high as 2,000 mm have been recorded 
(SECAP, 1988; TIRDEP, 1985). Two distinct rainy seasons can be distinguished: the long rains 
from March to June (in Kishambaa called Masika) and the short rains, from November to 
January (called Vuli).
Table 3.6 Population Change in the West Usambaras
Year 1978 1984 1988
Population 266,181 304,000 334,435
Increase No data 37,819 30,435
Density (persons/km2) 153 175 192
Mean Annual Growth Rate No data 2.4 2.5
Source: TIRDEP 1985 and Government of Tanzania 1989.
Cliffe et al (1975) have suggested that the most frequently stated problem of Lushoto's 
development crisis is overpopulation. The mountains have one of the highest rural population 
densities in Tanzania; in 1978 this was 153 persons per km2. By 1984 this had increased to an 
estimated 175 persons per km2. The 1988 census of the District reports a population of 
357,255, with an annual increase of 2.5 per cent, and a population density of 192 persons per 
km2 (Table 3.6). Although the annual population increase is not as large as the mean national
growth rate, the male-female ratio of 83:100 gives an indication of the high level of male out­
migration in the area
There is no identifiable soil type which is common to the Mountain area, as they vary 
considerably over relatively short distances. According to Sender and Smith (1990), the soils of 
the Usambaras may be characterised as acid and lacking in nutritional value, with the 
predominant soil type being a red laterite soil, with shallow organic topsoil. The laterite soils 
tends to be found on the wetter higher slopes under forest and are most susceptible to 
deterioration. Cliffe et al (1975) identify more fertile hillslope soils, including red and grey loams 
and grey-to-black fresh soils, which, with conservation techniques such as contour strip cropping, 
contour hedging and even retaining walls in places, provide good farming. In addition, there is 
valley colluvial, providing very fertile soils in a good situation for irrigation. Photograph 3.1 
shows a good example of an intensively cultivated valley bottom near Soni Village. Note the 
careful channelling of the stream and irrigation channels between the plots, and also the contour 
cropping of grasses above the right bank of the stream to reduce soil erosion.
The farmers of Lushoto have gradually entered into the production of commodities through two 
channels (Cliffe et al 1975). The first began with the introduction of settler farms and, more 
recently, has involved a small number of wealthy farmers and state bodies who have bought 
into these large production units. These farms are generally large scale and run on commercial 
lines, requiring significant capital and labour inputs. This has created a class of land owners and 
a class of labourers, (Cliffe et al, 1975).
Secondly, those with sufficient land to be agriculturally viable are able to begin commercial 
production of cash crops on a small scale. Fruit and vegetables became an important market 
for this area because of its temperate climate, and, with irrigation, it is possible to produce 
more than one harvest per year. The arrival of European settlers and missionaries brought in 
many new varieties of fruits and vegetables which were able to mature at much faster rates than 
the traditional subsistence crops, as in the case of Mgeta. Indeed, Delobel et al, (1989) report 
that the first species of temperate fruit trees to be planted in Tanzania were planted in 
Lushoto.
As the population in the area has increased, increasing in turn the pressure on the land's carrying 
capacity, there has been tremendous pressure on the producers to increase output to retain 
economic viability. This was attempted initially through the expansion of cultivated land into 
some of the last natural forest areas of Tanzania, particularly in the 1960s when 3,000 hectares of 
forest reserve were cleared and distributed to farmers in the District (Taube, 1988). More 
recently, producers have adopted exotic varieties of fruit and vegetables and begun using 
agricultural inputs. For example, in the case of tomatoes, a farmer in Lushoto explained that 
different types of fertiliser are required at different stages in the tomatoes’ growth. For a 2 to
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Valley Bottom Cultivation near Soni Village, Lushoto District1
Photograph 3.1
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2.5 hectare plot, he estimated that he would use 100 kg of Triple Super Phosphate when 
transplanting the tomatoes from the nursery to the field, 100 kg of Sulphur Ammonia when the 
plants' flowers begin to appear, and 100 kg of NPK compound fertiliser when the fruits begin
f
to appear. If he planted the tomatoes to time their harvest for the peak in market prices, at the 
end of the long rains (from February to May), he would also require fungicide, preferably 
Dithane M45, which he would apply at a rate of 50 kg per hectare per month for three months. 
However, during the survey it became apparent that the inputs were becoming increasingly 
difficult to purchase. Only producers with access to significant amounts of capital were in a 
position to obtain such inputs, as they were usually only available on the black market at inflated 
prices. For example, one farmer reported that Dithane M45 sold at TShs 25,000 per 25 kg 
sack, although fertilisers generally sell for between TShs 250 and TShs 1,100 per debe 
(approximately equivalent to 14 kg) depending on the type required. However, there are 
significant advantages from investing in these inputs if the capital is available. For example, 
one producer in Lushoto, able to obtain fungicides, now grows tomatoes during the wet 
season, harvesting them in time to be among the first producers to deliver tomatoes in Dar es 
Salaam in late May and early June. He reported that he was able to make a significant profit 
from the extremely high prices for tomatoes at that time of the year. In Dar es Salaam prices in 
excess of TShs 10,000 per tenga were reported in May 1989, when both earlier and later in the 
year prices of TShs 2,000 were accepted. However, given good conditions and inputs, with an 
estimated 10 kilograms of tomatoes per plant and 20,000 plants per hectare, this type of highly 
developed production is only possible for producers with significant quantities of capital and 
land.
3.3 Kariakoo Wholesale Market
Kariakoo Wholesale Market is of crucial importance to the fruit and vegetable supply system for 
Dar es Salaam. It is the only legal wholesale market for these commodities in the city. In spite 
of an increasingly important informal sector Kariakoo still attracts considerable quantities of 
produce. This section will describe the role the market plays in the city’s food system, and the 
way in which the data used in this study is collected.
The history of Kariakoo dates back to 1914 when Tanganyika was a colony of Germany. On the 
site of today's Kariakoo Market a building was erected to house the celebrations for the 
coronation of Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany. After the First World War the British Carrier Corps 
used the coronation building as a camp during the capture of Dar es Salaam from the Germans 
and the name of 'Carrier Corps’, with the Swahili spelling, was adopted as the name of the 
building, and subsequently of the area that was built around it.
In 1919, the building was turned into a market catering for the Dar es Salaam population, with 
goods being sold on the floor of the building until the 1960s when concrete and cement stalls 
were installed. However, it became evident, as the city's population expanded in the early
years of Independence, that the market was too small to cope with the volume of trade. 
Consequently, in 1970, after long discussions, the government finally approved the demolition 
of the old Kariakoo market building to make way for a "modern building of artistic design"
f
(Marketing Development Bureau, 1985). This new building was planned to meet the needs of 
the city for its expected growth over the next 50 to 70 years (Photograph 3.2).
The current Kariakoo Market Complex consists of two floors in the main building (ground and 
upper), and a single level extension for the retailing of food, crafts, clothing, banking and other 
services (Figure 3.4). The wholesale market for fruit, vegetables and fish is in the basement of 
the main building. A street next to the main building is also used for the wholesaling and 
retailing of coconuts. The entire complex is owned and operated by Kariakoo Market 
Corporation (KMC), a company owned jointly by central government and the Dar es Salaam 
City Council. The main trading floor is 2,400 square metres, with products of the same broad 
type being grouped together on the trading floor. The trading floor is served by a through 
road entering and exiting the basement via ramps to and from the road level. The road passes 
at a lower level at one end allowing lorries to be easily unloaded onto the floor level from the 
eight loading bays. The loading bay area is about 1,000 square metres and during busy 
periods, including the period of this survey, part of this is used as a spill-over trading area.
Pedestrian access to the trading area is by two stairways at the opposite end of the basement 
from the access ramps. The area at this end of the trading floor is used for sub-wholesaling, 
because it is too far from the access ramps, and has a small number of stalls. The immense 
volumes of fruit and vegetables handled in Kariakoo have meant that all the storage rooms and 
cold stores have had to be opened up for use as trading floor space. The store rooms are 
mainly used for sub-wholesaling, because these are all located at the stairway end of the 
building and access to each room is restricted to a single door. Stalls have been provided for 
sub-wholesaling. The wholesaling of coconuts takes place on a side-street outside the market 
due to a lack of space inside the market building. This area consists of 1,700 square metres, of 
which 1,100 square metres is for wholesaling only.
When it was constructed in 1975, as the only legally specified wholesale market for fruit and 
vegetables in Dar es Salaam, the market was designed to deal with approximately 30,000 
metric tonnes of produce per year. The wholesale market reported a peak annual delivery of 
92,787 tonnes between July 1980 and June 1981, and has been handling approximately 70,000 
tonnes annually since 1983. The only legal controls or interventions in the marketing of fruit and 
vegetables are that, firstly, the wholesaling must be dealt with in Kariakoo by KMC-registered 
auctioneers; secondly, the 'farmers'2 delivering produce are subject to a 6 per cent
Although called a "farmer" by the Kariakoo Market Corporation, the people bringing 
produce to the wholesale market may also be full-time commodity traders.
Kariakoo Market Building from the South East3 
(Auxiliary retail market building in fore-ground)
Photograph 3.2
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Layout of Kariakoo Wholesale Market 
(Kariakoo Market Complex, Basement)
Figure
commission payable to KMC; and thirdly, the KMC advise maximum and minimum prices for 
each of the commodities, although these are not binding.
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In reality, however, the General Manager of KMC is aware that, at the time the new market 
complex came into operation in 1975, it accounted for an estimated 90 per cent of Dar es 
Salaam's fruit and vegetable wholesaling, whereas now it accounts for an estimated 60-70 per 
cent. Indeed, Kariakoo has not been able to absorb the increased fruit and vegetable trade 
because of the physical constraints of limited capacity, as indicated by the relatively stable 
levels of goods passing through the wholesale market since 1981. An additional factor in the 
reduced importance of Kariakoo as a wholesale market is the attraction of avoiding the 6 per 
cent commission, which both 'pushes' and 'pulls' traders into 'informal wholesaling' on the 
'parallel market'. This means that up to 40 per cent of fruit and vegetables entering the city of 
Dar es Salaam may not be levied a commission.
Figure 3.5 Types of Transport Delivering at Kariakoo Wholesale Market (Percentages)
1980 1981 1982
Total
Vehicles
1983 1984
Year
1985 1986 1987 Mean
a Others
□ Bus
m Pick-ups
□ Lorries
24,585 31,768 36,917 37,083 37,895 21,110 44,325 24,853 32,317
Total
Volume
(M.Tonnes)
n/a 57,683 61,931 68,731 72,841 69,090 70,107 68746 iiiit iis 67,018
Source: Kariakoo Market Corporation Records, 1981-88
The produce arrives at Kariakoo market by a variety of means of transport including lorry, pickup 
and bus. Data were collected from KMC's Annual Reports for the different methods of 
transportation by which each fruit and vegetable delivery arrived at the market. The data 
available were for the years 1980 to 1987 and the percentage breakdowns are presented in 
Figure 3.5. The mean percentages show that lorries account for 61 per cent of the vehicles 
delivering fruit or vegetables at Kariakoo's wholesale market averaged over the time period 
1980-87. It should, however, be pointed out that because the lorries have a far greater capacity 
than any other form of transport, they therefore account for a far greater proportion of the 
volume of commodities involved.
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The percentage values plotted over time show that the number of lorries increased to account 
for 79 per cent of the delivery vehicles in 1981, but subsequently decreased annually to account
f
for 41 per cent in 1987. The use of pick-ups peaks three times across the time period, with 25
per cent in 1980, 25 per cent in 1984 and 24 per cent in 1987. Between the peaks the troughs
are 16 per cent in 1981 and 13 per cent in 1986. Over the period 1980-87, the annual average
was 21 per cent. The use of buses shows a continued increase in importance throughout the
»
period, after an initial drop from 8 per cent in 1981 to 4 per cent in 1982, climbing to account for 
19 per cent by 1987. The 'others' category includes informal transport such as hitching lifts, 
taking a bus and carrying by headload or hand cart (itnkokotem). This category has seen a 
sustained increase from 3 per cent in 1980 to 29 per cent in 1986, before declining to a level of 
16 per cent in 1987. Figure 3.6 is a graph of the absolute vehicle numbers and shows a general 
trend of increasing use of buses and 'other1 modes of transport. In contrast, it also shows a 
decreasing trend in the use of lorries and the use of pick-ups.
Figure 3.6 Types of Vehicle Delivering to Kariakoo Wholesale Market
Number of 
Vehicles
Year
Kariakoo Market Corporation Records, 1981-88
The large increase of deliveries made by 'other1 transport in 1986 - by a factor of three, and 
almost six times the number of the previous year - is exceptional and is difficult to explain 
using the data available from Kariakoo. An explanation must be sought in the wider economy 
of the country for the large changes in the delivery vehicles' profile for the years 1985 and 1986. 
In 1985 the Tanzanian economy was in severe difficulties. The Tanzanian government had been 
locked in bitter negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for five years, and the per 
capita income had declined steadily over the previous 5 years. Annual GDP growth, at 2.3 per 
cent, was unable to keep pace with the population growth of 3.3 per cent. The foreign trade
deficit was at an all-time high at 249 per cent of export earnings (almost double the previous 
year). The chronic lack of foreign exchange affected the availability and price of important 
imports such as petroleum and vehicle spares. The Structural Adjustment Programme had been 
in place for the whole of its three year period and no obvious benefits had accrued to the 
economy. All these effects on the nation's economy hit the Dar es Salaam fruit and vegetable 
suppliers by the increased cost of transport. As the increased cost of petrol and spare parts 
pushed up the cost of hiring a lorry for transporting, so the traders-appear to have sought 
alternative and more efficient means of transport. This is demonstrated in the markedly 
increased use of 'other' forms of transport and also in the increased mean size of deliveries per 
vehicle shown in Table 3.7.
In addition to these issues, the question of why the number of vehicles in 1987 has returned to 
the 1980 level must be addressed. The year 1986 saw an increase in economic confidence in 
Tanzania, with the election of a new President and an agreement with the IMF, and 
subsequently, most other aid organisations, who had been awaiting the outcome of the IMF 
negotiations. These circumstances are highlighted by the fact that the number of vehicles 
delivering to Kariakoo dropped from 38,000 in 1984 to 21,000 in 1985 and then rose the 
following year to 44,000, while the total volume of deliveries to the market fell by only 3,000 to 
69,000 tonnes and rose again by only 1,000.
Table 3.7 Mean Size of Delivery per Vehicle (metric tonnes)
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Mean Delivery
per vehicle 1.816 1.678 1.853 1.922 3.273 1.582 2.766
Source: Author's calculations from Kariakoo Market Corporation data
The contrast between these two years and the rest of the period is most clearly seen in Figure 
3.6. This graph plots the number of vehicles against each year and shows the decline in 'formal', 
hired transport and the more 'informal' transport, such as buses and 'other modes'. The most 
striking aspect of this graph is the dramatic fall in the number of lorries and of pick-ups 
delivering to Kariakoo in 1985. These are the two main methods of transportation used by 
commercial traders delivering to Kariakoo, the lorries over long distances and the pick-ups over 
distances in and around the city and its surrounding region. Clearly, the increased cost of 
transport has forced many of these traders to seek alternative means of transport.
Alternatively, this may be explained by the effect of giving each District authority the power to 
set up road blocks to prevent illegal flows of food. This constrained the movement of food, 
although from the evidence in Figure 3.5 it would appear that the deliveries continued, they 
simply arrived in different ways. In 1986 Prime Minister Sokoine ordered the relaxation of the 
flow of foods towards the main towns, and according to informants interviewed during the 
research, a 'blind eye' was turned to the unofficial use of parastatal vehicles in transporting of
food. This resulted in the number of lorries delivering to Kariakoo Wholesale Market increasing 
again, as does the number of pick-ups, but not to the same level. This may also be explained 
partly by the increased business confidence as the the Economic Recovery Programme was
f
adopted, bringing with it agreements with the IMF, The World Bank and many of the country's 
major bilateral donors. The mean volume per delivery reduces again in this year. In 1987 the 
total number of vehicles returned to a similar level to that of 1980. However, the volume of 
deliveries per vehicle has increased again whilst the number of lorries and 'other* vehicles 
delivering to Kariakoo has gone down.
Lorries and pick-ups, hired for the specific purpose of transporting fruit and vegetables to 
Kariakoo, can be considered 'formal' modes of transport. In this case, the bus and 'others' 
categories are informal modes of transport. Dividing the transportation in this way reveals the 
trend from 1981 to 1988, that formal modes of transport have declined from a peak of 95 per 
cent in 1982 to 59 per cent in 1986. Consequently, the informal modes of transport have 
increased from 5 per cent to 41 per cent, ending the period at 35 per cent. This shift in 
emphasis, away from a reliance on specifically hired lorries and pick-ups, requiring greater initial 
capital outlay, reflects the increased transport costs associated with these two types, resulting 
from the continually increasing fuel prices and more expensive imported spare parts, caused 
by the unfavourable terms of trade.
These vehicles are met at the market entrance by a KMC tally clerk, who counts the volume of 
the various commodities in each vehicle. Once the vehicle's load has been counted, the vehicle 
is directed down an entrance ramp to a free loading bay in the basement, where the wholesale 
market is located. At the loading bay the produce is counted by a different tally clerk and the 
final total agreed with the 'farmer'. The value of the produce is then calculated, using the current 
minimum price, and a 6 per cent commission is levied on the supplier. The vehicle leaves the 
basement by a different exit ramp. The 'farmer1 then negotiates a deal with a KMC registered 
auctioneer to have the produce auctioned on the trading floor, or he may try to sell direct to a 
buyer. The latter option has only been allowed in the last five years, before which a KMC 
registered auctioneer was the only person with which the 'farmer' could do business.
The buyer may be a sub-wholesaler, who will break the delivery into smaller quantities for 
resale to other buyers; a contract buyer, who buys on behalf of a large institution such as a 
corporation, a hotel or a prison; or a retailer, or group of retailers, who will transport their 
purchases to their retail market by pick-up or mkokoteni. This issue of transporting to the retail 
markets will be returned to in the next chapter.
A further source of fruit and vegetables, becoming increasingly important, is for Dar es Salaam 
residents to adopt the strategy of growing their own crops in or near to the city. It is very 
difficult to estimate how important this practice currently is, but observations around the city 
clearly demonstrate its importance; Dar es Salaam residents report that they and their
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neighbours are increasingly turning to this strategy for obtaining food (see Briggs, 1990; 1991). 
Finally, the KMC are also aware that the maximum and minimum prices they set may have little 
bearing on the actual prices agreed on the trading floor. Kariakoo Market Corporation, when it 
was formed in 1975, was given the task of managing the only legal wholesale market for fruit and 
vegetables in Dar es Salaam. Within this market, however, the wholesalers are free to act, and 
KMC has no direct marketing involvement. As the managing organisation, KMC is involved not 
only in providing and charging for market facilities, but also administering a commission charge 
on the produce delivered at the wholesale market. In addition, one aspect of this management 
has been to set weekly maximum and minimum prices as a guide-line for market trading. In 
reality, however, there is little monitoring and no regulation of the negotiated prices, and KMC 
is aware that these guide-lines are frequently exceeded. The KMC interview what they call 
‘price leaders’ to get an estimation of a fair range of prices for the commodities. It is on this 
basis that the guide-lines are decided. However, the differing sizes, qualities, and varieties of 
the commodities and the different conditions under which individual prices are negotiated, make 
this kind of price estimation very difficult. The maxima and minima, therefore, may exert some 
influence, but the settlement price is entirely between the buyer and the seller.
The large volumes of goods passing through the wholesale market cause problems for the 
provision and maintenance of a safe, clean trading environment. The storage and movement of 
commodities, and the disposal of a large amount of organic waste resulting from both rotted or 
damaged produce, as well as the materials used for packaging, is an increasingly important 
problem. The disposal of this waste becomes more crucial and more problematic, as the 
volume of goods and packaging material increases and the market becomes increasingly 
congested. The underground ventilation system is not adequate to cope with the high relative 
humidity (which can exceed 85 per cent), high temperatures (which can exceed 30°C), and the 
increased number of people and produce passing through the market.
Kariakoo was intended to play the central role in the distribution of fruit and vegetables to the 
Dar es Salaam population. The government-owned KMC was given a degree of control over 
the market, consequently, it vets and registers traders, monitors and levies a commission on 
produce entering the market, charges traders for market facilities and sets price guide-lines. In 
this way, it was hoped to bring the marketing channels under central control and protect the 
supply chain to the city population from speculators and racketeers. Sporrek (1985) discusses a 
number of stages in the development of an urban marketing chain system. Figure 3.7, presents 
a series of model supply systems, in which he argues that model A best describes the way 
Kariakoo was expected to fit into Dar es Salaam’s food supply system. The models B and C 
are seen by Sporrek as previous stages in the development of a marketing chain resulting in a 
hierarchy of institutions involved in the marketing process. The previous stages involve, firstly, 
direct producer-consumer and producer-producer transactions, either by cash or by barter 
(Model C). Secondly, a system develops where a number of individuals with capital are able 
to begin trading full-time and facilitate the trade between the producers and consumers (Model
B). The final stage is where an organised state intervention facilitates the marketing and at the 
same time regulates the prices, ensuring a minimum of exploitation by the middlemen.
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Figure 3.7 Sporrek’s Models of Food Supply System Development
Clearly, in 1976, when Sporrek (1985) carried out his fieldwork, it could be argued that the Dar es 
Salaam marketing chain had reached Stage A. Table 3.8 gives the responses of retail sellers of 
various food commodities to the question as to their source of supply. The lowest percentage 
response for Kariakoo is for spinach at 85 per cent. Twenty out of the twenty-five commodities 
listed have 95 per cent or more sellers buying from Kariakoo. Since that time, however, 
Kariakoo has reached an apparent wholesale ceiling capacity of approximately 70,000 tonnes 
annually. The increase in demand for fruit and vegetables in Dar es Salaam can reasonably be 
expected to follow the growth of population; given the intercensal population growth rate for 
Dar es Salaam (1978-88) of 4.8 per cent per annum, and KMC's acceptance that Kariakoo 
accounts for a decreasing percentage of the market, this suggests that the concurrent increase in 
demand for fruit and vegetables is being met through other channels. This being the case, 
Kariakoo will account for a decreasing proportion of the city's wholesaling activities, with 'farmers' 
seeking alternative sources for their produce.
The fruit and vegetables are packed by the producers or the transporters into a container that is 
both easily handled and gives a level of protection to the goods. Three types of containers are 
used for long distance transportation: a large oval basket (tenga), accounting for 40 to 80 
kilograms; a large canvas sack {gunia), accounting for 80 to 120 kilograms; and a used heavy duty 
plastic fertiliser bag {mfuko), accounting for 40 to 60 kilograms. Pineapples, being a much larger 
and also far more robust fruit, are usually transported loose. In addition, cooking bananas, also 
relatively robust, are transported on the large stalk on which the bunches of bananas grow. A 
'stalk' of bananas is known as a tnkungu, and may contain up to 150 bananas.
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Table 3.8 Dar es Salaam Retailers' Sources of Fruit and Vegetable Supply in 1976
Item Number of 
Sellers
Sources of Supply
Kariakoo llala Own Prod. Other No Answer
Onions 1256 1197(95%) 18 . 27 14
Tomatoes 1073 1033 (96%) 15 2 • 7 16
Oranges 1056 1034(98%) 11 r 1 9
Coconuts 753 741 (98%) - 2 2 8
Bananas 698 683(98%) 4 - 1 10
Limes 497 478 (96%) 10 - - 9
Mangoes 449 438(98%) 2 - - 9
Lemons 378 374(99%) 4 - - -
Ladies Fingers 337 332(99%) 3 - - 2
Tangerines 301 297(99%) 3 - - 1
Irish Potatoes 210 208(99%) - - - 2
Cabbage 175 164(94%) 1 - 4 6
Spinach 120 102(85%) 2 9 - 7
Beans 102 88(86%) - - 5 9
Paw paw 99 96(97%) - - 3 -
Peas 34 33(97%) 1 - • •
Source: Sporrek 1985
Tomatoes, ripe bananas and occasionally oranges are transported in the large oval baskets 
(tenga). There are two general sizes of baskets referred to by market traders interviewed. The 
first, and by far the most common according to the informants, holds about 60 to 80 kgs of 
produce, depending on the type of commodity. The second, which is comparatively rare, is 
usually about half the size, holding 40 to 50 kgs. The baskets are wide, but shallow, and 
therefore give some protection to the more delicate fruit usually carried in them, by their more 
rigid basket material and by restricting the number of fruits that can be stacked on top of each 
other inside the container. Alternatively, coconuts, Irish potatoes, onions, cabbages, oranges 
and occasionally green mangoes are packed in the large canvas gunny sacks, containing anything 
from 80 to 120 kgs of produce. Ripe mangoes, green mangoes, lemons and limes are 
transported in the heavy-duty plastic bags, which generally carry approximately half the weight 
of the sacks. Their smaller size allows more care to be taken in handling and restricts the 
combined weight of the contents reducing the possibility of crushing the fruits packed at the 
bottom of the bag.
Perishability is a second major problem in the transportation of these goods. The process of 
decomposition begins as soon as the fruit or vegetable has been picked or harvested (Jones, 
1987). This process can be slowed by keeping the goods in low temperatures and preventing 
damage by bruising. Refrigeration and refrigerated transport would clearly be the ideal 
solution. However, the capital investment involved in this type of technology is not available. 
Temperature is kept at a reasonable level by the ventilation given by the holes in the baskets 
and, to a lesser extent, in the sacks. If, however, grass or some other type of organic material 
is used to give extra protection, this may reduce any possibility of ventilation. This additional 
packing material, unless dried, also decomposes and, if kept in unventilated conditions, begins
to generate heat as a by-product of the decomposition process, accelerating the perishing of 
the commodities it is supposed to protect. In the case of the mfuko, or plastic bags, of course, 
ventilation through the material is impossible. Jones (1987) suggests that attempts to store 
fresh produce in Tanzania have tended to rely too mush on expensive technology. For 
example, he suggests that in order to store fruit at a temperature of 10-12° C “a simple fan 
blowing air into a store through as box containing straw with water dripping through is an 
effective device which also has the advantage of maintaining the humidity required to prevent 
the fruit from drying out” (Jones, 1987, p.26-27). He also suggests that it would be extremely 
profitable to examine the possibility of using recently developed technology in solar powered 
refrigeration, although, with the caveat that at this time the fresh fruit market is not developed 
enough to financially justify this level of investment.
The problems of perishability and the lack of refrigerated transportation and storage facilities 
mean that the fruit and vegetables must be transported rapidly to Kariakoo, so as to arrive in 
time for early trading and to be rapidly passed down the distribution chain to the retailers.
Long distance bus travel and road transportation in Tanzania is generally carried out overnight to 
avoid the high temperatures experienced during the day, often exceeding 30°C. This overnight 
journey also brings the produce to the market at the opening of the day's wholesale trading at 5 
am.
3.4 Dar es Salaam Retail Markets 
Mwenge Market
Mwenge market is situated on the corner of Bagamoyo Road and Sam Nujoma Road (Figure
3.1 and in Photograph 3.3). The market began developing beside the important bus terminal, 
which is also located at this junction, in 1975. The site was officially taken over by the city 
authorities in 1977 and the market currently has 75 registered retailers, who each pay TShs 500 
per year or TShs 20 per day for their stall. This contributes to the provision of a secretary, 
water and a telephone. Another TShs 200 per stall per month is paid to the city council, who 
are responsible for maintaining the stalls and clearing rubbish.
The market traders generally buy their produce from Kariakoo wholesale market. Notable 
exceptions to this are those selling mchicha, a type of spinach, which is widely grown on waste 
land or urban garden plots around the city. In addition, between August and October, 
tomatoes are bought from Kunduchi village, a little further along the Bagamoyo Road, to be 
brought into Mwenge for sale, as these are often cheaper and fresher than those available 
elsewhere.
Stalls inside Mwenge Market, Dar es Salaam4
Photograph 3.3
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Original in colour
Typically traders purchasing from Kariakoo take a bus to arrive there at about 5 am every 
morning in order to purchase their produce. They then usually hire a pick-up or a car to transport 
the produce back to their market. Where smaller amounts are involved traders will either group 
together to hire a pick-up, or return individually with their produce by bus. During the survey, a 
number of the retailers reported that one trader, who has a stall at the market, tried to sell fruit 
and vegetables in wholesale quantities to the other market retailers. The retailers were 
generally reluctant to agree to this, as it meant that they did not know, what the market price for 
the commodities was in the main wholesale markets. In the main, the retailers preferred to go 
to purchase their commodities themselves. Although this meant longer working days and the 
additional cost of transporting the commodities to the retail market, the traders interviewed 
expressed concern that buying from someone who supplied them at their own market place 
would mean that they would lose out on the possibility of obtaining a good price at the 
wholesale market. They feared losing the margin they were able to make by having to pay 
someone else to deliver to them, when they could do this themselves.
When pressed, the market secretary did acknowledge that, in spite of Kariakoo having the legal 
wholesale monopoly, some retailers went to Tandika and Tandale markets in search of wholesale 
goods. He went on to say, however, that it was difficult to estimate how many did this. He 
suggested that Kariakoo remained the most important source for fruit and vegetables for 
Mwenge retailers, followed by Tandale and then Tandika. The market secretary reported that, 
to some extent, the sources of produce depended on the season. For example, in the case 
of oranges, when oranges from Kilwa (Lindi Region, south of Dar es Salaam) are in season, 
Tandika is the best market, and Mwenge retailers sometimes travel to purchase oranges there. 
When oranges from Tanga or Morogoro are in season, Kariakoo or Tandale are the better 
markets. In the case of Tandale, this is because of its location on the main road into Dar es 
Salaam from these source areas, providing it with a prime site for off-loading arriving lorries. In 
the case of Kariakoo, it has off- and on-loading facilities unlike other markets, and it also has the 
additional advantage, of being the only legal market. For Mwenge traders Kariakoo is also the 
main source for cabbage, carrots, onions, peas and apples, and competes with Ubungo and 
Manzese for bananas, and with Tandale for mangoes. Potatoes mainly come from Manzese or 
Tandika (Table 3.9).
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Table 3.9 Summary of the Main Wholesale Sources for Mwenge Market
Source Commodities
Kariakoo oranges, cabbages, onions, bananas, carrots, peas, apples,
mangoes
Tandika oranges, potatoes, tangerines, pawpaws
Tandale/Manzese bananas, mangoes
Kunduchi pawpaws, tomatoes
Ubungo bananas
Source: Interview with Mwenge Market Secretary
Tandale Market
Tandale market was established in 1979 by Dar es Salaam City Council in an attempt to move 
market trading, which had developed spontaneously at the side of Morogoro Road at 
Manzese, away from an already highly congested urban artery. The city council initially 
constructed concrete huts and stalls and a permanent roof, and as the market has expanded, 
traders have added temporary stalls and shelter around the permanent trading area. The 
market place has expanded rapidly and has become a very busy, heavily congested area, with 
pedestrians mixing with large trucks and pick-ups. The main activities of the market fall into two 
parts, the wholesale section, which operates around the formal market building, and the retail 
section which exists within the main building.
Tandale's location, close to the main road from Morogoro and north and central Tanzania, makes 
it ideal for a delivery point for transporters of fruit and vegetables, as well as for staple foods. 
Since the liberalisation of the staple markets, Tandale has been legitimised as an important 
wholesale source of cassava, millet and maize, but is it also a good unofficial source of kidney 
beans, citrus fruits, mangoes, bananas, tomatoes and sugarcane.
While carrying out the survey at Tandale, the author interviewed a revenue collector employed 
by the Kariakoo Market Corporation to collect levies for those engaged in wholesale dealing of 
tomatoes, onions, sugarcane, bananas, and the other non-staple foods that should by law be 
sold through Kariakoo. He said that the reason for producers and retailers dealing outside 
Kariakoo was to avoid the levies which are charged there. He reported that KMC has revenue 
collectors who are also sent to Buguruni and Ubungo, but he acknowledged that they have a 
very difficult job to do, since the KMC offers no facilities at these sites and they cannot force 
the traders and dealers to pay, so they have to make concessions, and rarely are they able to 
collect the full levy.
Often those coming to Tandale have small quantities and do not wish to get involved with the 
bureaucracy of the Kariakoo wholesale market. It is easier to sell a small quantity undetected at 
a market such as Tandale. Nevertheless there are still those who prefer to go to Kariakoo 
because it provides facilities which are particularly useful for those with large loads. It is 
possible to lock the building at night, there is electricity for lighting to work by, particularly 
important early in the morning when produce is being bought by city retailers and being 
delivered by lorries from up country. In Tandale, according the KMC levy collector, himself, 
there is "... no light, no security, no nothing".
A typical negotiation over this commission charge between the revenue collector and the trader 
would take the following lines: the delivery from a sliatnba 5 is likely to consist of 20,000 oranges,
5 Sliamba is the Swahili word given to the traditional small farm.
at 250 per tenga 6 , making 80 maienga. The revenue collector will approach the trader, who has 
brought the batch to the market and point out the levy which is charged on all fresh food 
brought into Dar es Salaam. At the time of the interview (August 1989) this would be TShs 54 
per tenga for oranges, making a total for the load of TShs 4,320. The trader would point out that 
he had not been able to sort through his goods since arriving and about half would be wasted 
and unsaleable and, therefore, not taxable. Intense negotiations would be entered into at this 
point each arguing their case until a proportion of wastage is agreed, including perhaps a 
discount for not actually using Kariakoo's facilities and often limited by what the trader claims to 
have in cash. The compromise payment is then worked out and the two parties agree.
There are approximately 100 wholesale traders operating in Tandale, although the number 
varies throughout the year. There are no records of wholesale traders and so it is difficult to 
know how accurate an estimate this is. The wholesalers selling fruit and vegetables have 
constructed their own stalls, which generally consist of woven palm leave dividers used to create 
a large, shallow basket into which the fruit is piled. The traders sit behind these piles and sell 
their goods.
The wholesale market for staple foods exists at the same site. The staple grains are 
transported in large hessian sacks {gunia). These are piled up to heights of up to six feet and 
the traders are often found sitting on top of these piles. Large lorries travelling in to Dar es 
Salaam to deliver to this staple wholesale market or to elsewhere in the city, often pick up 
farmers with their produce and take them into the city for an arranged fee. Alternatively the 
drivers may take the initiative themselves and buy produce to sell on arrival in Dar es Salaam. 
The market at Tandale is in a good position to capitalise on this business, as it is near one of 
the main arteries feeding into the city.
The retail area is located in the main building built by the city council in 1979. Many of the 
concrete stalls are used by those selling higher value goods such as fish or meat. The fruit and 
vegetable sellers are housed under wooden huts which were also built by the city. Traders 
have added their own stalls to this since the market opened. These sellers pay TShs 30 per 
day if they come for a short period. Those trading for a longer period pay TShs 500 per month 
as a maintenance fee to use the city built structures, while those in their own structure pay only 
TShs 200 per month. All traders pay TShs 500 per year for their licence, this works out at TShs 
2,900 per trader per year in the self-built structures, or TShs 6,500 per year to use the city built 
stalls.
The temporary retailers tend to be either farmers who live just outside the city boundary, 
occasionally coming to the market to retail their own products and possibly also those of their 
neighbours, or, alternatively, Tandale retailers who travel out to Mbezi, buy from producers
6 Tenga (plural: matenga) a large hand made reed basket for carrying more delicate fruit 
and vegetables, such as oranges, tomatoes or ripe mangoes.
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there and return to Tandale to sell these goods. The revenue collector reported that those 
arriving from not far outside Dar es Salaam came by pickup, while those travelling a greater 
distance arrived by lorry or, less commonly, by bus.
Tandika Market
Tandika Market is a large market serving the southern part of Dar es Salaam where producers 
play an important part in the retailing and wholesaling process. The Market Secretary estimated 
that there are 485 fruit and vegetable traders, which includes all those selling on the streets 
outside the market. The City Council, which runs Tandika market, provides traders with refuse 
clearance, security (in the form of militia guards), and the use of toilets. In return, those traders 
who had use of huts provided for trading paid TShs 200 per month. Those who did not have 
use of a hut had to pay a levy on their sales. Examples of the levy rates are presented in 
Table 3.10.
Table 3.10 Levy Rates for Tandika Traders (August 1989)
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Commodity TShs per Pakacha 7
potatoes 30
cassava 30
oranges 30
Source: Interview with the Market Secretary
The Market Secretary reported that produce arriving in Tandika comes mainly from Rufiji, but 
also from the fringes of southern Dar es Salaam near to the Kilwa Road, the main road leading 
south from the city. Other key supply areas include Kimanzachana, Mkulanga, which are both 
on the Kilwa Road, and Ikwiriri in the Rufiji Basin. According to him a great deal of produce 
arriving at Tandika arrives direct from the rural areas to the south of the city, although he did say 
that cabbages mainly came from Kariakoo. Vegetables such as cabbages require cooler 
climates, which are not available along the coast south of Dar es Salaam. It is likely, therefore, 
that the reason cabbages sold in Tandika are bought from Kariakoo is that they are supplied to 
the city by traders from the northern and central highlands, who prefer to sell at Kariakoo. The 
reasons for this preference for Kariakoo has been discussed in detail earlier.
The busiest period for the market extends from May through to October. The market, 
however, is particularly vulnerable to heavy or extended rainy seasons, as its main supply 
artery, the Kilwa Road, is well-known to be unable to withstand heavy rains without becoming 
impassable.
Pakacha is a small basket formed by weaving the strands of two palm leaves 
together.
According to the Market Secretary the market is expanding all the time, and the removal of 
refuse from the market site is becoming a problem as the market becomes increasingly 
congested. He particularly made reference to the lack of tools and equipment for this job, 
specifically mentioning the problem of not having access to a truck for clearing cesspits.
Ubungo Market
Ubungo Market is situated on the junction of Morogoro Road and what is now called Nelson 
Mandela Road 8. It is located near to the main city council weighbridge and at the terminus of 
several urban bus routes. Its location as the first main market place on the Morogoro Road on 
entering the city puts it in an advantageous position to receive informal deliveries of wholesale 
foods from central and northern Tanzania. The Nelson Mandela Road is where lorries heading 
for the port turn off to avoid the city centre, and as there is only one other smaller market place 
on the way to the port area, lorry drivers who have food to sell frequently stop at Ubungo.
The retailers at Ubungo pay for a licence and a rent on their stalls, as described in the other 
market places. There was at one time a partnership between the traders in the market. 
However, this has since collapsed. The traders’ descriptions of this partnership and the 
circumstances of its collapse are vague, although it was described by some as a cooperative. 
The traders now pay a small contribution towards security (again in the from of militia guards), 
refuse collection and some other services. It was reported that there were 120 traders on the 
Market Secretary’s records, all of whom were retailers. According to the Market Secretary, there 
were no wholesalers operating at Ubungo: "wholesalers are those with a special clearance, in 
the form of a licence, from Kariakoo Market." The evidence obtained in the form of reports from 
other market secretaries as well as consumers who purchase from the market contradict the 
Market Secretary's account, suggesting that the market is a good source of bananas, both retail 
and wholesale.
Although Kariakoo is the most important source of fruit and vegetables, Tandale is of secondary 
importance. The retailers buy maize, rice, tomatoes, cabbages, mangoes, fish, sugarcane, 
onions, potatoes, yams, Irish potatoes, bananas, carrots, egg plants and some mchicha from 
both Kariakoo and Tandale. Occasionally supplies are brought directly from producing areas 
such as Morogoro, Mbeya, Iringa: bananas, potatoes, oranges, millet, fish, cabbages, beans, 
rice, maize, groundnuts, cassava, and peas may be acquired in this way. Mchicha is typically 
bought from producers in the nearby area and brought to the market by the retailers, or, 
alternatively, it may be brought to the market by producers themselves, some of whom also 
sell it direct to consumers. Some traders in the market have what they described as "long term 
trading bonds" with wholesalers, where they agree to purchase their goods from the same 
supplier. In return they may receive preferential rates. However, in practice, these
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Nelson Mandela Road was named after the South African political leader, when he 
visited the city after he was freed from prison. The road was known as the Port 
Access Road at the time of the survey.
agreements are not formal and depend on the availability of the commodity the retailer is 
looking for. Cliffe et al (1975) described circumstances in Lushoto where some producers would 
send supplies of fruit and vegetables to relatives in the either Tanga town or in Dar es Salaam, 
rather than selling it to traders or transporting it into the city to sell to retailers they do not know. 
This has the advantage of both the retailer and the supplier knowing and trusting each other and 
cutting out the handling between the producer and retailer, which would inevitably result in 
increased margins for each. However, they also described such kin-related transactions as rarely 
occurring regularly and not always involving immediate cash repayments.
Food supplies to Ubungo market can be badly affected during the rainy season, from March to 
May, when produce does not arrive in the city, being held up by flooding or impassable roads. 
On the other hand, oranges, fish, maize and beans have annual peak seasons of supply, 
occasionally causing a glut.
The traders use a five tonne lorry for transporting some produce to the market. Consumers 
buying in bulk often hire mikokoteni (a hand-pushed cart) to transport their purchases home, but 
not usually for distances of over 11/2 miles. Mkokoteni (plural: mikokoteni) is a relatively
inexpensive method of transporting a limited amount of produce over a short distance, and is 
generally used by traders close to their source (Sporrek, 1985). For example, mkokoteni are 
regularly seen operating from Kariakoo to Kisutu Market, a distance of approximately 1 km, or 
ten minutes. At the time of the survey, this journey would have cost approximately of TShs 
100, although this, as in the case of almost all informal transportation in Tanzania, is negotiable, 
depending on the size and value of the load, distance and the negotiating skills of those striking 
the deal. From Kariakoo, distances further than Kisutu are likely to be considered too far, or a 
considerably larger price is demanded. If their purchases are too large or the distance is too far 
for mikokoteni, the wholesale buyer may hire a pick-up either alone or together with someone 
else.
Kinondoni Market
Kinondoni market represents the top end of the market in terms of quality. It is known around 
the city of Dar es Salaam as the TX Market’, because it caters for the tastes of the expatriate 
community, whose vehicles generally have registration numbers beginning with the letters TX’. 
The Market officials and retailers proved considerably less cooperative than in the other 
markets. It proved impossible to obtain an interview with any market officials in the time 
available, and as a result their cooperation in the survey of the traders did not go beyond 
granting permission. Much less qualitative information, therefore, was obtained about this 
market.
The market is not large, with about 60 retailers. The quality of the produce is far superior to that 
on display in the other markets visited, but the prices are also higher. The retailers explained 
that they purchase the freshest possible fruit and vegetables, discarding any of poor quality
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and this increases their costs. They also have to discard any produce which begins to lose its 
freshness and this must be added to the cost of purchase. Their customers come from the area 
around Msasani peninsula and Oyster Bay, which is where the relatively affluent expatriates,
f
diplomats and aid workers tend to live. They can generally afford the prices being asked for at 
this market.
Ilala Market
Unlike the other markets, Ilala was at one time an official wholesale market for the city. This was 
whilst the old Kariakoo building was being replaced by the Kariakoo Market Complex. This 
may have had the effect of establishing Ilala as a good area for the purchase of some fruit and 
vegetables. Ilala has about 120 retailers, a large proportion of whom are able to occupy a 
concrete stall under the shelter of the Ilala Market building erected by the City Council. As in 
the other markets, Ilala retailers pay an annual fee for a trading licence and a monthly stall rent.
Ilala is not located on any of the main routes into the city, and so benefits less from the delivery 
of produce arriving in Dar es Salaam through informal marketing channels. It is located in the 
centre of a relatively old part of the city, which has traditionally housed the flood of immigrants 
from the rural areas arriving in search of employment in colonial Dar es Salaam. It is the closest 
of the survey markets to the wholesale market at Kariakoo. Consequently the retailers are 
reported to rely heavily on Kariakoo for the purchase of their produce. Ilala is close enough to 
Kariakoo to enable its retailers to use milcokoteni for transporting produce. The market has the 
additional retailing attraction of having large numbers of traders selling non-food items such as 
cooking implements, clothes and so on, in the open air around the main market building.
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Chapter Four 
Kariakoo Wholesale Market
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the analysis of the daily, monthly and annual variations in volume, value 
and price of the sixteen most important fruit and vegetable commodities delivered to Kariakoo 
wholesale market. The data were taken from two sources. The daily data were sampled from 
the daily reports compiled by the Kariakoo Market Corporation statistical officer from the tally 
sheets completed daily by each of the tally clerks, who check in any deliveries to the market. 
The monthly and annual data were taken from the monthly reports compiled by the statistical 
officer from the daily reports. The data were then analysed using both a spreadsheet 
(Microsoft Excel) and a mainframe statistical application (SPSSX) in order to calculate the means 
and the deflated values and prices and to produce the statistical results.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 deals with the annual volumes of wholesale 
deliveries to Kariakoo. Section 4.3 examines the monthly volume data, comparing the absolute 
and proportionate volumes of the various groups of commodities. The daily volumes of 
deliveries are analysed in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 examines the annual variations in the real 
value and price per metric tonne of fruit and vegetables at Kariakoo. The monthly variations in 
real price and values are examined in Section 4.6. Finally, the results of the analysis in this 
chapter are summarised in Section 4.7, concluding with a brief assessment of Kariakoo’s major 
problems and future prospects.
4.2 Annual Wholesale Market Deliveries
Data concerning the delivery of sixteen fruit and vegetable commodities to Kariakoo Wholesale 
Market (KMC) were collected on a monthly basis from January 1981 to August 1989 (the latter 
month having the last available data at the conclusion of the field visit). The sixteen 
commodities used for this survey were included in the KMC wholesale market records along 
with peaches, pears, four types of cooking bananas and several types of dried fish. The 
sixteen commodities were selected by eliminating the others for various reasons; fish were not 
relevant to the study; peaches and pears are supplied in very small quantities, are highly 
seasonal and the nature of the data makes it difficult to obtain useful results; cooking bananas 
are a staple typically cooked on their own (whereas Irish potatoes are included because in Dar 
es Salaam they are typically included in cooked stews in the same way as one might include 
other cooking vegetables). The data are compiled at the end of each month by the KMC 
statistical officer from the month's daily record sheets. The annual records are then compiled 
each year from the monthly record sheets (Appendix 4.1).
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Figure 4.1 summarises the data, presenting the annual deliveries for groups of commodities. A 
number of patterns can be seen. After a period of little change from 1982 to 1985, of between 
22 and 26 per cent, the proportion of tomato deliveries consistently decreases to 18 per cent in 
1988. In absolute terms, as shown in Figure 4.2, tomato annual deliveries climb from 7,584 
tonnes in 1981 to a peak of 14,859 tonnes in 1985, before declining steadily to 10,680 tonnes in 
1988. This nevertheless constitutes a net increase of 40.8 per cent over the period 1981-88.
Figure 4.2 Annual Volume of the Main Fruit and Vegetable Groups Delivered at Kariakoo 
1981 to 1988
M.Tonnes
Year
According to Hemy (1961), most Tanzanian soils will support tomatoes if they are well drained 
and have a long, warm growing season. As the urban population has found its income 
increasingly inadequate to meet basic needs, alternative strategies for survival have been 
sought. One such strategy is to obtain food from 'informal' sources, the most common of which 
is to grow food on small personal plots, where possible, within and just outside the city. This
diversion into cultivation can also supplement a resident's income if (s)he sells that produce not 
required in the home to friends, neighbours or work colleagues. In addition to this trend among 
the consumers, market traders have begun to seek their commodities from alternative, cheaper 
sources. This may mean purchasing 'informally1 from people who have transported commodities 
as far as a retail market and are selling them wholesale there. For example, traders named 
markets such as Ubungo, Tandale, Tandika and Buguruni as good sources for certain types of 
produce for retailers. Traders in Mwenge were even reported to be going to Kunduchi, an area 
just north of Dar es Salaam, at certain times of the year, particularly during August, to buy 
tomatoes direct from producers there. It is clear, therefore, that the decline in tomato deliveries 
at KMC does not necessarily mean that there has been a decline in the supply to the city, just 
that alternative channels may now be increasingly used. These issues will be looked at in more 
detail in Chapter Five.
Figure 4.3 Proportion of Tomato Deliveries to KMC from Different Origins
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A closer look at the origins of tomato deliveries (Figure 4.3) shows that the relative positions of 
the origin groups have varied over the 1981-88 period. The data for tomato deliveries are 
divided by the KMC into four categories: tomatoes from Moshi and Dodoma; tomatoes from 
Lushoto and Mbeya; tomatoes from Morogoro, Ruvu and Mkaiye; and finally from Iringa. 
According to the employees of KMC, these four groups roughly coincide with the four main 
varieties arriving at Kariakoo. They are clearly not divided up by geographical criteria, since the 
origins that are grouped together are not proximate (see Figure 2.1). There appears to be 
little consistency throughout the period. The Moshi/Dodoma group never reaches more than 
the 6 per cent of total deliveries (achieved in 1981) and declines to a total annual delivery of 151 
tonnes, or 1 per cent in 1988, a net decline of 8 per cent per annum. Iringa tomatoes have also 
declined steadily since the very large delivery of 8,030 tonnes in 1983, a 67 per cent increase 
from 1981. This group then declined by an average of 13.3 per cent per annum during the 
period from 1983 to 1988. The Lushoto/Mbeya category declines in proportion over the first 
three years from 34 to 24 per cent, but in 1984, it accounts for 37 per cent, a figure maintained in
1985, as the three major categories approach roughly an equal share of overall tomato supply. 
From 1986 to 1988, tomatoes from Lushoto and Mbeya continued to rise in relative importance, 
as the the two other main origin groups declined, particularly Iringa. The Lushoto/Mbeya 
tomato deliveries rose to account for 43 per cent of the deliveries by 1988, while the other two 
groups declined to 30 per cent for tomatoes from Morogoro, Ruvu and Mkaiye, and 25 per cent 
for tomatoes from Iringa. The pattern of the deliveries is illustrated in the graph in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4 Annual Volume of Tomato Deliveries to Kariakoo Market by Origin 
M.Tonnes
Year
Vegetables (which include onions, cabbage, and Irish potatoes), after a small decline in 1983, 
show a steady net relative increase from 36 per cent of all fruit and vegetable deliveries in 1981, 
to 58 per cent in 1988. This is very much reflected in absolute terms by a rise from 17,217 
tonnes to 34,847 tonnes or a net annual increase of 12.7 per cent.
Figure 4.5 Percentage of Deliveries to KMC of Selected Vegetables, 1981-88
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Inspection of Figures 4.5 and 4.6, shows that a significant amount of the change in proportions 
can be accounted for by the increase in Irish potatoes and the 'other' category. Irish potatoes 
increased steadily from 9,498 tonnes in 1981 to 21,378 tonnes in 1988, a net increase of 15.6 per 
cent per annum. The 'other* category (including peas, lettuce, carrots and beans) increased
rather less, from 2,508 tonnes in 1983, peaking in 1986 at 6,324 (accounting for 25 per cent of fruit 
and vegetables), to 3,980 tonnes in 1988, or a net increase of 15.0 per cent per annum. This 
increase in the delivery of Irish potatoes and other vegetables may be the result of household 
survival strategies, mentioned earlier, as a result of the deepening crisis in economic and 
business confidence. In this case, Kariakoo has the facilities to handle bulk commodities, such 
as Irish Potatoes, and so the Dar es Salaam population, looking for a cheap bulk vegetable as 
an alternative to the traditional vegetables and staples, turned to potatoes in preference to 
traditionally favoured ones. Traditional vegetables became relatively more expensive, thus 
reducing the price difference between them and alternatives. As a consequence, deliveries of 
potatoes and alternative vegetables increased rapidly to meet this demand, and because 
Kariakoo has the facilities to suit, and a known pool of buyers, it has benefited from this 
increase in supply.
Figure 4.6 Annual Volume of Vegetable Deliveries to Kariakoo Market, 1981-88 
M.Tonnes
Note: The data for the 'other* vegetables was missing in 1988.
During the period surveyed, a third clear pattern to emerge is that of the steady decline in the 
proportion of deliveries of citrus fruit (oranges, limes and lemons) (Figure 4.1). The bulk of the 
citrus fruit group is accounted for by oranges which, nevertheless, declined from 5,007 tonnes in 
1981 to 1,403 tonnes in 1987, followed by a slight increase in 1988 to 1,440 tonnes (Table 4.1). 
This is a net decrease by the end of the period of 8.9 per cent per annum. The decline in 
lemon supply to Kariakoo is, to some extent, very similar, although there is a temporary 
increase from 248 to 323 tonnes between 1981 and 1983. The net decline at the end of the 
period to only 35 tonnes in 1988 demonstrates a reduction of 86 per cent, or 10.7 per cent per 
annum.
Figure 4.7 Percentage Deliveries of Selected Citrus Fruits, 1981-88
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According to Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi (1971), in the 1968/69 season Dar es Salaam's main 
source of oranges was the Kisarawe District of Coast Region, about 40 km from Dar es Salaam. 
They made reference to the potential of Muheza District (Tanga Region), just over 300 km north 
of the city, and Morogoro District about 200 km inland. According to the Marketing 
Development Bureau (1986), these latter two now provide the dominant supply of oranges to 
the Dar es Salaam market. This was confirmed by interviews with the Kariakoo and retail market 
officials, although they did also mention the rising importance of Kilwa District, located about 300 
km south of Dar es Salaam on the coast. The main road from the south, Kilwa Ro^d, passes 
near to Tandika market. The main road from the north meets the Morogoro Road at Chalinze, 
just over 100 km inland of the city, and as it enters Dar es Salaam, Morogoro Road passes 
close to Ubungo, Manzese and Tandale markets, before reaching Kariakoo in the centre of the 
city. Interviews with market officials and traders revealed that oranges from Kilwa are frequently 
sold wholesale at Tandika, whilst oranges from Tanga and Morogoro are often sold wholesale at 
Tandale. Oranges from all three sources are reportedly sold at Kariakoo and occasionally Kilwa 
oranges turn up at Tandale. Buguruni, on the Port Access Road (recently renamed Nelson 
Mandela Avenue), is also reported to be an important wholesale source of oranges, although it 
is not clear where these oranges originate (see map in Figure 3.1).
Table 4.1 Annual Citrus Fruit Deliveries and Mean Annual Change, 1981 -88 
(Metric Tonnes)
Fruit 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Annual
Change
Oranges
Limes
Lemons
5007
190
248
4822
210
292
3863
231
323
2780
555
243
2229
197
309
1526
101
80
1403
219
114
1440
273
35
-8.9% p.a. 
+5.4% p.a. 
-10.7% p.a.
Total
Proportion of 
Total Delivery
5445
12
5324
10
4417
8
3578
6
2735
5
1707
3
1736
3
1748
3
-8.5% p.a.
Source: Kariakoo Market Corporation Records, 1981-88
Tandale is considered important enough in orange wholesaling for the KMC to send officials to 
act on its behalf as commission levying agents, who attempt to collect commission on the 
produce dealt with there. However, as the KMC provide no facilities for wholesaling at 
Tandale, their staff are in a relatively weak bargaining position and they admit they often have to 
accept from traders what they can get from negotiation. It seems that an elaborate wholesale 
network has emerged for the distribution of oranges, among other perishables, which is able to 
adapt to the changing circumstances, as sources of produce come into and go out of their 
harvesting season. It appears that liberalisation of the markets for previously controlled foods 
may have encouraged traders in fruits to be more open about trading their oranges. At the 
same time, because of the congestion and unsuitable, highly centralised chains of distribution in 
operation at Kariakoo, wholesaling there became much less attractive.
In contrast to the other citrus fruits, limes have expanded their proportion of the total delivery 
of citrus to Kariakoo twice during the period, to 16 per cent (in 1984 and again in 1988), with a 
lapse between of four years (Figure 4.7). The explanation lies in the fact that limes are not 
eaten in the same way as fruit such as oranges, but are used to accompany foods, such as fish 
or salads, as a garnish or flavouring. This results in a linking of limes to the vegetable markets, 
where they may be bought along with the vegetables with which they will be consumed.
Figure 4.8 Percentage Deliveries of Selected Fruits, 1981-88 
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'Otheri fruit, like citrus, tends to be retailed from either official retail markets, or at small, less 
official stalls, or even from bags at the side of the road. They tend to be highly perishable and 
therefore have to be distributed to the retailer for sale as quickly as possible. The 'other' fruit 
category has experienced a net increase from 7,344 tonnes in 1981 to 7,493 in 1988, an increase 
of 2 per cent. However, the proportion of the total fruit and vegetable deliveries this category 
represents has decreased over the period from 36 per cent to 21 per cent (see Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.9 Annual Volume of Fruit Deliveries to Kariakoo Market
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In terms of the proportion of annual deliveries, the bulkier and less perishable vegetables have 
increased at the expense of the more perishable tomatoes (after an initial rise in 1982), citrus 
fruits and 'other* fruits. It is, however, clear that tomatoes and fruits are being obtained 
elsewhere.other than Kariakoo by both retailers and consumers. This will be explored further in 
Chapter 5, which examines Dar es Salaam retailers and their sources of fruit and vegetables.
Figure 4.10 Total Fruit and Vegetable Deliveries to Kariakoo Market 1981-87
Deliveries 
(Metric Tonnes)
Years
In summary, Kariakoo's volume of trade reached a maximum capacity of around 70,000 metric 
tonnes per annum in 1983 (Figure 4.10). Despite this relatively stable overall supply changes in 
the relative balance of individual and groups of commodities have occurred. Most vegetables 
have continued to increase in relative importance during this period, while fruit and citrus crops 
have declined.
With the increasing population in Dar es Salaam Region (the annual.intercensal population 
growth rate between 1978 and 1988 was 4.8 per cent), it can be assumed that the demand for 
fruits and vegetables wold have increased concurrently. It must, therefore, be concluded that 
the wholesale market, as the relative importance of vegetables over this period has increased, 
is being avoided by fruit sellers. To some extent, this was confirmed by informants in various 
surveyed retail markets, who tended to buy fruit from markets such as Tandale, Tandika and 
Ubungo (see Figure 3.1). This information will be examined in more detail later. In addition , 
farmers who transport their own goods into Dar es Salaam, and traders interviewed in the two 
key vegetable producing areas, reported Kariakoo as being the main market they would 
consider. It has unloading facilities as well as a known pool of registered buyers, whereas in 
other markets the buyers are unknown to them and the facilities for unloading are not as good. 
The number of Kariakoo dealers is limited by KMC licensing arrangements. It is likely that 
farmers and up-country traders coming to Dar es Salaam easily identify a trader with whom they 
are happy dealing and return to him in future harvesting seasons. In the informal sector, 
however, this kind of trust is more difficult to establish. There are greater risks, both from 
having to deal with someone unknown and the technical illegality of informal sector wholesale 
dealing generally. Only when the trader knows a wholesale buyer in the informal sector, or the 
price offered is sufficient to outweigh the risks, would the informal sector seem to be attractive 
method of disposing of produce. The margin achieved by avoiding the Kariakoo sales 
commission and licensing charges and the costs of porterage around the market, make the 
attraction of the informal sector more likely.
4.3 Monthly Volumes
In order to assess monthly variations in deliveries of the different commodities at Kariakoo 
wholesale market, the monthly mean delivery was calculated for each commodity over the time 
period 1981-89 (see Appendix 4.2). It should be noted that the months January to August 
used data from 1981 to 1989, whereas for months September to December only data up to 
1988 were available.
Figure 4.11 shows that the mean monthly delivery by weight of all fruit and vegetables is 4,304 
tonnes, with a range from 4,017 to 4,656 tonnes. This demonstrates a remarkable consistency of 
delivery throughout the year, with a coefficient of variation of 4.47 per cent. The peak months 
are July, with the highest estimate of monthly mean deliveries of 4,656 tonnes, and October 
with 4,597 tonnes. When the proportional group delivery profile in Figure 4.12 is examined, a
relatively stable pattern is found for each of the groups. During the first month of the year the 
fruit and vegetable groups are delivered in the following proportions: tomatoes accounted for 
23 per cent of the mean monthly deliveries, vegetables account for 45 per cent, citrus for 4 per 
cent and fruit account for 27 per cent. On the whole, throughout the year these proportions are 
maintained by each of the groups. Tomatoes range from a low of 19 per cent in August, with a 
mean delivery of 854 metric tonnes, to a high of 27 per cent in November, consisting of a mean 
delivery of 1,192 metric tonnes, although for much of the year tomatoes account for around 20 
per cent of overall deliveries. Vegetables range from a low proportion of 39 per cent in 
November, made up of the lowest mean delivery of 1,731 metric tonnes, to a high of 52 per 
cent, made up of the third highest mean monthly delivery of 2,116 metric tonnes in April, at the 
height of the long rainy season. Citrus fruits play a surprisingly small role in the make-up of the 
fruit and vegetable delivery at Kariakoo, accounting for a proportion of mean monthly deliveries 
ranging from 2.5 per cent in February, the lowest mean delivery at 100 metric tonnes, to a high 
of 9.4 per cent in August, the peak of mean monthly deliveries at 422 metric tonnes. This large 
range demonstrates the highly seasonal nature of the citrus fruits, in contrast to the vegetables, 
many of which can be produced throughout the year, given the appropriate conditions and 
husbanding techniques. The seasonality of many of the other fruits is reduced in the overall 
mean monthly fruit deliveries by the year round harvesting of fruits such as coconuts and ripe 
bananas. The fruits range from 22 per cent in May, at the end of the long rains to 30 per cent in 
August at the end of the long cool dry season and 29 per cent in November at the end of the 
short rains. The reason for these variations within each group will now be examined in more 
detail.
Figure 4.11 Mean Monthly Volume of Delivery of the Main Fruit and Vegetable 
Groups at Kariakoo 1981 to 1988
M.Tonnes
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Figure 4.12 Percentage Mean Monthly Deliveries of Fruit and Vegetables to 
Kariakoo 1981 to 1988
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Mean monthly deliveries of tomatoesare shown in Figure 4.13. This shows an overall decline 
from 980 metric tonnes in January to 880 metric tonnes in February, to a low of 856 and 846 
metric tonnes in March and April respectively. The reason for this low supply, according to 
interviews with producers and traders, is the influence of the long rainy season. The rains affect 
both the transportation, making some roads at least difficult, if not impassable, as well as the 
tomato crop itself. The tomato plant is susceptible to fungal infection and fruit damage if it is 
subjected to heavy rains. This can only be prevented by investment in fungicides and chemical 
protection of the tomatoes. Those in a position to make this initial investment are in a strong 
position to gain from the high prices offered at this low point in the tomato supply year.The rest 
of the year is characterised by a slow rise in overall tomato deliveries up to September and 
then a large increase in October to a mean of 1,203 metric tonnes, as the short rainy season 
begins. After this peak the supply of tomatoes declines slowly towards the end of the year.
Figure 4.13 Mean Monthly Deliveries of Tomatoes to Kariakoo 1981-1988
M.Tonnes
Month
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The smallest tomato group recorded in the Kariakoo market record sheets is that from Moshi 
and Dodoma. The mean monthly delivery of this group never exceeds 55 metric tonnes.
Indeed, during the entire period covered, deliveries from these areas do not exceed 184 metric 
tonnes, recorded in July 1981. In the first eight months of 1989, when this group should have 
reached its peak delivery, the largest monthly delivery was 9.9 metric tonnes in April. This 
extraordinarily low supply from this area may be explained by the poor rains in these regions 
in 1989. In addition, the longer term decline of these regions may be partly the result of the 
deteriorating condition of the roads connecting these areas with Dar es Salaam. This situation 
may change in the future, with improvements being made to the main road from Moshi to Dar 
es Salaam.
At the beginning of the year, the majority of tomatoes arriving at Kariakoo are from Lushoto 
and Mbeya. This group begins the year at a monthly mean of 664 metric tonnes and climbs to a 
peak of 703, before declining during the long rainy season to a mean monthly low of 83 metric 
tonnes later in the year in September. These tomatoes are delivered when the supplies from 
the other areas are at their lowest, hence supplies from Lushoto/Mbeya account for 80 per cent 
of tomatoes in February, the highest proportions of mean monthly supplies achieved. During 
the short rainy season, tomatoes from Lushoto and Mbeya account for 50 per cent of those 
tomatoes delivered, while tomatoes from Iringa account for another 46 per cent.
Figure 4.14 Percentage Profile of Mean Monthly Tomato Deliveries to Kariakoo
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Tomatoes from Morogoro, Ruvu and Mkaiye begin the year by declining from 59 metric tonnes 
in January to the lowest mean monthly delivery of any of the tomato groups, at less than one 
metric tonne in May. However, from this low point the deliveries of tomatoes from these areas 
climb sharply to reach a mean of 769 tonnes in September, dropping sharply at the end of the 
year to 173 metric tonnes in December. This group of tomatoes are delivered in quantities 
when other regions such as Iringa, Lushoto and Mbeya are not delivering in large quantities.
Tomatoes from Iringa account for the largest proportion of tomato deliveries at Kariakoo, never 
declining below 16 per cent of mean monthly deliveries (in February), and accounting for as 
much as 79 per cent (June). The year begins with a decline from 251 metric tonnes in January to 
the smallest mean monthly volume of deliveries for this variety of 143 metric tonnes in February. 
The mean then begins a strong climb to the peak of the Iringa tomato delivery season during 
the long cooler dry season, in May to July, reaching a peak of 723 metric tonnes in June. 
Deliveries from Iringa reach a secondary peak of supply in December at the start of the short, 
hot dry season, when they return to 454 metric tonnes, accounting for 42 per cent of all tomato 
deliveries at that time. The supply of Iringa tomatoes is clearly important, with the supplies 
being maintained throughout the year.
The relative importance of each tomato supply group is illustrated in Figure 4.14. This clearly 
demonstrates the times of year during which each of the three main supply groups dominates 
the Dar es Salaam market. The sum of mean monthly tomato deliveries ranges from 846 metric 
tonnes in April, during the long rains to 1,203 metric tonnes in October, during the short rains, a 
range of 30 per cent of the October delivery.
Figure 4.15 Percentage of Mean Monthly Vegetable Deliveries at Kariakoo
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The variation in monthly vegetable deliveries appears to be far less than for tomatoes (Figure 
4.15). The main trend is for Irish potatoes to decline in importance from a maximum proportion 
in January, February and March of 69 per cent to August, when they reach a low of 56 per cent. 
These commodities are not vying for dominance of the market in the same way as the tomato 
varieties appear to be and any variations which occur in supply from different regions of the 
country are likely to have a complementary effect on overall supply of any one commodity, in a 
similar pattern to that of the tomatoes. The variations are due to growing conditions and ease 
of transport from the supply areas. Because about two-thirds of vegetable deliveries are 
accounted for by Irish potatoes, the estimate of the total grouped supply follows roughly the 
same pattern. This effect is strengthened by the relatively gentle monthly supply variations 
apparent for the onions, cabbage and peas.
Figure 4.16 Mean Monthly Vegetable Deliveries to Kariakoo 1981 to 1988
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The relatively consistent proportions accounted for by each of the vegetables within the group 
is mirrored by the volumes of supply, presented in Figure 4.16. This graph demonstrates the 
importance of Irish potatoes to the overall supply pattern, as the sum of mean monthly 
vegetable deliveries follows the Irish potato mean monthly delivery very closely. This pattern 
of supply begins the year at 1,357 metric tonnes and climbs to the peak mean monthly volume 
of 1,466 metric tonnes in March. The rest of the year is characterised by a slow decline to 1,194 
metric tonnes by December. The lowest mean monthly delivery occurs in August at 1,036 metric 
tonnes. Both onions and peas demonstrate a tendency to higher volumes of deliveries 
between March and August, of between 66 and 100 metric tonnes for peas and 441 and 487 
metric tonnes for onions, while cabbage tends to be in greater supply later in the year, rising in 
supply from 270 metric tonnes in September to 309 metric tonnes in November, beginning to 
decline by December at a mean of 296 metric tonnes. This is a season of light rains for much of 
eastern Tanzania, coinciding with the main cabbage harvesting season. Those producers with 
access to irrigation can produce cabbage early, harvesting towards the end of the dry season in 
about August. However, the main harvesting of cabbages occurs towards the end of the rainy 
season when the cabbage can have abundant water during its two to three month growing 
period.
Clearly, on a monthly basis, there are continuous supplies of most vegetables throughout the 
year. Indeed, this consistency of supply throughout the year in all of the vegetable 
commodities is not repeated in any of the other commodity groups. Even in fruits, where at 
least a small delivery is made every month, there are significant variations in supply, whereas 
within the vegetable group, the monthly variations are relatively small. This is likely to be made 
possible by the fact that vegetables are planted on a seasonal basis and can often be timed 
to harvest at certain times, either to take advantage of the market, where sufficient capital is
initially available to invest in the technology or techniques necessary, or, where it is not, to make 
full use of the environmental conditions, such as cool spells, dry seasons or rainy seasons.
Fruits, on the other hand, are mainly perennials, with clear seasons for harvest. The reason 
there is some degree of consistency is the complementarity of different regions of Tanzania, 
where, due to the environmental circumstances, the perennials enter their harvesting seasons at 
slightly different times.
Figure 4.17 Percentage of Mean Monthly Citrus Fruit Deliveries at Kariakoo 
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The citrus fruit category’s heavy dependence on oranges is clearly illustrated in Figure 4.17, 
where the lemon and lime deliveries are very low in comparison with those of oranges. The line 
of the sum of means follows closely the shape the orange supply has effectively given it. This 
pattern shows considerable similarity with the pattern described by Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi 
(1971). "The peak period, during which there was an upward trend in supply, extends for a 
duration of about three months; during the period, 1968-70, the rise in supply started in March 
and declined towards the end of June" (Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi 1971, p.4). They go on to 
report that between May 1968 and April 1969, the peak supply period was from March to July, 
when over 1,000 matenga (approximately 60 metric tonnes) were delivered each week, reaching 
a peak of almost 4,000 matenga (approximately 240 metric tonnes) in June. The off-season 
period from September to early March achieved approximately 100 matenga (approximately 6 
metric tonnes) per week, with a small rise to about 1,000 matenga in one week in November.
The mean monthly supply from 1981 to 1988 has a slightly modified pattern. The main season is 
from March to September, with a monthly mean peak peak in August of 5,822 matenga 
(approximately equivalent to 87 metric tonnes per week). The off season is not as low as 
described by Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi in 19868/69, with a low of 1,256 matenga in February 
(roughly equivalent to 18 metric tonnes per week).
Kev
B Lemons
m Limes
□ Oranges
Figure 4.18 Mean Monthly Citrus Fruit Deliveries to Kariakoo 1981 to 1988
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The modification in the main supply period for oranges is likely to have occurred as a result of 
the shift in emphasis from Kisarawe to the key orange producing regions of Tanga and 
Morogoro, and the emergence of areas close to the city, as discussed in the previous section. 
Although the orange supply varies between a mean of 76 metric tonnes in February and 370 
metric tonnes in August (Figure 4.18), it maintains a stabler proportion of the citrus fruit 
deliveries only varying between 81 and 90 per cent (Figure 4.17). The reason for this is, firstly, 
the dominance of oranges in the citrus group. In addition, other citrus fruits are produced in the 
same areas as oranges and are harvested at about the same time. Lime deliveries, for 
example, peak at around the same time as the oranges rising from a low of 17 metric tonnes in 
the middle of the dry season to reach 33 metric tonnes in September, at the start of the short 
rainy season. However, in terms of the proportion of citrus, they are more important in 
February, accounting for 18 per cent of all citrus deliveries, when oranges and lemons are at 
their lowest. Limes appear to have a second harvesting season, reaching a mean monthly 
volume of 24 metric tonnes in January. Lemons climb from their off-peak months of February 
and March, when a mean of 1 metric tonne of lemons was delivered in each month, to reach its 
peak harvest time, just after oranges, in September, at 49 metric tonnes, accounting for 13 per 
cent of citrus fruit deliveries.
The shape of the 'other' fruit means has three peaks, in February, August and November 
(Figure 4.19). The first of these peaks in mean fruit deliveries at Kariakoo covers the first three 
months of the year. These are characterised by relatively high deliveries of green mangoes, 
which are in one of their two peak harvesting seasons of the year. Ripe mangoes decline from 
their peak at the start of the year, from a mean of 96 metric tonnes and 6 per cent of fruit supply 
in January, to 46 metric tonnes and 2 per cent in February and eventually 9 metric tonnes and 
less than 1 per cent in March. Deliveries of ripe bananas rise slightly in this first three months 
from 214 metric tonnes in January to 271 in February and 261 in March. This constitutes a rise of 
from 19 per cent to 25 per cent of fruit deliveries. The first three months of coconut deliveries
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rise on average from a mean of 563 metric tonnes in January to 630 in February and then 692 in 
March, increasing their proportion of fruit deliveries from 50 and 51 per cent in the first two 
months of the year to 57 per cent in March. Overall fruit supply declines relatively sharply in 
April, probably because of the difficulties of maintaining supplies through the rainy season,* 
which particularly affects access to the main producing areas of these commodities, most of 
which are in highland areas, with relatively poor roads.
Figure 4.19 Mean Monthly Delivery of Other Fruits to Kariakoo 1981 to 1988
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The dry season from May through to July is characterised by a climb in fruit supplies to 
Kariakoo, reaching its peak in August. As can be seen from Figure 4.19, an important factor in 
this peak is the increase in coconut supplies, which reach their mean monthly peak of 888 metric 
tonnes and 70 per cent of fruit deliveries in that month. A second important component of this 
period’s high fruit deliveries is the second peak in supply of green mangoes, at a mean of 232 
metric tonnes in July and 190 metric tonnes in August, accounting for 17 per cent, and 10 per 
cent respectively (Figure 4.20). As these two dry season fruits decline in delivery in 
September, from their August peaks, so does the overall fruit supply. The main wet season 
fruits have not yet been harvested.
A rise in mean monthly deliveries of ripe mangoes and ripe bananas in October and November 
are the main cause of the third overall peak of fruit deliveries at Kariakoo, 320 metric tonnes of 
ripe bananas form the peak mean monthly delivery of this fruit in October, accounting for 27 per 
cent of fruit deliveries, while ripe mangoes reach a peak mean monthly supply of 373 metric 
tonnes in November. Pineapples do not account for a high proportion of the mean monthly 
fruit supplies, the main pineapple season is December and January, when there was a mean
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monthly delivery of 34 metric tonnes in each month, accounting for only 3 per cent of fruit 
deliveries each time.
Figure 4.20 Percentage of Mean Monthly Fruit Deliveries to Kariakoo 
1981 to 1988
%
Key
□  Coconuts 
■  Pineapples
□  G Mangoes 
E23 R Mangoes 
H R Bananas
i i i i i i i i i i i i
Ja F Ma Ap M Ju J A S  0  N D
Month
4.4 Daily Volumes
As described in Chapter Three, the data concerning daily variations in the volumes of fruit and 
vegetable supplies were sampled from Kariakoo Market Corporation's records. The sample 
consisted of the data from a randomly selected day from each week between January 1987 and 
August 1989, as explained in Chapter Three. Data from one hundred and thirty-eight days were 
sampled, from a possible nine hundred and sixty-six days, between January 1987 and August 
1989 (a 14 per cent sample).
Table 4.2 presents the daily variation of the volume of each commodity group. The range of the 
sums of mean daily volumes for each weekday ranges from 94 to 140 metric tonnes. The week 
begins on Monday at 106 tonnes, drops to 94 tonnes on Tuesday, before climbing through the 
rest of the week to peak on Friday at 140 tonnes. The week ends on Sunday at 99 tonnes. In 
terms of overall volume of deliveries, this is partly the result of the three most important 
commodities, Irish potatoes (accounting or 31 per cent of all deliveries on Fridays), coconuts 
(accounting for 13 per cent), cabbage (10 per cent) and tomatoes from Moshi/Dodoma (10 per 
cent) all reaching their maximum mean daily supply on Friday. The peak on Friday may be 
explained in two ways. Firstly, many Dar es Salaam employees are paid on a weekly basis, 
being paid towards the end of the week and hence have cash available on that day. Secondly, 
households buy sufficient food to see them through the weekend. It may also be the case that 
peak deliveries result from the influence from the supply end, where a large number of rural 
periodic markets on Thursdays encourage a greater volume of Friday deliveries to Dar es 
Salaam.
Table 4.2 Mean Daily Volume of Deliveries of the Main Commodity Groups 
(M. Tonnes)
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Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun
Tomatoes 23 21 25 27 30 31 25
Other Vegetables 57 45 48 66 73 62 51
Citrus 4 5 5 3 5 4 3
Other Fruit 22 23 25 25 31 27 19
Sum 106 94 102 122 140 124 99
Source: Kariakoo Market Records 1981-89
The most notable feature of Figure 4.21 is the level of stability in the proportion of volumes 
accounted for by each commodity group over the week. However, variations do exist. Fruit on 
Tuesday and Wednesday accounts for its highest proportion at 24.4 per cent and 24.1 per cent 
respectively. Citrus fruits also favour Tuesday, peaking at 5.4 per cent of overall deliveries, 
while tomatoes favour Wednesday (24.1 per cent) and Sundays (26.4 per cent). The peak mean 
daily deliveries of other vegetables occur on Monday (54.3 per cent) and Thursday (54.3 per 
cent).
Figure 4.21 Mean Daily Delivery of Fruit and Vegetables to Kariakoo
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There is a greater degree of variation within each commodity group, however. For example, 
while deliveries of each of the four types of tomato peak on Friday or Saturday, they all have 
secondary peaks on quite different days during the week. Tomatoes delivered from Lushoto 
and Mbeya reach their highest volume on Friday, with 15.1 tonnes on average, accounting for 50 
per cent of the tomato supply for that day, but they account for the highest proportion on 
Sunday (51 per cent). This is clearly the most important tomato type accounting for a mean 
proportion of 41 per cent. Tomatoes from Iringa peak in absolute terms at a mean of 12 tonnes 
on Saturday (accounting for 39 per cent of that day's tomato supply), while in terms of the 
proportion of total tomato deliveries, they peak at 48 per cent on Tuesday (10.1 tonnes). 
Tomatoes from Morogoro, Ruvu and Mkaiye are delivered in the greatest volumes on
Wednesdays (29 per cent and 7.1 tonnes) and Saturdays (32 per cent and 9.63 tonnes). Tomato 
deliveries from Moshi and Dodoma build up gradually through the week from 1 per cent on 
Monday to 3 per cent on Saturday (0.2 tonnes to 0.8 tonnes). On Sunday the mean delivery 
falls back to 0.01 tonnes, an amount too small to account for one per cent of that day's mean 
tomato supply.
Figure 4.22 Mean Daily Delivery Profile of Tomatoes to Kariakoo
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In the case of other vegetables, Friday is the most important day in terms of mean volume of 
deliveries (Table 4.2). In terms of proportion, however, Monday and Thursday are the most 
important days for vegetable deliveries, both at 54 per cent (57 and 66 tonnes respectively). 
Within the vegetables group the daily variations are considerable. Figure 4.23 demonstrates 
that Friday has the highest mean volume of deliveries for peas and Irish potatoes and an 
important secondary peak for cabbage.
Figure 4.23 Mean Daily Delivery Profile of Other Vegetables at Kariakoo
Potatoes are easily the most important vegetable crop in terms of volume to be delivered to 
Kariakoo, accounting for between 50 per cent (on Monday) and 60 per cent (on Tuesday) of the 
mean volume of vegetable deliveries, and between 27 and 34 per cent of the overall mean 
daily volume of deliveries. Its main day in terms of absolute volume, with 42.9 tonnes, is Friday, 
while the lowest mean delivery is on Tuesday with 25.9 tonnes. The large proportion of 
vegetable deliveries accounted for by potatoes exerts considerable influence on the pattern of 
overall vegetable supply. The largest mean daily delivery of potatoes is made on Friday, and, 
in spite of the fact that the other vegetables highest mean daily deliveries are on other days 
this is the day on which the highest mean vegetable delivery is made.
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The peak delivery days for onions are Wednesday and Thursday, which are almost the same in 
absolute terms at 14.2 and 14.4 tonnes respectively. In terms of proportion, Wednesday 
accounts for 30 per cent and Thursday for 22 per cent. Cabbage seems to vary the most from 
day to day, from 7 per cent and 3.8 tonnes on Wednesday to 28 per cent and 16 tonnes on 
Thursday. Peas account for no more than 4 per cent of the sum of means, which it achieves on 
Tuesday with 1.7 tonnes and also on Friday with 2.8 tonnes, the latter being the largest mean 
delivery.
Figure 4.24 Mean Daily Delivery Profile of Citrus Fruit at Kariakoo
%  100 -  
90 - 
80 - 
70 - 
60 - 
50 - 
40 - 
30 - 
20 -  
10 -  
0
■ ■
: ! H i
Key
m Lemons
z Limes
□ Oranges
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun
Mean citrus supply is maintained at around 4 tonnes daily throughout the week, although it 
reaches 5 tonnes on Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday. In terms of proportion of overall 
supply, it peaks on Tuesday at 5.6 per cent (Figure 4.24). By far the most important citrus crop 
are oranges, accounting for between 76 and 89 per cent of mean daily volumes (lowest on 
Sunday, highest on Friday). This pattern of dominance is very clear from Figure 4.20. This 
shows that lemons maintain a relatively steady proportion of the overall citrus delivery - 
reflected in a stable volume of delivery of between 0.13 and 0.41 tonnes. Limes and oranges 
on the other hand appear to complement each other, one peaking when the other is at its 
lowest and vice versa. Limes are more important on Tuesdays (with 15 per cent), Thursdays
(with 17 per cent) and Sundays (21 per cent), while oranges are at their most important on 
Wednesdays (with 85 per cent) and Fridays (89 per cent).
The deliveries of the final main commodity category, other fruit, range from 18.8 to 24.4 per cent 
arid from 19 to 31 tonnes of the overall mean daily volumes (Figure 4.25). The peak day is 
Friday with a mean delivery of 31 tonnes (accounting for 22 per cent of all deliveries on that day), 
whereas in relative terms, fruit is strongest on Tuesday accounting for-24 per cent (or 23 tonnes).
Figure 4.25 Mean Daily Delivery Profile of Fruit at Kariakoo
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Examining the greater proportional variations for individual fruit, seen in Figure 4.25, coconuts 
are the most important fruit type accounting for between 48 and 64 per cent of mean daily fruit 
deliveries. The most important days for coconuts in terms of mean tonnage are Friday at 18 
tonnes, when deliveries of most commodities are not at their highest, with a secondary peak on 
Wednesday at 15 tonnes. The lowest mean daily delivery occurs on Tuesday (Appendix 4.3).
In terms of the proportion of total fruit deliveries, the most important days are Sunday at 64 
per cent, with a secondary peak on Wednesday at 62 per cent. Coconut deliveries account for 
the lowest proportion of overall fruit deliveries on Thursday at 48 per cent. Reports from 
informants in Dar es Salaam suggest that the main areas of prodction of coconuts are Mafia 
Island and Kisiju, both to the south of Dar es Salaam (see Map 4.1). One explanation of the 
reason for coconuts being at their highest may involve the boats delivering from Mafia Island 
running regular trips. If this is so, then a boat arriving on a Sunday is likley to result in a larger 
supply to the market on that day. If this is known by the coconut purchasers, they will tend to 
avoid days of low supply. This will have the cumulative effect of having days on which coconuts 
are known to be in good supply, and when the coconut market is busy, and days when the 
supply is not so good and the market consequently is not so busy. By Thursay the coconuts 
delivered at the weekend are almost sold out and the deliveries may be at their lowest.
Figure 4.26 Key Towns and Cities in the Supply of Fruit and Vegetables to Dar es Salaam
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Deliveries of green mangoes and ripe bananas range from 12 per cent on Saturday for 
mangoes and Friday for bananas, to 22 per cent on Thursday and Tuesday respectively. In 
tonnage delivery terms, bananas range from 2.5 tonnes on Sunday to 5 tonnes on Tuesday and
t
green mangoes from 3 on Sunday to 5.5 tonnes on Thursday. These two crops are very similar 
in terms of size and pattern of delivery to Kariakoo. In addition to the similarity displayed in 
these data, these two fruits are consumed as a snack. In contrast to the ripe mangoes and 
oranges, which are consumed as thirst quenching snack, these are consumed for energy and 
often substitute as a midday meal.
Ripe mangoes range from 2 per cent of mean fruit deliveries (and 0.3 tonnes) on Monday, to 14 
per cent and 4.3 tonnes on Friday. Pineapples maintain a relatively low but stable supply 
throughout the week, ranging form 0.1 tonnes, which is not large enough to register a single 
percentage point, on Wednesday to 0.4 tonnes, and the highest proportion of mean fruit 
deliveries at 2 per cent, on Tuesday.
An overview of the relative variability of each individual commodity can be found in Table 4.3 
presenting the overall mean, standard deviation and analysis of variance. The low F ratios in the 
results of the analysis of variance suggest a wide range of variability from commodity to 
commodity during the week. A brief review of the likely channels of distribution will help to 
explain this variability. A much more detailed examination of these channels of marketing is 
presented in Chapters Five and Six.
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Table 4.3 Overall Mean, Standard Deviation and Analysis of Variance of the
Kariakoo Daily Delivery Volumes
Commodity Overall Mean Standard Deviation Analysis of Variance 
F Ratio Significance
Tomatoes
Moshi/Dodoma 0.386 1.29 0.783 0.594
Lushoto/Mbeya 11.089 11.73 1.056 0.394
Moro./Ruvu/Mkaiye 5.972 11.31 0.537 0.778
Iringa 8.982 8.90 0.854 0.531
Onions 13.227 11.43 0.929 0.477
Cabbage 9.680 19.01 1.040 0.405
Peas 1.513 1.52 3.069 0.009
Irish Potatoes 33.499 36.67 0.323 0.923
Oranges 3.516 3.52 0.913 0.489
Limes 0.497 0.72 1.137 0.348
Lemons 0.191 0.55 1.488 0.210
Green Mangoes 3.801 3.80 0.949 0.468
Ripe Mangoes 2299 230 1.009 0.450
Pineapples 0.249 0.50 0.618 0.715
Ripe Bananas 3.978 2  77 2094 0.059
Coconuts 14.292 9.97 1.249 0.287
Source: Author's Calculation?
One of the main collection points in Morogoro is a purpose-built wholesale market building in 
Mgeta Division. The buyers begin their work here negotiating their price with farmers who have 
not necessarily brought their produce here, but bring their produce to meet the lorry as it 
proceeds from the market building to Dar es Salaam. At collection points along the road the 
produce is then repacked by paid labour, this may cost up to TShs 40 per gunia in labour. The 
trader buying the produce accompanies the lorry, which may have been hired locally, from 
business people in the area, or from Dar es Salaam, to Dar es Salaam to sell the produce at 
Kariakoo. There appeared to be a greater likelihood of being able to hire a lorry locally in 
Lushoto District, than in Mgeta Division, the latter having far less established capital.
Once the lorry has deposited its load at Kariakoo, it will return immediately to the source area, 
or even to the same collection points, if there is "the prospect of more produce requiring 
transportation. At peak harvest time, such as when the author was visiting the area, a lorry may 
make two round trips between Mgeta and Dar es Salaam (a 4-5 hour journey) in 24 hours.
By contrast the more commercially-developed area of Lushoto District in Tanga Region, which 
was also visited by the author, has a periodic market system which forms the focus for the 
district's marketing activities. The main function of these markets is the exchange of goods 
between small farmers and between the farmers and village or town-based consumers, 
although they also fulfil many cultural, social and political needs besides. In addition to this, at 
the spatial margins of the market area, wholesalers meet with producers and negotiate prices 
for their produce. For example, Photograph 4.1 shows Soni market in Lushoto District, where 
produce is often brought to the market to sell to the wholesale traders, seen to the right of the 
main retail activities, which in Lushoto are generally carried out by the women. More frequently, 
a sample is brought to the market and the main bulk is collected later in the day by lorry and 
driven down to Dar es Salaam overnight to arrive in Kariakoo early the following morning.
Clearly in this case the day on which the periodic market takes place has an influence on the 
volume of commodities which will eventually arrive at Kariakoo wholesale market. Although the 
supply from this area does not take place exclusively on the periodic market days, it will still 
have the effect of sending ‘waves’ of produce to Kariakoo during the course of the week. In the 
case of Soni the main market day for supply to Dar es Salaam is Friday.
Ignoring for the moment those commodities which have a very low mean daily delivery, such as 
those of less than 1 tonne, it can be hypothesised that commodities with a high coefficient of 
variance, in terms of their daily delivery, such as cabbage (196 per cent), tomatoes from 
Morogoro, Ruvu and Mkaiye (189 per cent), Irish potatoes (109 per cent) and tomatoes from 
Lushoto and Mbeya (106 per cent), are being supplied in ‘waves’, as described. Produce of 
lower daily variance such as bananas (69 per cent), coconuts (70 per cent) and onions (86 per 
cent), may originate from a variety of supply areas. This will have the effect of spreading the 
supply over the week and will reduce the impact of the ‘wave’ effects of periodic rural markets.
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Potograph 4.1
Soni Market, Tanga Region1
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Original in colour
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This is the case for tomatoes, which have a wide range of source areas, each with a highly 
variable delivery from day to day, but overall with a relatively stable supply throughout the 
week at Kariakoo market.
Secondly, some produce is supplied from areas relatively close to Dar es Salaam. This has the 
less beneficial effect of, on the one hand, reducing the advantage of selling to a middleman who 
has the capital to buy and assemble large viable loads. On the other hand, it can be in the 
producer’s interests to try to cut out the middleman and transport his or her produce the short 
distance to an urban market to sell directly, and hence receive a higher margin of profit. This is 
the case for green mangoes and oranges, where each have a significant proportion delivered 
from areas relatively close to Dar es Salaam. In each case there are reports of producers 
ferrying their own produce to the city by pick-up and selling small loads, such as one or two 
gunia, to street sellers or to sellers at retail markets. These small deliveries do not go through 
any periodic assembly in the same way as those described above, but, because the producers 
are closer to the market it may be expected that they will use their advantageous location to 
supply on days where they will obtain a good price. This is likely to have the effect of 
spreading the supply, as peri-urban producers try to avoid peak delivery days, but they will 
also avoid days when demand is low.
Thirdly, in some less commercially developed areas, such as the more peripheral areas of 
Lushoto District, where there is no periodic market system frequented by wholesale traders and 
farmers, traders may make several speculative trips into a particular potential supply area.
Once a viable load has been assembled, the trader hires a lorry, collects the produce and 
heads for Kariakoo. In this process, the produce arrives in a rather random temporal fashion at 
Kariakoo, subject to its availability, and is not characterised by the ‘waves’ of areas where the 
periodic market has a strong influence. In addition, producers located close to the major trunk 
roads are able to take advantage of the traffic passing by. A lorry driver delivering charcoal to 
Dar es Salaam, for example, may use fresh produce from the roadside to fill extra space he 
may have in his lorry either by buying the produce or arranging to transport the produce and the 
farmer or trader to Dar es Salaam for a price. This additional, informally earned, income for the 
driver results in small random deliveries of produce arriving at markets on the main roads in Dar 
es Salaam, as the lorry drivers deliver the produce on their way to their formal destination. It 
also provides an additional marketing chain for the producers in the rural producing areas. 
Photograph 4.2 shows a producer with hired labour harvesting oranges and packing them for 
sale to the passing traffic. Note the large hessian gunia, or sack, used to transport about 80 kg 
of oranges and the use of grass as additional packaging to protect the oranges.
In summary, Friday is by far the most important day for overall delivery, with a mean total 
delivery of 140 tonnes, accounting for nearly 18 per cent of the total weeks business. This is 
influenced by the fact that six of the sixteen commodities have their highest mean daily delivery 
on Friday (coconuts, ripe mangoes, oranges, Irish potatoes, peas and tomatoes from Lushoto/
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Photograph 4.2
Orange producers packing oranges for sale to passing traffic on the Korogwe-Mombo road,
Tanga Region2
Original in colour
Mbeya). The lowest overall day of the week is Tuesday with an overall supply of 94 tonnes, 
accounting for less than 12 per cent of the week's total deliveries. This coincides with the 
occurrence of the minimum mean daily deliveries for Irish potatoes, coconuts and tomatoes from
t
the Lushoto and Mbeya group, and the Morogoro, Ruvu and Mkaiye group.
Commodities with a highly variable daily delivery pattern, such as tomatoes from Moshi and 
Dodoma, lemons, pineapples and cabbage, have peak delivery days which coincide with 
important periodic markets in the supply areas. For commodities with a less variable daily 
supply, periodic markets have a reduced influence, resulting from a complementary supply from 
areas without a periodic market system. This has the effect of reducing the importance of 
produce delivered through the periodic market system. In addition, producers near the city are 
likely to use their more favourable location to supply the market at times which are beneficial to 
them. These producers are likely to avoid periods of over-supply and low demand, and hence 
concentrate their supply on days when they are most likely to achieve a fast sale at a good 
price.
In the case where the producing area is at some distance from the city it is necessary to bulk the 
commodities in order to ensure an economically viable load (Bromley 1978). When this is 
necessary, the system of bulking takes one of the two forms described above, either a system 
of periodic marketing exists, which can be used by the traders and farmers to meet and carry 
out their transactions, or the traders must go in search of their supply. Some stability can be 
ensured under the first system if producers or traders deal regularly with the same people.
There are considerable risks involved in the latter system, such as not purchasing sufficient 
produce to ensure a viable load, but in more peripheral areas, where the prices are likely to be 
lower it is also possible for this more speculative type of trader to make a greater margin of 
profit. In the two areas visited by the author the first system generally involves rural-based 
traders, who are part-time farmers themselves, while the latter system generally involves urban- 
based traders. Finally, in areas close to Dar es Salaam, according to interviews with retailers in 
the city, the producers may come in to sell in the retail markets and the retailers may group 
together to make a trip into the rural areas to purchase direct from the producers. This confirms 
the description by Briggs (1990) of two of the marketing channels for peri-urban producers on 
the fringes of Dar es Salaam. The third channel involves selling in the nearest village market to 
other peri-urban dwellers, passers-by on the main roads entering the city or to urban dwellers 
coming out of the city to buy for home consumption. This latter system of marketing channels 
for the peri-urban fringe rarely involves any form of middleman, but, according to interviews with 
traders and residents of Dar es Salaam, they usually involve sales either between the producer 
and the retailer, or directly with the consumer.
4.5 Annual Variations in Price and Value
In the same way as annual variations in volume have been measured, so this section will 
examine the variations in annual real value and mean annual real prices per metric tonne for each
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of the commodities. The values have been calculated using the Kariakoo Market Corporation’s 
records of volume and value of deliveries at Kariakoo. The value and mean prices have then 
been deflated using the Tanzanian annual inflation rate for the years included in the data series,
r
as published in Africa Review (Appendices 4.4 and 4.5).
Figure 4.27 Percentage Profile of Mean Annual Real Value of Fruit and Vegetable 
Groups at Kariakoo 1981 to 1988
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Figure 4.27 presents a view of the annual mean real value of fruit and vegetables delivered to 
Kariakoo over the sample period from 1981-88. There has been a noticeable decrease in 
importance of fruit and citrus fruit value arriving at the market. For fruit this decrease goes from
31.6 per cent to 13.8 per cent, while in the case of citrus this decrease has been from 6.2 per 
cent to 2.1 per cent. This decrease in proportion has occurred in spite of an absolute increase 
in real value from TShs 52.97 million to 76.34 million in the real value of fruit deliveries (an real 
increase of 44.1 per cent at 1981 values) and TShs 10.44 million to TShs 11.82 million (an real 
increase of 13.2 per cent) in the real value of citrus fruit deliveries. However, as Figure 4.28 
demonstrates, in order for fruit and citrus to have maintained their relative proportions of total 
real value, it would have been necessary for there to have been a greater increase in real value 
of the deliveries of these commodities.
Vegetable deliveries at Kariakoo, on the other hand, have increased markedly from TShs 64.82 
million in 1981 to TShs 318.46 million in real terms, an increase of 391 per cent, or 55 per cent 
per annum. The real value of tomato deliveries rose from TShs 39.57 million in 1981 to TShs 
147.36 million in 1988, a real increase of 272 per cent. These sharp rises in real value of 
deliveries of these two commodity groups has resulted in tomatoes rising from accounting for
23.6 per cent of the real value of fruit and vegetables in 1981 to 26.6 per cent in 1988. In the 
case of vegetables this rise is from 38.6 per cent of the value of fruit and vegetable deliveries 
in 1981 to 57.5 per cent in 1988. This shifting in importance of the four main commodity groups 
confirms the earlier interpretation of similar patterns in the volume of these groups over the 
same time period discussed in an earlier section.
Figure 4.28 Annual Delivery Value of the Fruit and Vegetable Groups at Kariakoo 
Million TShs
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With reference specifically to tomatoes, deliveries by value from Moshi and Dodoma have 
decreased through to 1988 (Figure 4.29). The decline in real value of these tomatoes has been 
from TShs 2.43 million in 1981 to TShs 1.75 million in 1988 (Rgure 4.30). This represents a 
decline in real value of this group of tomatoes, over the period, of 27.8 per cent, or a mean of
4.0 per cent per annum. By contrast, tomatoes from Lushoto and Mbeya record 33.5 per cent 
of the real value of overall tomato supply in 1981, and rise to account for 60.5 per cent of real 
tomato values by 1988. This might suggest an increase in the overall value of the tomatoes 
from Lushoto and Mbeya. However, interviews with farmers in Lushoto would suggest that the 
peak period during which tomatoes were supplied from these areas generally occurs at a time 
of the year when the supply of tomatoes in Dar es Salaam is low. This low supply, coupled 
with the continued high demand in Dar es Salaam, appears to have pushed up the price of 
tomatoes arriving in Kariakoo at this time of year. Indeed, some producers with sufficient capital 
are able to plant their tomatoes in order to harvest at this period, and take advantage of the 
low point in deliveries, and consequent increase in prices.
Figure 4.29 Percentage of the Real Value of Annual Tomato Deliveries to Kariakoo
□  Iringa
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Figure 4.29 also shows that, after an initial decrease in the proportion of the real value of 
tomatoes from Morogoro, Ruvu and Mkaiye, declining from 28.0 per cent in 1981 to 13.7 per 
cent in 1983, the next three years see a modest recovery to reach 25.1 per cent of overall real 
tomato values by 1986, but this is followed, in turn, by a further decline again to 14.9 per cent 
by the end of the period. The proportion of tomatoes accounted for by those from Iringa 
increase between 1981 and 1983 from 32.4 per cent to 54.5 per cent, but then decrease steadily 
until 1988 to 23.4 per cent. This is reflected in the real values, which begin the period at TShs
12.8 million, and increase to TShs 47.51 million by 1983. In 1984 the real value of the Iringa 
tomato deliveries dropped to TShs 27.9 million. During the latter years of the period the real 
value of deliveries of tomatoes from this region increased again, reaching TShs 34.54 million by 
the end of the period.
Figure 4.30 Real Value of Tomato Deliveries at Kariakoo 
Million TShs
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The proportion of the value of vegetable commodities delivered at Kariakoo is represented in 
Figure 4.31. This barchart shows that the proportion of pea and cabbage real value of 
deliveries rose between 1981 and 1983 from 4.6 to 7 per cent in the case of peas. This 
represents an increase in real value from TShs 3.01 million to TShs 5.38 million (Figure 4.31), and 
from 6.6 to 15.3 per cent in the case of cabbage, and a real value increase from TShs 4.30 
million to TShs 13.68 million. The real value of cabbage deliveries then declined to around 10 
per cent of total vegetable values by 1985 and remained at that level until 1988. However, the 
pattern of real value of cabbage remained at between TShs 11 million and 13 million between 
1983 and 1986, increasing to TShs 34.15 million by 1988. This is a real value increase of 694 per 
cent or 99 per cent per annum. The real value of peas declined to 3.8 per cent of vegetable 
value in 1984, rose again to about 5.5 per cent in 1985 and 1986, declining in 1987 to 3.7 per cent 
and finally rose to 4.8 per cent, appearing to form a pattern of two years of high delivery value 
followed by one of lower value. However, this is reflected in terms of the real values as a
general increase over the period, with one year of decreased value in 1984. The real value of 
the pea deliveries at Kariakoo in 1981 was TShs 3.01 million. The value of deliveries of peas 
climbed to TShs 5.38 million by 1983. In 1984 a modest decline in value to TShs 3.93 million was 
recorded, but the last four years of the period recorded a steady increase in the real value of 
pea deliveries, reaching TShs 15.26 million by 1988, a real increase of 407 per cent, or 58 per 
cent per annum
Figure 4.31 Percentage Profile of the Real Value of Annual Vegetable Deliveries 
to Kariakoo
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Onions begin the period at 41.3 per cent, and decline to 25 per cent in 1985 and 1986. The 
onion value then increased to account for 34.1 per cent of vegetable value in 1987, before finally 
declining to a proportion of 28.8 per cent by 1988. This decline in the importance of onions is 
likely to be partly the result of the increasing proportion accounted for by Irish potatoes. As 
Figure 4.32 shows, onions increase in value along with the other vegetables after the Tanzanian 
economy’s lowest point was reached in 1986. The proportion of the vegetable delivery values 
accounted for by potatoes began in 1981 at 47.5 per cent. This is followed by a decline to 38 
per cent in 1983, an increase to 59.4 per cent by 1985 and finally declining to 50.6 and then 55.7 
per cent in 1987 and 1988. Irish potatoes were at their peak in terms of proportion of 
vegetable value in 1985 and 1986, when the Tanzanian economy was at the low point of its 
recession. Irish potatoes offered a cheap form of bulk vegetables, which could be added to a 
vegetable stew where possible, or simply boiled and eaten.
The real value of Irish potato deliveries in 1981 were TShs 30.78 million. They increased steadily 
throughout the period, reaching TShs 177.29 million by 1988, a real increase of 476 per cent, or 
68 per cent per annum. The reason for this consistent increase in the value of potato deliveries 
may be explained partly by the deepening political crisis affecting Tanzania during this period. 
As people in the urban areas found their income being held at a consistently low level, and 
prices for basic food commodities subject to inflation rates of 30 per cent or more, they sought 
alternative, cheaper means by which to feed themselves. Irish potatoes are a carbohydrate-rich
food which can be consumed in the place of the staple foods, such as maize and rice, the formal 
marketing of which was still strictly controlled at that time. The alternatives open to the urban 
population were: firstly, to try to obtain staples from the controlled, but inefficient formal 
marketing sources; secondly, to buy staples from the relatively more efficient, but highly priced 
illegal market; or to adopt alternatives, such as Irish potatoes, as a main food. What is 
surprising, although it is still early to draw firm conclusions, is that the liberalisation of the main 
staple grain markets in 1986 have not had an influence on the value of Irish potatoes still being 
delivered to Kariakoo. Clearly, there is still demand for this vegetable. Its importance during 
this period is demonstrated in the fact that, of each of the vegetables covered in this analysis, it 
is the only one which consistently increased the real value of its annual delivery over the entire 
period.
Figure 4.32 Annual Real Value of Vegetable Deliveries at Kariakoo 
Million TShs
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Oranges do not account for less than 77 per cent of the annual real value of deliveries of citrus 
fruit, and account for up to 89 per cent of total citrus values (Figure 4.33). These annual 
variations are mirrored by the variations in the real values presented in Figure 4.34. For 
example, the value of orange deliveries in 1981 is TShs 8.80 million, rising to a peak in real 
value of TShs 15.05 million in 1983, before declining slowly through the years of the height of the 
economic crisis in Tanzania to TShs 5.19 million in 1986. The real value of the orange deliveries 
then begin to pick up, rising to TShs 10.61 million by 1988. In view of the declining volume of 
orange deliveries, reported in an earlier section, the variations in real value are likely to have 
more to do with the inflation rate, business confidence and the changing costs of transportation 
as the period of the 1980s developed, declining to the low point of 1986 and showing modest 
recovery by the end of the period, rising once again above the 1981 level. The consumption of 
oranges, as a snack food, is likely to be more adversely affected by worsening economic 
circumstances. As urban consumers’ incomes are squeezed they are more likely to continue 
buying staples, such as the grains, potatoes and cooking bananas and the main foods, such as
onions and tomatoes, even if in smaller quantities. However, the urban consumers are also 
more likely to go without foods such as oranges, which are not as important to their survival.
Because of the very high proportion of the citrus deliveries accounted for by oranges, they 
have a very strong influence on the real value of overall citrus deliveries reported earlier.
Rgure 4.33 Percentage Profile of the Real Value of Annual CitrUs Fruit Deliveries 
to Kariakoo
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The annual value of lime deliveries begin the period at TShs 0.99 million, declines to TShs 0.95 
million, before rising to TShs 1.52 million by 1984. This results in lime value accounting for 9.5 
per cent of citrus deliveries in 1981, decreasing to 6.5 per cent in 1982 and rising to 11.2 per 
cent by 1984. The annual real value of deliveries in 1985 and 1986 declined to TShs 0.99 million 
and then TShs 0.59 million, accounting for 9.2 and 9.9 per cent of the real value of citrus fruit 
deliveries respectively. 1987 saw a strong recovery of lime values reaching TShs 1.67 million or
17.3 per cent of citrus delivery value, however, it declined once more in 1988 to TShs 1.09 
million, accounting for 9.2 per cent of citrus value. There is no clear explanation for the faster 
recovery of limes after the 1986 low point for citrus fruits. It is likely to be linked to their special 
place in this category, as they are usually consumed as a garnish to main meals, and therefore 
the lime consumption patterns tend to follow that of the vegetables more closely than that of 
their counterparts in the citrus group category.
Figure 4.34 Annual Real Value of Citrus Fruit Deliveries at Kariakoo
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Lemons account for 6.2 per cent of the value of citrus fruit deliveries at Kariakoo in 1981, and 
rise, after a decline in 1982 to 8.5 per cent in 1983. The next three years, through which the 
Tanzanian economic crisis worsened, saw lemons account for only between 2.1 per cent in 1984 
and and 2.6 per cent in 1985. The real value of lemons increases to account for 5.6 per cent of 
citrus deliveries in 1987, but the period ends with lemons accounting for only 1 per cent in 1988. 
Clearly, oranges have continued to dominate this declining group of commodities, whilst the 
value of lemon deliveries has declined in importance, even relative to other citrus fruits. Figure 
4.34 demonstrates the decline of the real value of lemon deliveries at Kariakoo. They begin the 
year at TShs 0.65 million, rise to their peak in real value at TShs 1.52 million in 1983. The next 
year the value of lemon deliveries had fallen to TShs 0.28 million and remained there in 1985, 
declining further to TShs 0.15 million. In 1987 there is a slight recovery, with a rise in value to 
TShs 0.54 million, but 1988 records the lowest annual real value of the period at TShs 0.12 
million. Clearly, lemon deliveries are not an important component of Kariakoo’s business, 
accounting for between less than one tenth of one per cent in 1988 and just over one half of 
one per cent of the total annual real value of fruit and vegetable deliveries at Kariakoo in 1983. 
Lemons are one of only two of the commodities covered which declined in terms of the real 
value of their deliveries at Kariakoo, in spite of a real increase in price. A possible explanation 
for the decline in importance of the lemons and limes being delivered at Kariakoo is that as a 
specialist food, and as one which is generally bought and sold in much smaller quantities, it is 
likely that this feature of these commodities lends itself to the informal market. One of the 
difficulties of the informal market is the lack of facilities for handling the large quantities often 
shipped from up-country producing locations. However, in the case of these two commodities 
they would be much easier for an informal trader to purchase and distribute, with fewer 
difficulties to overcome.
Figure 4.35 Percentage Profile of the Real Value of Annual Fruit Deliveries to 
Kariakoo
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The annual real value of other fruit commodities is dominated by the value of coconut supply 
(Figure 4.35). This fruit began the period accounting for 78.6 per cent of the value of other fruit 
supply, and decreased to 57.0 per cent by 1985. Coconut value made a recovery during 1986 
and 1987, rising to account for 74.0 per cent of the real value of fruit deliveries in 1987, but 
declined again to 67.8 per cent by 1988. The importance of the value of coconut deliveries to 
the overall fruit delivery values is demonstrated in the graph of real value of deliveries (Figure 
4.36). The real value of coconut deliveries increased from TShs 41.64 million in 1981 to the 
highest annual value of the period at TShs 54.09 million in 1982. A decline in 1983 to TShs 43.59 
million was followed in the next two years with further declines reaching TShs 25.78 million in 
1985. The latter three years were marked by a recovery of the value of coconut deliveries to 
achieve TShs 51.79 million.
Figure 4.36 Real Annual Value of Deliveries of Other Fruit to Kariakoo
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Ripe bananas begin the period accounting for 9.6 per cent of the fruit value, rising to 22.8 per 
cent in 1983, declining slightly to account fro 18.4 per cent in 1984, before a rise to account for
24.7 per cent of fruit values in 1985. This is reflected in a rise from TShs 5.10 million shillings 
worth of ripe bananas delivered during 1981 to TShs 15.48 million in 1983. There then follows a 
period of uncertain change as the value of ripe banana deliveries fluctuates between around 
TShs 9 million and TShs 11 million, as the economy reached the lowest point in its crisis. The 
last three years of the sequence see a consistent rise in the value of deliveries almost reaching 
1983 levels with a real value of delivery of TShs 15.01 million.
Pineapples began the period at 2.6 per cent in 1981 increased to 4.1 per cent in 1985 and then 
decline to 1.8 per cent in 1987, finally rising to account for 2.3 per cent of the fruit value by 1988. 
Ripe mangoes began in 1981 accounting for 4.1 per cent of fruit value in 1981, decreased to 1.6 
per cent in 1982 and 1.7 per cent in 1983, but over the next three years rose again to 6.0 per 
cent, before declining to 1.5 per cent in 1987 and 2.3 per cent by 1988. Green mangoes 
increase in value from 5.0 per cent in 1981 to 11.4 per cent in 1984 They declined to 5.8 per cent 
of fruit value in 1987 and finally to 6.6 per cent in 1988.
Over the period the relative fruit values vary considerably. Coconuts remain the most important 
of fruit commodities, in terms of delivery values, although, as described, they decline in 
proportion of value from 78.6 to 67.8 per cent over the period, but a net real value increase of
24.3 per cent. Pineapples and ripe mangoes also declined in relative importance, from 2.6 per 
cent in 1981 to 2.3 per cent in 1988 and from 4.1 to 3.6 per cent respectively. Ripe bananas 
and green mangoes have a net proportionate increase, from 9.6 per cent in 1981 to 19.7 per 
cent in 1988 and from 5.0 per cent in 1981 to 6.6 per cent in 1988. The first two years of the 
period see a strong rise in the value of deliveries of all commodities. The following three years, 
up to 1986 see a decline in all commodities, most strongly evident among the fruits and citrus 
fruits. Finally, the last two years see a strong rise in the value of deliveries of all commodities, 
most strongly in the vegetables and, to a lesser extent, tomatoes.
None of the fruits are used in basic cooking and are not, therefore, considered as an important 
food for survival. It is to be expected, therefore that in times of a depressed economic 
situation, the market for these commodities will decline considerably. This has happened in 
both the case of citrus fruits and other fruits as demonstrated in the graphs of real value of 
deliveries in Figures 4.32 and 4.34. During this time the deliveries values of the vegetables did 
not decline, its increase merely slowed (Figure 4.30) and the real value of tomato deliveries 
declined by a only limited amount (Figure 4.28). The importance of vegetables to the diet and 
their lower demand elasticity means that the effect of periods of national economic difficulty will 
be reduced on these commodities. Thus during the mid 1980s, it may be expected that the 
initial decline in the importance of fruit may be the result of low demand. However, as the 
country’s economy began to recover, the new increases in fruit supplies to Dar es Salaam had
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no other option than to by pass the already overcrowded Kariakoo and go directly to the retail 
markets.
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Table 4.4 Annual Grouped Deflated Prices per Metric Tonne (TShs) and Percentage-' 
Annual Changes
Year Tomatoes % Vegetables % Citrus % Fruit %
1981 26,083 18,907 10,089 '
•
19,633
1982 30,122 15.49 20,817 10.10 13,224 31.07 28,173 43.50
1983 29,026 -3.64 28,434 36.59 17,216 30.19 30,772 9.23
1984 22,594 -2216 21,296 -25.10 10,610 ■38.37 27,162 -11.73
1985 21,842 -3.33 20,614 -3.20 10,251 -3.38 28,807 6.06
1986 21,826 -0.07 26,139 26.80 11,116 844 26,456 -6.16
1987 31,551 44.56 45,226 73.02 15,974 43.70 30,638 15.81
1968 49,768 57.74 59,009 30.48 15,261 -4.46 44,785 46.17
Total 23,685 90.81 40,102 21210 5,172 51.26 25,152 128.11
Source: Author’s Survey
The deliveries of fruit and vegetables at Kariakoo appear to have reached their peak by about 
1983 after which time it remained at around the same level or a little less. During the following 
three years, the deliveries of both categories of fruit declined significantly, by up to 60 per cent 
per annum in citrus fruits and 34.8 per cent in the other fruit category. The deliveries of 
vegetables, however, continued to increase, albeit more slowly, between 1983 and 1987 when 
the country’s economic crisis was at its height. Currently, during a period of economic 
liberalisation, those delivering fruit are finding Kariakoo market more crowded than ever and 
dominated by vegetables. In order to sell quickly, while the fruit are still in good condition, and 
to avoid the congestion and tax involved in Kariakoo, it is easy to understand why an increasing 
amount of fruit does not enter the Dar es Salaam market through Kariakoo.
Figure 4.37 Mean Price per Metric Tonne of the main Grouped Fruit and Vegetable 
Categories
TShs/M.Tonne
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Figure 4.37 gives overall variations in real prices among the commodity groups over the survey 
period. All commodity groups saw an increase in mean price per metric tonne between 1981 
and 1983, except tomatoes, which began to decline in price in 1982. (See Table 4.4) In 1984 all 
the commodity groups declined in price by between 11.73 per cent, in the case of fruit, and 
38.37 per cent, in the case of citrus fruit prices. In 1985 all the grouped commodity group prices 
declined by around 3.3 per cent, except fruit which increased by 6.06 per cent. The 1987 to 
1988 period has resulted in a significant increase in price for all the commodity groups ranging 
from 15.81 per cent for fruit to 73.02 per cent for vegetables. By the end of the period 
vegetables emerge have increased by the largest proportion, rising from TShs 18,907 to 59,009 
at 1981 prices, a net increase of 212.10 per cent or 30.3 per cent per annum. The fruit group 
increased from TShs 19,633 to 44,785, a net increase of 128.11 per cent or 18.30 per cent per 
annum (Table 4.4). The pattern over the period appears to be one of interrupted increase, 
with the prices on the whole increasing up to 1983, when the Kariakoo wholesale market reaches 
more its ceiling capacity of around 70,000 metric tonnes of deliveries, and when the Tanzanian 
economy reached its lowest point, in terms of the availability of goods in markets and shops. 
The group price then declined in 1984, levelling off in 1985 and 1986, before increasing again in 
the last two years of the period.
Figure 4.38 Annual Mean Price per Metric Tonne of Tomatoes
TShs/M .Tonne
The price per metric tonne data for tomatoes is graphed in Figure 4.38. This shows a consistent 
increase in price over the period for all tomatoes, ranging from a net increase of 39.1 per cent 
for tomatoes from Morogoro, Ruvu and Mkaiye, to 170.6 percent for tomatoes from Iringa. 
Tomato prices increase from 1981 to 1982 in all cases, except for tomatoes from Morogoro, 
Ruvu and Mkaiye, which decline consistently right up to 1984. Reports from inhabitants of Dar 
es Salaam suggested that a considerable amount of illegal trading of vegetables from 
Morogoro took place in the early 1980s. On a number of occasions the food supply in Dar es
Salaam was extremely low. Some inhabitants collectively hired a vehicle of some sort, 
preferably a pick-up and under cover of night took a trip to producing areas in order to 
purchase food for their household. This involved taking the risk of being caught at police
f
roadblocks and charged with black market trading, and so the nearest producing areas such as 
Morogoro were the obvious targets of such enterprises. This had a depressing impact on the 
price of tomatoes and other commodities from these areas, because of this additional outlet for 
the producers. After 1982 tomatoes from Moshi and Dodoma and Lushoto and Mbeya 
declined in price until 1986 in the first case and 1985 in the second, both increasing after this to 
end the period 40.5 and 159.8 per cent higher than the 1981 price at 1981 values.
Figure 4.39 Annual Mean Price of Vegetables at Kariakoo
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With regard to vegetable prices, the first two years of the 1981-87 period are characterised by a 
decline in the real price for onions and Irish potatoes and increased prices for cabbages and 
peas (Figure 4.39). 1982 to 1983 sees real increases in the prices of all the commodities, 
greatest in onions, rising from a mean of TShs 6,209 to TShs 10,211 (up 64 per cent), and least 
in pea prices, rising from TShs 9,099 to only TShs 9,870 (up 8 per cent). After this increase,
Irish potato prices continued increasing in real terms to reach TShs 8,348 in 1988 from TShs 3,356 
in 1981, a net increase of 148.8 per cent at 1981 values. Figure 4.39 shows similarities with the 
upward trend interrupted in the middle of the period as shown in the graph of tomato prices 
(Figure 4.39), particularly in the case of peas and cabbage. The net increases over the period 
are far greater in the vegetable group than in the tomato group, however. The net increases in 
real price estimates range from 103.0 per cent for onions to 472.4 per cent for cabbages. The 
surprisingly low price estimates achieved for the peas may be explained by the fact that this 
commodity included pigeon peas and green peas, both of which have quite different prices and 
values. Pigeon peas are usually dried and sold throughout the year. Green peas are sold 
fresh and have a distinct season focused around July and August. Peas are the most
expensive vegetable in six of the eight years reviewed, exceeded only by cabbages in 1981 
and 1983. This vegetable emerges in the last two years of the period as the most expensive 
of the sixteen commodities reviewed, sharing this position with only cabbage and pineapples.
f
Figure 4.40 graphs the mean annual price per tonne of the citrus fruits. One of the notable 
features of this graph is the remarkable drop in price of lemons in 1985 to the lowest of the 
survey period. Similar declines are recorded for the other two commodities in the middle of the 
period under review, in 1984 for limes and in 1986 for oranges. The supply of oranges, as 
described in section two of this chapter, is in decline at Kariakoo (see Table 4.1), as are the 
deliveries of lemons. This appears to have influenced the net increase in the price of these two 
commodities, by 283.0 per cent in the case of oranges and 41.7 per cent in the case of lemons. 
Limes, on the other hand, increased in supply to Kariakoo (see Table 4.1) and this apparently 
influenced the 19.8 per cent net decline in price over the period, the only commodity reviewed 
to decline in real price over the period. The greatest decline in the real price of limes occurred 
in 1984 falling by TShs 2,078 to TShs 4,009, or 34 per cent, from the previous year, coinciding 
with the peak volume of delivery year for limes, when a record of 555 metric tonnes were 
delivered, over twice the nearest annual delivery recorded over the period (see Table 4.1). The 
reason for this may lie in the fact, already referred to, that limes are consumed alongside 
vegetables as a garnish for main meals.
Figure 4.40 Annual Mean Citrus Fruit Price per Metric Tonne at Kariakoo
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The mean annual prices per tonne for other fruit are graphed in Figure 4.41. The first two years 
are characterised, as in each of the other commodity groups, by an increase in each of the 
commodities. This is followed in 1983 by pineapples and green mangoes increasing in value, 
while the other three decline. In 1984, all the fruits, except pineapples decline in real price, 
followed by a modest increase in real prices for ail the commodities in 1985. Both ripe and 
green mangoes decline in price in 1986, while ripe bananas and coconuts increased in price. 
This may be explained, at least in part, by the increase in the volume of supply of the former
two fruits in contrast to the decrease in supply of the latter two. In this year and the following 
year pineapples declined in real price. The exceptional pattern of the pineapple real price 
changes may be partly explained by the pattern of the volume of delivery. The first five years
r
of the period see a decline in the volume of pineapple deliveries at Kariakoo, which peaks in 
1985 (see Figure 4.9), the same year as the peak price per metric tonne. The following year, 
1986, sees an increase in the supply of pineapples for the first time in the period, and a 
consequent decrease in the price for the first time. In the last two years of the period only 
pineapples record a decline in price in 1987. This is more than made up for by the recovery of 
the price to TShs 15,059, above its 1986 level. The initial increases in the pineapple price may 
have been the result of the sharp decline in supplies in 1984 and 1985, delaying the decline in 
rice for two or three years. It may also have been partly influenced by the export market. 
Pineapples are the only commodity, of those examined in this analysis, which Tanzania exports 
in any great quantity.
Finally, ripe bananas and coconuts follow a very similar pattern both in terms of price and 
in terms of annual change. Both begin with a rise in price to 1983, both fall in price in 1985 and 
then rise sharply to 1988, before falling in 1989. Coconuts began the period at a higher price of 
TShs 4,500 remained at a higher price than bananas, before and falling by TShs 17,000 between 
1988 and 1989. In contrast, bananas began at a price of TShs 2,700 and ended at TShs 16,000 
after falling only TShs 8,000 in from TShs 24,000 in 1988 to TShs 16,000. Bananas experienced a 
net increase of 488 per cent. This dramatic drop in price during the final year resulted in 
coconuts having the lowest net increase over the survey period at 132 per cent.
Figure 4.41 Annual Mean Fruit Price per Metric Tonne at Kariakoo
TShs per M. Tonne
Year
This section has demonstrated that the data representing the value of deliveries to Kariakoo 
Wholesale Market mirror those of the volume of deliveries. This confirms the increasing
importance of vegetables over fruit in the market. Within the four main categories, the value of 
tomatoes, from Lushoto and Mbeya increased in importance over those from other origins, 
particularly after 1983. In the vegetable group the value of Irish potato deliveries increased
f
over the period making this crop account for over 50 per cent of annual vegetable value. This 
may be because of the Irish demand for traditional staple foods, which some consumers may 
abandon in favour of potatoes, if they consider them to be cheaper or more convenient. The 
value of oranges deliveries dominates the citrus fruit, but lemons decline over the period in 
favour of limes. Finally, the value of coconut deliveries has declined over the period in favour of 
sweet bananas. The value of deliveries of the fruit commodities increased in relative importance 
until 1985, but subsequently declined as the absolute values of coconuts and sweet bananas 
increased again. The mean annual real price of all commodities except pineapples declined in 
the mid 1980s, as the Tanzanian economy reached the height of its crisis. As the economy has 
recovered, towards the late 1980s, so the real prices of the commodities examined have 
increased again.
4.6 Monthly Value and Price of Deliveries to Kariakoo
The mean value of monthly deliveries for each of the commodity groups is presented in Figure 
4.42. The vegetable group accounts for a large proportion of the value of fruit and vegetables 
delivered to Kariakoo, ranging from 43.8 per cent in February to 52.6 per cent May. The lowest 
proportion coincides with the lowest value of monthly deliveries at TShs 10.2 million in February. 
The highest proportion coincides with a value of TShs 13.4 million in May. After reaching this 
mean monthly value in May, there is a decline of 6.8 per cent, to TShs 12.5 million in June, 
before increasing once more by 9.9 per cent to TShs 13.7 million in July. The end of the dry 
season, in August, sees the value fall by 21.0 per cent to TShs 10.8 million, after which the mean 
monthly value climbs steadily to reach TShs 12.6 million in December. A rise of 16.7 per cent 
over four months is facilitated by the easier transport conditions during the December to 
February dry season and encouraged by the increased demand during the Christmas holiday.
The next most important commodity group by value is the tomato group (Figure 4.42). This 
group averages a proportion of 27.7 per cent of the overall mean monthly value of deliveries, 
ranging from 20.1 per cent in August to 35.5 per cent in February. The month of the lowest 
proportion of overall value coincides with the month of lowest mean monthly value, August, 
recording a value of TShs 4.7 million, after which the volume of deliveries of tomatoes began to 
rise to its peak in October. Although February also records a high mean monthly value, the 
highest is recorded in December at TShs 8.4 million, at the peak of the short, intense dry 
season, when tomato deliveries are beginning to decline once more.
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Figure 4.42 Percentage Profile of Mean Monthly Value of Fruit and Vegetable 
Group Deliveries at Kariakoo
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The deliveries of citrus and other fruit categories are influenced to a much greater extent by the 
importance of the environment and the climatic seasons. The majority of the fruit crops are 
perennial plants harvested at certain periods of the year, with the notable exceptions of 
coconut, banana and paw paw trees, which produce fruit at any time of the year. In the case of 
the vegetable crops, their fruit come from annual plants, which, in most parts of Tanzania may 
be planted at any time of the year, given suitable environmental conditions, such as the 
availability of water during the dry season for irrigation, and the accessibility of inputs, such as 
fungicides to protect the plants from fungi, particularly prevalent during the rainy seasons. 
However, fruit trees in all parts of Tanzania do not necessarily produce fruit at the same period 
of the year, and evidence from interviews and some reports (Seminar fur Landwirtschaftliche 
Entwicklung, 1986; Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi 1971) suggest that orange trees in different areas 
of Tanzania supply the city of Dar es Salaam at different periods of the year. For example, 
oranges from Morogoro and Tanga Regions, the main supply regions for Dar es Salaam, are 
mainly delivered between April and July, while the area of Kilwa in Lindi Region (see Map 4.1) 
mainly supplies between July and September and the area around Dar es Salaam, Coast 
Region, supplies the city throughout the year. In the case of those supply areas which are at 
some distance from the city the supply may be almost as much influenced by the conditions of 
the roads as by the actually size of the harvest available for the city.
The fruit category accounts for a monthly mean proportion of 20.1 per cent, ranging from 15.6 
per cent in April, at the centre of the main rainy season, to 26.7 per cent at the of the long dry 
season. There is a secondary peak in the proportion of value in December, during the shorter 
dry season, but this accounts for the highest mean monthly value at TShs 6.4 million. August 
records TShs 6.2 million, while April also records the lowest mean monthly value at TShs 4.0 
million.
The citrus fruit category accounts for the smallest proportion of mean monthly value. On 
average, it accounts for 4.0 per cent of overall value of deliveries, but never more than 7 per 
cent. It records less than 1.8 per cent of overall value in February, when only TShs 0.4 million 
worth of citrus fruit is delivered at Kariakoo. The period of peak citrus fruit supply occurs during 
the months of August and September at the end of the long dry season, when a mean of just 
over TShs 1.5 million worth of citrus fruits were delivered at Kariakoo. This coincides with a rise 
in the peak of the orange deliveries which dominates the citrus category, and the rising supply 
of lime and lemon deliveries, all combining to produce a high volume of citrus fruits at this time 
of year.
Throughout the year the proportion of total value of fruit and vegetable deliveries accounted for 
by tomatoes to Kariakoo appears to have an annual cycle. The value begins in February at a 
high level, when the value of fruit and vegetable deliveries is relatively low, but the value of 
tomato deliveries is relatively high, and it it low in August, when the value of fruit and 
vegetables is low, but the value of tomatoes is also low. In the case of vegetables the cycle 
peaks in May, when the value of vegetable deliveries is at its highest, and troughs in January 
and February, when it is at its lowest. Citrus fruits peak in August and trough in February, 
during the heaviest rainy season, when such fruits are in low demand, and the difficulties of 
transport are at their greatest. Finally, the proportion of value accounted for by fruit peaks in 
August, at the end of the long dry season, when supplies are relatively high, and troughs in 
October and February, during the two rainy seasons. The highest mean monthly value of 
deliveries occurs in December at the height of the main dry season in December. These highly 
variable supplies of fruit and vegetables have clear implications for the consumers. In periods 
of peak supply there is an abundance of commodities at reasonable prices, but only the more 
affluent households have the facility to purchase the more perishable crops and store them in 
order to avoid either paying the high prices or the commodity shortages during periods of low 
supply. The corollary of this is that during the rainy season, when traders have difficulty in 
getting supplies to the city because of the poor condition of the roads, or, during periods when 
most crops are not being harvested, the poorer sections of Dar es Salaam's population either 
have to pay high prices or, more likely go without such basic vegetables as onions. They have 
to rely instead on monotonous diets of staples, occasionally supplemented with beans or other 
foods which are less perishable or which can be dried.
Mean monthly prices per metric tonne of each of the selected commodities were calculated by 
the author from the volume and the value data. It should be noted, however, that, when 
examining these data the volume in tonnes are generally the result of estimates made by KMC 
staff and the value is calculated on this basis using KMC-set minimum guide-line prices. These 
guide-lines are arrived at through the procedure explained in Chapter Three. The results of this 
section, therefore, represent an indication of the monthly pricing patterns, and are not intended 
as accurate presentations of the actual prices paid to Kariakoo's suppliers. In addition, it should 
be remembered that the minimum guide-line prices are set by KMC on a weekly basis. This
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rules out the use of the data for the analysis of daily variations in price and value of the 
commodities examined. A more detailed survey of daily transactions would be required in 
order to facilitate such an analysis.
Figure 4.43 The Grouped Mean Monthly Fruit and Vegetable Prices
Month
The mean monthly price per metric tonne of the commodity groups at constant 1981 prices, 
graphed in Figure 4.43, shows general trends. Firstly, the mean tomato price climbs steadily 
from TShs 7,457 per metric tonne in January up to the highest mean monthly price of TShs 9,562 
in May, a rise of 28.2 per cent over four months. This highest price in May is likely to be the 
result of high demand and the low, or infrequent, supply due to the transport difficulties in the 
heavy rainy season which ends in early May. This is followed by a decrease to the minimum in 
September, at approximately TShs 5,733, a decline of 40.0 per cent over four months. A mean 
monthly price of around TShs 6,000 is maintained during the short rainy season in October and 
November, before climbing again to TShs 7,876 in December.
Table 4.5 The Proportion of Monthly Variation in Prices for the Main Commodity 
Groups
Month Tomatoes Vegetables Citrus Fruit
January1 -5.31 -19.02 20.88 -18.10
February 22.73 -9.51 27.77 -5.37
March -0.37 -4.65 206 5.00
April -1.43 4.41 -1.19 5.31
May 6.39 -5.05 -2.34 -5.08
June -19.00 1.64 2.54 -3.88
July -8.90 2.93 7.34 0.85
August -8.09 -13.25 10.46 4.69
September -11.59 -0.96 -3.75 0.69
October 9.68 17.53 13.41 3.51
November 6.51 7.65 -7.35 2.93
December 17.59 25.39 -5.45 12.96
1 The figure quoted for January represents the proportion of difference between the price 
in December and that in January
Source: Author’s calculations
The mean monthly price for vegetables is relatively more stable. It begins the year at TShs 
8,583 in January, falling by 14.2 per cent over the next two months to TShs 7,406 in March. A 
mean monthly price of around TShs 7,500 is more or less maintained over the next four months, 
before a fall in price of 13.25 per cent to TShs 6,663 in August (see Table 4.5), and then to TShs 
6,566 in September. The last three month are characterised by a 58.6 per cent increase in the 
price from September to December, when the peak mean monthly grouped price is achieved 
at TShs 10,470.
The citrus fruit price begins the year with the highest mean monthly price at TShs 5,108. It 
declines by 27.8 per cent, as the rainy season begins in February and demand for these fruits 
declines. It maintains a price of between TShs 3,500-4,000 during the period of high delivery, 
when the main supply areas are in their harvesting season. The price increases by 10.5 per 
cent to TShs 4,418 in August, as supplies from the main supply regions of Tanga and Morogoro 
begin to decline. However, there is a slight decline of 3.75 per cent in September to TShs 
4,252. Interviews with Kariakoo Market staff suggest that this modest decline in September is 
the result of supplies from the increasingly important citrus producing area of Kilwa in Lindi 
Region, south of Dar es Salaam. The deliveries from this area are not yet as important as 
those from Tanga or Morogoro, but oranges from Kilwa are considered among the staff and 
traders at Kariakoo to be among the sweetest to arrive there. According to Kariakoo market 
staff, peak deliveries from this area occur in September, just before the rainy season. The 
roads from the south of the country to Dar es Salaam are particularly badly affected by the rains, 
and so the supplies from this area are severely limited by their ability to get through to the city. 
The decline in price may be the result of the lime and lemon fruits reaching the peak of their 
deliveries in September and their prices falling from the previous month by 8.7 and 11.9 per 
cent respectively. By October,at the height of the lesser rainy season, the price of citrus fruits 
has already risen again to TShs 4,823 . This rise may have been influenced by the rise in price 
of the lime and lemon deliveries of 23.1 and 28.0 per cent respectively, as these two fruit begin 
to decline in from their peak months of volume of deliveries.However, the price in November 
and December declines once more by 7.4 per cent to TShs 4,468 and then by 5.5 per cent to 
falling back to around TShs 4,225. This time however the decline in price is likely to be 
influenced by the increased supply of limes and the diversion of demand for a sweet, juicy fruit 
from oranges to the massively increased supply of ripe mangoes which occurs at this time.
Fruit appears to have the most stable grouped mean monthly price at no less than TShs 5,400 
and no more than 7,000. The pattern is one of a gradual increase throughout the year, from the 
lowest point in February, 5.4 per cent down on the January price, at TShs 5,452, to the highest 
point in December at TShs 7,034, a rise of 29.0 per cent over 11 months.price in December at 
TShs 7,034 July to the maximum in November. This increase is followed by a gradual decline 
(December records almost the same price as July) over two or three months, and a period of 
relative stability, until a drop in price from June to the minimum in July.
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Each of the commodity groups, except citrus fruit, has a marked price increase from November 
to December. This may be explained by an increase in purchases as people buy food to 
celebrate first Independence Day on the 12th December, and secondly Christmas. The lack of 
increase at the same time in fruit may perhaps be explained by the onset of the ripe mango 
season. As the temperature in Dar es Salaam increases during the hottest months of the year, 
when temperatures frequently exceed 30°C, the demand for a thirst quenching snack increases. 
Although the mean deliveries of oranges declined to around 200 metric tonnes from a peak of 
400 metric tonnes earlier in the year, the supply of ripe mangoes increased from a mean of 
under 5 metric tonnes in August to over 200 between October and December, reaching as high 
as 373 metric tonnes in November (see Appendix 4.2).
Figure 4.44 is a graph of the mean monthly proportions of the value of tomato deliveries from 
the four main source groups to Kariakoo. This bears a striking similarity to the graph in Figure 
4.13, which displays the proportion of volume of tomato deliveries: the pattern of tomato value 
and tomato deliveries are very similar, in terms of seasonal variation. The total monthly value of 
tomatoes, as in the case of the tomato volume, varies much less than each of the tomato 
groups, ranging from just over TShs 4.7 million to just under TShs 8.4 million . This results in a 
coefficient of variation of 18.25. However, the seasons of each of the tomato types is very clear 
and the variation in mean monthly value of the deliveries of each type has a much larger range. 
Tomatoes from Iringa and Moshi/Dodoma peak in June at about 70 and 6 per cent of the total 
tomato market value respectively; tomatoes from Morogoro/Ruvu/Mkaiye peak in September 
at about 70 per cent; and tomatoes from Lushoto/Mbeya peak in February at about 80 per 
cent. The implications confirm the conclusion of the examination of the data concerning the 
volume of tomato supply that, in spite of the marked seasonal variations in supply, the traders 
in Tanzania have been able to ensure a relatively stable supply of tomatoes to the city of Dar 
es Salaam.
Figure 4.44 Percentage Profile of Mean Monthly Value of Tomato Deliveries at 
Kariakoo
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The most notable impression from Figure 4.45 is the highly variable price of each tomato type 
throughout the year. Tomatoes from Moshi and Dodoma begin the year at about TShs 8,800, 
and increase by 19.4 per cent to TShs 10,528 in February. A similar pattern is evident for the 
other tomato groups . Tomatoes from Lushoto and Mbeya increase by 12.8 per cent from 
TShs 8,202 to TShs 9,248. Tomatoes from Morogoro, Ruvu and Mkaiye increase by 31.9 per 
cent from TShs 6,214 to TShs 8,198. Tomatoes from Iringa increase.tpy 30.9 per cent from TShs 
6,596 to TShs 8,637. Only tomatoes from Lushoto and Mbeya and tomatoes from Morogoro, 
Ruvu and Mkaiye continue this upward trend. In the case of the former, the price increases by a 
further 9.9 per cent and in the case of the latter the price increases by a further 24.4 per cent. 
The likely reason for these sharp increases in price is the general downward trend of the overall 
volume of tomato deliveries in the first four months of the year (see Figure 4.12). The variation 
in price between March and April is generally downward, but by a less extreme factor. In the 
case of tomatoes from Lushoto and Mbeya, the price decreases by 0.2 per cent, while at the 
other extreme the tomatoes from Morogoro, Ruvu and Mkaiye decrease by 2.6 per cent.
Interestingly, the month of May divides the four tomato groups into two trends, once more, as 
tomatoes from Morogoro, Ruvu and Mkaiye and from Moshi and Dodoma increase in price by
23.9 and 11.8 per cent, respectively, to prices of TShs 9,551 and TShs 11,112. Meanwhile, 
tomatoes from Lushoto and Mbeya and Iringa decline in price by 4.9 per cent and 2.7 per cent 
respectively. The likely reason for these declines are in the case of Lushoto and Mbeya, the 
deliveries of tomatoes are declining in this month, but the demand shifts to the increasing 
volume of tomatoes being delivered from Iringa and, to a lesser extent, from Moshi and 
Dodoma.
Figure 4.45 Mean Monthly Price per Metric Tonne of Tomatoes Delivered at Kariakoo 
(at constant 1981 prices)
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Over the following two or three months there is a small increase in the overall volume of 
tomatoes delivered to Kariakoo, the result of the easier transport conditions during the long dry 
season. This results in a rapid decline in the mean monthly decline in the price of all tomato, 
groups from May through to September. The factor of this decline varies from the smallest in 
the case of Moshi and Dodoma, where the price declined by 313.4 per cent from TShs 9,551 to 
TShs 6,546. The highest decline in price during this part of the year occurred in the tomatoes 
from Ruvu and Mkaiye, where the tomato price declined from TShs/11,102 by 55.2 per cent to 
TShs 4,975. This latter group reached a peak of 696.8 metric tonnes in September, contributing 
to the higher downward trend of the price of tomatoes from this group. With the onset of the 
rainy season in October, the price of all the tomato groups increases by between 4.4 per cent 
in the case of Morogoro, Ruvu and Mkaiye and 19.1 per cent in the case of Iringa. In the first 
case, tomatoes from Morogoro, Ruvu and Mkaiye are at their highest mean monthly delivery, 
with 769 metric tonnes, and in the case of Iringa, in October the supply begins to increase for 
its second wave of supply, which peaks in December (see Figure 4.12). In each case the trend 
for the last three to four months of the year is upwards, the only exception being the price for 
tomatoes from Moshi and Dodoma, which declines by 1.3 per cent. This is likely to be the 
result of a modest increase in the volume of delivery of tomatoes from this area from from 9.5 
metric tonnes to 14.8 metric tonnes.
In summary, the year can be divided into three main parts. The first can be characterised as a 
period of high price, of varying degrees. This extends into May, when after the end of the 
short, but intense rainy season, the prices enter the second part of the year, characterised by 
declining prices. This decline continues through the long dry season to reach the month of 
September. The final part of the year is characterised by rapidly increasing prices, initially 
brought on by the onset of the rainy season, but this is later sustained by the increased 
demand at the time of the Christmas holiday.
The proportions of value of deliveries of vegetables are far more stable as can be seen in 
Figure 4.46, although there are two exceptions in the pattern of mean monthly values. These 
occur in March and August, at which times the total onion value increases, whilst the value of 
potatoes, which accounts for an average of 62.9 per cent of the mean monthly volume of 
vegetable deliveries, and a mean monthly value of delivery of 53.9 per cent, decreases to 
account for 55.5 per cent of the overall vegetable delivery and 43.7 per cent of the overall 
vegetables delivery value. Figure 4.15, graphing the absolute volume of deliveries arriving at 
Kariakoo, shows that in August the mean potato delivery in metric tonnes is at its lowest level.
In Figure 4.47, it is clear that the August value of potato deliveries achieves its lowest point, the 
value of potato deliveries declines to TShs 4.7 million in August, from the highest value of TShs
7.4 million in May, a decline of 36 per cent over three months. Meanwhile deliveries of onions 
rose to a mean monthly volume of 470 metric tonnes, which is achieved in both August and 
September. The August delivery, however, accounts for 25.0 per cent of the overall mean 
vegetable delivery for that month, whereas September accounts for only 22.7 per cent. The
value of onion deliveries reached its highest point in July at TShs 0.9 million, but by August the 
value of onion deliveries is still TShs 0.8 million.
Figure 4.46 Percentage Profile of Mean Monthly Value of Vegetable Group 
Deliveries at Kariakoo
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The value of cabbage deliveries has a pattern which falls into four main parts. The first part 
begins the year in January at TShs 1.3 million and declines 5.94 per cent to TShs 1.2 February. 
This is followed by an increase in value over the next two months, reaching TShs 1.4 million, an 
increase of 16.7 per cent, in April. This increase in value is most likely to be the result of the 
increase in the price of cabbages paid over these initial few months of the year during the 
intense rainy season. Evidence, collected during field visits to the producing areas, suggests 
that some of the areas which produce cabbages, (for example, Mgeta Division of Morogoro 
Region), is particularly badly affected by the onset of the rains. This reduces the frequency of 
cabbage deliveries at this time of year, and appears to have had the effect of increasing the 
price. This has the knock-on effect of increasing the value of deliveries at Kariakoo. However, 
the value of deliveries of other vegetable commodities also increases at this time, particularly 
peas and Irish potatoes. This has the effect of producing a general pattern of the proportion 
of overall vegetable value accounted for by cabbage, to decline from January, when it accounts 
for 12.2 per cent through to June,when it accounts for 8.9 per cent of the value of vegetable 
deliveries. The only exception to this occurs in April, when cabbage deliveries rise to account 
for 11.0 per cent of vegetable value.
After June, the proportion accounted for by cabbage increases steadily to November, when it 
accounts for its highest proportion of 14.2 per cent. This coincides with the highest mean 
monthly value of deliveries of TShs 1.6 million. Once more, as a result of evidence collected in 
the field, the peak months of supply of cabbages from one of the most important production 
areas, Mgeta Division, in Morogoro Region, begin in August and go through to December, with 
the only likely interruption being the effect of the rains on the transportation. This is borne out 
by the fact that towards the end of the long dry season, the volume of deliveries increases to
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the highest mean monthly volume of cabbage deliveries at 310.6 metric tonnes, in October.
The price for cabbage increases towards the end of the main cabbage harvesting season, such 
that the high value of cabbage deliveries are sustained at TShs 1.6 million for the last three 
months of the year.
Peas maintain a relatively low value throughout the year, beginning the year in January at 2.7 per 
cent of vegetable values, this rises through to August when it reaches its peak at 7.7 per cent, 
coinciding with the decline of the peak of the value of deliveries of peas at Kariakoo in July TShs 
0.9 million and coinciding withe the highest mean monthly volume of deliveries in August at 97.1 
metric tonnes.
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Vegetable monthly prices, shown in Figure 4.47, are relatively low and stable throughout the 
year, with the striking exception of the price per metric tonne for peas. Peas begin the year in 
January at TShs 16,963 per tonne. This is followed by a fall of 32.3 per cent to February at 
TShs 11,4849, a level which is more or less maintained, until June, when a small downward trend 
until August, takes the price down to TShs 8,899. After the lowest mean monthly price per 
metric tonne for peas is recorded in August,when the largest mean monthly delivery is also 
recorded, there then begins a sharp increase to more than double the price in the next three 
months, reaching TShs 21,918 per tonne in December,when the lowest volume of delivery is 
recorded at 13.5 metric tonnes, or 0.8 per cent of the vegetable delivery, an increase of 146.3 
per cent over four months. The sharp changes in price for peas may make the variations in 
other crops in Figure 4.47 seem relatively less important, although cabbages and potatoes do 
maintain a relatively stable price throughout the year,ranging from TShs 4,000 to 5,700 and from 
TShs 4,400 to TShs 5,700 respectively. Cabbages tend to have a higher price per tonne than 
potatoes, although their prices converge in the last two months of the year.
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Mean Monthly Price per Metric Tonne of Vegetables Delivered at 
Kariakoo (held at 1981 values)
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Onions are midway between the two extremes, beginning the year at just over TShs 8,523, 
followed by the highest mean monthly onion price of TShs 11,128. This is then followed by a 
three month decline of 25.6 per cent to TShs 8,276 in May, and a two-month increase of 27.5 per 
cent to July at TShs 10,556. After July, the price declines to about TShs 7,500 until a modest 
increase is recorded from TShs 7,633 to TShs 8,597 in December, an increase of 12.0 per cent.
A comparison with the graph of volumes in Figure 4.15 shows that the troughs of price in May 
and September, at the beginning and end of the long dry season, .coincide with peaks in the 
volume of onions supplied at 434.8 and 470.3 metric tonnes.
Figure 4.48 Percentage Profile of Mean Monthly Value of Citrus Deliveries at Kariakoo
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Figure 4.48, graphing the proportion of total citrus value delivered at Kariakoo, shows a clear 
domination by oranges, accounting for no less than 76 per cent, and as high as 90 per cent, 
throughout the year. The pattern of the proportion of the value citrus fruit deliveries accounted 
for by oranges declines initially from 80.7 per cent to 77.0 per cent in February, a decline of
37.4 per cent, from TShs 0.5 million to 0.3 million in February. The year begins with a slight 
increase in the proportion of citrus fruit value accounted for by limes and a concurrent decline in 
the proportion accounted for by oranges and lemons. Limes increase from 18.3 per cent to
22.7 per cent, while oranges decline from 80.7 per cent to 77.0 per cent and lemons from 1.0 
per cent to 0.3 per cent, the lowest proportion Accounted for by this fruit. The decline in the 
proportion accounted for by oranges coincides with a decline of 37.4 per cent in the value from 
TShs 0.5 million to TShs 0.3 million. A concurrent decline in the value of limes of 18.0 per cent 
takes place, from TShs 116,804 (the highest recorded mean monthly value) to TShs 95,362 
million. However, this is compensated for by the large decline in the value of deliveries of 
oranges. After this initial two months, the proportion of value accounted for by oranges 
increases to around 90 per cent. This proportion is maintained through to September, when 
the highest value of deliveries for oranges is recorded in both August and September at TShs
1.3 million, accounting for 87.7 per cent of the value of citrus fruit deliveries in each case. 
Lemons are at their lowest in terms of volume of delivery in the first three months of the year.
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The later years of the time series see a decline in the delivery of lemons to the point that 
February records no deliveries of lemons in the last three years. In 1988, according to Kariakoo 
records the market went from February to August without receiving a single delivery of lemons.
Figure 4.49 Mean Monthly Citrus Fruit Price per Metric Tonne Delivered to Kariakoo Market 
(at 1981 values)
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The proportion of the value of citrus fruit deliveries accounted for by limes ranges between 6 
and 8 per cent from April through to October, but this is reflected in an increase in line with the 
increases in the value of orange deliveries, to the second highest value of deliveries in August 
at TShs 108,822. Lemons increase from February through to October when the highest mean 
monthly value of deliveries is recorded at TShs 110,446. This increase in volume and value of 
lime deliveries coincides with the sudden decline in the volume and value of deliveries of 
oranges, as the harvesting season in the main supply regions (Tanga and Morogoro) comes to 
an end in August. However, as discussed earlier, limes and lemons are consumed in a different 
way from oranges. The price of oranges does not increase, as much as might be expected, 
because of the complementary increases in the volume of deliveries of ripe mangoes, which are 
consumed in a similar way to oranges. When this is compared with the monthly volume 
variations, presented in Figure 4.17, the reason for the increase in price becomes apparent: 
September is the end of the main orange season and the volume of orange deliveries declines 
by 15.8 per cent in September and another 44.4 per cent in October. Hence, prices rise 
dramatically as demand outstrips supply. The subsequent fall in price in October is explained 
by the replacement of oranges as a refreshing 'snack' by the ripe mango, which begins its main 
season in October (see Figure 4.18). At the end of the dry season, the demand for a sweet 
juicy fruit is particularly great and this is partly met by ripe mangoes. These factors have the 
overall effect of keeping the orange price remarkably consistent, considering the wide variations 
in the volume of supply seen in Figure 4.17. This may suggest that other factors are also at 
work. If, as is suggested, the majority of the citrus fruits, particularly oranges, are by-passing
Kariakoo, then the factors influencing the price may be obscured by the fact that these data are 
far from a complete picture of the citrus fruit market in Dar es Salaam.
In summary, each of the citrus fruits examined in this survey have distinct harvesting seasons. In 
the case of oranges, this is between June and September; in the case of limes, this occurs 
initially in August, but more importantly from November to January; and in the case of lemons 
the peak value of deliveries occurs in September and October. As the higher value of 
deliveries occurs, so the price increases. This is apparent in each of the citrus fruits. Figure 4.49 
demonstrates that the mean orange price maintains a relatively stable pattern throughout the 
year remaining between TShs 4,000 and TShs 4,786, which is recorded in September, as the 
mean volume declined from its highest at 369.7 metric tonnes in August to 311.1 metric tonnes in 
September. The price also declines in November to TShs 3,800, but this is likely to result from 
competition from ripe mangoes. September is the month when the highest mean monthly 
volume of ripe mango deliveries occurs, and this has a depressing effect on the price of the 
ripe mangoes and similar juicy, sweet fruit. As the ripe mango deliveries decline once more in 
December, the demand shifts back to oranges, thus both fruits’ price increases in this month, 
which is also when the Christmas holiday occurs, with the effect of increasing demand. The 
hottest dry season reaches an end in February and this coincides with the decline in supply.
The reduced demand for these fruit has the effect of depressing the price at the same time as 
the supply begins to decline.
The pattern of the value of fruit deliveries in the first few months of the year divides the five 
commodities into two groups. Coconuts and ripe bananas, which are far more consistent in their 
delivery through the year, increase in value. The values of green and ripe mangoes and 
pineapples, all of which have quite clearly defined main seasons, decline in the first four months, 
in the case of the mangoes, and the first eight months in the case of pineapples. Coconuts are 
clearly seen to account for the largest proportion of total fruit value, 68.6 per cent on average 
(Figure 4.50). Coconut deliveries in January amount to a mean monthly value of TShs 2.8 million, 
accounting for 57.4 per cent of fruit value. They increase to about TShs 3.0 million in March, April 
and May, the latter accounting for 75.8 per cent of fruit value. Ripe bananas account for an 
average of 17.7 per cent of the value of fruit deliveries and begin the year at TShs 655,737, 
accounting for 13.37 per cent of fruit value. The value of ripe banana deliveries increase 
consistently to TShs 781,545, accounting for 19.75 per cent of the fruit value by April. Green 
mangoes account for a mean proportion of 7.1 per cent of the fruit value and the first mean 
monthly value of delivery of the year is TShs 610,862 accounting for 12.5 per cent of fruit value, 
declining to TShs 177,696, accounting for 4.4 per cent of fruit value by May. A mean of TShs 
425,483 worth of ripe mangoes are delivered in January, accounting for a mean of 2.6 per cent 
of fruit value compared with a mean proportion of 4.0 per cent of fruit value. This declines to 
TShs 1,274, accounting for 0.03 per cent by May. Pineapples account for a mean of 2.6 per cent 
of the fruit value, declining to TShs 35,735, accounting for 0.6 per cent of fruit value in August.
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Figure 4.50 Percentage Profile of Mean Monthly Value of Fruit Deliveries
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The dry season from May to September is when coconuts and ripe bananas account for the 
greatest proportion of overall fruit value. These two fruit alone account for a combined total of 
between 88 and 97 per cent of the overall value of fruit supplies in these five months. Roughly 
10 per cent of the fruit supply is accounted for by a secondary wave of green mango deliveries 
of TShs 459,961 and TShs 616,029 in June and July. The mean value of delivery of coconuts and 
ripe bananas actually increases in the latter few months of the year. The mean value of ripe 
bananas increases from TShs 723,190 in August to TShs 1.1 million in October, accounting for
14.6 per cent and 25.5 per cent respectively, before declining to TShs 935,068, accounting for
14.5 per cent in December. The mean delivery value of coconuts from October declines initially 
from TShs 4.76 million to TShs 3.1 million, before increasing to TShs 3.7 million in December. In 
spite of these increases, the proportions of total fruit value they account for decline, because of 
the increase in importance of the other fruits. Ripe mangoes increase to TShs 861,076 in 
November and TShs 974,078 in December, accounting for 15.6 per cent and then 15.5 per cent 
of overall value respectively. Green mangoes increase to TShs 305,316 in November and TShs 
397,080 in December, accounting for 5.5 and 6.2 per cent respectively. Pineapples increase to 
TShs 176,199 in November and TShs 461,530 in December, accounting for 3.2 and 7.2 per cent 
respectively. Only green mangoes out of these three fruits continue to increase in the value of 
their deliveries,reaching the higher value of TShs 610,862 in January, accounting for 12.5 per 
cent.
Mean monthly fruit prices are shown in Figure 4.51. Pineapples have the highest mean price 
per metric tonne, at TShs 13,111, but begin the year at TShs 12,766 per tonne, declining 4.5 per 
cent to TShs 12,191, before beginning a strong rise to its highest mean monthly price of the 
year at TShs 14,434 in May. The initial decline in price occurs in each of the other fruit 
commodities, a decline which ranges from 2.0 per cent in ripe mango price to 12.8 per cent in 
ripe bananas. The ripe mango decline continues through to May at the end of the main rainy 
season, when the price declines to TShs 2,555, when the supply is at its lowest. Deliveries of
the fruit at this time are infrequent, and in many years between 1981 and 1989 the months of 
April to October Kariakoo did not receive any delivery of ripe mangoes at all. Coconut prices 
begin with a decline in the first month of 5.4 per cent to TShs 4,859. During the next few 
months the mean monthly coconut price remains between TShs 4,800 and TShs 5,000, reaching 
TShs 5,045 in June. This consistency in price coincides with the value remaining within TShs
100,000 of TShs 3.0 million over the same months.
Figure 4.51 Mean Monthly Price per Metric Tonne of Fruit Delivered to Kariakoo Market 
(held constant at 1981 values)
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Green mangoes at about TShs 3,004, have the lowest overall mean price per metric tonne for 
fruit. They begin the year at TShs 2,729 and after the small decline in February to TShs 2,597, 
increased by 18.7 and then 8.1 per cent to TShs 3,332 in April. This occurs as the supply of 
green mangoes declines at the end of the short intense dry season. Green mango prices 
decline in the months of May and June, as deliveries begin to increase once more for the 
secondary wave of deliveries, which peaks in July at 232.4 metric tonnes and TShs 616,029. The 
price falls from TShs 3,332 per metric tonne in April to TShs 2,763 in May and then TShs 2,583 in 
June, decreases of 17.1 per cent and 6.5 per cent respectively. As the secondary wave of 
green mango deliveries declines the price begins to increase once more to reach TShs 3,816 by 
September. The price of pineapples declines for the two months of June and July at the 
centre of the long dry season at just over TShs 12,000, increases in August to TShs 13,671, as 
the pineapple supply reaches its lowest in September. From May, when the coconut price is 
TShs 4,866, the coconut price increases consistently to the end of the year at TShs 8,550, an 
increase of 75.7 per cent over seven months. This increases at the same time as the decline in 
the mean volume of delivery of coconuts delivered to Kariakoo by 42.0 per cent from the 
highest delivery of coconuts in August at 887.9 metric tonnes to 514.3 metric tonnes.
The mean price of pineapples in September, October and November remains at just over 
TShs 13,000, and increases 8.7 per cent in December to TShs 14,347. This is the result of a 
combination of increased supply and increased demand as the second rainy season ends and 
the hottest dry season begins. The price of green mangoes declines once more in the latter 
few months of the year as the supply increases, with an increase of 5.6 per cent in December, 
as a result of the increased demand at this time. This coincides with an increase in the supply of 
green mangoes as the deliveries approach the highest mean monthly delivery which occurs in 
January. From August to December the price of ripe bananas does not vary more than 5.0 per 
cent except in December at around TShs 4,500, when the price increased, along with all the fruit 
crops, by 9.3 per cent to TShs 5,030as a result of the increased demand associated with this 
time of year.
If a comparison of the variations in price with the variations in volume of deliveries is made, a 
relationship emerges. Comparison of Figure 4.14 with Figure 4.44, shows that the months of 
February and June are the lowest in terms of overall tomato supply, but the highest.in terms of 
price (all four tomato types record their highest mean monthly price per metric tonne between 
February and May). Tomatoes from Lushoto and Mbeya have a different pattern from the 
others: in the case of the other types, the price reaches a maximum in anticipation of the peak 
mean monthly delivery, the price 'curve' of the Lushoto and Mbeya tomatoes follows roughly 
the same shape as the delivery 'curve' (see Figures 4.12 and 4.44). The highest mean monthly 
delivery is in March, as is the highest mean monthly price. The lowest mean monthly price is in 
November in a trough which started in September. The lowest mean monthly delivery is in 
September.
A possible explanation for the unusual pattern followed by tomatoes from Lushoto/Mbeya is 
that some producers, mainly the more commercially-aware farmers, plant their tomatoes at a 
time of the year that will allow them to harvest during the lowest months of supply in Dar es 
Salaam. In spite of the fact that more chemical inputs are required to protect the plants through 
the less favourable rainy season of the year, this enables farmers to sell their produce at a 
premium price, when demand is high and they can therefore expect to increase their margin of 
return. This requires a greater amount of initial investment in the chemical inputs, and so is only 
an option to those farmers who can afford it or those who can arrange credit. For example, one 
farmer, who was interviewed followed this strategy in 1989 and reported selling 70 matenga 
(about 80 kilograms per tenga) at about TShs 10,000 per tenga. This comes to about TShs
125,000 per tonne, more than four times the highest monthly mean recorded by this sample 
survey. He was one of a small number to get to Dar es Salaam along roads that had been 
badly affected by particularly heavy rains, illustrating forcefully the importance of an effective 
transport network for an efficient food distribution system.
In the case of oranges, the sharp increase in price in September coincides with the beginning 
of the decline of the annual peak of orange deliveries and also with the beginning of the hottest
season of the year in Dar es Salaam. For limes, a sharp increase in price coincides with an 
increase in December of lime deliveries. This confirms the association of an increase in demand 
with an insufficient increase in supply in the period approaching the Christmas holiday.
The general trend for lemon prices is to increase during the course of the year, especially in 
December. This, however, is in contrast to the pattern of the mean volume of deliveries (Figure 
4.17) which reaches a peak in September and begins to decline towards the end of the year.
This may partly explain the increase in lime demand since these two fruits are used 
interchangeably for flavouring in cooking or as a garnish for salads.
This section has demonstrated seasonal monthly price variations, which may be explained in 
terms of monthly supply. In the case of some commodities, such as tomatoes, the overall 
supply is held relatively stable through the year, because of the different sources of supply 
complement each other. A second feature identified in this section is the large variations in 
price of highly seasonal commodities, such as the different tomato categories, oranges, peas 
and ripe mangoes. At the other extreme, the crops with more stable prices, such as 
pineapples, lemons, Irish potatoes and cabbage have more stable monthly prices. One 
exception to this general rule is the remarkable increase in the price of limes in December after 
a very stable mean monthly price throughout the rest of the year and relatively little change in 
supply in December. This highlights the need for an examination of factors external to the 
supply chain such as demand, disease and so on. In the case of limes this price increase can 
be explained by the dramatic increase in demand for limes as a garnish and for cooking at the 
Christmas festivities.
4.7 Kariakoo: Problems and the Future
This chapter has described the patterns of supply of fruit and vegetables to Kariakoo 
wholesale market through an analysis of price, volume and value recorded at the market. These 
patterns have been analysed in relation to the more qualitative data concerning conditions in the 
market and supply linkages. Various patterns of delivery have been described and a variety of 
explanations have been suggested. These explanations will be taken up in a later chapter in 
order to establish the various marketing linkages through which fruit and vegetables are 
distributed to Dar es Salaam. This chapter has demonstrated that Kariakoo is suffering from 
acute congestion. However, a closer examination is necessary to find solutions to the 
problems.
The evidence presented has demonstrated a rise in the volumes of vegetables such as onions, 
cabbage and Irish potatoes being delivered to Kariakoo. On the other hand, fruits such as 
oranges, green and ripe mangoes, lemons, pineapples, ripe bananas and coconuts are 
decreasing in importance, in terms of volume deliveries to the market. When presented 
alongside the increase in Dar es Salaam's population, this evidence points to a gradual process
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of specialisation at Kariakoo. This is not the result of deliberate KMC policy, but the result of a 
combination of ‘demand-led’ and ‘supply-led’ movement of fruit marketing to alternative markets 
around the city. This, in turn, is a response to the increasing liberalisation of the Tanzanian 
economy since the mid-1980s, reflecting the changing political economy of the country.
This process has favoured retail markets which are more accessible to transporters arriving in the 
city, who do not wish to become involved in the traffic congestion often experienced in the 
Kariakoo area. Examples of this trend include the delivery of oranges from the south of 
Tanzania to Tandika market located near the main road from the south of the country; the supply 
of oranges from the north of Tanzania to Tandale market on the main road from the north; and at 
Buguruni on the Port Access Road, which leads from the main road from the north towards the 
port. This is also demonstrated by the availability of tomatoes from areas along the road to 
Bagamoyo at Mwenge market on Bagamoyo Road itself. This aspect of the role of the various 
urban retail markets in receiving fruit and vegetable deliveries direct from the areas of 
production, will be returned to in more detail in a later chapter.
A report commissioned by KMC, and produced by the Ministry of Agriculture's Marketing 
Development Bureau, found three main shortcomings of the Kariakoo wholesale market. The 
market area was considered to be too small for the volume of trade and no space was available 
for expansion. Consequently, there is not enough handling space and high stacking of produce 
using unsuitable containers is necessary. Secondly, handling conditions are difficult due to the 
unsuitable and inflexible layout of the market area - including insufficient access from the outside. 
Finally, the ventilation is considered insufficient, which results in stagnating humid air and high 
temperatures. This accelerates the decomposition of highly perishable produce (Marketing 
Development Bureau, 1985).
When produce is stacked too high it will increase the likelihood of damage. The inflexibility of 
the layout of the trading floor results in no possibility of expansion, and moving produce into, 
around and out of the trading area becomes difficult. The lack of space and congestion is clearly 
shown when at various times the discarded packing and spoiled produce begins to form a 
carpet of debris along the access ways between the traders' areas. These deposits often 
become concentrated, impeding porters, traders, buyers and KMC staff, as they go about 
their work.
The increasing population of Dar es Salaam will result in a continued increase in the demand for 
fruit and vegetables. The constant high level of approximately 70,000 metric tonnes of volume 
being handled annually by Kariakoo since 1983, suggests that Kariakoo can expand its handling 
capacity no further. The increased demand, therefore, over the last seven or eight years has 
been progressively absorbed by the alternative, ‘informal’ wholesaling sector. The continued 
increase in the handling of the fruit and vegetables.entering Dar es Salaam, gives increased 
credibility and importance to the role of this informal sector. This transfer will involve a change in
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buying patterns, as the buyers begin to seek out alternative sources of fruit and vegetables, 
that will not be easy to reverse. The open air, flexible, non-commision-levying, ‘informal’ 
wholesale markets will begin to seem more attractive to both buyers and suppliers.
Many ‘farmers’ still prefer Kariakoo, because of its large and ready market, its good loading and 
unloading facilities, its central location and its large number of buyers who ensure that produce 
turns over rapidly. However, the dis-benefits of over-crowding, warm humid conditions and the 
commission levy may have begun to repel Kariakoo's buyers and sellers. In a review of fruit 
and vegetable marketing in the developing world, Abbott gives Kariakoo's three main 
problems as
- Throughput is far in excess of the 26,000 tonnes per year for which the 
market was intended; by 1978 it was already 63,000 tonnes.
- High temperatures, humidity and poor ventilation accelerated spoilage 
and make working difficult.
- Produce has to be carried through congested sales areas, out again 
over the same route up a steep ramp 4-5m to street level loading 
bays; this is done by porter.
(Abbott 1986, p.201-202)
The MDB report came to three basic conclusions. Firstly, the wholesale market should be 
relocated outside the city on a main access road, such as the Nelson Mandela Road. Secondly, 
the commission charged on produce is too high and administratively costly. Finally, in the future 
more attention should be given to layout and design, including the possibility of future 
expansion (MDB, 1985). These three conclusions appear to have been pre-empted by the 
spontaneous response of the informal sector. Firstly, fruit which is less expensive in terms of 
price-to-weight ratios and which must be sold and distributed rapidly, because of their high 
perishability, have tended to be delivered at more peripherally located retail markets.
Secondly, one of the advantages for the traders of this produce avoiding Kariakoo is that the full 
KMC commission is not charged. Finally, the retail markets are all located on flat land and have 
spontaneously expanded to cope with their increased trade. In the case of Mwenge, Buguruni, 
Ubungo and Kinondoni, there is space still available for limited further expansion.
When KMC commissioned this report it had already obtained a plot of land at the side of the 
Port Access Road (recently renamed Nelson Mandela Avenue), a dual carriageway which acts as 
a partial ring road for Dar es Salaam. However, according to MDB calculations, this site is too 
small to absorb the projected volumes of trade. The MDB estimate that the demand in Dar es 
Salaam for fruit and vegetables will increase to a total of 505,600 metric tonnes in the year 2000, 
from their estimate of total demand in the city in 1985 of 225,600 metric tonnes (see Table 4.6) 
According to this estimate, if Kariakoo, or a replacement wholesale market continues to deal with 
deliveries to the city at the same proportion as Kariakoo (roughly 50 per cent), Kariakoo, or the 
replacement will have to be able to handle a throughput of over 250,000 metric tonnes. This
estimate does not include the beans, starches (such as cooking bananas, a large proportion of 
which enter the city's market throught Kariakoo) and fish, which the market currently also deals 
with. Based on the 1985 figures, there is currently 2,400 square metres of open trading area ine
Kariakoo wholesale market. This was originally designed for the trading of 35,000 metric tonnes.
If we assume that the MDB estimates are correct and that the replacement market is intended 
to deal with even half of the estimated fruit and vegetable wholesale market in the year 2000, as 
estimated above, this suggests that 17,000 square metres of trading space are required for fruit 
and vegetables alone. The MDB estimate that an average of 79 lorries and 30 pick-ups deliver 
produce to the market every day. They estimate that the number of collecting vehicles 
averages 370 per day. An increase in volume of the level suggested is likely to result in a 
tripling of this volume of traffic. In order to manage such a volume an enormous amount of 
space is required not only for the trading and storing of produce, but also to manage the traffic 
outside the market. It is clear, therefore that the current site owned by the Kariakoo Market 
Corporation of 13,000 square metres is inadequate for the purpose (Kariakoo Market 
Corporation, 1986).
Table 4.6 Marketing Development Bureau Estimates of the Fruit Vegetable, Starches
and Nut Demand in Dar es Salaam
Commodity 1985 1990 2000
Fruit 50,400 78,500 159,800
Vegetables 95,800 157,100 345,800
Starches and Nuts 327,500 494,400 997,400
Source: Marketing Development Bureau, 1986.
As a result of the research carried out for this study the following additional points are 
appropriate. Kariakoo wholesale market must now consider itself to be operating in 
competition with alternative retail markets for both suppliers and buyers. As such, Kariakoo has 
a number of advantages over its competitors, such as the 'good will' of regular traders, which 
has been built up over a considerable period of time. It has a central location, it has an 
organised structure of porters and auctioneers - although this has apparently become obsolete 
- it has loading bays and it has the protection of the building from adverse weather and theft 
when the market is closed for business. This study will demonstrate in later chapters that the 
supply chains currently built up are based on the contacts and knowledge of those involved in 
the buying and selling and not just in the physical roads buildings and vehicles. A complete 
shift in location of Dar es Salaam fruit and vegetable wholesaling would result in immense 
disruption of the food distribution chains. Finally, any future planning must take into account the 
periodic fluctuations in daily, monthly and annual supply, as they have been described in this 
chapter and the reasons behind them, such as climate, the growing season, consumer demand, 
seed and input availability and transport problems. Any solution suggested for the problems 
of congestion should be able to adapt to absorb any mean increases in the trade, but also the 
maxima of supply and demand.
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A more pragmatic approach to the problems of Kariakoo in the light of this research may be the 
partial relocation of the wholesaling market to a peripheral location, such as that which currently 
exists on the Port Access Road. Such a wholesale market could target itself for the 
commodities which Kariakoo has been losing to informal wholesalers at the retail markets and 
which would benefit from a more peripheral wholesaling location. Clearly, more detailed 
examination of this suggestion would have to be carried out, but the evidence presented in this 
and later chapters will bear out the hypothesis that, if the current plan were to go ahead, 
significant disruption to the food distribution chains would occur.
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C h a p t e r  F i v e  
Dar es Salaam Retail Markets
5.1 The Survey Approach
This chapter examines the role of the retail markets of Dar es Salaam in the supply of fruit and 
vegetables to the city. This will be achieved by using a questionnaire survey of a sample of 
153 market traders in six of the city's main retail markets, by examination of secondary data, and 
from in-depth interviews carried out with market officials and observations recorded by the 
author. Map 3.1 shows the location of the six markets surveyed. The rationale of the selection 
of the six markets and a description of each appears in an earlier chapter.
Table 5.1 Market Survey Responses.
Market Responses Day Total No. of traders
Mwenge 25 Wed (7/9/89) 75
Ubungo 25 Thurs (8/9/89) 120
Tandale 24 Fri (9/9/89) [100 wholesalers]
llala 25 Sun (11/9/89) [120]
Tandika 24 Mon (12/9/89) 485
Kinondoni 30 Sat/Mon (10 & 26/9/89) [60]
6 markets 153 6 Days [475]
Source: Author's Survey 
[Values given in square brackets are estimates]
As can be seen from Table 5.1, the survey of Kinondoni market was carried out over two days 
and yielded 30 respondents. The reason for this was that difficulties were experienced in 
attempting to carry out the survey in the absence of the market secretary. After some 
reluctance among the traders to co-operate, it was decided to abandon the survey and return to 
carry it out two weeks later, when the secretary was available. The second occasion was more 
successful as the traders were far more co-operative with the market secretary present.
A copy of the questionnaire form is presented in Appendix 3.3. The form has eight questions 
and was designed with the intention of obtaining the co-operation of the market traders with the 
minimum of interference in their marketing activities. The response rate was very good, with few 
traders refusing to respond where the market secretary was available to give help. Each 
interview took about five minutes and, in most cases, the trader was able to continue selling, 
while answering the questions put to him or her. The questionnaire asks basic questions about 
the gender, length of time in business, and type and source of produce that the traders sell. 
More specific data on the traders' sources of produce, the method of transportation to the 
market and the people to whom they sell their produce are then solicited. The focus for the
survey is the role of traders, who operate in the retail markets, in the distribution linkages for 
the city as a whole.
The choice of markets is detailed in an earlier chapter, but it should be noted that the markets, 
on which this survey is concentrated, are among the biggest in Dar es Salaam. For the 
purposes of his fieldwork, Sporrek (1985), defined a market as a grouping of five or more 
stalls. For the purposes of food retailing these 'markets' are important to the Dar es Salaam 
population. This questionnaire survey, however, investigated the role of traders in the city's 
wholesale supply of fruit and vegetables, who operated outside Kariakoo. Interviews of 
Marketing Development Bureau and Kariakoo Market officials, carried out before the 
questionnaire survey took place, indicated that this mainly takes place in the city’s retail markets 
on an informal basis. There were reports, however, of wholesaling of quantities of food from 
lorries at pre-arranged meeting places on the outskirts of the city or simply at the side of the 
road. The questionnaire survey has focused on the more informal trading and has provided 
information about both informal wholesaling and the ways in which retailers obtain their produce 
in the main retail markets of the city.
158
5.2 Survey Results
Figure 5.1 shows a clear bias towards male traders, with 96 per cent of the respondents being 
males, and only 4 per cent female respondents. This reflects the strong influence of Muslim 
culture in the city, which discourages women being involved in commercial activities. When this 
information is examined more closely, it becomes clear that the small number of women 
responding to the questionnaire are only involved in selling direct to consumers and not to other 
traders. In addition, the markets where women were interviewed were Mwenge and Ilala, 
markets which have a limited amount of wholesaling activities. None of the female respondents 
had been in business for longer than 3 years and they were operating in markets in the more 
peripheral residential areas of the city.
Figure 5.1 Gender of the Traders Interviewed in The Retailing Survey
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This evidence bears out the information received from discussions with a number of Dar es 
Salaam residents, as well as the interviews with market secretaries, that women are generally 
not involved in urban marketing of fruit and vegetables in Tanzania. This is very different to 
West Africa, for example, where, in some cases, women have control of the fruit and vegetable 
markets (Hodder, 1967; Lawson, 1971; Abbott 1986). In Dar es Salaam women are to be found 
selling bread, some handicrafts, such as basketware and cloths, and cooked foods such as 
boiled rice and ugali (maize-meal).
An additional factor may be that the assistant interviewing the traders was male, hence 
introducing an element of interview bias, either on the part of the interviewer, or on the part of 
women who may have been reluctant to answer such a questionnaire. The author did observe 
women selling in several of the other markets, but only in small numbers and often not selling 
fruit or vegetables, but fish or basketware. It may be, therefore, that women are under­
represented in this survey. However, because of the complex sociological and cultural issues 
involved, a more comprehensive approach is required to investigate in great detail the role of 
women in Dar es Salaam's urban markets than is possible here.
Figure 5.2 The Number of Years Traders Have Been in Business
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Figure 5.2 shows that over 40 per cent of the traders interviewed had been in business for less 
than two years, and 69 per cent of the traders responding said they had been in business for 
three years or less. As the number of years increases, the data become increasingly 
unreliable, because, in common with Sporrek's survey (1985), traders appeared to find greater 
difficulty in remembering the precise number of years they had been in business. This can also 
be seen by the clustering of traders at around the five and ten year levels as they have 
rounded off the number of years, in an effort to remember.
Table 5.2 Number of Years Retailers Had Been in Business (Sporrek’s 1976 Survey)
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Length of Time Percent
Less than One Year 16
One to Three Years 25
Three to Five Years 17
Five to Ten Years 25
Over Ten Years 17
Source: Sporrek 1985
The modal length of time for being in business in a retail market is one year, with 31.4 per cent 
of respondents giving this reply. This suggests a relatively high turnover of traders, with only 1 
in 5 surviving longer than five years. This may indicate the unstable nature of business in the 
fruit and vegetable trade in Dar es Salaam in the mid 1980s, resulting from the more general 
stagnant condition of the Tanzanian economy, as discussed earlier. The liberalisation of trading 
regulations did not begin to have an obvious impact on the economy until at least two years 
after the Economic Recovery Programme was adopted in 1986. Even at the time of the survey 
it was not clear that all the effects had influenced the economy.
A comparison between the results of Sporrek’s survey of retail traders, presented in Table 5.2 
and those of this study, presented in Figure 5.2, suggest some differences. Firstly, the data 
are not totally compatible. However, if the first two groups for each survey are combined, this 
shows that 41 per cent of the Sporrek survey had entered the retail market less than three 
years before the question was asked in 1976. In the case of the author’s survey 41.6 per cent 
had entered the fruit and vegetable market less than three years before the question was 
asked in 1989. This would suggest a remarkable consistency and rule out any suggestion that 
the high turnover of traders has changed since 1976. However, Sporrek’s survey took in a large 
number of street-side sellers, many of whom would require very little capital; indeed, he 
reports that 9 per cent of his sample were children. One would expect this cohort to represent 
a large proportion of the recently established traders, as there is indeed a high turnover of this 
group. On the other hand, the present survey carried out by the author is of market licensed 
traders. This group requires a greater degree of capital to invest in the trading licence, pay for 
stall rental and so on, as well as to purchase the greater quantities of food likely to be sold 
from this location. The latter group would be expected to have been established for a longer 
period of time, and to be relatively more stable in their trading activities than the peripatetic 
and street-side traders likely to have participated in Sporrek’s study. This does suggest, 
therefore, that there has been a period of change in the fruit and vegetable market with a 
cohort of recently established market retailers.
A second factor may have contributed to the high proportion of traders in business for a 
relatively short period of time. Trading of fruit and vegetables has been in the hands of the 
private sector since Independence, and the state has only played a regulatory role; in the case
of Dar es Salaam the rule has been that all fruit and vegetables entering the city must pass 
through Kariakoo. In 1986 the National Milling Corporation’s monopoly on trading of staple 
foods was removed, allowing private traders to begin trading. Mindful of the speed with which
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the private sector has taken up this opportunity, there is the question as to where the capital to 
absorb this level of commercial expansion has come from. It would appear that informal 
trading of staples was already at an advanced stage by the time the market was liberalised and 
that this simply served to legitimise an already important informal trade. However, the 
Marketing Development Bureau estimated that as early as 1988, open market channels 
accounted for 65 per cent of maize and 94 per cent of rice trading (Marketing Development 
Bureau 1987), and the National Milling Corporation had more or less limited its operations to 
the management of the Strategic Grain Reserve, the importing of food and the distribution of 
food aid, suggesting that the private market in staples has expanded very rapidly in recent 
years. One explanation may be that the already successful fruit and vegetable traders moved 
into the staple markets. This in turn released opportunities for new traders to emerge in the 
fruit and vegetable markets in the last five years. This explanation is strengthened by the 
results of a survey of Manzese staple food traders carried out by Gordon (1988), which 
revealed that the ethnic profile of these traders was dominated by the Waluguru, accounting for 
33 per cent of the total, the remainder made up of thirteen different groups. Gordon explains 
this dominance as being due to the fact that the Waluguru have historically been a strong ethnic 
group in the trade of fruit and vegetables from Morogoro to Dar es Salaam. The years of 
controlled markets have meant that fruit and vegetable traders have a comparative advantage in 
their experience of the long haul food trade and in trading skills, experience and established 
networks of business contacts.
Table 5.3 Cross Tabulation of the Number of Years the Traders Have Been in Business 
by the Type of Customers To Whom They are Selling
Count Other Consumers Row Total
Expected Value Customers
Up to One Year 10 51 61
17.8 43.2 40.4%
Two Years 3 20 23
6.7 16.3 15.2%
Three to Four Years 9 19 2B
8.1 19.9 18.5%
More Than Five Years 22 17 39
11.3 27.7 25.8%
Column 44 107 151
Percent 29.1% 70.9% 100.0%
Chi-Square 21.85
Degrees of Freedom 3
Significance 0.0001
As the length of time a trader is in business increases, so the greater is the likelihood of the 
traders selling to other traders, rather than to consumers. Table 5.3 shows that over half of the 
traders with five or years experience are selling to other traders, whereas, of those with one
year or less, only 16 per cent are involved in this wholesale trade. The reason for this may be 
that some of the traders who have been able to diversify into wholesale trading activities have 
been able to survive longer, since they have not had to rely solely on their retailing to survive. 
Alternatively, traders who have been in business longer are likely to have had more 
opportunities for diversifying their activities. Table 5.3 also has a highly significant chi-squared 
value, which confirms the significance of the relationship between the length of time in business 
and the main customer to whom a trader is likely to sell.
Table 5.4 Cross-Tabulation of The Market Location by the Number of Years the Traders 
Have Been in Business
Count
Expected Value
Up to
One
Year
Two to
Four
Years
More
Than
Five
Years
Row Total
Mwenge 6 8 11 25
10.1 8.4 6.5 16.3%
Ubungo 21 4 0 25
10.1 8.4 6.5 15.7%
Tandale 4 6 14 24
9.7 8.0 6.3 15.7%
llala 5 12 8 25
10.1 8.4 6.5 16.3%
Tandika 10 7 7 24
9 7 8.0 6.3 15.7%
Kinondoni 16 14 0 30
12.2 10.0 7.8 19.6%
Column 62 51 39 153
Percent 40.5% 33.3% 26.1% 100.0%
Chi-Square 53.91
Degrees of Freedom 10
Significance 0.0000
Table 5.4 shows Kinondoni and Ubungo markets to be dominated by relatively recently 
established traders, with no-one in Ubungo having been in business for more than three years 
and only four having been in business for longer. Of the entire sample, only 12 respondents 
(7.8 per cent) have been in business for more than ten years, half of whom are trading in 
Tandale market: 58.3 per cent of Tandale traders have been in business for more than 5 years, 
accounting for a very large proportion of more experienced traders in comparison with other 
markets. These traders have been able to survive the worst period of Tanzania's economic 
stagnation. This suggests that they are more resilient traders, who have had the skills and 
perhaps capital to allow them to survive in business in the face of more erratic variations, such 
as adverse annual climatic variations or the impact of a series of currency devaluations, as 
discussed earlier. Tandale has no traders in the group with 2 years experience, and in fact the 
overall proportion in the 2 years and 3 to 4 years groups are low. This also suggests that these 
markets experienced decline 3 or 4 years before the survey, when either no new traders began 
business or those that did, did not survive. This coincides with the economic low-point in the 
performance of the Tanzanian economy. Ubungo, Kinondoni and, to some extent, Tandika 
have all demonstrated a skewed distribution towards the lower number of years of experience. 
This suggests an increase in the amount of business activity in these markets within the last few
years, particularly in the case of traders in Ubungo, where no traders had been in business for 
more than 2 years. This may be in response to increased business confidence generally in 
Tanzania since 'liberalisation'.
Table 5.5 cross-tabulates the data from the length of time in business with the traders' sources 
of produce. A chi square test indicates that there is not a statistical relationship between the 
variables, but there are a number of points worth noting. The traders with more experience 
gave a wider range of sources with 47 per cent using sources other than Kariakoo as their main 
source of produce. This contrasts with less experienced traders, where 95 per cent of traders 
with less than 1 year's experience have concentrated their sources in Dar es Salaam, with 62 per 
cent obtaining their produce from Kariakoo.
Table 5.5 Cross-Tabulation of the Number of Years the Respondents Have Been in 
Business and their Origin of Fruit and Vegetables
Count
Expected Value
Kariakoo Dares 
Salaam 
(other than 
Kariakoo)
Other & 
Outside Dar 
es Salaam
Row Total
Up to One Year 38 20 3 61
38.9 17.6 4.4 40.1%
Two Years 18 5 0 23
14.7 6.6 1.7 15.1%
Three to Four Years 20 7 1 28
17.9 8.1 2.0 18.4%
More Than Five Years 21 12 5 40
25.5 11.6 1.6 26.3%
Column 97 44 11 152
Percent 63.8% 28.9% 7.2 100.0%
Chi-Square 11.81
Degrees of Freedom 6 
Significance 0.08
A greater proportion of those traders, who have been in business for more than 5 years, give 
lorries as the method of transport by which their produce arrives at the market (Table 5.6). 
Although the distribution of the frequencies make a chi square test of relationship inconlusive, 
this cross-tabulation suggests a greater degree of purchasing from lorries among those traders 
who have been in business for over five years. A total of five traders, accounting for 10 per 
cent of traders with up to one year's experience and 4 per cent of all respondents, obtain their 
produce from lorry deliveries. In contrast, there is only one trader from the two middle year 
groups, who obtains produce from lorry deliveries. The reason for this is likely to lie in the fact 
that a large amount of capital is required to hire a lorry. At the time of the survey, the hire of a 
10-tonne lorry to carry commodities to Dar es Salaam cost TShs 75,000, while the cost of hiring a 
7-tonne truck from Mgeta in the Uluguru Mountains, near Morogoro, to Dar es Salaam was 
between TShs 40,000 and 45 ,000. Traders who have only been in business for a short time are 
less likely to have either obtained sufficient capital to pay for the hire in advance, or to have the 
business contacts to obtain a hired lorry on credit until the produce is sold.
This shows that the more experienced traders are more likely to be involved directly in 
wholesaling activities. They meet and purchase produce which arrives by lorry from distant 
supply areas and then sell it to traders either in their market or elsewhere, such as smaller 
markets or stalls nearby, and in some cases in other retail markets. These purchasers obtain 
the produce they will sell for the day and transport it in a hired pick-up back to the market. 
There are two main strategies for obtaining transport for produce. If the trader has sufficient 
capital (s)he can purchase enough goods to fill a hired pick-up and sell his or her surplus to 
colleagues on return to the market. Alternatively, a group of traders may collectively hire a pick­
up and split their expenses.
Table 5.6 Cross-Tabulation of the Number of Years the Respondents Have Been in 
Business and the Method of Transportation
Count
Expected Value
Lorry Pick-up Other Row Total
Up to One Year 5 40 6 51
6.1 39.3 5.7 40.5%
Two Years 0 20 2 22
2.6 16.9 2 4 17.5%
Three to Four Years 1 22 2 25
3.0 19.3 2.8 19.8%
More Than Five Years 9 15 4 28
3.3 21.6 3.1 222%
Column 15 97 14 126
Percent 11.9 77.0 11.1 100.0%
In an attempt to assess the relative importance of different comodities, traders were asked to 
list those they sold in order of importance. Table 5.7 combines the various priorities assigned 
to the fruit and vegetable commodities by the traders, in terms of the importance to their 
business. In terms of the number of traders involved, oranges are the most important crop, 
with 29 per cent of respondents selling them. This is followed by tomatoes, accounting for 25 
per cent, onions (25 per cent) bananas (both cooking and sweet, 24 per cent) and Irish 
potatoes (16 per cent). The importance of oranges in the retail market is rather different to their 
importance in the Kariakoo wholesale market. In terms of volume, oranges account for only 2 
per cent of Kariakoo's annual volume of deliveries in 1987. In terms of number of traders selling 
these crops, the survey shows that 29 per cent of traders surveyed sell oranges and only 16 
per cent sell Irish potatoes (which are relatively more important at Kariakoo than oranges). This 
suggests that a very large proportion of the orange supply is by-passing Kariakoo and going 
straight to the city's retail markets. Bananas, tomatoes and onions follow in importance, and 
indeed are among the most important crops at Kariakoo, although not in the same order of 
priority.
These differences may reflect the retailing structure of individual commodities, rather than their 
relative importance in terms of volume. For example, Irish potatoes are the most important 
Kariakoo vegetable, but here, in terms of percentage of traders selling, bananas, tomatoes 
and onions come ahead of them. This may simply be because Irish potatoes are sold by a 
smaller number of traders, who specialise in that commodity, rather than the fact that Irish 
potatoes are less significant outside Kariakoo.
Table 5.7 Commodities Sold by the Respondents Grouped and in Order of Importance
Commodity 1 2 3 4 5 Total Weighted Score % of Sample
Veaetables
Onions 10 15 11 - 2 38 145 25
1. Potatoes 13 5 4 2 - 24 101 16
Mchiha 14 4 2 - - 20 92 13
Cabbage 7 10 1 ' 3 1 22 85 14
Peas 6 8 5 - 2 20 79 . 14
Beans 6 6 1 4 2 19 67 *• 12
Sweet Pepper 5 3 1 3 1 13 47 8
Garlic - 2 3 - 1 6 17 4
Pigeon Peas 1 - - 2 - 3 9 2
Carrots - - 3 - - 3 9 2
Sweet Potatoes - 2 - - - 2 8 2
Cucumber 1 - - - - 1 4 >1
Aubergines - - - - 1 1 1 >1
Fruit
Bananas 27 7 - - 2 36 165 24
Mangoes 4 3 1 3 - 11 41 7
Pineapples - 4 5 1 - 10 33 7
Paw Paw 2 2 2 - - 6 24 4
Coconuts 2 - 1 - - 3 13 2
Bread Fruit - - - - 1 1 1
Citrus
Oranges 34 7 2 2 - 45 208 29
Tangerines 3 8 4 - - 15 59 10
Lemons 1 2 3 1 - 7 24 5
Limes - 1 1 2 - 4 11 3
Tomatoes
Tomatoes 16 7 8 7 1 39 147 25
Bitter Tomatoes 2 1 3 14 2
Source: Author’s Survey
Figure 5.3 shows that 72 per cent of the respondents report that they sell fruit and vegetables 
only. The reasons for this are not immediately clear, but will emerge as this result is compared 
with other variables. A chi-square test of the number of years in business against whether or 
not the trader only sells fruit and vegetables failed to find a significant difference, indicating that 
the number of years in business is not an important factor in the decision to specialise in fruit 
and vegetables only (Table 5.7).
Figure 5.3 The Level of Specialism Among Fruit and Vegetable Traders
Fruit and Vegetables Only?
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Figure 5.4 Dar es Salaam Traders’ Main Customers 
Customers
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Figure 5.4 sets out the responses of traders in terms of their main customers. This question 
=separates the traders in the retail markets, whose predominant activity is wholesale trading 
(29.1 per cent), and those whose dominant activity is retailing (70.9 per cent). The wholesalers 
are also separated into two groups, those who sell mainly to traders in their own markets (17.9 
per cent), and those who sell to traders from other markets (11.3 per cent). Interviews with 
market traders and officials suggest that a number of these market traders buy a large volume 
of produce at a wholesale market, which they transport back to their retail market. This they sell 
to their colleagues in the market, as part of their normal trading activities, and the rest they retail 
themselves. These traders do not fall clearly into either of the two categories given in the 
questionnaire. They sell a greater volume of produce to other traders than they retail to 
consumers, but, they may actually spend more time retailing. The response they gave to the 
questionnaire depended on their interpretation.
The predominant proportion of traders in the markets surveyed are mainly involved in retailing. 
Interpretation of this, however should bear two considerations in mind. Firstly, trader-trader 
transactions will inevitably involve greater volumes of produce at the wholesale levels than at 
the retail level. At the urban stages of the distribution chain the produce is continually unbulked, 
as it is sold from transporter to wholesaler to sub-wholesaler to retailer to consumer. It is, 
therefore, reasonable to assume that, although roughly 30 per cent of the traders are involved 
in the selling of produce to other traders, a greater proportion of produce volume is sold 
between the traders at this level. Secondly, it is worth noting that 23 per cent of respondents 
identified two main customers, indicating that a significant proportion of the sample take 
opportunities to sell to different customers. The majority of these respondents' (57 per cent) 
secondary customers were traders from outside their market. Interviews and observations 
suggest that these customers are duka owners or small street-side sellers, who operate from 
stalls or selling areas near to the market.
167
Table 5.8 Analysis of Variance of The Number of Years Traders Have Been in Business 
Broken down by the Type of Customer to Whom they Sell
Category Sum Mean Standard Sum of Squares 
Deviation
Cases
Consumers 279 6.34 6.32 1715.89 44
Other Traders 293 2.74 3.52 1314.67 107
Within Groups Total 293 3.79 4.51 3030.56 151
Source Sum of D.F. Mean F-Ratio Significame
Square Square
Between Groups 404.66 1 404.66 19.90 0.0000
Within Groups 3030.56 149 20.34
Table 5.8 shows that the mean number of years traders who sell direct to consumers, have 
been in business is 2.7, whilst the mean number of years traders who sell to other traders have 
been in business is 6.3. This produces an F-ratio of 19.9, which is significant at the p=0.0001 
level, demonstrating a statistically significant difference between the number of years in 
business by wholesale and retail traders. This reinforces the suggestion that retail trading is 
less stable than wholesale trading, but it may also be explained by the fact that the traders, 
who have survived the longest, have diversified into other activities in order to survive. By 
getting involved in buying and selling with traders, as well as consumers, a trader can increase 
his margins and his turnover. This provides greater opportunities for gain and thus also reduces 
the trader’s risk.
Figure 5.5 Sources of Fruit and Vegetable Produce Reported by Retail Traders
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The respondents were asked to give the main source for their produce. Figure 5.5 shows that 
the largest proportion, 63.8 per cent, of the respondents gave Kariakoo as their main source 
for fruit and vegetable produce. In view of the fact that it is technically illegal for traders to buy 
their produce from anywhere other than Kariakoo, it can be expected that a proportion of 
respondents would give Kariakoo in reply to this question, if they are at all wary of the motives 
of the interviewer. This suggests that in reality this proportion could be revised downwards,
although it is difficult to say by how much. In spite of this, 36.2 per cent still give sources other 
than Kariakoo, which is a large response considering the legal monopoly held by Kariakoo. 
However, it should be noted that interviews with some market officials indicate that traders 
'shop around', and that this proportion is by no means static. For example, a trader taking the 
bus to Kariakoo wholesale market may visit Tandale market to compare the prices and also the 
quality of the produce (s)he is seeking. This evidence reinforces the argument that Kariakoo is 
competing with the other markets in its wholesale trading of fruit an0 vegetables.
Table 5.9 shows that the number of years in business traders buying from Kariakoo have, is 
roughly the same as those for the traders who purchase from elsewhere in Dar es Salaam, 
namely 3.4 and 3.8 respectively. In the case of those using 'other* sources, such as informal 
peri-urban production, the mean number of years in business is 2.2 years, although the number 
of cases here is only 5. Finally, of those obtaining their produce from outside Dar es Salaam, 
there are only 6 cases, but the mean number of years in business is 10.8. This further 
reinforces the notion that the wholesale traders in the urban retailing markets in Dar es Salaam 
tend to have a far greater business experience. The analysis of variance produced an F-ratio of 
4.98, which is significant at the p>=0.005 level, demonstrating a significant statistical relationship 
between the number of years in business and the source of supply of produce.
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Table 5.9 Analysis of Variance of The Number of Years Traders Have Been in Business 
Broken down by the Source of Their Produce
Category Sum Mean Standard
Deviation
Sum of Squares Cases
Kariakoo 339 3.49 4.33 1796.25 97
Dar es Salaam 167 3.80 5.056 1099.16 44
Outside Dar 65 10.83 6.82 232.83 6
Other 11 220 259 26.80 5
Within Groups Total 582 3.83 4.62 3155.04 152
Source Sum of D.F. Mean F-Ratio Significance
Square Square
Between Groups 318.51 3 106.17 4.98 0.0025
Within Groups 3155.04 148 21.32
In Dar es Salaam there is a range of transport methods available to traders wishing to take 
produce they have bought to their market (Figure 5.6). Five main options are available: lorry, 
pick-up, bus, mkokoteni (a hand pushed cart), or 'other', which was generally headload or bicycle. 
Mkokoteni and 'other' account for a combined proportion of 9.5 per cent so these were grouped 
together with bus (1.6 per cent), to form a total of 11.1 per cent. Pick-ups are the largest 
category accounting for 77.0 per cent. Lorries are a much smaller category at 11.9 per cent, but 
when it is considered in terms of the volume of produce lorries are capable of transporting, the 
role of lorries in the distribution of fruit and vegetables may be underestimated by these 
proportions.
Figure 5.6 Methods of Transport by Which Produce Arrives at The Retail Markets
169
11 .11%
□ Pick up
m Lorry
m Other
The use of buses for traders at the large retail markets in this survey, accounting for 11.1 per 
cent of the sample, is perhaps not as important as for the retailers selling at small individual 
sites around the city. Many small traders, typically selling a bag of oranges at the side of the 
road, take this bag to their selling site each day by bus from Kariakoo, since this method of 
transport is relatively cheap and efficient. According to Sporrek (1985), where the load to 
transport is smaller than a pick-up, for example one or two large sacks of fruit, the bus is used 
to transport goods a similar distance (over about 2 kilometres in and around the city).
Market retailers, however, tend to sell greater quantities of produce, because of their location, 
and have greater opportunities to pool their resources to hire transport, such as a pick-up, or, 
alternatively, if they were to buy the produce and hire the transport themselves they will know 
that there is an expectant market awaiting their return. The cost of hiring a pick-up from Kariakoo 
to Mwenge at the time of survey was reported to be about TShs 800 to 1,000. In some cases 
where a retailer has a duka, or small shop at the front of the house, which is close to a retail 
market, the retailer will transport with other market traders from the nearest market and then use 
a mkokoteni to finish the journey. Mikokoteni and pick-ups are often seen queueing up, close to 
retail markets waiting for business such as this.
5.3 The Differences Between Dar es Salaam Retail Markets
The overall mean number of years in business is 2.3, but the range of market means was from
1.2 years in Ubungo to 3.3 in Tandale (Table 5.10). The analysis of variance produced an F-ratio 
which is significant at the p>=0.0001 level, indicating a strong probability of a relationship 
between the market place location and the length of time the traders have been in business. 
This gives a statistical significance to the suggestion in Table 5.4 that Ubungo and Kinondoni 
traders have less experience than the rest, while Tandale and Mwenge traders are likely to 
have been in business the longest.
Table 5.10 Analysis of Variance of The Number of Years Traders Have Been in Business 
by Market Location
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Category Sum Mean Standard
Deviation
Sum of Squares Cases
Mwenge 73 2.92 1.22 35.84 25
Ubungo 29 1.16 0.37 3.36 25
Tandale 78 3.25 1.11 28.50
llaJa 68 272 1.14 31.04. 25
Tandika 56 233 1.31 39.33 24
Kinondoni 48 1.60 0.72 15.20 30
Within Groups Total 352 230 1.02 153.27 153
Source Sum of D.F. Mean F-Ratio Significance
Square Square
Between Groups 82.90 5 16.58 15.90 0.0000
Within Groups 153.27 147 1.04
Table 5.11 shows a cross-tabulation of the responses given to the question of whether the 
traders specialised in fruit and vegetables only against the traders' market location. The chi- 
square value of 18.05 is highly significant. This value forces a rejection of the null hypothesis that 
there is a random distribution of traders selling fruit and vegetables only in each of the markets. 
This suggests, therefore that there are varying degrees of fruit and vegetable specialisms in 
each of the markets surveyed. Traders from Mwenge and Ubungo are more likely to be trading 
in other goods in addition to fruit and vegetables, with about 50 per cent in each case. 
Observations indicate that the other commodities include salt, paper bags, rice, fish, spices, 
maize flour. In other markets, the proportions trading only fruit and vegetables range from 79.2 
per cent in Tandale to 84 per cent in Mala. This may reflect common locational peculiarities of 
Mwenge and Ubungo, both of which are on a main road into the centre of town, as opposed to 
set back from the main urban arteries. Both are at the terminus of a number of bus services, 
and both are sufficiently distant from any alternative retailing concentrations for there to be a 
demand for these other goods. Ubungo is a relatively recently established market, with new 
retailers. As it matures, it is likely that its location will tend to promote the establishment of a 
greater degree of wholesaling activities.
The type of transportation employed to bring produce from the source is dominated in the 
sample by the use of pick-up trucks (Table 5.12). Responses from all but Tandale market 
indicate that over 60 per cent of each market's traders obtain produce which is transported by 
pick-up to their retail market. The mean for the overall study is 77.0 per cent with a minimum of 
30.8 per cent in Tandale and a maximum of 100.0 per cent in Kinondoni. Tandale and Tandika 
have a very low response rate to this question. Traders may have been reluctant to answer the 
question if they suspected the motives of the interviewer, or, alternatively, they may have 
understood the question to be asking them how they had transported the produce to the 
market, and not considered the question as applicable to them, if they had purchased from
people who had transported the produce to their market. The latter, according to informants 
and observations, is more likely to be the case in these two markets.
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Table 5.11 Cross-Tabulation of Market Location by Fruit and Vegetable Specialisms
Count
Expected Value
Fruit & Veg. Others Row
Total
Mwenge 13 10 23
16.6 6.4 15.3%
Ubungo 11 14 25
18.0 7.0 16.7%
Tandale 19 5 24
17.3 6.7 16.0%
llala 21 4 25
18.0 7.0 16.7%
Tandika 19 4 23
16.6 6.4 15.3%
Kinondoni 25 5 30
21.6 8.4 20.0%
Column 108 42 150
Percent 72.0% 28.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square 18.05
Degrees of Freedom 5
Significance 0.0029
Ubungo, Tandale, llala and Tandika markets are all located on or close to the main arterial routes 
entering Dar es Salaam, such as Kilwa Road, Morogoro Road and Nelson Mandela Road 
(Figure 3.1) These are the only four markets where lorries are specified as a method by which 
produce is transported to the retail market place, as can be seen in Table 5.12. Lorries are 
only generally economically viable for transporting large quantities of produce over long 
distances (Mbilinyi and Mascarenhas, 1973; Temple, 1969). Meanwhile Kinondoni, Mwenge and 
Ubungo have the highest proportion of deliveries transported by pick-up, over 80 per cent in 
each case. This reflects a heavier dependence on the sources in and around the city in these 
market places, since pick-ups are generally only viable for transporting over relatively short 
distance, such as up to 25 km (Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi, 1969). The distribution of frequencies 
was such that a chi square test for relationship between these variables was not possible.
Table 5.12 Cross-Tabulation of the Market Location by the Method of Transportation
Count
Expected Value
Lorry Pick-up Other Row Total
Mwenge 0 21 3 24
2.9 18.5 2.7 19.0%
Ubungo 2 20 2 24
2.9 18.5 2.7 19.0%
Tandale 7 4 2 13
1.5 10.0 1.4 10.3%
llala 2 14 7 23
2.7 17.7 2.6 18.3%
Tandika 4 8 0 12
1.4 9.2 1.3 9.5%
Kinondoni 0 30 0 30
3.6 23.1 3.3 23.8%
Column 15 97 14 126
Percent 11.9% 77.0% 11.1 100.0%
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The cross-tabulation in Table 5.13 highlights the dichotomy of market functions. According to the 
market survey, Mwenge, Ubungo, Ilala and Kinondoni have very strong consumer-oriented , 
traders, with between 82.6 per cent, in Mwenge, and 100 per cent, in Ilala, selling direct to 
consumers. In contrast, Tandika and Tandale maintain their consumer-oriented business, but 
have a relatively strong trader-oriented, or wholesaling component, with between 66.7 and 83.3 
per cent of traders involved in wholesaling. Table 5.13 has a highly significant chi-square value 
at the p>=0.00001 level, which confirms that there are differences between the markets. There 
is an overall mean proportion of traders selling to consumers of 70.9 per cent, with a minimum 
of 16.7 per cent in Tandika and a maximum of 100 per cent in Ilala. These latter two 
proportions, however, are exaggerated since although 20 respondents, or 13 per cent, 
specified Tandika as their main source, it is primarily a retail market. In the case of Ilala, only 2 
respondents, or just over 1 per cent of all respondents specified it as the main source of their 
produce. This suggests that Ilala cannot sell 100 per cent of its produce to consumers, and in 
Tandika 16.7 per cent of consumer-oriented selling is a low proportion for a market which is 
primarily considered as retail. In addition to this, Ilala had temporary status as a wholesale 
market while Kariakoo market complex was under construction in the mid- to late 1970's. It 
seems surprising, therefore, that such an extreme range should exist in the survey.
Table 5.13 Cross-Tabulation of the Market Location by the Type of Customers to Whom 
the Traders Sell
Count
Expected Value
Other
Customers
Consumers Row Total
Mwenge 4 19 23
6.7 16.3 15.2%
Ubungo 1 24 25
7.3 17.7 16.2%
Tandale 16 8 24
7.0 17.0 15.9%
Ilala 0 25 25
7.3 17.7 16.6%
Tandika 20 4 24
7.3 17.0 15.9%
Kinondoni 3 27 30
8.7 21.3 19.9%
Column 44 107 151
Percent 29.1% 70.9 100.0%
Chi-Square 75.30
Degrees of Freedom 5
Significance 0.0000
Table 5.14 is a cross-tabulation of the sources of the produce against the market place. 
Mwenge, Ubungo, Ilala and Kinondoni emerge as distinct from the other two markets in their 
preference for Kariakoo as a source. Out of these four, Ubungo is the only market where 
traders say that they get their produce from sources outside the main Dar es Salaam markets.
In the case of Ubungo market, there were two traders who gave the area of Ubungo as their 
source of produce, suggesting that they buy from producers in this peri-urban area, where the 
author did observe some informal production on small, otherwise vacant plots of land takes 
place.
Table 5.14 Cross-Tabulation of the Market Location by the Source of Produce
Count
Expected Value
Kariakoo Other Row Total •
Mwenge 17 7 24
15.3 8.7 15.8%
Ubungo 21 4 25
16.0 9.0 16.4%
Tandale 6 18 24
15.3 8.7 15.8%
llala 19 6 25
16.0 9.0 16.4%
Tandika 6 18 24
15.3 8.7 15.8%
Kinondoni 28 2 30
19.1 10.9 19.7%
Column 97 55 152
Percent 63.8% 36.2% 100.0%
Chi-Square 49.17
Degrees of Freedom 5
Significance 0.0000
A chi square test of relationship between the market location and the source of produce 
suggests a statistical relationship between the two variables. In both Tandale and Tandika, 75 
per cent of the respondents gave an alternative to Kariakoo as their main source of produce. 
Tandale and Tandika are already acknowledged to have commodities being delivered from 
outside Dar es Salaam, and the author frequently observed lorries, having travelled from 
locations some considerable distance to Dar es Salaam, arriving at Tandale market delivering 
fruit and vegetables, as well as staples. In addition to these sources, there were three 
respondents (two traders selling at Tandika, and the one at Tandale), who gave "their own farm" 
as their main source of supply.
The overall mean proportion of traders giving Kariakoo wholesale market as their main source of 
supply is 63.9 per cent. In those markets other than Tandika and Tandale, most traders gave 
Kariakoo as their main source of supply, between 70.8 per cent in the case of Mwenge, and
93.3 per cent in the case of Kinondoni. These figures highlight the difference which exists 
between the two 'wholesaling' markets, Tandale and Tandika, and the other markets surveyed. 
However, interviews with the market officials, who had little to lose by telling the author where 
they thought the main sources of produce were, indicated that Tandika was receiving oranges, 
mangoes and pineapples from the south of Tanzania; Tandale was receiving oranges, 
tangerines and other citrus fruits from Tanga and Morogoro Regions; Buguruni, a market on the 
Nelson Mandela Road, receives oranges from Kisarawe and other areas to the south-west of 
the city; Ubungo was receiving cooking bananas from Coast Region and to the south west of 
the city; and Mwenge obtained tomatoes and some fruits, when in season, from the peri-urban
areas around the market and just beyond the city boundary, near Kunduchi. This perhaps 
indicates that the search for alternatives to Kariakoo as a source of produce is selective 
depending on the type of produce involved. Finally, the fact that such a varied number of 
sources have been quoted to the author, in some cases by the same trader, suggests that the 
sources of produce are not fixed. Traders and observers, such as market secretaries and some 
consumers, report that retailers compare the relative price, quality and supply of commodities 
between sources. Their final purchase arrangements depend on the*.assessment of the relative 
benefits of purchasing from one market or another.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that Tandale and Tandika markets distinguish themselves from 
the other markets as important wholesale centres. Both markets are relatively large, 
established retailing markets located on two of the main road arteries entering the city. They 
are located in the midst of relatively large residential areas, but not far enough into the city to 
experience the same high levels of traffic congestion around Kariakoo market and the city 
centre. However, the other markets also have traders involved in wholesaling. It seems that in 
the retail markets surveyed there are different categories of traders, such as retailers, 
wholesalers, of which there are only a small number, and those who are involved in both 
retailing and wholesaling.
Most produce which enters Dar es Salaam goes to a wholesale market, of which we can identify 
three major ones, Kariakoo, the only legal one, Tandika and Tandale. In addition, Ubungo and 
llala have a small number of traders whose produce is primarily delivered by lorry. This 
indicates some level of wholesaling activities in these markets.
Kinondoni and Mwenge are slightly different again, with no traders whose produce arrives at 
their market by lorry. In addition, there is limited direct trade contact with areas outside Dar es 
Salaam. These two markets may be considered as slightly more quality-oriented, with 
Kinondoni, known as the ‘TX Market’1 because of the number of expatriates that shop there, 
and Mwenge, being so close to the University of Dar es Salaam and a large army base. Both 
markets are situated away from the main national routeways, which are most likely to channel fruit 
and vegetable supplies in from the important producing areas.
The pick-up is the most important method by which fruit and vegetables are transported to the 
market place except in the case of Tandale, where this is the lorry. A significant proportion of 
produce (26 per cent) arrives at llala by mkokoteni, a similar proportion (24 per cent) of llala 
traders use Kariakoo as their main source of produce. Kariakoo is the most important source of 
produce with overall, 63.8 per cent of traders obtaining goods from there, but between 
markets this ranges from 25 per cent in Tandika and Tandale to 93.3 per cent in Kinondoni.
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TX ’ is the code mainly used for licence plates of expatriate-owned vehicles in Tanzania.
Those traders with more years in business are more likely to be involved in wholesale trading, 
while those with one year or less are most likely to be primarily retailers. In addition, Tandale 
had the highest mean number of years in business followed by Mwenge and then Tandika.'The 
lowest mean number of years in business were recorded in Ubungo and Kinondoni.
There is evidence of a significant number of traders who have recently (within the last five years) 
begun trading in fruit and vegetables. It is too early to establish, with confidence, the reason 
for this, but there are suggestions that the liberalisation of the staple markets attracted some 
experienced fruit and vegetable traders to invest in this new market. It appears the new 
traders in fruit and vegetables have moved in to replace them.
Selected fruits and vegetables, such as oranges, tangerines, bananas and tomatoes are clearly 
by-passing Kariakoo. They are being dealt with in the main retail markets around Dar es 
Salaam. Each market has built up a specialism, so that they are known for particular fruit or 
vegetables, such as Tandale being known for oranges, Ubungo for bananas, Tandika for 
pineapples and citrus. These specialisms can be explained as the result of the geographical 
location of the market places, in relation to the incoming traffic from the main supply areas.
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Chapter Six 
Fruit and Vegetabie Traders’ Survey
6.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on traders involved in the wholesale supply of. fruit and vegetables for the 
urban market of Dar es Salaam. This will be carried out using results of a questionnaire survey 
of wholesale traders operating in the Lushoto District of Tanga Region, designed by the author 
and carried out in August 1989 (see Appendix 3.3). This survey was administered in Swahili by 
a Tanzanian assistant in order to overcome the language barrier. The purpose of the survey 
was to build a profile of the trading activities of those traders who actively buy fruit or 
vegetables from the Lushoto producers with the intention of transporting the produce to an 
urban market. The most practical method of interviewing traders was to meet them while at 
work at the periodic markets in the District. These markets take place every day in a different 
village, so that any one village will host a market every three or four days. The main purpose of 
the markets is for the exchange of goods among rural farming households, but they are also 
used by traders to meet farmers and negotiate their wholesale purchases. Three periodic 
markets were visited near to Lushoto: Lukozi, Soni and Mlalo.
6.2 The Traders Survey
It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of traders actively engaged in the wholesale 
trading of fruit and vegetables. There is considerable overlapping of roles, where, on the one 
hand, farmers who may have business in one of the main towns, may take some of their own 
and perhaps their neighbours' produce with them to sell. On the other hand, most of the 
traders (over 70 per cent) interviewed were also part-time farmers. In addition, all the 
individuals interviewed said that it is very common for anyone travelling out of the area for any 
reason to buy locally-produced commodities for sale elsewhere. They also return with 
commodities which are not expensive or not generally produced in the area to sell. These 
include cigarettes, matches, kerosene, soap and cloth. This level of informal trading ranges from 
full-time traders to those who make the occasional trip, combined with some trading activities in 
order to supplement incomes, or, in some cases, to defray the cost of a business trip. The 
evidence from interviews with local informants suggests, however, that most large wholesalers, 
purchasing from Lushoto producers, meet the farmers at the periodic markets held in most 
villages in the district at least once per week. It is for this reason that this study has 
concentrated on those traders active at the periodic markets. Interviews with the traders and 
some producers suggest there are traders who come to the District from elsewhere; for 
example, from Dar es Salaam or Arusha. Their visits tend to be irregular and speculative, so
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Figure 6.1 Lushoto District of Tanga Region 
(Indicating the villages surveyed)
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this is not a very reliable form of trading, and, consequently, those participating in it are very 
difficult to meet and interview.
The survey included twenty-two males and eight females. Table 6.1 is a contingency table of 
location of trader by gender. This shows a mearked split between Soni and Lukozi on the one 
hAnd and Mlalo on the other. The first two are located on the main road through the District 
while Mlalo is some distance off this road. The cross-tabulation of gender by method of 
transportation in Table 6.2 confirms that female traders use the category ‘other’, which 
represents the use of either buses or carrying their produce as a headload, whereas male 
traders tend to use hired vehicles. In an interview with the Lushoto market secretary, he 
explained that it is considered unseemly for women to be involved in such activities as hiring 
and loading pick-ups or trucks. This leaves women with the options only of carrying by 
headload, or going by bus, where larger loads are involved. It is clear that attitudes such as 
this have restricted women's involvement in fruit and vegetable trading, except where they are 
retailing their own produce on a small scale. It would appear that around Lushoto women 
generally are responsible for providing the household with food, while men are more 
responsible for cash dealings with traders. This interpretation is paralleled by Sender and 
Smith (1990, p.66) reporting that “cash incomes from sales of food crops in local markets was 
generally said to be divided equally between husband and wife, although women 
acknowledged that their closer involvement in production and marketing provided them with 
some ability to manipulate shares." However, cash income from tea and coffee sales all 
accrued to the husband in spite of the fact that “the overwhelming majority of manual agricultural 
labour is done by women” (p.66). In the case of large cash sales of fruit and vegetables, 
considered as cash crops in Lushoto, the economic benefit of sales of large quantities to 
traders also accrues to the husband. This is in contrast to some countries of West Africa, where 
women have obtained virtual control over the fruit and vegetable marketing (Lawson, 1967). 
Photograph 4.1 shows women in the main part of Soni's periodic market, retailing small 
quantities of mainly staples, but also some fruit and vegetables, which they themselves have 
produced. The wholesale traders, who are mainly male, are to be seen around the fringes of 
the market, buying or selling wholesale commodities and re-packing produce in preparation for 
loading onto the lorries.
Table 6.1 Cross-tabulation of the Market Place by the Gender of Respondents
Count
Expected Value
Male Female Row Total 
(Column %)
Soni 14 1 15
11.0 4.0 (50.0%)
Lukozi 8 0 8
5.9 2.1 (26.7%)
Mlalo 0 7 7
5.1 1.9 (23.3%)
Column Total 22 8 30
Percent 73.3% 26.7% (100.0%)
Table 6.2 Cross-tabulation of Method of Transport by Gender
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Count
Expected Value
Hired
Vehicle
Bus Row Total 
(Column %)
Male 21 0 21
15.4 5.9 (724%)
Female 0 8 8
5.6 2.1 (27.6%)
Column Total 21 8 29
Percent 70.0% 26.7% (100.0%)
There is an important social dimension to women’s participation in marketing in Lushoto.
Women frequently carry produce on foot for long distances in order to take part in the market 
day. In some cases, a woman, who has none of her own produce to sell, may buy from her 
neighbours, and may even sell her produce at a loss, in order to attend a particular market. The 
periodic market forms a focus around which many of the issues important to village life may be 
resolved. For example, loans are often arranged, recalled and paid back at the market, 
disputes may be settled with the help of village officials, and news and information about what 
is happening in and around the village may be discussed at the market. Consequently, missing 
a periodic market may mean missing out on far more than the opportunity to buy or sell 
produce.
In view of these clear gender differences, it is possible that some interview bias has resulted in 
the over-representation of women as wholesale traders in this study. Clear examination of their 
questionnaire forms shows that they are all involved in the trading of relatively small quantities of 
local staple foods. They, therefore, consider themselves as wholesale traders, although they 
are prevented from dealing in larger quantities by the cultural forces which exclude them from 
the use of larger transportation facilities. This raises the important point of how the traders 
perceive themselves in relation to other traders in the market. Clearly, traders interviewed in 
Mlalo consider themselves as wholesalers, and in one sense they are, since they appear to be 
buying from producers and selling to other traders. However, the locations of their sales and 
the volumes of produce they are dealing suggest that they are operating on a far smaller scale 
than the traders who purchase commodities for exporting out of the District. These traders may 
even operate as middle agents purchasing from producers and selling to larger traders.
Table 6.3 Mean Age of Respondents
Market Location Mean Age
Soni 31.5
Lukozi 29.5
Mlalo 33.3
Total 31.4
Table 6.4 Cross-tabulation of Market Location by Number of Years Schooling of the 
Respondents
Count
Expected Value
Less Than 
Six
Seven Eight or 
more
Row Total 
(Column %)
Soni 6 7 2 15
6.0 7.5 1.5 (50.0%)
Lukozi 2 5 1 8
3.2 4.0 0.8 (26.7%)
Mlalo 4 3 0 7
2.8 3.5 0.7 (23.3%)
Column Total 12 15 3 30
Percent 40.0% 50.0% 10.0 (100.0%)
The traders interviewed had an overall mean age of 31.4, with little variation between markets 
(Table 6.3). Approximately half of the survey have had seven years schooling, that is, full 
primary level education. 40 per cent have received less than seven years, and only three 
traders (10 per cent) received more. This represents a relatively highly educated group of the 
population, 50 per cent of which have received seven years of primary school education, 
compared with the population of Tanga Region, of which, in 1984, only 10.2 per cent had 
received seven years of primary education (TIRDEP, 1985). The level of education did not differ 
significantly between the traders interviewed in the different village markets (Table 6.4). For 
most respondents, trading in fruit and vegetables appears to be a natural extension of 
farming, since all those who did indicate a second job indicated farming; approximately 77 per 
cent of the traders interviewed were also farmers. These proportions did not differ significantly 
between village markets (Table 6.5).
Table 6.5 Cross-tabulation of Part-time Farmers by Market Location
Count
Expected Value
Part-Time
Farmer
Not p/t 
Fanner
Row Total 
(Column %)
Soni 11 4 15
11.5 3.4 (50.0%)
Lukozi 8 0 8
6.1 1.9 (26.7%)
Mlalo 4 3 7
5.4 1.6 (23.3%)
Column Total 23 7 30
Percent 76.7% 23.3 (100.0%)
Figure 6.2 shows the number of employees the respondents employ. Employees are mainly 
taken on for labouring jobs, such as carrying, packing and possibly cleaning. This barchart 
demonstrates that the majority (some 63 per cent) work alone. Those employing anyone 
account for 37 per cent, and out of this proportion almost 17 per cent employ only one person. 
It is not clear from this what level of employment is involved, whether it is full-time, part-time, 
temporary, piece-meal or even family labour. The implications of this are that it is unclear how 
important employment is to the trading activities of the respondents. This level of detail would 
require a more detailed survey than was possible here. However, we can see from these data
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that the majority of the traders buying produce from the Lushoto District markets for shipment 
to the main urban markets are small scale traders working alone. This suggests that the trade is 
operating on extremely tight margins, and is likely to be susceptible to adverse changes in the 
economic climate. All the traders depend on their earnings to provide their households with the 
consumer goods, although a large proportion are still closely tied to their farms. This would 
suggest that if the economic situation worsened, they would continue to attempt to trade in 
order to bring in cash, but ultimately, if the costs became too high, and the prices of consumer 
goods increased, or their availability diminished, the traders are likely to be able to survive on a 
subsistence basis by devoting more of their time to their farms.
Figure 6.2 The Number of Employees Used by The Respondents
No. of Employees
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Figure 6.3 shows that the most important types of crop traded by the respondents are 
vegetables, accounting for 52.6 per cent of the commodities they listed. Fruit accounts for 35.1 
per cent, while staples and pulses account for only 12.4 per cent. In a rural area such as 
Lushoto, a high proportion of the staples consumed in the household are grown on the 
household farm as subsistence crops, especially maize, yams and, increasingly, Irish potatoes. 
Furthermore, these staples have only recently been freed of monopoly marketing controls. The 
newly liberated market is intended to provide traders with a greater freedom of choice about 
who to buy from and sell to. It is intended that these liberated economic conditions will release 
the government from the enormous financial burden of the National Milling Corporation’s 
running costs, discussed earlier. It is also intended to ensure efficient, cost-effective flows of 
commodities between producers and consumers, benefiting both by increasing producer 
prices and reducing consumer prices. As discussed earlier, the reality is not as clear-cut as this. 
The cross-tabulation in Table 6.6 shows that of the traders interviewed in this survey, all the 
female traders and only four out of the twenty-two male traders indicated that their most 
important crop type was a staple. The same proportion of men indicated that pulses are their 
most important trading crop, while the largest proportion of the overall sample (47 per cent), or 
fourteen men, gave vegetables as their main trading crop.
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Figure 6.3 Types of Crop Bought by The Respondents
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Table 6.6 Cross-tabulation of Most Important Crop by Gender
Count
Expected Value
Vegetable Pulses Staples Row Total 
(Column %)
Male 14 4 4 22
10.3 2.9 8.8 (73.3%)
Female 0 0 8 8
3.7 1.1 3.2 (26.7%)
Column Total 14 4 15 30
Percent 46.7% 13.3% 40.0% (100.0%)
As can be seen from the questionnaire form (Appendix 3.3), traders were asked to give an 
example of the volume and price of a purchase of each of the commodities in which he or she 
would normally deal. For the purposes of the following discussion these will be referred to as 
‘batches’. Traders were asked to indicate the crops in order of the importance for their 
business (Tables 6.7 and 6.8). Some 46.7 per cent of respondents indicated that vegetables 
were their most important crop type, with 13.3 per cent naming pulses and 40 per cent staples. 
None of the respondents considered fruit as their most important commodity.
Table 6.7 The Crops Traders Indicated as Their Most Important Grouped into Types
Crop Type Number of Traders Percent
Vegetables 14 46.7
Staples 12 40.0
Pulses 4 13.3
Fruit 0 0.0
Total 30 100.0
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Table 6.8 sets out the crop types of all the batches reported by traders. This is subtly 
different, as it groups all of the crop types dealt with regardless of priority, and it yields subtly 
different results. Vegetables account for 52.6 per cent of all the crop batches reported, and 
staples and pulses account for a combined proportion of 35.1 per cent, while fruit accounted for
12.4 per cent. Clearly, fruit is a more important trading crop than may be suggested by Table 
6.7. In interviews with key informants the advantages of growing staples were reported to be 
that if there was to be a general harvest failure, or there were marketing difficulties, at least the 
trader and his or her household could eat what they had grown or bought, and store a 
considerable portion for later consumption or sale. It is also likely that in a highly populated 
area such as Lushoto, staples would be in constant demand. On the whole, fruit trees, are 
considered more of an unnecessary hindrance. The trees take up valuable land and much of the 
produce does not get to market, because of the problems of high perishability, of over­
production (particularly of pears) and low demand, and a high quality is required for the market. 
The result is that although the staples do not have such a high profile in terms of sales, they are 
considered important by the traders, because of their strategic value, while fruit is relatively less 
important, despite the over-production of temperate fruit and the suitability of the area to the 
production of this type of fruit.
Table 6.8 All The Crops Reported By the Traders in Their Transactions
Crop Type Number of Batches Percent
Vegetables 51 52.6
Staples/Pulses 34 35.1
Fruit 12 12.3
Total 97 100.0
Table 6.9 gives a breakdown of the number of crops handled by each trader. This table shows 
a relatively even spread, with a significant proportion (23.3 per cent) dealing with only one 
commodity and the same proportion dealing with as many as six or more commodities. Traders 
who concentrate on a small number of commodities tend to deal with a small range of crops, for 
example the traders in Soni and Lukozi dealing with four crops or less tend to concentrate on 
tomatoes, cabbage and potatoes, occasionally with a fruit of some sort, such as jack fruit. 
Traders in Mlalo dealing with such a small number of crops tend to concentrate on bananas and 
millet, with cassava and beans. Traders dealing with four or more commodities tend to be 
based in either Soni or Lukozi; only one Mlalo trader deals with as many as three commodities, 
while only in Soni do traders deal with more than five commodities. This pattern of trading is 
likely to arise from the level of contact each of the village markets has with the outside and the 
ability of the surrounding area to produce a range of commodities to meet the needs of the 
external markets. The environment around Mlalo is not as well-suited to the production of such 
a wide range of crops as that around Soni and Lukozi. The latter two markets also benefit from 
their more convenient location for transporting crops out of the District.
Table 6.9 The Number of Crops Handled by Each Trader
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Number of Crops Handled Number of Traders Percent
One 7 23.3
Two 5 16.7
Three 6 20.0
Four 5 16.7
Five 0 0.0
Six and over 7 23.3
Total 30 100.0
Figure 6.4 shows the proportion of commodity batches bought at different locations; 53.6 per 
cent were purchased at the periodic village markets, 37.1 per cent were bought at the 
producers’ farm, and only 9.3 per cent originated from the traders’ own farm. This clearly 
demonstrates the importance of the periodic markets as the location for carrying out transactions 
for these traders. The cultural importance of the periodic market to the people of Lushoto 
suggests that the traders, knowing that a large proportion of the local producers will attend the 
market, come in search of produce there. Interviews with agricultural extension workers and 
village officials confirm that the majority of trading is, in fact, carried out through the periodic 
markets, and that produce which by-passes this channel is only a relatively small proportion in 
Lushoto. These other channels comprise the following: large producers who have a contract 
with a buyer, or who produce in sufficient quantities for viability in hiring lorries for themselves 
and trade their own produce in an urban market; or urban-based buyers who make speculative 
purchases.
Figure 6.4 Location of The Traders’ Purchases
9.3%
m Farm
□ Village Market
m Own Premises
It is important at this stage that the process of purchasing is understood. The farmer and trader 
may meet at the periodic market, or at an alternative pre-arranged meeting, in order to 
negotiate a deal. The farmer may bring the produce to the meeting or may bring a sample for 
the trader to check. If a sample has been brought by the farmer, the trader may agree to
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collect the rest of the harvest later at the farmer's field, once transport has been arranged. This, 
however, leaves a degree of ambiguity, for the purposes of the questionnaire, about the . 
location of the trader's purchase. The purchase may then be seen as occurring when the '  
agreement is reached, at the pre-arranged meeting, or it may be at the exchange of money 
and goods, at the producer’s farm. In order to clarify this and the importance of the variety of 
processes of purchase which are employed, a more comprehensive survey than could be 
carried out here is required.
In addition, a fourth method of purchase exists, although this is not as common in Lushoto 
District as in the coconut, orange and mango producing areas in the lower altitude areas of 
Tanga Region. In this process the trader rents the farmer's land at the time of harvest and 
arranges for the harvesting himself. This reduces the amount of labour required by the farmer 
and, therefore, the initial capital investment normally required by producers for the costs of 
harvesting.
The greatest proportion of traders (90.3 per cent) purchase their commodities on a weekly 
basis, with only 6.5 per cent purchasing more frequently and 3.3 per cent less frequently (Figure 
6.5). Caution, however, must be exercised when interpreting this result. The traders may only 
be referring to their work at the time of the questionnaire survey, even though the questions 
were framed in a more general way. In this case, seasonal variations in the size, frequency and 
type of traders’ purchases can be expected to have some influence on the results of this 
sun/ey. The survey was carried out in July, consequently the transactions which the traders were 
making at that time would be uppermost in their minds. The corollary of this is that transactions 
they had negotiated six or nine months previously will tend to be less accurately recalled.
Figure 6.5 Frequency of Traders’ Purchases
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□  Weekly 
US Monthly
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90.7 per cent of the produce reported in the questionnaire was purchased directly from the 
producers (Figure 6.6). This leaves 9.3 per cent to be purchased from some other form of 
middle agent, such as other traders (5.2 per cent) and 'others' (4.1 per cent), which may include 
the more informal, infrequent traders described at the start of this section.
Figure 6.6 The People From Whom The Traders Purchase Their Produce
4.1%
□ Producer
B Trader
Other
Figure 6.7 shows that the greatest majority of the batches of crops reported by the traders 
(97.8 per cent) were paid for in cash. Only 2 batches used credit. Credit is very rarely used in 
the purchase of fruit and vegetables in Lushoto. According to one local business man, farmers 
in Lushoto rarely use credit because they have no collateral against which to borrow: most 
farmers rent or lease the land they work and have no other property with which to secure a loan. 
Indeed, it appears that credit is only generally used between family members. However, 
close family ties in the area and the approximately 50 per cent level of out-migration among the 
18 to 35 year old males (Sender and Smith, 1990), suggest that some credit may be obtained 
through cash-earning out-migrants. The result of this is that traders must generate a significant 
amount of initial capital, usually through family relations, with which to make purchases of fruit and 
vegetables in the Lushoto area. In addition, they have to hire transport in order to take the 
produce they have purchased to the market where they intend to sell. Interviews with two 
business people in the Lushoto area, however, suggest that lorries may in some cases be 
hired on credit and paid for once the commodities are sold at the destination market. In other 
words the lorry owner will provide the lorry, driver and fuel in advance, on the understanding 
that the trader will pay the hire on return from the destination market.
Figure 6.7 Methods of Payment
Method of Payment
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Traders were asked to identify the most important factor in their decision to buy from one 
producer or another; 20 per cent gave no reason, while of those who gave a reason (Table J5.8)
33.3 per cent rated quality of produce as the most important factor in selecting a supplier and
23.3 per cent rated the price of the commodities as the most important factor. 16.7 per cent 
said they always bought from the same person, while only two respondents gave ‘other 
reasons’. One of these traders reported that he buys from the same person because he can 
purchase on credit, the other reported that he purchases small quantities from a large number 
of producers and rarely tries to return to the same producer. The quality-price trade-off ranks 
highly, as would be expected, but it is surprising that such a high percentage always buy from 
the same producer. The advantage of this, however, is that this simplifies the trader’s job by 
dealing with a supplier he knows and presumably trusts. Interviews carried out in the District 
suggest that this arrangement more often exists between neighbours or relatives, although the 
importance of the “blood brother network” in social and economic behaviour in Lushoto, 
reported by Sender and Smith(1990), may also provide the basis for such an arrangement.
Figure 6.8 Decision-Making Factors When Traders Select From Whom to Buy
□ Wait for Price
□ Spoilage
□ Wait for Transport
□ Build Viable Load
m Wait for Market
n To Ripen
48.5 per cent of the batches of crops reported by the respondents have been stored by them 
before selling. The mean storage time is 6.7 days, although the maximum is ninety-nine days 
and the minimum is one day. Figure 6.8 illustrates the reasons why these crops have been 
stored; 34 per cent are put in storage to wait for a better price; 22.6 per cent to prevent 
crops from being spoiled, although the traders did not explain the delay between purchase 
and re-sale that required them having to be kept long enough for storage to be necessary;
20.8 per cent were stored while waiting for transport to a market. The last two reasons account 
for relatively small proportions of the sample: two respondents to wait for the market day and 
one respondent to allow the crop (bananas) to ripen.
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The survey shows that 92.8 per cent of the batches reported were not processed in any way 
by the traders (Figure 6.10). The 7 per cent remaining, including potatoes, cabbages, 
tomatoes, pears, apples, bananas and cassava, had simply been cleaned before resale. 
Most traders, however, repack all their crops to make loads more suitable for long distance 
lorry journeys and for the portering at the end of the journey.
Figure 6.10 The Proportion of Traders Who Process the Foods They Deal With
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The possibility of a more fundamental form of processing has been discussed in Lushoto for a 
number of years. A small tomato canning plant currently exists in Soni village, although it has 
had considerable supply and operational problems. The most recent contribution to the 
debate is a consultants' report in 1987, assessing the feasibility of producing an alcoholic liqueur 
from the unused fruit that is produced each year in the District (Schaeffer and Jenders, 1987). 
This investigation looked particularly at pears as a raw material for the liqueur. Pear trees were
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originally planted in the area under the instructions of the colonial government, but there is no 
longer the demand for pears, although the trees continue producing them, despite the neglect 
of farmers. The result is a very large stock of unkempt pear trees, which are estimated to ' 
produce about 100,000 metric tonnes per year. Only 20 per cent of this is sold or consumed. 
The remainder is allowed to fall off the trees and rot on the ground. Because the pear trees 
are unkempt, the quality of pears is relatively poor, however, Schaeffer and Jenders (1987) 
report that the introduction of suitable husbanding would rapidly improve the quality of the fruit. 
A company has been formed in Lushoto and most of the relevant permits and licences have 
been applied for or already obtained, but, as yet, the investment has not been forthcoming. A 
resident in Lushoto is known to produce an alcoholic drink from pears, following a recipe 
brought to the area by the colonial settlers. It is thought, however, that the recipe would not 
lend itself to large-scale production, because of the complications in fermenting the particular 
type of sugar which pears produce.
Figure 6.11 Destination of Lushoto District Produce Bought By The Traders
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The largest proportion of crop batches reported (55.7 per cent) were to be sent to Dar es 
Salaam (Figure 6.11). Tanga, as regional capital, also figures prominently as a destination of 
Lushoto's produce, accounting for 30.9 per cent. Finally, Lushoto town itself has a significant 
proportion of non-agricultural inhabitants who require fruit and vegetables and, indeed other 
food crops, which can be supplied from the District, and this accounts for 12.4 per cent of the 
batches reported.
The most important method of transporting crops to the market where they are to be sold was 
a hired vehicle, accounting for 88.7 per cent of the reported batches (Figure 6.12). A further 9.7 
per cent were accounted for by a obtaining a lift from passing traffic. 2.1 per cent indicated 
'other* methods of transport, which include either bus or headload. Observations made by the
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author on bus journeys from the supply areas into Dar es Salaam, and interviews with some 
farmers suggest that the bus is generally only used by farmers transporting their own produce 
rather than by traders. The reasons for this are clear. A farmer who has produced his own fruit 
is able to miss out the middle agent by travelling into the urban market to sell the produce to 
retailers himself. On the other hand, a trader who makes most of his living from trading would 
require large loads to make a trip to an urban market a viable option. In this case, transport by 
bus would not allow enough space to carry a sufficient load, and the unit costs of transport are 
likely to be higher than hiring a lorry for bulk transportation.
Figure 6.12 Methods of Transport Used By the Traders
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Figure 6.13 shows that breakdowns are considered the most important constraint faced in 
transporting, accounting for 84.9 per cent of the batches reported; 10.3 per cent gave no 
constraint or 'none' in response to this question; 3.2 per cent gave 'other' problems, such as 
finding and negotiating with sellers, as their most important constraint; and 1.1 per cent 
indicated that 'time' was their most important constraint. This indicates the importance of 
transport to traders’ business, which should be borne in mind when it comes to 
recommendations to improve the distribution process for marketing fruit and vegetables in Dar 
es Salaam. According to the results of this survey of traders, if there are to be any 
improvements in the supply of food to the city, the roads connecting the main producing areas 
with Dar es Salaam must be improved in order to reduce breakdowns and ease the flow of 
traffic. It may be argued that this could have a beneficial effect on the prices offered to 
producers, because the easier access is to the producing areas, the easier it is for competing 
buyers to get access to the producers.
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Figure 6.13 Constraints on Trading Activities Reported By The Traders
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The traders were asked to specify what alternative transport methods were available to them. 
Eighteen out of the thirty traders interviewed (60 per cent) said that there were no alternatives. 
Only eight (26.7 per cent) gave the bus as an alternative. Two traders (6.7 per cent) would 
consider obtaining lifts from passing traffic, and only one each would consider using their own 
vehicle or a hired vehicle. This suggests that if their normal transport arrangements are 
unavailable, the majority of traders would not consider an alternative and would simply not 
trade. This indicates the importance of an adequate transport system to the distribution and 
marketing of fruit and vegetables in Tanzania. In most cases when traders are carrying large 
loads, the only viable transport method is a hired lorry. By comparison, the bus is an 
expensive method of transport, with restricted space, making it difficult to justify economically 
sending such a load to the urban market. When asked about the use of buses, some traders 
felt that they were not only expensive, but also not dependable, or the delays made the use 
of this method of transportation unnecessarily difficult. The buses make scheduled stops, which 
are often arranged with local business people in order to give them the opportunity to sell 
food, snacks and drinks to the passengers. This causes delays which traders with hired lorries 
can avoid. In addition, lorry drivers can use a greater amount of speed over the poor roads 
without the fear of complaints from the cargo. The traders hiring lorries benefit from being the 
main customer, whereas traders travelling by bus, as subsidiary customers, are forced to fit in 
with the priorities of the bus owners. Transport was considered the most significant cost of 
trading by 24 respondents (80 per cent). Other important costs include tariffs such as those 
charged by marketing authorities, such as Kariakoo Market Corporation, accounting for 10 per 
cent and the buying of crops 3.3 per cent.
Figure 6.14 Location of the Traders’ Sale of Produce
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Figure 6.14 shows the location where the traders eventually sell their load. Some 62.9 per cent 
of the reported batches were sold in a city market, and 12.4 per cent were sold in a village, 
which equates with the 12 per cent already reported to be transported to Lushoto town (Figure 
6.4). Finally, 24.7 per cent of the batches were sold by the roadside. If the village market 
element is eliminated and the rest (87.6 per cent) is assumed to take place in the urban areas, 
then 71.8 per cent of urban selling reported by these traders takes place in a city market and
28.2 per cent took place by the roadside. Because fruit and vegetables must legally enter the 
Dar es Salaam market through the Kariakoo wholesale market, the 28.2 per cent sold at the 
roadside are sold into the informal market. However, a proportion of the 71.8 per cent must 
also enter the Dar es Salaam market through informal wholesaling in the retail markets around 
the city, as described in earlier chapters. This is an indication of the proportion of traders from 
Lushoto involved in wholesale dealing on an informal or formal basis in the urban context. Most 
of the traders, farmers and other informants indicated that Kariakoo was the only market they 
would go to in Dar es Salaam, because it had all the required facilities and a healthy demand. It 
can be safely assumed, therefore, that a high proportion of the 71.8 per cent of the batches 
reported to be sold in city markets are in fact sold in Kariakoo. This can be reinforced in Figure 
6.15 which shows to whom the batches of commodities were sold: 66 per cent were sold to 
wholesalers and 34 per cent were sold to retailers. Selling direct to retailers in Dar es Salaam is 
technically illegal and would not have taken place in Kariakoo. A number of wholesalers are 
known to operate outside Kariakoo in the main urban retail markets, and so a proportion of the 
66 per cent may have been sold to them. As a result of the analysis of the Kariakoo wholesale 
market data in the previous chapter, it is clear that Kariakoo is beginning to favour vegetables 
over fruit, and the survey of Lushoto traders indicate that Lushoto District producers tend to 
specialise in commercial production of vegetables as opposed to fruit. This would suggest that 
there would be a heavy bias towards selling in Kariakoo among the Lushoto traders.
Therefore, although it is known that a minimum of 34 per cent of the Lushoto traders sell on the 
informal market in Dar es Salaam, it can also be assumed that this is a relatively low estimate if
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compared to a more mixed fruit and vegetable supplying area, and particularly if compared to 
a mainly fruit producing area, such as Korogwe in Tanga Region or Matombo in Morogoro . 
Region which is likely to favour the informal market. However, based on these data, the figures 
generally suggest about 50 per cent of the cash market for fruit and vegetables in Dar es 
Salaam is formal and 50 per cent informal.
Figure 6.15 To Whom the Traders Sell
— i---------1--------------1---1-------- 1-------- 1---------1-------- 1-------- 1-------- 1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
□ Wholesaler
0 Retailer
It is already clear from the discussion above, however, that the distribution within some 
variables is so dominated by one value as to make statistical testing difficult. The small sample 
size (n=30) makes extended use of the chi square test relatively difficult, particularly where there 
is a large bias towards one value in a variable. The contingency tables which follow present 
some of the data relating to the market location, the most important crop to the trader's 
business and the destination of the produce, as reported by the trader. Chi square tests have 
been carried out where possible. Where this is not possible the contingency tales will be 
discussed as they stand.
The cross-tabulation of market location by destination in presented in Table 6.11 shows that a 
higher than expected proportion of batches reported in Soni were destined for Tanga, while 
the batches reported in Lukozi were exclusively destined for Dar es Salaam. Batches of 
commodities purchased in Mlalo, on the other hand, were exclusively destined for Lushoto.
Table 6.11 Cross-tabulation of Destination of Commodities by Market Location
Count
Expected Value
Dar es 
Salaam
Tanga Lushoto Row Total 
(Column %)
Soni 15 30 1 46
25.9 14.4 5.8 (47.9%)
Lukozi 39 0 0 39
21.9 12.2 4.9 (40.6%)
Mlalo 0 0 11 11
6.2 3.4 1.4 (11.5%)
Column Total 54 30 12 96
Percent 56.3% 31.3% 125% (100.0%)
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In the case of those traders purchasing in Soni and Lukozi, however, the question arises that if 
Soni is favoured by traders transporting to Tanga, and if Lukozi is similarly favoured by traders 
transporting to Dar es Salaam, is there some form of produce specialisation? Table 6.12 shows 
that there is a significant chi square value relating the categories of the market location and the 
crop type, suggesting that there may be some degree of specialisation. When the table is 
examined, however, the most striking difference is that nine out of the eleven batches of goods 
reported in Mlalo are staples, while the other two, as the calculated expected variables would 
suggest, are fruits. In the case of Lukozi, the distribution follows the expected frequency 
relatively closely, never deviating by more than a residual of 1. Soni suggests some small 
degree of variance from the expected frequency favouring vegetables over staples, with fruit 
following the expected distribution. This suggests that the wholesale trading in Mlalo market 
tends to specialise more in trading staples, while Soni tends to specialise in more in 
vegetables.
Table 6.12 Cross-tabulation of Most important Crop Group by Market Location
Count
Expected Value
Vegetables Fruit Staple/
Pulse
Row Total 
(Column %)
Soni 30 5 12 47
24.7 5.8 16.5 (48.5%)
Lukozi 21 5 13 39
20.5 4.8 13.7 (40.2%)
Mlalo 0 2 9 11
5.8 1.4 3.9 (11.3%)
Column Total 51 12 34 97
Percent 526% 12.4% 35.1% (100.0%)
Chi Square 15.46
Degrees of Freedom 4
Significance 0.0038
Table 6.13 has a highly significant chi square value, with the most striking feature of this table 
being the highly specialised purchases made for the Lushoto market; 10 out of 12 reported 
batches are of staples and the remaining two are of fruit. In the case of the purchases made 
for Tanga, they favour vegetables over staples, with an expected fruit element. This may 
reflect the preferences of the Tanga population for staples which cannot be competitively 
produced in Lushoto District. For example, maize is grown on the plains around Mombo, 
taking about three months to mature, while the same crop can take up to nine months to mature 
in the higher altitudes of the Usambara Mountains around Lushoto. Purchases for Dar es 
Salaam follow a more even distribution pattern of crop types. This reflects the large demand in 
the city for a wide variety of crops, combined with the local demand for staples, such as those 
which are traditionally grown in the valleys of the Usambaras (for example, yams). This also 
reflects the importance of growing a variety of pulses, such as pigeon peas, red kidney beans 
and cow peas, which can be grown either for subsistence or for sale.
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It can be concluded, therefore, that the purchases made in the three villages reflect a 
specialised purchasing strategy for produce intended for the local market, featuring mainly . 
staples or pulses and a small amount of fruit, which has a slightly different growing season, 
depending on altitude. The purchases for Tanga market do not appear to be specific in terms 
of crop type. They favour vegetables over staples or pulses, while fruit purchases correspond 
to the expected frequencies. Purchases for the Tanga market were reported exclusively in 
Soni. Purchases for the Dar es Salaam market include a more balanced spread of crop types, 
corresponding with the expected frequencies in Table 6.13, and reflecting its large and varied 
demand for all crops. Purchases were reported to favour Lukozi slightly over Soni, but none 
were reported in Mlalo at all.
Table 6.13 Cross-tabulation of Most Important Crop by Destination
Count
Expected Value
Vegetables Fruit Staples/
Pulses
Row Total 
(Column %)
Dar es Salaam 30 6 18 54
28.1 6.8 19.1 (56.3%)
Tanga 20 4 6 30
15.6 3.8 10.6 (31.3%)
Lushoto 0 2 10 12
6.3 1.5 4.3 (125%)
Column Total 50 12 34 96
Percent 521% 125% 35.4% (100.0%)
Chi Square 17.725
Degrees of Freedom 4
Significance 0.0014
Table 6.14 cross-tabulates the person from whom the produce was sold by the destination of 
the produce. This yields a significant chi square value of 18.672. For both Tanga and Dar es 
Salaam, traders have tended to purchase directly from the producer, in 93 and 100 per cent of 
cases respectively, since this will keep purchasing costs relatively low. This may also be due to 
the volumes required in order to assemble an economically viable load. In order to achieve 
this, it may be necessary for buyers to go directly to producers in order to benefit from the 
economies of scale. In the case of the produce intended for Lushoto, there is a greater 
reliance than may be expected on other individuals: in 5 out of 12 cases (or 42 per cent).
Table 6.14 Cross-tabulation of Destination of Purchased Commodities by The People 
From Whom The Traders Purchased
Chi Square 18.077 
Degrees of 
Freedom 2 
Significance 0.0001
Count
Expected Value
Producer Other Row Total 
(Column %)
Soni 50 4 54
48.9 5.1 (56.3%)
Lukozi 30 0 30
27.2 2.9 (31.3%)
Mlalo 7 5 12
10.9 1.1 (125%)
Column Total 87 9 96
Percent 90.6% 9.2% (100.0%)
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The cross-tabulations in Table 6.15 and 6.16 deal with the location of produce purchase. In 
Table 6.15, this is cross-tabulated against the market location where the interview took place. In 
the case of Mlalo market, 10 out of 11 purchases reported were made in the market place/In 
Lukozi, the locations of purchases favoured the producer’s farm, and produce originating from 
the trader’s own farm are favoured over purchasing in the market place. The problems of 
interpreting this result have already been discussed, but this may be interpreted to mean that 
producers in Lukozi have their produce collected from their farm after having met the trader at 
the periodic market, since this is where the traders were interviewed at work. In the case of 
Soni, 33 out 47 (or 70 per cent) of the reported purchases took place in the market and the 
remaining 14 took place at the producer's farm. None of the reported batches of produce 
dealt with by traders at Soni originated from their own farm.
Table 6.15 Cross-tabulation of Where the Produce is Bought by the Market Location
Count
Expected Value
Farm Village
Market
Own
Premises
Row Total 
(Column %)
Soni 14 33 0 47
17.4 25.2 4.4 (48.5%)
Lukozi 21 9 9 39
14.5 20.9 3.6 (40.2%)
Mlalo 1 10 0 11
4.1 5.9 1.0 (11.3%)
Column Total 36 52 9 97
Percent 37.1% 53.6% 9.3% (100.0%)
Table 6.16, cross-tabulating the location of purchase with the destination market, follows a similar 
distribution to that of Table 6.15, if one equates Dar es Salaam with Lukozi, Tanga with Soni, 
and Mlalo with Lushoto. In this case a significant chi square value demonstrates a statistical 
relationship between the two variables. Dar es Salaam-destined produce tends to have been 
purchased at the producer's farm, produce bound for Tanga town tends to have been 
purchased in the village market, while the produce intended for Lushoto is almost exclusively 
purchased in the village market. Thus the evidence strengthens the suggestion of a link 
between the villages where the produce originates and the towns and cities, for which the 
produce is destined.
Table 6.16 Cross-tabulation of the location of the Purchases by the Destination Market
Chi Square 28.998 
Degrees of 
Freedom 4 
Significance 0.0000
Count
Expected Value
Farm Village
Market
Own
Premises
Row Total 
(Column %)
Dar es Salaam 29 16 9 5A
20.3 28.7 5.1 (56.3%)
Tanga 6 24 0 30
11.3 15.9 2.8 (31.3%)
Lushoto 1 11 0 12
4.5 6.4 1.1 (12.5%)
Column Total 36 51 9 96
Percent 37.5% 53.1% 9.4% (100.0%)
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Table 6.17 Cross-tabulation of The Reasons for Storing by the Market Destination
Count
Expected Value
Transport Marketing Ripening Row Total 
(Column %)
Dar es Salaam 15 18 1 34
10.9 14.4 8.7 (723%)
Tanga 0 0 4 4
1.2 1.7 1.0 (8.5%)
Lushoto 0 2 7 9
2.9 3.8 2 3 (19.1%)
Column Total 15 20 12 47
Percent 31.9% 42.6% 25.5% (100.0%)
Table 6.17 cross-tabulates the destination of the produce against the reasons the traders have 
given for storing the produce. The most striking observation is that relatively few of the traders 
store at all, and of those who do, most appear to be dominated by purchases made for the 
Dar es Salaam market. Surprisingly few of the batches purchased for Tanga use storage, while 
a remarkably high proportion of those purchased for the Lushoto market do. The producers 
selling produce in Lushoto are mainly concerned with less perishable staples and pulses and 
can, therefore, store the produce relatively easily, whereas the more perishable vegetables 
and fruits destined for the urban markets of Tanga and Dar es Salaam, must be transported 
almost immediately in order to avoid wastage due to over-ripening.
In the case of purchases made for both Tanga and Lushoto, the main reasons given for storing 
crops are what has been termed ripening reasons in Table 6.17, such as to prevent spoilage or 
to allow the crops to ripen. In the case of Dar es Salaam, on the other hand, 'other* reasons 
assume greater importance. Fifteen out of the thirty-four reported batches (44 per cent) were 
stored for reasons of transport; for example, to wait while obtaining transport, or to assemble 
an economically viable load. Eighteen out of the thirty-four batches (53 per cent) were stored 
for marketing reasons, such as to wait for the (periodic) market to take place or to wait for a 
good price. This latter result suggests a greater degree of commercial awareness among the 
traders purchasing commodities for the Dar es Salaam market.
Storage has become an important part of horticultural marketing in the developed world. In 
countries such as Tanzania, however, with a generally high humidity and temperature, the 
storage of perishable goods is more difficult, and, therefore, more expensive. Experiments in 
refrigerated transportation were made in the early 1980s, with the National Cold Chain 
Operators using refrigerated lorries and train cars, but sadly this has been a failure, with 
technical and managerial difficulties impeding the flow of fresh goods. While the majority of 
consumers of commodities such as fruit and vegetables have difficulty in purchasing them, 
according to the general manager of Kariakoo Market Corporation, the market will not sustain 
the added cost of storage refrigerated transportation. Jones (1987), however, argues that 
approaches to this problem have focussed on technology which is far too expensive, and that 
simpler cheaper storage methods could be found.
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Table 6.18 Cross-tabulation of the Location of Sale by the Market Location
Count
Expected Value
Roadside Village
Market
City Market Row Total 
(Column %)
Soni 15 1 31 47
11.6 5.8 29.6 (48.5%)
Lukozi 9 0 30 39
9.6 4.8 24.5 (40.2%)
Mlalo 0 11 0 11
27 1.4 6.9 (11.3%)
Column Total 24 12 61 97
Percent 24.7% 124% 629% (100.0%)
Chi Square 89.0412
Degrees of Freedom 4
Significance 0.0000
Table 6.18 shows a cross-tabulation of the location of sale, as reported by the traders, against 
the location of the interviews, and, therefore, where the trader mainly negotiates or purchases 
the crops. All the purchases reported in Mlalo were sold in a village market, which is already 
known to be Lushoto; 30 out of 39 purchases (77 per cent) reported in Lukozi were sold in a 
city market, while the remaining 23 per cent were sold by the roadside. In the case of Soni, 31 
out of 47 purchases (66 per cent) were sold in a city market, while 32 per cent were sold by the 
roadside and the remaining 2 per cent went to Lushoto.
Table 6.19 Cross-tabulation of the Location of Sale by the Destination Market
Count
Expected Value
Roadside Village
Market
City Market Row Total 
(Column %)
Dar es Salaam 9 0 45 54
13.5 6.8 33.8 (56.3%)
Tanga 15 0 15 30
7.5 3.8 18.8 (31.3%)
Lushoto 0 12 0 12
3.0 1.5 7.5 (125%)
Column Total 24 12 60 96
Percent 25.0% 125% 625% (100.0%)
Table 6.19 may help in the interpretation of the previous results. There are too many observed 
frequencies of zero to carry out a chi square test on this table, however, a pattern emerges. All 
the purchases destined for Lushoto were sold in a village market. Half of the purchases made 
for Tanga were sold in a city market and half were sold by the roadside, suggesting a higher 
degree of informal trading in Tanga. It may also be that some traders sell commodities in Tanga 
themselves, since it is only a six-hour bus journey from Lushoto, and it is also relatively easy to 
obtain transport. Dar es Salaam has forty-five out of fifty-four, or 83 per cent, of the reported 
batches being sold in a city market and 17 per cent sold by the roadside. The 17 per cent is 
clearly informal trading. However, a proportion of the 83 per cent of batches being sold in Dar 
es Salaam's markets are also informal, since it is estimated by the Kariakoo Market Corporation 
that about 60 per cent of the produce entering the Dar es Salaam market is traded informally.
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Table 6.20 Cross-tabulation of The Persons to Whom the Traders Normally Sell by the
Market Location
Count
Expected Value
Wholesaler Retailer Row Total 
(Column %)
Soni 41 13 54
35.4 18.6 (56.3%)
Lukozi 19 11 30
19.7 10.3 (31.3%)
Mlalo 3 9 12
7.9 4.1 (125%)
Column Total 63 33 96
Percent 65.6% 34.4% (100.0%)
Chi Square 11.389
Degrees of Freedom 2
Significance 0.0034
Table 6.20 is a cross-tabulation of the destination of the purchases reported by the traders with 
the people to whom they sold the produce. A chi square test proves a significatn statistical 
relationship between the two variables. Of the produce sold in Dar es Salaam, 13 out of 54, 
(24 per cent), of the reported batches of produce were sold directly to a retailer, while the 
remaining 76 per cent was sold to wholesalers. In Tanga, the distribution was as expected with 
about 63 per cent of the reported produce being sold to wholesalers and the remaining 37 per 
cent being sold directly to retailers. Again this gives an indication of the level of informal sector 
trading of fruit and vegetables in Dar es Salaam and Tanga. However, as there are wholesalers 
in these cities operating in the informal sector it can be assumed that a proportion of the 76 per 
cent in the case of Dar es Salaam and 63 per cent in the case of Tanga, which is sold to 
wholesalers, remains within the informal sector.
6.3 Conclusion
It can be concluded that the wholesale trading of fruit and vegetables in Lushoto is highly 
flexible and adaptable. It is conducted on a modest scale by a large proportion of the 
population, many of whom have reasons to travel hence trading is a means of defraying 
travelling costs of a journey, and may even add something to the participant’s income.
Large-scale fruit and vegetable traders tend to find their suppliers at the district’s periodic 
markets, although the purchase, that is the transfer of cash for goods, does not necessarily take 
place at the market, but may take place later in the day when the trader brings a hired lorry to 
the producer’s field to collect the produce. Wholesale trading of fruit and vegetables is 
predominantly a cash-based system, with credit, when it does exist, only usually being given in 
transactions between relatives, or at least people who are well known to each other. It is, 
however, possible for the traders to hire transport using credit.
Each of the markets surveyed appeared to concentrate on supplying only one destination. In 
the case of the survey markets, Mlalo supplied Lushoto with mainly staples and a little fruit;
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Lukozi supplied Dar es Salaam with mainly vegetables, but also some staples or pulses and 
some fruit; and Soni supplied Tanga with a relatively even distribution of each of the 
commodity groups.
In spite of the evidence presented in the more informal interviews with farmers, market officials 
and local government or extension officers, the survey revealed that about 24 per cent of the 
supply bought in the survey markets for Dar es Salaam is sold direct to a retailer there. In 
other words, this constitutes a minimum proportion of produce which enters the Dar es Salaam 
market through the informal sector. This proportion is higher for Tanga resulting in the bar graph 
in Figure 6.15. However, this estimate of the proportion of informal sector fruit and vegetable 
trading can be increased, because of the known informal wholesaling activities in Dar es 
Salaam’s markets other than Kariakoo.
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C h a p t e r  S e v e n  
Fruit and Vegetable Market Prices in 
Dar es Salaam and its Main Supply Areas
7.1 Annual Market Price Margins
This chapter uses retail market prices to analyse the changes in fruit and vegetable prices 
across time and space. The data are collected by market reporters employed by the Marketing 
Development Bureau, a department in the Tanzanian Ministry of Agriculture. These data are 
then used to calculate margins between the price in the towns in production areas and the price 
in Dar es Salaam. The real prices are then calculated using the retail price index.
This section will examine the margin between the deflated average annual market price 
recorded in Dar es Salaam and the corresponding price in the supply town markets. It should 
be noted that this is only a guide to serve as an indicator for the trend in the market prices of 
these commodities, and not the actual market margins obtained by the traders or middle agents 
involved in the dealing of fruit and vegetables.
The bar charts demonstrate a general tendency for market margins to remain approximately 
constant, or to show a decline over the course of the time series (from 1983 to 1989). This 
consistency is particularly apparent for cabbages. The margins for Irish potatoes, oranges and 
tomatoes have shown a tendency to decline up to the mid-1980s, and then begin a modest 
increase towards the end of the decade. In any event, in the early part of the 1980s, coconut, 
onions and sweet bananas were the only commodities, of those selected, to show an overall 
increase in real price margins. In the case of coconuts, however, there is evidence of that 
increase tailing off towards the end of the series in 1989. The trend of the market margin 
appears to be more a function of the type of commodity and less a function of the origin of the 
produce. For example, if coconuts, onions and sweet bananas were excluded, this would 
leave only three instances of a positive net change in market margin, these being in the case of 
tomatoes in Moshi and Morogoro and cabbages in Moshi. Although tomatoes are produced in 
Moshi, the distance and condition of the road have been negative and disruptive factors in the 
trade between Dar es Salaam and Moshi. However, if the positive trend continues and the 
plans to improve large sections of this important road go ahead, this evidence suggests that 
the market margin is likely to be exploited as tomatoes and cabbages, in particular, begin to 
be supplied to the Dar es Salaam market from Moshi.
The clear advantage of such improvements is an increased supply to Dar es Salaam of these 
foods, which are important supplements to the urban diet. In addition, Kilimanjaro Region
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produces cabbages mainly in the last four and first two months of the year (Marketing 
Development Bureau, 1986), when cabbage prices are relatively high in Dar es Salaam. An
f
increased supply from Moshi, at this time in particular, will help to lower prices to consumers at 
a period, when previously they have been high, and improve supply when previously it has 
been low.
Cabbages (Figure 7.1)
The general pattern to be found in the cabbage mean annual margins is for a decline over the 
course of the time series. However, Moshi and Iringa, after an isolated decline in 1984 and a 
slight decline in 1987/88, have margins which are relatively stable or increasing. In the case of 
Moshi, the margin never reaches more than TShs 2.00 per kilogram, while in the case of Iringa, 
one of Dar es Salaam's main supply areas, the margin varies between TShs 2.00 and a 
maximum of TShs 4.20. The isolated decline to be found in 1984 is not peculiar to Moshi and 
Iringa, but is evident in all the towns. The reason for this fall in margin is not clear, but it 
appears to be largely a function of a drop in the real mean annual price of cabbages reported 
in Dar es Salaam. Mbeya records the highest mean annual price margin of the series in 1983 at 
TShs 11.32, although in the years following this, Mbeya only twice achieves a mean annual real 
margin of more than TShs 3.00. Lushoto, reportedly the main producer of cabbages for the 
Dar es Salaam market, has a real price margin that declines over the course of the series. 
Lushoto's strength, in terms of its real margin performance, is that the minimum of TShs 2.84 in 
1984 is the highest minimum of the six towns reported.
Morogoro Region is also reported as an important supplier of cabbages to the Dar es Salaam 
market. Nevertheless, the margins achieved are relatively low, rarely higher than TShs 3.50 per 
kilogram. Two explanations may be put forward. Firstly, Morogoro has a major locational 
advantage over the other supply areas, in that the distance to Dar es Salaam is less (see 
Figure 7.1) and, in addition, the condition of the road, from Morogoro town at least, is relatively 
good. For example, in Mgeta Division in Morogoro Region, the main cabbage producing area 
in Morogoro, the author observed a lorry making approximately five trips to Dar es Salaam in 
forty-eight hours. This would not be possible from Iringa or Lushoto, where lorries supplying 
to Dar es Salaam generally set off to drive overnight, timing their journey to arrive at Kariakoo at 
about 5 am, when the wholesale market opens and prices are generally good. The lorry may 
then be able to return to its starting point that evening, in other words one round trip in 24 
hours. This, in addition to the assembly of larger loads, results in comparatively cheaper 
transport costs for traders supplying Dar es Salaam with Morogoro cabbages and enables the 
traders to make more from a smaller margin.
A second explanation for this difference is the location of the markets where the prices were 
recorded. Lushoto town is located in the heart of Lushoto District, a little closer to the main 
road than most of the highland area which makes up the vegetable producing district.
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Figure 7.1 The Price Margins for Deflated Cabbage Prices in Dar es Salaam and the Main
Supply Areas (TShs per kilogram)
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Morogoro, on the other hand, is located almost half way from Mgeta, to Dar es Salaam, in 
terms of travel time by lorry. In addition to this, Morogoro is a relatively well-developed town 
located on a dry plain, with a high demand for food commodities, particularly from the more' 
temperate highland areas, such as Mgeta. These two conditions, the high demand and the 
more distant location from the producing areas will tend to lower the margin recorded in 
Morogoro town, making it problematic to compare this with Lushoto.directly.
Coconut (Figure 7.2)
The mean real market price margins for coconuts for the selected towns can be divided into two 
main patterns, those declining over the time series, and those increasing. These two groups 
characterise, on the one hand, coconut producing areas, and, on the other hand, those which do 
not produce coconuts.
Tanga’s margin increases initially, before declining towards the end of the period. The period 
begins in 1983 in Tanga with a margin of TShs 0.54 per nut and rises to a margin of TShs 1.50 in 
1986. This is followed by a decline to TShs 0.82, resulting in a small net decline over the time 
period. In the other markets, which are not in coconut-producing areas, there has been a rise in 
the margin over the time series. This is most evident in the case of Mbeya, where the margin 
began the series at minus TShs 5.24, rising to minus TShs 1.61, before data are no longer 
available in the following years. The trend is also apparent in Iringa, rising from minus TShs 4.96 
to minus TShs 1.84. The Moshi price margin rises by TShs 1.74 net to TShs 0.22 in 1986, 
before falling again to minus TShs 0.53 by 1989. Lushoto rises from minus TShs 1.07 to within 
TShs 0.35 of the zero margin, with the significant exception of 1986, when the price margin falls 
to minus TShs 2.82. Finally, Morogoro, which has a margin that records a price higher than Dar 
es Salaam only in 1987, produces a margin which increases from minus TShs 0.25 in 1983 to 
TShs 0.85 in 1986, the following years however decline to within TShs 0.25 of either side of the 
zero margin line.
According to the Kariakoo group interview, the main producers of coconuts for the Dar es 
Salaam market are Mafia Island and Kisiju, on the Pwani coast. Only Mafia is covered by the 
MDB's Market Information Service, but because it only produces coconuts for the Dar es 
Salaam market it has been omitted from this analysis. Closer examination of the pricing 
patterns in both Mafia and Kisiju would help to explain the declining differential prices recorded 
in the net supply area of Tanga, because these would allow a fuller examination of the price 
margin patterns there.
Irish Potatoes (Figure 7.3)
The mean annual market price margins for Irish potatoes decline over the time series in each of 
the towns covered in this analysis. The highest net decline over the time period occurred in 
Mbeya, declining from TShs 9.28 per kilogram to TShs 2.48.
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Figure 7.2 The Market Margins for Deflated Annual Coconut Prices in Dar es Salaam
and the Main Supply Area Market Towns (TShs per nut).
KENYA
206
Figure 7.3 The Market Margins for Deflated Annual Irish Potato Prices in Dar es Salaam
and the Main Supply Area Market Towns (TShs per kilogram).
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The towns from the northern part of the country, namely Moshi, Lushoto and Tanga, also had an 
initial decline in margins in 1984/85, before rising through the rest of the time series. None of 
these three, however, were able to return to the level of margin which they had recorded at the 
beginning of the period. For example, Lushoto, one of the main supply areas for Dar es 
Salaam, begins with a mean annual real market price margin of TShs 3.92 per kilogram in 1983, 
followed, in 1984, by a margin of TShs 0.75. In the latter part of this.series Lushoto's margin 
climbs up to TShs 2.09 in 1989.
Although Moshi and Tanga follow the initial pattern exemplified by Lushoto, with variations of 
about the same magnitude, their mean annual margins are at a lower level, Moshi beginning the 
period at TShs 2.63 and ending with a margin of minus TShs 0.60, while Tanga begins the 
period with a margin of TShs 0.99 and ends at minus TShs 0.52. This similarity may be in part 
due to the fact that Lushoto and Moshi are very important suppliers of Irish potatoes and 
Tanga is relatively easily supplied by these areas through a good road connection, although this 
road has deteriorated in the latter years of this series. The occurrence of a negative margin 
indicates a period when the price of the commodity in the market town is higher than that in Dar 
es Salaam. The likely reason for this is that the production of the commodity near to the market 
town has ceased, while Dar es Salaam is receiving supplies from elsewhere. Linder these 
circumstances it is unlikely that Moshi or Tanga supplies Dar es Salaam with potatoes, they are 
more likely to come from Lushoto or Mbeya, both of which have high positive margins at the 
end of the period.
Morogoro, Mbeya and Iringa, all of which are located in the southern and central part of 
Tanzania, begin this time series with a relatively high mean annual margin. In the case of 
Mbeya, considered by the MDB's 1986 report to be a very important national net supplier of 
Irish potatoes, the first year recorded the highest mean annual real market price margin of all the 
series, at TShs 9.28 per kilogram. From 1984 until the end of the period the margin in Mbeya 
declined from about TShs 3.50 to TShs 2.50,1988 recording the lowest margin of TShs 2.36. 
Morogoro and Iringa started the period with a peak margin of TShs 5.31 and TShs 4.32 
respectively. Their margins thereafter declined from about TShs 2.00 to TShs 0.50, with a low of 
TShs 0.25 in 1987 in the case of Morogoro, and from TShs 1.75 to TShs 0.70, with a modest rise 
of TShs 1.39 in 1989 in the case of Iringa.
The MDB's 1986 report argues that Mbeya and Kilimanjaro regions are the two key supply 
areas for the country and that they will determine the price trends in the other regions. If this is 
the case, it may be suggested that the two patterns of price trends described above are 
influenced by the trends of Mbeya town, as they are presented here, and Kilimanjaro region as 
they are represented by the price data of Moshi town. In the light of this, it is surprising that 
the group interview of Kariakoo market tally clerks should omit Mbeya from a list of regions from 
which Irish potatoes are supplied to Kariakoo. This may be explained by the fact that 
potatoes from Mbeya are not arriving at Kariakoo, but going elsewhere.
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Onions (Figure 7.4)
Onions are one of the few commodities, covered by this analysis, to demonstrate an upward 
trend in all its represented supply towns. Singida Region is considered by both the MDB 
1986 report and the Kariakoo staff as the main producer of onions for both Dar es Salaam and 
the country as a whole. However, as onions are the only horticultural commodity Singida 
supplies to Dar es Salaam, it has been omitted from this analysis. Arusha is also considered, 
by both the MDB and the Kariakoo staff interviewed, to be of importance, but, because of its 
limited supply of other commodities to Dar es Salaam, it is also not included here. However, 
Iringa, Moshi, Morogoro and Mbeya were all mentioned in the Kariakoo group interview as 
areas of importance in the supply of onions to Dar es Salaam. The highest mean annual margin 
recorded in all the towns occurs in Mbeya, at TShs 8.53 per kilogram, where the lowest margin 
is also recorded, at minus TShs 15.79 in other words TShs 15.79 higher than the Dar es Salaam 
price.
The evidence of the barcharts suggests that 1983 was a bad year for the onion market price 
margins for most towns supplying Dar es Salaam. Apart from Morogoro, which does not 
appear to have been as adversely affected, the margins for this year range from minus TShs 
3.47 in Moshi to minus TShs 15.79 in Mbeya. All the towns increased their margins during the 
rest of the series, except Morogoro, where the margin declines in the mid 1980s to within TShs 
0.13 of the Dar es Salaam price, before climbing to a mean annual real market price margin of 
TShs 4.06. Iringa was the only town where the onion market price failed to drop below the Dar 
es Salaam, resulting in a constantly negative market margin throughout the period, the nearest 
was a margin of minus TShs 0.72 in 1984.
Oranges (Figure 7.5)
Each of the locations covered in this analysis demonstrate a net decline in the mean annual real 
price margins for oranges. Surprisingly, the highest margin recorded in any of the towns was 
recorded by Lushoto at TShs 0.74, which is not in an area of major orange production, but which 
undoubtedly benefits from the relative proximity of the orange growing area around the town 
of Korogwe (See Figure 4.26). Tanga town, although it is the capital of Tanzania’s principal 
orange producing regions, is also a centre of relatively high demand. This will have the effect of 
reducing the margin between the price obtained in Tanga and that in Dar es Salaam. By the 
end of the time series, Tanga has the highest margin of TShs 0.25 per fruit. It is surprising to 
note that there is little to distinguish the other orange growing areas, represented here, such as 
Morogoro and Tanga, which are both considered as important orange supply areas. Morogoro 
and Tanga have price margin variation patterns which are as similar to other net consuming 
areas, represented here by towns such as Moshi, Lushoto and Mbeya, as they are to each 
other. In fact, in 1984 Morogoro records a margin suggesting that the mean annual real market 
price of an orange was TShs 0.17 per fruit higher than in Dar es Salaam, in spite of the 
significant orange growing areas located near to the town.
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Figure 7.4 The Market Margins for Deflated Annual Onion Prices in Dar es Salaam and
the Main Supply Area Market Towns (Tshs per kilogram).
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Figure 7.5 The Market Margins for Deflated Annual Orange Prices in Dar es Salaam and
the Main Supply Area Market Towns (TShs per fruit)
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This situation may in part be explained by the fact that the actual growing areas in both 
Morogoro and Tanga region are some distance from the town markets, thus incurring the added 
costs of transportation and marketing, though not as high as in the case of produce marketed in 
Dar es Salaam. This will have the effect of bringing the market prices in Morogoro and Tanga 
closer to those of Dar es Salaam. This effect may be further compounded by the fact that the 
main orange growing areas in Tanga Region are located on the main road from Tanga town to 
Dar es Salaam, and consequently it is not necessary for the oranges to pass through Tanga 
town itself. Finally Morogoro and Tanga, as significant urban centres themselves, represent 
areas of high demand for all food crops. This has tended to inflate the price of commodities 
relative to rural areas.
Tomatoes (Figure 7.6)
There is no discernible general trend in the mean real price margins recorded for tomatoes. This 
may be a function of the fact that tomatoes are grown in most regions of Tanzania, and 
therefore each market's margin trend will be largely a function of its own local supply rather than 
of the supply to Dar es Salaam. Because of their very high perishability, it is more practical to 
produce tomatoes relatively close to the consumption area, unless very good growing 
conditions exist for popular varieties at some distance from the an area of high consumption, as 
in the case of Lushoto and parts of Morogoro.
Sweet Bananas (Figure 7.7)
There is a general trend in all the sweet banana mean market price margins of positive growth, 
although in the case of Moshi and Lushoto, this begins in 1985 after an initial decline. In 
Lushoto it is TShs 0.25 per fruit, while in Moshi it is TShs 0.04. In each case these are followed 
by a decline in 1985. The remainder of the 1980s is spent climbing back to the 1984 level. In 
the case of Moshi, this is achieved and improved on, ending the period with a margin of TShs 
0.18.
Mbeya, ranked second as supplier of sweet bananas to Kariakoo market by the Kariakoo 
group interview, records the highest mean market price margin in 1989 with TShs 0.44, having 
increased from TShs 0.18 in 1984. Morogoro, ranked as the most important supplier, records 
mean annual prices, which are higher than those in Dar es Salaam, in the first four years of the 
time series. It barely achieves a positive margin by the end of the series reaching TShs 0.02 in 
1988 and TShs 0.03 in 1989.
7.2 Monthly Market Margins
This section will examine the seasonal variation in actual market prices for the selected 
commodities by looking closely at their monthly mean price variations. Once again the market
212
Figure 7.6 The Market Margins for Deflated Annual Tomato Prices in Dar es Salaam and
the the Main Supply Area Market Towns (TShs per kilogram).
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Figure 7.7 The Market Margins for Deflated Annual Sweet Banana Prices in Dar es Salaam
and the Main Supply Area Market Towns (TShs per fruit).
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price margins, representing the difference between the market price in Dar es Salaam and the 
supply town markets, is calculated. This will be compared to give an indication of the price 
differential between the main supply areas and the main net consuming area. This method of 
analysis will also highlight months when some areas are able to profit most from supplying the 
Dar es Salaam market.
Cabbages (Figure 7.8)
The mean monthly market margins in Tanga, Moshi and Morogoro produce an undulating 
pattern, building up to about TShs 10 per kilogram in April, falling to between minus TShs 5 
and minus TShs 9 in July, or May in the case of Morogoro, and returning to a positive margin, 
by October, of about TShs 5. In Tanga, Moshi and Lushoto, July is the month with the lowest 
margins, while the highest margins for these towns, located in northern Tanzania, occur in May 
with a secondary peak in November. In the southern towns of Iringa and Mbeya the lowest 
margins are recorded later in the year, in September and October, respectively. The highest 
margins of these towns generally fall a little later than their northern counterparts, occurring from 
April to June. Morogoro has a pattern that does not fall easily into either group. It begins the 
year with a rise to a peak of TShs 5.55 in April, but the next five months which follow are 
characterised by low mean margins, the lowest occurring in May at minus TShs 6.04. Finally, the 
last three months of the year are among the highest mean monthly margins recorded in this 
town; indeed December records the highest at TShs 5.67.
Lushoto, Iringa and Mbeya all maintain a positive margin of between TShs 10 and TShs 20. In 
each of these towns the highest margin recorded is in May. There are three distinguishable 
troughs of margins in each of the four towns, occurring in April, July and September/October.
Lushoto, Iringa and Morogoro are described as the main surplus areas of cabbages in Tanzania 
by the MDB report in 1985. The report goes on to say that the price is mainly a function of 
these areas' supply to the other regions of the country. However, there appears to be some 
confusion over the data presented in the report. The data used to describe the supply of fruit 
and vegetables are based on a survey carried out in 1975 (Marketing Development Bureau, 
1975). However, this 1975 survey describes Iringa as the main surplus producing region of 
cabbages, based mainly on a peak of production which occurred in the first half of the year. A 
MDB report published in 1986 suggests that this situation has changed and that Iringa's main 
production occurs in the second half of the year, and that little or no production takes place in 
the first half of the year.
A group interview carried out by the author with tally clerks at Kariakoo Wholesale Market 
suggests that Lushoto is the main supply area for Dar es Salaam. Because of the sheer size 
of the Dar es Salaam market it can safely be presumed that Iringa is the main national surplus 
producer. This presumption suggests that Lushoto has increased in importance relative to 
Iringa as a supplier for the country's largest market. Iringa and Lushoto share similar patterns of
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Figure 7.8 The Market Margins for Deflated Monthly Cabbage Prices in Dar es Salaam
and the Main Supply Area Market Towns (TShs per kilogram).
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mean monthly price variation, though, in terms of size of margin, Lushoto appears to have the 
clear advantage.
Coconut (Figure 7.9)
In Tanga a significant margin occurs throughout the year. The highest margins for coconuts in the 
selected towns occurred in Tanga, but high margins are only sustained for five months, from 
TShs 5.81 per nut in December, to TShs 6.88 in January and TShs 7.08 in March, and back to 
TShs 5.60 by April. The price margins decline in April and May to a level of about TShs 2, 
declining further to TShs 1.50 in August and rising to around TShs 1.90 between September 
and November to before climbing in December to TShs 5.81.
In Tanga a period of higher mean price margins begins in December and builds up to the peak 
of TShs 7.08 per nut in March, thereafter the margin stabilises at about TShs 2, from May to 
about November, after which the margin rises again, ending the year with a mean margin of 
TShs 5.81.
Mbeya and Lushoto remain relatively close to the zero margin level, meaning that the prices 
recorded in Dar es Salaam are at the same level as these two towns which are relatively distant 
from the main coconut producing areas. Lushoto shadows the Dar es Salaam price particularly 
closely, only once recording a mean margin of more than TShs 3 difference from the Dar es 
Salaam prices, but with a margin of minus TShs 14.96 in July. This is the same month when 
Tanga records its lowest margin. From May to November, however, an almost consistently 
negative mean margin was recorded in both towns. In Lushoto the margin is generally between 
about minus TShs 2 and positive TShs 2. Mbeya, meanwhile, has a marked undulating pattern, 
peaking in March at TShs 2.13 and reaching a trough in September of minus TShs 6.54.
Clearly the highest margins for coconuts in the towns selected occur in the earlier part of the 
year, from about January or February to April. There then follows a low point from May to 
November. The November low is followed in December by a rise in the mean market margin 
of about TShs 3 in most cases.
Irish Potatoes (Figure 7.10)
Mbeya records the highest mean Irish potato price margin of this data set at TShs 15.29 per 
kilogram. This peak occurred in March and is followed by a series of relatively high margins 
declining gradually over the year to TShs 8.08 per kilogram in November and a slight rise in 
December to TShs 11.76.
Lushoto, Iringa, Morogoro and Mbeya sustain a positive mean margin throughout the year. In 
each case the highest margins are generally towards the early part of the year, for example 
Morogoro peaks in March with TShs 14.21, but generally remains between about TShs 2 and 
TShs 4. Lushoto has margins of between TShs 8 and TShs 11, but July and August recorded
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Figure 7.9 The Market Margins for Deflated Monthly Coconut Prices in Dar es Salaam
and the Main Supply Area Market Towns (TShs per nut).
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Figure 7.10 The Market Margins for Deflated Monthly Irish Potato Prices in Dar es Salaam
and the Main Supply Area Market Towns (TShs per kilogram).
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TShs 3.52 and TShs 1.80 respectively and December TShs 11.10. Iringa remains between 
about TShs 4.00 (in February, August, October and November) and TShs 6.00, exceeding this 
from March (TShs 6.83) to July (TShs 6.71), with a peak of TShs 7.08 in June.
Tanga and Moshi have 9 or 10 months where their margins are negative, meaning their market 
prices are higher than in Dar es Salaam. In each case the worst margins are clustered at two 
different months of the year, for example in Tanga the lowest marcjms are focused on February 
and July and in Moshi they are focused on January and August. While Tanga is located at low 
altitudes, near the coast, and is therefore not ideal growing conditions for Irish potatoes, 
Kilimanjaro Region, where Moshi is located, is considered one of the most important national 
Irish potato producing regions. This, however, makes an explanation of Moshi's price margin 
pattern more problematic, since it resembles the net consuming areas more closely than the 
other main producing areas.
The MDB report in 1986 describes Mbeya and Kilimanjaro as the two most important areas 
producing Irish potatoes. This is confirmed by the Kariakoo wholesale market group interview 
carried out by the author. However, the report goes on to argue that two peak periods of Irish 
potato supply, associated with low prices, which are linked with peak production in these two 
key areas, can be identified. In Mbeya peak production is said to occur from March to June, 
while in Kilimanjaro the peaks are said to occur from September to February. Mbeya's mean 
market price margins show a gradual change throughout the year, but the largest margins do in 
fact occur between March and June. Moshi's market price margin indicates that the price there 
was at least TShs 2.08 higher than the Dar es Salaam price between September and February, 
reaching a price TShs 5.52 higher than that recorded in Dar es Salaam, or a mean margin of 
minus TShs 5.52.
Onions (Figure 7.11)
The most notable feature of the barcharts for the mean monthly onion price margin, is the 
geographically consistent low margin in September. In every town the September margin is 
significantly lower than the other monthly margins. Only in Mbeya does the August margin 
remain positive, although it falls from a differential of TShs 17.92 per kilogram in July to TShs 6. 
The second notable feature of these barcharts are that the highest margins for onions occur 
between the months of April and June, inclusive. The latter half of the year is characterised, in 
these mean margin figures, by a relatively low, but positive market margin.
Mbeya records the highest market margin for this particular commodity at TShs 49.33 per 
kilogram in June. Lushoto is nearest, recording a peak margin of TShs 30.10 in the same month. 
June is also a relatively good month for onions in Iringa, when the price of onions, which is 
higher than Dar es Salaam for the rest of the year, falls below the Dar es Salaam price by TShs 
1.75. This causes the otherwise negative margin to become positive for that one month.
220
Figure 7.11 The Market Margins for Deflated Monthly Onion Prices in Dar es Salaam
and the Main Supply Area Market Towns (TShs per kilogram).
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In spite of the fact that onions have a relatively long storage life, it appears that the traders and 
farmers involved in producing and supplying this vegetable are reluctant to store it in order to 
take advantage of the more favourable prices which may occur later in the season (Marketing. 
Development Bureau, 1986). Given the correct conditions and preparation, onions can be 
stored for up to 8 months before resale (Food and Agricultural Organisation, 1989). This has 
clear implications for the possible returns on a traders investment, or on the returns to a 
producer. The important requirement in order to allow a trader or farmer to be able to store in 
this way is the initial investment. Firstly, suitable storage facilities are required in order to 
provide the storage conditions required. Secondly, the time between the initial investment and 
the return is increased. This can be particularly important for a farmer who requires a relatively 
quick return on his initial investment in terms of inputs, labour and so on. Where the financial 
backing does not exist, therefore, storage will be very difficult. In the situation of onions, the 
high relative prices per kilogram may in fact provide the economic incentive to traders to store 
their purchases in order to gain from more favourable prices. This is beneficial to the rural areas 
if the storage takes place there, as the added return comes back there. It also benefits the 
urban area in that it provides an incentive for traders and producers to provide produce in 
periods of shortage when the price is higher. The ideal result of this will be a lowering and 
stabilising of the price of onions as the supply becomes more stable.
Oranges (Figure 7.12)
There is little in the way of a distinctive overall pattern to be found in the mean monthly orange 
market price margins. The two towns, closest to the main supply areas are Tanga and Lushoto, 
which are closest to Korogwe District in Tanga Region, possibly the largest orange producing 
area in Tanzania (Seminar fur Landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung, 1986), and Morogoro, which is 
close to the orange growing areas on the Uluguru Mountains. This proximity ought to be 
reflected in their higher margins. In Lushoto, this appears to be true, while Tanga, on the other 
hand, remains throughout the year at a low margin of around TShs 1.00 per fruit. The margins 
peak at TShs 1.80 in July. The last six months involve a variation in the margin between about 
TShs 0.60 in August and to about TShs 1.25 in the intervening months. In Morogoro the margin 
is even lower than in Tanga, except in March when the margin reaches a peak of TShs 1.95. In 
the months of April and August the price appears to be greater in Morogoro than in Dar es 
Salaam. Morogoro is a centre of high demand, and it is likely that this has an effect on the cost 
of the fruit delivered at the retail market. The times when the margin is low, or even negative 
are likely to reflect periods of low production around the town. In addition, March is the 
beginning of the wet season, and any supplies from other ares of the country, for example 
Tanga Region, would have difficulty in getting through to Morogoro.
Morogoro is also relatively close to Matombo in the Uluguru Mountains, an important orange 
producing area which supplies both Morogoro and Dar es Salaam. Morogoro begins the year 
with a low margin, climbing to TShs 1.95 in March. The margins that follow remain at around
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Figure 7.12 The Market Margins for Deflated Monthly Orange Prices in Dar es Salaam
and the Main Supply Area Market Towns (TShs per fruit).
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TShs 0.60 up to November, with the notable exceptions of April and August, when the margin 
falls to minus TShs 0.17 and minus TShs 0.06. The last four months of the year are characterised 
in these mean margins as declining steadily from TShs 0.94 in September to TShs 0.17 in r 
December.
Moshi and Iringa are both net consuming areas and this is reflected in their much lower mean 
margins. As the most distant represented towns in this set of data they are also the only ones 
whose margins most frequently fall below the zero mark, indicating that their market prices were 
higher than those of Dar es Salaam. These negative margins, or at least low margins, occurred 
early in the year and in the months from August to November in both towns. The most 
favourable margins in Moshi occurred in April, with TShs 1.46 per fruit, followed by a decline to 
minus TShs 0.65 in October. In Iringa the strongest mean margin occurred in June, with TShs 
0.39. The distance of these markets from orange supplying areas suggest that the price 
variations are less likely to be the function of varying supply, but the result of varying demand. 
The demand for a fruit such as oranges is likely to be affected by the climatic season - the 
warmer and drier the season the more likely there will be high demand for the thirst-quenching 
qualities of an orange. The demand is also likely to be affected by the supply of alternative 
fruits, as they come into season and under-cut the price of the orange. This seasonal 
introduction of a lower-priced fruit may come about because the fruit is a type which is 
produced closer to these two towns. An example of this type of commodity competition can 
be found in the production of the more temperate fruits to be found in Moshi and Iringa, such 
as apples, pears and sweet bananas.
Sweet Bananas (Figure 7.13)
The evidence of market price margins presented in the barcharts of sweet banana data, 
characterises the variations of price margin for this fruit as building up to a peak in the middle of 
the year. This is particularly clearly demonstrated in the margins for Tanga, Lushoto, Moshi, and 
Mbeya. July is generally when the peak margin occurs after which relatively stable mean 
margins occur about TShs 1 per fruit lower than the July peak.
Lushoto and Mbeya all record price margins of about the same level of between TShs 0.50 and 
TShs 2.00 per fruit. In Tanga, although the pattern described by the data is similar, the scale is 
smaller, with the mean price margins varying from about TShs 0.10 to TShs 1.00. In all cases, 
except Morogoro, June and July are the months which record the highest mean monthly 
margins. Morogoro's peak margins occur in the month of April at TShs 0.69 and in July, when 
the margin is about TShs 0.65.
Tomatoes (Figure 7.14)
The evidence presented in the mean monthly price margins for tomatoes suggests that in most 
cases the margin between the supply towns and Dar es Salaam are greatest in the months of
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Figure 7.13 The Market Margins for Deflated Monthly Sweet Banana Prices in Dar es
Salaam and the Main Supply Area Market Towns (TShs per fruit).
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Figure 7.14 The Market Margins for Deflated Monthly Tomato Prices in Dar es SaJaam
and the Main Supply Area Market Towns (TShs per kilogram).
the early-to-middle part of the year. Mbeya and Iringa both have their peak margins in the 
months of May, June and July. Tanga, Moshi and Morogoro have their peak margins in the 
months of April and May. Lushoto has two peaks of very similar proportions, one at TShs, 
53.23 in June and one at TShs 54.54 in July. In addition to this difference, Iringa, Mbeya and 
Lushoto also have a more prolonged peak price margin in common, which in each case is 
sustained over the three months mentioned. The latter group, however, has a clear peak in 
only one of the months mentioned.
7.3 Model Supply Strategy for Dar es Salaam
This section will examine the highest mean monthly margins achieved for each of the 
commodities highlighted in the data taken from the Marketing Development Bureau’s monthly 
market price data. The highest market price margin between the Dar es Salaam retail price and 
the prices recorded in the six other towns, which are located in or close to important fruit or 
vegetable producing areas, will be presented for each month. This exercise is intended to 
give an indication of the area which is in the strongest position, in terms of mean price 
advantage to deliver that commodity in each month, using the price margin as a criterion of 
strength. Clearly, this has important potential for identifying the key months when it is 
advantageous for an area to target, as well as providing strategically important market 
information for planners and traders alike. However, one caveat must be discussed before 
analysing this data. The apparent price advantage of one town over another, based on the 
retail prices of the commodities discussed, does not guarantee that the area represented by 
the towns will necessarily be in a strong position based on other criteria, such as environmental 
conditions.
Figure 7.15 presents the data for the price margins for cabbages. This barchart is dominated 
by the price margins recorded in Lushoto. The District of Lushoto is well known for cabbage 
production and it is an important supplier of cabbage and other leafy vegetables to Dar es 
Salaam. The Lushoto price margins are at their highest from August through to March, ranging 
from TShs 12.96 in September to the highest at TShs 20.23 in February. Other centres which 
record the highest mean monthly margins include Mbeya and Iringa. Mbeya records the highest 
mean monthly margin in August at TShs 13.55, although previously it had recorded higher 
margins in April to June. In Iringa the highest price margins begin in April at TShs 22.51 and 
continue through to July when the highest price margin is July when the highest margin has 
declined to TShs 11.95. This is the only commodity in which Iringa achieves the highest margin 
of the six centres examined for this study. Iringa manages to maintains a minimum price margin 
of no less than TShs 10.00 throughout the year.
Figure 7.15 Highest Mean Monthly Price Margins for Cabbages between
Dar es Salaam and its Main Supply Market Towns (TShs per kilogram)
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Figure 7.16 presents the highest mean monthly price margins for coconuts between Dar es 
Salaam and its main supply towns. This barchart is entirely given over to the price margins of 
Tanga, which has the highest mean monthly price margins for every month of the year. This is a 
reflection of the coastal environment for the production of coconuts. Because of the way in 
which the data were collected, concentrating on towns in areas important for a broad range of 
commodities, it is not possible to reflect the importance of Coast Region around Dar es 
Salaam and the islands of Pemba and Unguja, which are also important sources of the supply 
of coconuts to the city. The main price margins range from TShs 7.08 per nut during March down 
to a low of TShs 1.88 which occurs in both September and October. The times when Tanga’s 
price margin is at its strongest is from December through to April, when the price is between 
about TShs 6 and TShs 7, and at its weakest from March through to November, when the price 
is at around TShs 2 for those seven months.
Figure 7.16 Highest Mean Monthly Price Margins for Coconuts between 
Dar es Salaam and its Main Supply Market Towns
TShs/Nut
For key see Figure7.15
The data presented in Figure 7.17 are taken from the mean monthly price margins for Irish 
potatoes. This barchart is also dominated by the price margins from Mbeya. There is only one
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month when the price margins of Mbeya are exceeded by another town, namely Lushoto, 
which achieves the lowest of the year at TShs 8.74. The general pattern is a modest increase at 
the beginning of the year to around TShs 15, which is maintained from March through to May,, 
when a price margin decline begins reaching TShs 8.74 in Lushoto, which is in turn followed by a 
modest increase to TShs 11.76 Mbeya in December. Once again this demonstrates the high 
potential of Mbeya as a temperate vegetable producing area. Indeed, the Marketing 
Development Bureau (1986) confirms the importance of Mbeya, explaining that it sends 
potatoes to Dar es Salaam from January right through to September, but it also supplies most 
of the southern part of the country and parts of the north at certain times of year. It also 
maintains that the Kilimanjaro area around Moshi is an important area for the production of Irish 
potatoes. The price data, however, do not appear to bear this out, as the price of potatoes in 
Moshi is apparently higher than in Dar es Salaam for ten out of the twelve months of the year. 
This is because of the importance of Moshi as a potato consuming area.
Figure 7.17 Highest Mean Monthly Price Margins for Irish Potatoes between 
Dar es Salaam and its Main Supply Market Towns
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Figure 7.18 presents the data for the mean monthly price margins for onions. This barchart is 
once again dominated by the town of Mbeya, which has the highest margin for ten out of the 
twelve months of the year. The highest monthly margins of February and November are 
recorded by Morogoro. The barchart has a quite distinct peak in market margins in the month of 
June, when the margin is recorded at TShs 49.33. The pattern climbs from TShs 12.38 in 
January to the peak in June and then decline to TShs 6.00 in September. This is followed by a 
relatively modest climb to TShs 13 in November and a small decline in December. This 
demonstrates the importance of Mbeya as an onion producing area and the importance of its 
supply to Dar es Salaam. According to the Marketing Development Bureau, Singida, Iringa and 
Arusha are the most important onion producing areas in Tanzania, the periods of supply 
occurring from April to October in Singida, June to January in Iringa and September to 
February or March in Arusha. The result is that onion supply to Dar es Salaam is almost 
continuous, with a short period of low supply between February, when supply begins to 
decline in Arusha, and April, when the supply from Singida begins.
Figure 7.18 Highest Mean Monthly Price Margins for Onions between 
Dar es Salaam and its Main Supply Market Towns
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Figure 7.19 presents the data for the price margins of oranges. This reflects a relatively mixed 
distribution of high margins during the year, although it is dominated by the margins achieved in 
Lushoto. Although the area around Lushoto is not an orange producing area itself, its proximity 
to the orange groves of Korogwe is likely to benefit the retail price which is recorded in 
Lushoto. The result is that Lushoto records the highest mean monthly margin for eight out of 
the twelve months of the year, namely from September to February, and also in May. The 
margins recorded range from TShs 0.71 per orange in October to TShs 1.81 in February. The 
other towns which achieve the highest orange market price margins include Morogoro which 
achieves TShs 1.95 in March. This is more understandable as Morogoro town is close to the 
area around Matombo village, where large volumes of oranges are produced and transported 
to Morogoro town and Dar es Salaam.
Figure 7.19 Highest Mean Monthly Price Margins for Oranges between 
Dar es Salaam and its Main Supply Market Towns
TShs/Fruit
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The following month, April, records a margin of TShs 1.46 in Moshi. This is surprising, as Moshi 
is further inland than Korogwe. The likely explanation may involve the difficulty of transporting
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oranges, or indeed, any commodities at the beginning of the rainy season. The relatively good 
condition of the roads towards Moshi may result in the oranges being taken there instead of Dar 
es Salaam, in the hope that they are more likely to arrive in reasonable condition. The high . 
demand in Dar es Salaam, which is not being met because of the difficulties of the road 
conditions, coupled to the lower prices in Moshi, as a result of the higher than expected 
supply, may result in this anomalous price margin. Three months of high market margins are 
recorded in Tanga Region from June to August. This is more easily.explained by the 
importance of orange production in Tanga Region, not only around Korogwe, but also near 
Handeni and close to Tanga town itself. The last four months of the year are dominated by the 
margins recorded in Lushoto, the result of the importance of orange growing on the plains 
relatively close to Lushoto.
Figure 7.20 Highest Mean Monthly Price Margin for Sweet Bananas between 
Dar es Salaam and its Main Supply Market Towns
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Figure 7.20 presents the highest mean market margins for sweet bananas. This barchart is also 
dominated by the market margins achieved in Mbeya, which account for the highest market 
margins for every month of the year, except for August, when Lushoto exceeds the Mbeya 
price margin. The price margins in Mbeya range from TShs -1.66 per fruit (in other words the 
price in Mbeya exceeded the price in Dar es Salaam by TShs 1.66 per fruit), in August, when 
the price margin is exceeded by the Lushoto margin, to TShs 2.58 in June. The high margins 
recorded in Mbeya mask the relatively high margins recorded in Lushoto and Tanga in June and 
July, when price margins are around TShs 1.9 and TShs 1.5 respectively. Once again the 
importance of Mbeya for the production of bananas, and, indeed, many other types of food is 
clearly demonstrated by the barchart in Figure 7.20.
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Figure 7.21 Highest Mean Monthly Price Margin for Tomatoes between 
Dar es Salaam and its Main Supply Market Towns
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Finally, the data presented in Figure 7.21 is that of the highest mean market margins from 
tomatoes. The margins recorded in Lushoto and Mbeya dominate this barchart, each accounting 
for six months. The year begins with increasing tomato margins recorded in Mbeya, rising from 
TShs 32.87 per kilogram January to TShs 41.948 in March. The months of April to July are 
dominated by the tomato margins recorded in Lushoto, which remain at around TShs 55 until a 
decline begins in July, towards the end of the long dry season. In August the tomato margins 
from Mbeya are once more at the highest recording a decline from TShs 25.65 in August to 
TShs 19.44 in September. In October and November the highest margins are recorded once 
more in Lushoto, during the short rainy season rising from TShs 15.10 to TShs 17.76. The last 
highest monthly tomato price margin of the year is recorded at TShs 22.57 in Mbeya. This 
reflects the importance of these two areas for the production of tomatoes for the Dar es 
Salaam market, as reported by the officials at Kariakoo and by the producers in Lushoto, who 
felt they had to compete with other areas, particularly Mbeya, to supply the city’s tomato 
demand. However, in both cases the point was made that, despite the possibility of 
producing tomatoes all year round in both areas, the environmental conditions in each area were 
most favourable for tomato growing at different times of the year. The result of this is 
apparently the type of complementarity in the supply of tomatoes from each area during the 
course of the year, with margins perhaps reflecting a favourable period for Mbeya in the first 
three months of the year, and in Lushoto in the next four months, with both areas relatively 
closely matched in the latter five months.
7.4 The Performance of the Main Market Towns 
Morogoro
Morogoro town has its own highly developed market with a relatively high local urban demand 
for food, particularly as a result of recent rapid urban expansion due to considerable industrial
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investment in the town. Consequently, prices in Morogoro town are frequently at levels similar 
to those found in Dar es Salaam itself. Many of the fruit and vegetables produced in Morogoro 
Region are produced in the Region's higher, more temperate areas, or where irrigation has, 
been developed on the plain surrounding the town itself. The high demand has translated into 
a relatively high price in Morogoro’s retail markets, resulting in the Morogoro price being under­
represented among the producing areas in this analysis.
Morogoro records the highest price margin for oranges. The main orange growing area in 
Morogoro is at Matombo in the east of the Uluguru Mountains (see Figure 4.26). This area is 
approximately 30 km from Morogoro, connected by a very poor road. Oranges transported to 
Dar es Salaam do not pass through Morogoro town, although much of what is produced in 
Matombo is also sold in Morogoro, as this is a market which can command a relatively high 
price.
Morogoro also records the highest price margin for onions in both February and November. 
The fact that Morogoro is located on the main road from Mbeya to Dar es Salaam results in 
Morogoro town prices benefiting from supply both from the surrounding area, but also from 
Mbeya. This may have resulted in a lower price, and, consequently, a higher price margin, by a 
small factor, than was recorded in Mbeya in the months of February and November when 
Morogoro’s price margin exceeded Mbeya’s. In addition, one would expect Morogoro to 
benefit from its location, on the route from Singida, the nation's biggest onion producing area, 
to Dar es Salaam.
Tanga
Tanga records the highest monthly price margins for coconuts for the entire year, the highest of 
which, as has been described, occurring in December and the first four months of the year. 
According to the Marketing Development Bureau report (1986), the highest yields of coconuts 
are usually obtained in the middle of the year. The last three months of the year are when 
supplies are at their lowest, and the prices at their highest. This is a period of high demand, 
when coconuts are added to the ingredients of meals as the festivities of Christmas draw near.
If it were possible for Tanga to produce coconuts at this time, it would benefit Tanga in revenue 
gained from their sale to Dar es Salaam dealers, and it would benefit Dar es Salaam by 
providing more coconuts at a time when they are in short supply. However, the pattern 
presented in Figure 7.16 suggests that other supply sources, such as Coast Region and the 
islands, are of enormous significance in the supply for Dar es Salaam. It is possible that the 
main production in Tanga Region occurs during the months from December to April, reflected in 
the high price margins. However, it seems likely that during the times when coconuts margins in 
Tanga are recorded at about TShs 2 per nut, from May to November, other sources not 
covered by this analysis, such as Mafia Island or areas on the coast south of the Dar es Salaam, 
are supplying the city.
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Tanga benefits from proximity to the orange groves in Korogwe, Handeni and, to a lesser 
extent around the town of Tanga itself. This is reflected in Tanga recording the highest margins 
for oranges in the months of July to August.
Lushoto
Lushoto has one of the strongest mean monthly price margin profiles of the towns discussed in 
this chapter. It achieves highest price margins in all commodities except coconuts, indicating a 
high potential price advantage. Lushoto District has a strong reputation as a fruit and vegetable 
producing area, both in terms of volume and especially in terms of quality. However, its 
importance in the data concerning oranges, where it commands the highest mean margins in 
seven months, is, as has been explained already, a little misleading. It may well be that those 
traders transporting to Tanga or Dar es Salaam, fill their lorries on their upward journey, in order 
to supply Lushoto. The author's own experience of travelling to Lushoto included two stops 
so that the driver of the aid agency vehicle, in which he was travelling, could negotiate the 
purchase of a gunia of oranges and one of mangoes. These he intended to sell on arrival in 
Lushoto. This is relatively common in most of Tanzania, when people travel on business and 
are able to carry produce.
Cabbages are a commodity that Lushoto District produces in large quantities and competes 
with a relatively small number of other areas. In this analysis, Lushoto price margins are highest 
in seven out of the twelve monihs of the year, from September to March. Lushoto is also 
reported as an important tomato producer. This is borne out by the data demonstrating its 
highest margins in six of the months, but most importantly, in the four months from April to July 
when it consistently records enormous margins of around TShs 55 per kilogram.
Sweet bananas are reported to be grown in Lushoto, but it is regarded as a more important 
source of cooking bananas which are successfully inter-cropped with other crops such as tea and 
coffee (Sender and Smith, 1990). The highest margin recorded for sweet bananas in August is 
relatively small, and stands out sharply from the rest of the pattern which is dominated by the 
margins of Mbeya. It does however, suggest that Lushoto has some potential as a sweet 
banana producing area. This is particularly the case when one considers that the margins 
recorded in Lushoto, as described already, are relatively close to those in Mbeya.
Irish potatoes are a crop which can, given the correct conditions, be stored for some time very 
successfully, in order to optimise prices and to reduce shortages at times of the year when the 
production is low. A second point worth considering in the context of Irish potatoes being 
produced in Lushoto, is that the mean monthly price in Tanga town exceeds that of Dar es 
Salaam in nine months out of twelve. Given the proximity of Tanga and the higher margins 
which could potentially be gained, it would seem a more useful strategy for Lushoto Irish 
potatoes to be targeted at Tanga, rather than transporting them to Dar es Salaam to compete 
with,on average, cheaper potatoes from Mbeya.
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Lushoto has a demonstrable advantage as a fruit and vegetable producing area, in terms of 
potential mean monthly price margins. This potential appears to be fulfilled to some extent, 
according to interviews with Dar es Salaam market officials. However this analysis has pointed 
to some areas where more serious consideration could be given to optimising the gains from 
the district's environmental advantage.
Mbeya
Mbeya has the highest number of highest mean monthly price margins of the selected towns in 
this analysis. While Mbeya Region’s more northerly highlands provide the more temperate 
climates for vegetables and temperate fruits, the southerly plains around Lake Nyasa are well 
suited for the production of tropical fruits such as mangoes, pineapples and citrus fruits. It 
records high price margins in all commodities except coconuts and oranges. This strength of 
margin is reinforced by the reports in interviews, and particularly in the MDB report (Marketing 
Development Bureau, 1986) of Mbeya's importance, in reality, in the supply of Irish potatoes 
to Dar es Salaam (Bartlett and Odero-Ogwell, 1976).
Mbeya's most important crop, in terms of the mean monthly price margin criteria, is that of 
sweet bananas, where it dominates, with eleven of the highest mean monthly margins. Its 
second most important commodity, according to these criteria, is that of onions, where it 
commands ten of the highest monthly margins. However, in spite of this potential, Mbeya is 
not acknowledged as an important surplus region for the production and supply of onions. It 
was ranked seventh after (in order of importance) Singida, Arusha, Tabora (except during the 
rainy seasons), Moshi, Iringa and Morogoro (the last three were more or less ranked as equal) 
as a supplier of onions to Dar es Salaam by the Marketing Development Bureau (1986).
Mbeya also records the highest mean price margins for tomatoes in the months from 
December to March , and also in August and September. Mbeya's very low mean monthly 
price margins for many of these commodities, in comparison to the other towns, can in part be 
explained by its distance from the more highly developed, high demand areas nearer to the 
coast. Mbeya's distance from the urban markets results in a lower cost of living and generally 
lower prices. In addition, the higher number of farmers in the District also consume much of 
their own produce, lowering the demand for retailed food, particularly in staples and less 
perishable crops which can be stored in the home, such as Irish potatoes, cooking bananas and 
onions.
Iringa
In contrast to the importance given to Iringa by the MDB (Marketing Development Bureau, 
1986), it records surprisingly few entries among the mean monthly price margins in this analysis. 
The most successful commodity in Iringa appears to be cabbages, which is the only commodity 
which records a highest monthly price margin in this series. The highest monthly margins,
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however, occur in the same months for each of the towns and at the same time as the highest 
months in absolute mean monthly price. This is perhaps the result of the high demand for these 
vegetables at that time translated into high prices offered, thus resulting in high prices in the, 
rural areas, as local demand competes with the large, high demand among urban supplying 
buyers.
Moshi
Moshi, like Iringa, is a town representing a region which is reported as an important producer of 
fruit and vegetables for the city of Dar es Salaam, and yet it scores comparatively weakly in this 
analysis. It achieves only the highest mean monthly price margins in one commodity, oranges. 
The area around Moshi is well-known for its production of vegetables. Hence these results 
cannot be considered as representative of the types of margins that a trader in Moshi can 
expect. It is more likely that the high urban demand existing in both Moshi and Arusha, as well 
as unofficial cross-border trade, has had the effect of increasing the urban retail prices of the 
commodities dealt with in this analysis. This factor indicates the shortcomings of this use of the 
data. However, given that this is the case, the results suggest that Moshi has a strong 
advantage in the commodities in which it does score relatively highly, namely, onions, tomatoes 
and oranges. The exception is the anomaly of oranges, which once again have scored highly in 
an area where they are not, in fact, produced. The only explanation for this is that the orange 
producing districts of Korogwe and Muheza are on the same international routeway as Moshi, 
which runs from the ports of both Tanga and Dar es Salaam to Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. 
This routeway, which is heavily used by large lorries transporting goods both to and from the 
coast, provides the occasional opoortunity for using available space on the vehicles for goods 
such as oranges, particularly if the lorry driver is interested in making a little unofficial income to 
supplement his wages.
This chapter has provided a framework for the analysis of the fruit and vegetable supply 
system as it operates through the network of market towns supplying Dar es Salaam. The 
analysis has identified periods in the year when certain areas, are in an economically strong 
position, in terms of the retail market margins, for supplying Dar es Salaam with fruit and 
vegetable commodities.
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Chapter Eight /
Fruit and Vegetable 
Farming in The Rural Producing Areas
8.1 Introduction
This chapter will examine the results of a questionnaire survey carried out in a total of six 
villages in two key fruit and vegetable producing areas. These areas are Lushoto District of 
Tanga Region and Morogoro Rural District of Morogoro Region. As described in Chapter 
Three both are situated in highland areas and are approximately 300 and 200 kilometres from 
Dar es Salaam, respectively. Evidence presented in Chapters Five and Six identify both 
these areas to be of crucial importance as suppliers of fresh fruit and vegetables to the Dar es 
Salaam markets (see Figure 8.1). The method of survey is also described in detail in Chapter 
Three and the questionnaire form is contained in Appendix 3.2.
This questionnaire survey was carried out in Swahili by a Tanzanian field assistant in July 1989. 
The assistant translated the responses in preparation for analysis. A total of 271 interviews was 
carried out. The method of sample selection is discussed in Chapter Three. The response of 
the farmers was, in general, favourable, although in Mgeta the assistant reported a greater 
reluctance to co-operate, in spite of the assistance of the village government, which had to be 
sought in each village the study involved. On investigation the reason for the problems in 
Mgeta seems to have been that some farmers had already been interviewed by researchers in 
separate studies not long before. This appears to have resulted in a 'research fatigue', where 
the farmers had become tired of giving up time to take part in interviews, in which they see no 
direct benefits for them personally. The author met two other researchers working in this area 
at the same time, while he was carrying out his own field work.
This problem was reduced, to some extent, by enlisting the aid of the village and divisional 
agricultural extension officers, who knew the farmers and quickly helped to gain their co­
operation. The extension officers were also able to assist the author in some initial 
interpretation of the results and, as will be seen, were able to serve as a check on some of the 
responses given.
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Figure 8.1 The Rural Study Areas; a Location Map
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The mean age of the head of the fruit and vegetable producing household is 44.9, although the 
ages given range from 20 years to 87 (Table 8.1). The modal age was 30, accounting for about 
7.5 per cent of the respondents. This indicates that the head of household, who in most cases 
is the male, and who will carry out the negotiating for the sale of the household’s produce, is a 
relatively experienced farmer. Only 15 per cent of the sample is under 30 years old.
The mean level of schooling is just over five years, which is one year longer than the minimum of 
four years primary education. 43.5 per cent of the respondents who indicated they had 
attended school have had four years of schooling, while 38.7 per cent have had seven years or 
more. The result is that over 65 per cent of the total sample have received four years or more 
of primary level education. Bearing in mind that universal primary school education was only 
introduced in the 1970s, this is a very high level of education relative to the national population.
Table 8.1 Summary Table of Socio-economic Variables
Variable Minimum Mean Maximum
Age 2D 44.9 87
No. of Years Schooling 0 5.4 8
Household Size 1 7.3 20
No. of Children 0 3.0 9
Farm Size 0.3 Ha. 3.2 Ha. 30.0 Ha.
No. of Plots 1 3.4 20
No. of Crops Produced 1 4.8 9
Source: Author’s Survey
The overall mean household size is 7.3 persons. The most frequent size indicated was a 
household of eight people, which accounted for 30 households or just over 11 per cent of the 
total sample. The mean number of children (defined here as those under 12 years old) in each 
household is 3.0, which is also the mode, accounting for 21.4 per cent of the total sample. 
There are frequently problems with the reporting of child data in the African context. Paul 
(1988) reported that the ‘average family’ in Mgeta Division comprises six people, four of whom 
are children. If the data for children reported in the sample is collated with the data 
representing household size, the children reported account for 34.8 per cent of the total 
number of members of households reported. In Lushoto District Sender and Smith (1990) 
reported that children in the 0 to 14 year age group accounted for 51 per cent of the district 
population, compared with 47 per cent for rural Tanzania as a whole. This suggests that the 
sample under-represents both the household size and the number of children in each 
household. This is an important factor for consideration of agricultural production, as Paul (1988) 
reported that 57 per cent of the households in Mgeta had sufficient family labour to run their 
farm, while in Lushoto Sender and Smith (1990) identify links between school absenteeism and 
child labour, particularly among the poorer households,.who cannot afford to hire labour.
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The mean farm size is 3.2 hectares, with a maximum of 30.0 hectares and a minimum of 0.3 
hectares. There were twenty-four cases of missing data, all of whom were farmers who were 
reluctant or unable to estimate the size of their farm. In some cases the only way to establish 
the size of the farm was for the farmer to describe it, and the field assistant to estimate the 
size based on the farmer's description. The farm which was 30.0 hectares is an exception, 
being located in Soni village and the only farm which produces fruit and vegetables under 
contract. According to Paul (1988) and Taube (1988) the mean farm'sizes in Mgeta and Lushoto 
respectively are between 2 and 3 hectares, suggesting that the fruit and vegetable producers 
have larger farms than general agricultural producers in the study areas.
Most farmers have their farms split into plots of varying land quality and at varying distances 
from the household. The mean number of plots in this survey is 3.4, with a minimum of 1 and a 
maximum of 20. The modal number of plots is 3 accounting for 27.5 per cent of the total 
sample. Those respondents with 2 or 3 plots of land account for over 50 per cent. Only 12 
per cent of the respondents had farms of more than 5 plots. Paul (1988) report that the mean 
number of plots in Mgeta is about 4 and Taube (1988) that most producers have between 4 
and 6 plots. This suggests that there is a slightly lower degree of fragmentation among the 
respondents of the current survey than in general.
In terms of the number of crops grown, the farmers interviewed are more diverse, with the 
mean number of crops being grown for sale 4.8, a maximum of 9, and only 5 respondents 
growing one crop. The modal number of crops is 4, accounting for 21.5 per cent of the total 
sample. The sample is spread to a far greater extent, with 20 per cent growing 7 or more 
crops and only 7.4 per cent (25 respondents) reported to be growing 2 or fewer crops.
150 respondents, or over half the sample, specified no form of employment as an alternative 
to farming, and as a means of obtaining additional income. There were a total of 26 different 
types of alternative employment indicated (Appendix 8.1). These have been divided into four 
grouped categories and they are listed in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2 Employment Groupings
Employment Type Frequency Per Cent
Commercial 67 55.4
Trade/Craft 32 26.4
Professional/Administrative 14 11.6
Other 8 6.6
Survey Total 121 100.0
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The professional/administrative category is mainly people employed in the public sector, such 
as teachers, levy collectors, or extension officers. The commercial sector are mainly involved in 
running private businesses, such as trading, or providing local services such as producing local 
beers, running a hotel or a shop. The Trade/Craft’ sector accounts for those selling a practical 
skill as a service, such as carpentry, bicycle maintenance, or plumbing. Finally, the other 
category accounts for a small number of occupations which do not easily fit into the previous 
definitions.
It is clear from Table 8.2 that the commercial category is the most important of the grouped 
activities, accounting for more than 55 per cent. The most important responses within this 
grouped category were 'business', which was the overall modal individual response, accounting 
for 20.7 per cent of the employed respondents, and the less vague 'small petty business', 
which accounted for 12.4 per cent of the employed respondents (see Appendix 8.1). Most 
other grouped categories account for up to five different types of employment, however 
'carpentry' stands out as dominating the 'Trade/Craft' grouped category, accounting for 16 out of 
the 150 employed respondents, or 13.2 per cent.
When the respondents were pressed for a more accurate description of their 'business' or 
'small petty business' their responses became even more vague, or they simply refused to 
elaborate. Some 3 per cent of the employed respondents indicate that their employment is 
'business (market)'. Reports from interviews suggest that a significant proportion of the 
'business' and 'small petty business' respondents, together with the 'business (market)' 
respondents, accounting for a combined 39.7 per cent of the employed respondents (17.7 per 
cent of the overall sample), are involved in the trading of agricultural produce. The interviews 
with the traders in Lushoto District suggest that these traders may trade their own produce, but 
more frequently use it to add to the produce they have bought from other producers, in order 
to assemble a load that would be large enough to make hiring a lorry viable.
However, the involvement in petty trading at all levels of rural Tanzanian life make an accurate 
estimate of the proportion involved in fruit and vegetable trading impossible. Indeed, in some 
cases, petty trading may be overlooked, as it is frequently perceived as such a natural part of 
the way of life, and so respondents may not consider it as important. The above proportion 
can therefore only be taken as an estimate of those producers frequently involved in this type 
of trading, as opposed to those who take part in trading on an occasional basis, as a means of 
partly covering the cost of a long journey. This form of creative use of resources and 
conservation of transport was encouraged by some party officials in the economically crippling 
years of the early eighties. The call was issued for those who were travelling with a vehicle to 
make sure that all available space on their vehicle was being used in order reduce the country's 
fuel demand, which was rapidly using up the country's meagre foreign currency reserves.
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8.2 Comparisons and Contrasts between Lushoto and Morogoro 
8.21 Socio-economic profile
This section will examine the differences between the two areas where the interviews took 
place, Lushoto District of Tanga Region and Morogoro Rural District of Morogoro Region. A 
description of the two areas is given in Chapter Three, so this section will concentrate on the 
differences which are highlighted by the results of the questionnaire survey.
Table 8.3 Summary Table of the Chi Square Tests with the Study Area Location
Var. 1 X Variable 2 Chi square degrees of 
freedom
Significance Reject H0
Area X Age Group 16.810 5 0.0049
X Household Size 3.453 3 0.3269
X No. of Children 2337 2 0.3108
X Level of Schooling 1.242 1 0.2651
X Employment 0.146 1 0.7022
X Employment Type 4.938 4 0.2937
X Farm Size 0.500 3 0.9190
X No. of Plots 14.682 4 0.0054
X No. of Crops 1.307 2 0.5202
X Crop Type 71.046 4 0.0000 X
X Crop Selection Motivation 0.226 3 0.9732
X Access to Credit 1.474 1 0.2247
X Purpose of Credit 50.018 4 0.0000
X Source of Credit 4.726 2 0.0942
X Credit Use Frequency. 19.207 4 0.0007 X
X Access to Mkt Info 139.403 1 0.0023 X
X Source of Mkt Info 11.765 3 0.0082
t  Because of the dominance of one or two values, this test was invalid.
Table 8.3 is a summary of chi square tests carried out on the variables, resulting from the 
questionnaire survey, by the survey area in which the interviews took place. This table shows 
that only four chi square values are statistically significant. These are for the type of crop, the 
purpose to which credit is put, the frequency of credit use, and, finally, the respondents' access 
to market information. There were no significant chi square results for the socio-economic 
variables already discussed, indicating no significant differences between the two areas. This 
section will examine these four variables in more detail using the contingency tabes used to 
calculate the chi square values.
8.2.2 Crop Type
56 different crops were reported to be grown by the respondents. The respondents were 
asked to rank their crops according to their importance to their farm. 33 different crops were 
reported to be most important by the respondents. The crop which was most frequently 
selected as most important was cabbage, accounting for 20.7 per cent of the survey alone. 
This was closely followed by tomatoes, accounting for 18.5 per cent. A list of the most 
important crops appears as Appendix 8.2, but the crops were grouped into crop type 
categories, as shown in Table 8.4.
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The most important type of crop, grown by the respondents in this survey is cooking 
vegetables, which includes such crops as onions, cabbage and cauliflower, accounting for 31.4 
per cent of the sample, the majority of which are cabbages (see Appendix 8.2). Salad 
vegetables (such as tomatoes, lettuce and cucumber) and fruit (such as bananas, oranges, and 
lemons) are almost of equal importance, accounting for just over 20 per cent each of the overall 
sample. Staples (such as cassava, Irish potatoes and sweet potatoes) and pulses are 
relatively less important, accounting for only 17.6 and 9.0 per cent respectively of the most 
respondents’ most important marketable crops. Staple foods are considered to be the most 
important food crops grown in both the producing areas visited (SECAP, 1988; Paul, 1988), and 
nationally (Ministry of Agriculture, 1988). The low status given to them by respondents in this 
questionnaire may partly be the result of its stated aim of examining the production and selling 
of fruit and vegetables, but interviews with extension workers suggest that the staples are 
grown mainly for subsistence crop purposes.
In Lushoto, for example, the main staple consumed is maize, however this crop matures 
relatively slowly in upland areas, where the climates are cooler and slow the growing period of 
most crops. In highland areas of the District it can take nine months to produce a maize harvest 
because of the cooler climate (Cliffe et al, 1975). However, on the hotter, drier plain, near 
Mombo (Figure 8.1), it is possible, with irrigation, to produce a maize harvest in only three 
months. Clearly, there is a strong argument for farmers in the higher altitudes of Lushoto to 
produce fruit and vegetables for cash, and to use some of the cash to buy the cheaper maize 
produced on the plain. Extension officers reported that they have a policy of advocating that 
the lower slopes of the valleys be freed for the production of crops which are more suited to 
their environments, such as vegetables. Occasionally, the producer may use some of the farm 
area to produce staples to supplement the household diet or to save cash which then can be 
allocated to other purchases. The fruit and vegetable crops take the form of cash crops, which 
are mainly grown for sale, whereas the staples are mainly grown for home consumption.
Table 8.4 Chi Square of Crop Type by Study Area
Count
Expected Value
Salad
Vegetables
Cooking
Vegetables
Fruit Staples Pulses Row
Totals
Morogoro 0 21 35 0 23 76
16.0 23.8 15.8 6.8 13.4 29.8%
Lushoto 54 59 18 23 25 179
37.8 56.1 37.3 16.1 31.5 70.2%
Column 54 80 53 23 45 255
Percent 21.2% 31.4% 20.8% 9.0% 17.6% 100.0%
Degrees of Freedom 4 
Chi Square 71.046
Significance 0.0000
No salad vegetables or staples appear as the most important crop type in Morogoro. 
Cooking vegetables follow the expected frequencies relatively closely. Pulses and especially
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fruit are more frequent in Morogoro than expected, accounting for 46.0 per cent and 26.3 per 
cent of the Morogoro sample respectively, and both at frequencies considerably higher than 
can be expected if randomly distributed. Salad vegetables and staples are very frequently 
referred to in this context in Lushoto, accounting for 30.2 per cent and 12.8 per cent of the 
Lushoto sample respectively, but at much higher frequencies than expected.
It is more likely that this distribution is a function of a variation between the villages selected for 
survey rather than a difference between the two survey areas. However, the high levels of 
initial capital investment required to grow salad vegetables, and the differing levels of economic 
development in each of the areas, described in Chapter Three, suggest that the economic 
infrastructure may not be sufficient to maintain such costly investments, in Mgeta. It may also 
be related to the channelling of resources for the production of this type of crop into a very 
large project already underway in nearby Manolo Valley, which is better suited to the irrigated 
growing of such crops .
8.2.3 Market Information
There is a significant difference in the access producers have to advance market information in 
each of the study areas. Table 8.5 is a crosstabulation of these two variables and produces a 
significant chi square result. 'All the respondents were asked if they had access to market 
information before negotiating their sales with the traders (see Appendix 3.2). All the 
producers in Morogoro responded to this question in the negative, whereas in Lushoto 78.0 
per cent of the respondents indicated that they did have some information in advance of the 
sales transaction. One of the differences in the relationship between the producers and the 
traders in each of the areas is that the traders in Mgeta appear to be almost exclusively based 
in Mgeta. Indeed, the Waluguru tribe, based in the mountains where Mgeta is located, have a 
long established reputation of trading between Dar es Salaam and its interior (Gordon, 1988). 
As has been reported, there are suspicions that the traders in Mgeta are conspiring to keep 
the producer prices low. In Lushoto, there is a significant number of traders who travel to the 
District to obtain food. The more open market in Lushoto, therefore, may reflect the prices 
reported in Dar es Salaam more accurately, than the allegedly closed market in Mgeta. This 
may mean that the producers in Lushoto feel that any reports they receive from whatever 
source are more credible, whereas those in Mgeta were reported to feel far more isolated 
from the market of Dar es Salaam.
Table 8.5 Chi Square Test of Access to Market Information by Study Area
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Count
Expected Value
Yes No Row Total
Morogoro 0 85 85
45.5 39.5 31.4%
Lushoto 145 41 186
99.9 86.5 68.6%
Column 145 126 271
Percent 53.5% 46.5% 100.0%
Degrees of Freedom 1 
Chi Square 139.4025
Significance 0.0023
The crosstabulation in Table 8.6 indicates the access producers have to market information 
according to their study area. Again this produces a significant chi square result indicating a 
significant difference between the two areas in the sources of their information. The main part 
of this difference lies in two values. Firstly, Lushoto tends to favour to a greater extent than 
expected the trader as a source of market information. Secondly, in Morogoro there is a 
greater than expected frequency of indicating that rumour was the main source of market 
information. The Kin/Friends and Other categories follow the expected frequencies relatively 
closely.
Table 8.6 Chi Square of Access to Market Information by the Information Source
Count
Expected Value
Trader Kin/
Friend
Rumour Other Row Total
Morogoro 41 3 7 7 58
46.3 3.1 2 6 6.0 18.6%
Lushoto 121 8 2 14 145
115.7 7.9 6.4 15.0 71.4%
Column 162 11 9 21 255
Percent 79.8% 5.4% 4.4% 10.3% 100.0%
Degrees of Freedom 3 
Chi Square 11.7653
Significance 0.0082
The explanation for the differences may lie more in the differences between the individual 
villages surveyed in each of these areas. Both Mgeta and Matombo can be considered 
relatively isolated, since it takes a relatively long journey by difficult roads to reach both villages. 
By comparison, the road to Lushoto from the main road between Tanga and Arusha, has 
recently been upgraded and renewed. This has resulted in greatly enhanced transport and 
communication between the villages of Lushoto District and the outside world.
8.2.4 Decision Making Factors
Table 8.7 displays a chi square of the purpose to which credit is put by the two areas of study. 
This cross-tabulation shows a very clear distinction between the priorities of credit use within the 
two study areas. The largest observed frequency produced is for the use of credit to hire 
labour in Morogoro. The expected frequency is 6 and the observed count is 17 or 65.4 per
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cent of the Morogoro respondents of this question, or 18.7 per cent overall. By contrast only 
respondents in Lushoto used credit for the purchase of seeds and food, accounting for 15.4 
and 13.8 per cent of the Lushoto respondents. Almost all of the respondents who used credit 
to purchase inputs were in Lushoto (36 out of 65) accounting for 55.4 per cent of the Lushoto 
respondents or 39.6 per cent of the overall sample. There is some preference for putting 
credit to the cost of transport and the purchase of implements in Morogoro, with almost twice 
the expected frequency in this cell, or 26.9 per cent of Morogoro respondents.
Table 8.7 Chi Square of Purpose of Credit by Study Area
Count
Expected Value
Buying
Seeds
Buying
Food
Transport & 
Implements
Buying
Inputs
Labour Row Total
Morogoro 0 0 7 2 17 25
29 2 6 3.7 10.9 6.0 28.9%
Lushoto 10 9 6 36 4 65
7.1 6.4 9.3 27.1 15.0 71.4%
Column 10 9 13 38 21 91
Percent 11.0% 9.9% 14.3% 41.8% 23.1% 100.0%
Degrees of Freedom 4
Chi Square 50.018
Significance 0.0000
Clearly a difference in priorities exists between the use of credit in the two study areas. 
Lushoto respondents concentrate their credit power on purchases of seeds, inputs and food, 
while the Morogoro respondents concentrate on obtaining labour and transport and 
implements. This confirms the opinion of extension officers in Lushoto, that the purchase of 
material inputs for agricultural production, such as fertiliser or fungicides, is severely hampered 
by infrequent and insufficient supply through official channels. The result of this is that 
producers have to purchase from unofficial informal market sources at much higher prices. The 
purchase of inputs is particularly important for the salad vegetable crops, such as tomatoes, 
lettuce and cucumber, which require much more inputs than traditional, more resilient crops, such 
as staples or pulses..
The geographic variation in crop selection between the two survey areas may be explained by 
the influence of the growing conditions of the villages selected for the survey, which vary 
according to altitude, among other factors, in each village, and also by historical influences. 
However, the cross-tabulation of the study area by the reasons given for selecting their most 
important crop did not produce a significant chi square result (see Table 8.3). There is, 
therefore, no significant statistical difference between the grouped decision motivations 
reported in the two study areas.
Individual crop choice motivations (Appendix 8.3), rather than the grouped motivations, may be 
of greater significance to the producers' decisions. For example, in Lushoto, the British 
colonial government ordered a very large number of fruit trees to be planted, producing 
temperate fruits which would cater for the increasing expatriate population. The population
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never expanded fast enough to consume the supply, and most have now departed, leaving a 
very large number of fruit trees, particularly pear trees, to produce with minimal care and . 
attention. The market for pears in Tanzania is very small, indeed there were some reports in 
interviews of pears being sold at very low prices simply because there is not sufficient demand 
for the quantity which are produced. The pear trees continue to produce with minimal care, 
although the quality is low. It has been estimated that Lushoto District produces 100,000 
tonnes of pears every year. Of this 100,000 tonnes, it is estimated that the district can consume 
or sell 20 per cent, while the rest are left on the trees to fall off and later rot on the ground. 
Some farmers are reported to be cutting the pear trees down in order to use the land for more 
productive uses, from which they will gain direct benefit.
8.3 Comparisons and Contrasts Between The Survey Villages
8.3.1 Crop Types
Because the data is distributed over a larger number of categories when compared with the 
villages, it proved more difficult tocalculate meaningful chi square tests. Some of these 
contingency tables are therefore discussed as they stand. Perhaps the most important 
distinction for the purposes of this research is the differing crop types which are produced in 
the villages. The contingency table (Table 8.8) demonstrates clearly the differences between 
the villages. Each village concentrates on one or perhaps two types of crop at the expense of 
the other crop types. This is particularly clearly demonstrated in the case of Matombo, where 
almost all (26 out of 34) the farmers there have indicated that a fruit is their most important crop. 
The remainder are pulse producers. Apart from Matombo there is a clear pattern of each 
village having about half of their respondents involved in producing one type of crop, while the 
other half are divided among the other crop types. For example, in Lukozi just under half of 
the farmers favour cooking vegetables, while in Lwandai half of the farmers favour salad 
vegetables. The villages vary in their specialism and also in the degree to which they have 
become specialised in one crop type. The specialisation is likely to be strongly influenced by 
the growing conditions which exist in each of the villages, which vary and suit different crops.
The degree of specialisation may also be interpreted as an indication of the level of outside 
influence, which has penetrated the areas studied, where producers have been able to 
capitalise on crops in demand which they can produce.
This pattern suggests a high degree of specialisation has developed among the producers of 
the villages visited. This appears to be particularly strong in Mgeta and Matombo, where there 
are no farmers who produce staple or salad vegetables as their most important crop. This 
specialisation, when examined together with other environmental influences, results in a number 
of other related variables, such as the motivation priorities of the producers or the growing 
conditions of their farm.
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Table 8.8 Chi Square of Crop Type by Village
Count
Expected Value
Saiad
Vegetables
Cooking
Vegetables
Fruit Staples Pulses Row Total
Matombo 0 0 30 0 8 38
8.0 11.9 7.9 3.4 6.7 14.9%
Lukozi 8 20 3 10 5 46
9.7 14.4 9.6 4.1 3.1 18.0%
Lwandai 22 7 4 4 \ 8 45
9.5 14.1 9.4 4.1 7.9 17.6%
Soni 18 12 5 2 9 46
9.7 14.4 9.6 4.1 3.1 18.0%
Malindi 6 20 6 7 3 42
3.9 13.2 8.7 3.8 7.4 16.5%
Mgeta 0 21 5 0 12 38
8.0 11.3 7.9 3.4 6.7 14.9%
Column 54 80 53 23 45 255
Percent 21.2% 31.4% 20.8% 9.0% 17.6% 100.0%
The geographic variation in crop selection can be explained by the influence of the growing 
conditions in each village, which vary according to altitude, among other factors and also by 
historical influences. For example, the colonial government imposed fruit tree planting before 
independence and this has meant that many fruit tree producers in Lushoto have inherited a 
plantation of fruit trees, which they may not want. In addition to these influences, the 
contingency table of village location by type of employment (shown in Table 8.9) suggests that 
the geographic location also is related to the likely employment of the producer. This, in turn, 
can be linked to age by analysis of variance of age broken down by the employment type, the 
results of which are shown in Table 8.10.
Table 8.9 Chi Square of Employment Type by Village
Count
Expected Value
None Commercial Trade/
Craft
Professional/
Administrative
Other Row Total
Matombo 34 5 3 0 0 42
23.2 10.4 5.0 2.2 1.2 15.5%
Lukozi 30 11 3 3 1 48
26.6 11.9 5.7 2.5 1.4 17.7%
Lwandai 27 12 6 1 3 49
27.1 129 5.8 25 1.4 18.1%
Soni 16 13 13 3 2 47
26.0 11.6 5.5 2 4 1.4 17.3%
Malindi 28 8 4 1 1 42
23.2 10.4 5.0 2.2 1.2 15.5
Mgeta 15 18 3 6 1 43
23.8 10.6 5.1 2.2 1.3 15.9%
Column 150 67 32 14 8 271
Percent 55.4% 24.7% 11.8% 5.2% 3.0% 100.0%
The results of this show a statistical difference in the mean ages of producers, who are in 
different types of employment (Table 8.10). For example, the mean age of producers who 
are also employed in the Professional/Administrative sector is 39 years, while, by contrast, the 
mean age in the Trade/Craft sector is 52 years. Correspondingly, 13 out of 32 of those
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employed in the Trade/Craft sector are in Soni, the village with the second highest mean age of 
49 years. 34 out of 42 respondents in Matombo are in the "not employed" category, which has 
the second highest mean age of the sectors with 47 years. Matombo has the lowest number 
of respondents in all the sectors, except trade/craft.
Table 8.10 Analysis of Variance of Age Broken Down by Employment Sector
Employment Sector Mean Std. Deviation No of 
Cases
Not Employed 47.27 15.64 148
Commercial 40.64 13.04 67
Trade/Craft 52.28 16.82 32
Professional/Administrative 39.00 9.92 13
Other 46.63 8.72 8
Within Groups Total 45.79 14.81 268
F value = 4.621 Significance = 0.001
Matombo and Mgeta differ greatly in the number of their producers who are employed in 
addition to agricultural production. The chi square in Table 8.9 shows that Mgeta has the lowest 
proportion of respondents who are not otherwise employed, while Matombo has the 
highest. In this variable, Lukozi, Lwandai and Malindi, all relatively isolated, in terms of main 
roads and important administrative or commercial activities are concerned, have more in common 
with Matombo than Matombo has with Mgeta.
The reasons for this are clearly to do with the relative locations of each of the villages. Mgeta 
has its divisional headquarters for the local level government, agricultural extension and co­
operative society in its village. In addition, the road on which Mgeta is located becomes 
impassable at higher altitudes, and so Mgeta has become a focus for commercial activities 
particularly during the rainy season, when lorries transporting produce to their markets have to 
stop and collect their loads at Mgeta. This is the reason for the location in Mgeta of the 
wholesale building as well as the administrative and commercial offices mentioned. These 
important geographic factors in Mgeta, and those already explained in Soni, have contributed 
to the provision of employment in each of these villages. The comparative isolation of the 
other villages has meant that the producers there have had to rely much more on the income 
derived from their production to survive.
8.3.2 Market Information
The crosstabulation of the village location by the access to advance trading information 
produces a highly significant chi square value (Table 8.11). This appears to be mainly - although 
not wholly - the result of Matombo and Mgeta, the villages in Morogoro Region, where none
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of the respondents indicated that they had access to any trading information. It is not at all clear 
why this should be the case. It does suggest that the villages surveyed in the Morogoro area 
have a chronic lack of market information. This will act as a hindrance in this area to the proper 
functioning of the free market, which exists for the trading of fruit and vegetables. Indeed, this 
is a situation which can only benefit the traders and certainly acts as a disbenefit to the 
producers, who are in a very weak bargaining position. One of the. extensions officers 
interviewed expressed frustration that not knowing what crops are in demand in the urban 
markets means that there is no basis on which he, or anyone else, can calculate what may be 
considered a fair price for the producers.
Table 8.11 . Chi Square of Market Information by Village
Count
Expected Value
Yes No Row Total
Matombo 0 42 42
22.5 19.5 15.5%
Lukozi 43 5 48
26.2 223 17.7%
Lwandai 36 13 49
26.2 228 18.1%
Soni 31 16 47
25.1 21.9 17.3%
Malindi 35 7 42
225 19.5 15.5%
Mgeta 0 43 43
23.0 20.0 15.9%
Column 145 126 271
Percent 53.5% 46.5% 100.0%
Degrees of Freedom 5 
Chi Square 148.7321
Significance 0.0000
The problem of isolation and lack of independent sources of market information was a particular 
concern held by the extension officers interviewed in the Mgeta area. The lack of independent 
market information fostered a suspicion among the farmers and extension officers alike that the 
traders who bought fruit and vegetables in this area were conspiring against them to obtain 
more favourable prices for themselves.
Table 8.12 The Source of Market Information by the Village
Count
Expected Value
Trader Other Row/Total
Matombo 24 7 31
24.7 6.3 15.3%
Lukozi 41 2 43
34.3 8.6 21.2%
Lwandai 23 13 36
28.7 7.3 17.7%
Soni 29 3 32
25.5 6.4 15.8%
Malindi 28 6 34
27.1 6.8 16.7%
Mgeta 17 10 27
21.5 5.5 13.3%
Column 162 41 203
Percent 79.8% 20.1% 100.0%
Degrees 
of Freedom 5 
Chi Square 19.426 
Significance 0.0016
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The original contingency table of the sources of market information by village was invalid for chi 
square purposes, because of the very low frequency of use of any of the possible sources 
other than the traders themselves. Radio, rumour and kin/friends were therefore included in 
the 'other' category as a source of market information for the purposes of calculating the chi 
square value. This appears in Table 8.12. When the sources of information are considered, it is 
found that the producers in Lushoto, who appear to have a greater level of information, in most 
cases receive their information from the traders. The only exceptions are in Lwandai, where 
about one third of the respondents used the 'independent sources', such as kin or friends, the 
radio, rumour or the original 'other' category which included extension officers or possibly co­
operative officials and so on. In the villages of Matombo and Mgeta, where advance 
information appears to be less available, the producers are more reliant on independent 
sources. Only two people have indicated their source of information as being the radio, one 
each of these is in Mgeta and Matombo.
The data concerning the source of the market information have been cross-tabulated in Table 
8.13 by the producers' most important crop type. This table suggests that the crop type 
produced by the respondent is related to the access the producer has to market information. 
The chi square test has resulted in a highly significant result. This suggests that if a village as 
specialised as those involved in this survey, has difficulty in obtaining independent reliable 
market information, the sector of production the village is involved in will be adversely affected. 
For example, both Mgeta and Matombo have been shown to have a serious lack of 
information. Matombo has developed a specialism in the production of fruit, particularly citrus 
fruit, while in Mgeta the specialism is in the production of cooking vegetables, such as cabbage 
and, to a lesser extent, pulses. This chronic lack of information will have a detrimental effect on 
the market for these crops. If producers find that they are having difficulty negotiating a fair 
price for their produce they may simply opt out of commercial production and choose to 
produce food for household consumption only.
Table 8.13 Chi Square of Market Information by Crop Type
Count
Expected Value
Yes No Row Total
Salad Vegetables 0 8 54
225 24.4 21.2%
Cooking Vegetables 43 2B 80
26.2 36.1 31.4%
Fruit 36 46 53
26.2 23.9 20.8%
Staples 31 4 23
25.1 10.4 9.0%
Pulses 35 29 45
225 20.3 17.6%
Column 145 115 255
Percent 53.5% 45.1% 100.0%
Degrees of Freedom 4 
Chi Square 74.4416
Significance 0.0000
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8.3.3 Decision Making Factors
The respondents were asked to give a reason for selecting their most important crop. The 
responses varied greatly, but it was possible to group them into 25 different answers. The 
modal motivation for growing the most important crop, indicated by the respondents, was ‘to 
obtain cash’ (see Appendix 8.3). This accounts for one hundred respondents or 38.5 per cent 
of the sample. The importance of the crops as a cash earner is reinforced by additional similar 
motivations such as 'it is my major source of income’, accounting for 5.8 per cent of the sample.
These twenty-five motivations have been divided into four broad motivations: economic, such 
as for its high or consistent price, geographic, such as the crop is suited to the areas; ecologic, 
such as the crop's short growing season; and social or cultural, such as the land was inherited 
with the trees already planted, or the crop is grown mainly for domestic purposes, such as 
during the Muslim fasting period of Ramadan. The results of this comparison have then been 
compared with the type of crop selected as the most important by the respondents. This is 
presented in Table 8.14. The economic motivation for selecting a crop, has been given priority 
over the other main themes mentioned by the respondents, with 59.6 per cent indicating this 
type of reason as their most important for selecting their most important crop. However, the 
producers are clearly aware of the importance of the ecology of their District. A significant 
proportion of the respondents (18.4 per cent) opted for their most important crops because of 
ecological reasons, such as the crop was best suited for the growing environment, or the crop 
was resistant to adverse environmental conditions, such as drought. This concern is likely to 
have arisen from the high population density and the long term concern over the environmental 
impact of such a high population density in the west Usambaras (Cliffe et al, 1975).
The results show that these motivations and the type of crop are related. For example, the 
salad and cooking vegetables have been selected primarily for economic reasons. Ecological 
and social or cultural reasons have some importance in the selection of a cooking vegetable, 
while a low, but higher than expected frequency of geographic motivations also exists behind 
some decisions concerning salad vegetables. Although the greatest proportion of fruit 
producers gave an economic motivation for deciding to grow fruit, the count was nevertheless 
lower than the expected frequency. The count exceeds the expected frequency in social and 
cultural reasons. This may be the result of two different, but not entirely unrelated, influences. 
Firstly, there are a number of producers who have inherited land with the fruit trees already 
growing on them. Most producers have left the trees to continue producing. In Matombo 
where the production of citrus fruits is very important to the local economy the trees are a 
valuable asset in any inherited land and are looked after with care.
4
Table 8.14 Chi Square of Decision Motivation of Credit by Crop Type
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Count
Expected Value
Economic Geographic Ecologic Social/
Cultural
Row Total
Salad Vegetables 39 8 5 1 S3
31.6 4.9 9.8 6.8 21.2%
Cooking Vegetables 50 9 16 4 79
47.1 7.3 14.5 10.1 31.6%
Fruit 25 3 8 16 53
31.6 4.9 9.8 6.8 21.2%
Staples 15 2 4 1 22
13.1 20 4.0 2 8 8.8%
Pulses 19 1 13 10 43
25.6 4.0 7.9 5.5 17.2%
Column 149 23 46 32 250
Percent 59.6% 9.2% 18.4% 128% 100.0%
Degrees of Freedom 12
Chi Square 422790
Significance 0.0000
The staple foods, according to Table 8.14, follow the expected frequency relatively closely 
suggesting that their distribution is little affected by the motivations. The pulses are similar, but 
are slightly more affected by the social and cultural motivations. This table may be interpreted 
as reflecting the level of economic awareness related to different crops. Either a high level of 
economic awareness is required to decide to grow the vegetable crops, or those growing 
vegetable crops have developed a higher level of economic understanding. The former 
seems the more likely where the producer is operating on a small scale, and is reliant on a small 
number of crops to provide sufficient income for the household. Where the producer is 
operating on a larger scale, it is more likely that diversification is possible and thus the producer 
can invest in less certain crops, while at the same time producing sufficient quantities of crops 
already known to give good and reliable returns.
The economic priorities of the producers can perhaps be interpreted by the purpose to which 
those who had access to credit, used it. Table 8.15 is a cross-tabulation of the purpose for 
which credit is obtained by the village location of the producer. The number of respondents for 
this question is low, and so the categories of buying seeds and buying inputs were combined, 
as were the categories of buying food and labour, to allow easier interpretation. The high 
number of low expected frequencies precludes a chi square test. This contingency table 
indicates that, for example in Matombo the most important purpose for which credit is 
obtained is for the supply of labour. This can be interpreted as the main cost of production in 
the village. The main crop is fruit and, therefore, the harvest time will require a very large 
amount of labour for the task of picking fruit from the trees.
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Table 8.15 Contingency Table of Purpose of Credit by Village
Count
Expected Value
Buying 
Seeds & 
Inputs
Transport & 
Implements
Food & 
Labour
Row Total
Matombo 1 2 13 16
8.5 2.3 5.3 17.6%
Lukozi 12 1 0 13
6.8 1.9 4.3 14.3%
Lwandai 9 1 8 18
9.5 2.6 6.0 19.8%
Soni 19 2 2 23
12.1 3.3 7.6 25.3%
Malindi 6 2 3 11
5.8 1.6 3.6 12.1%
Mgeta 1 5 4 10
5.3 1.4 3.3 11.0%
Count Total 48 13 30 91
51.8% 14.3% 33.0% 100.0%
In Lukozi, where the main crops are cooking vegetables and staple foods, the major purpose 
for credit is the purchase of agricultural inputs. In Lwandai, where the main crops are salad 
vegetables, the priorities are split between the purchase of food and the purchase of seeds. 
In Soni, where the main crop is also salad vegetables, 16 out of 23 respondents indicate that 
the main purpose to which credit is put is also the purchase of seeds. In Malindi and Mgeta, 
which have the lowest number of respondents in this variable, the producers responses are 
spread thinly across the different purposes, the highest values occurring in the purchase of 
seeds category in Malindi and in the the provisions of transport and implements in Mgeta. This 
suggests that the crop type is an important factor which influences the credit spending priorities 
of the producers. However, when it is tested directly, a chi square value of 2.016, which, with 4 
degrees of freedom, is not significant at even the p=0.1 level.
There are, however, other factors which appear to have influence on the use of credit by the 
respondents. The village with the highest incidence of credit use is Soni. Although there was 
found to be no significant relationship between the use of credit and the village location, this is 
perhaps significant, as it is perhaps the closest of all the villages to a road of national 
importance and is located on the main route from Lushoto District to this trunk road. This makes 
Soni's geographic location commercially highly advantageous and is perhaps the reason why so 
many producers involved in the Trade/Craft’ sector are able to find work. In addition, it is well 
located for the supply of agricultural produce since lorries do not have to travel further into 
Lushoto's Usambara Mountains, where the other survey villages are located, in order to find 
the required temperate growing conditions for the salad vegetables which Soni produces. This 
is reinforced by the fact that the only farmer interviewed, who was producing for contract, was 
found in Soni.
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8.4 Survey of Crop Sales
In addition to the agricultural details, the questionnaire survey of farmers obtained details of 
producers' estimated normal crop sales. Details of a total of 1,248 transactions were collected. 
The table below shows that the greatest overall number of transactions reported was in Soni.
Table 8.16 Farmer Transaction Details by Village
Village Transactions (%) Farmers (%) Ratio
Matombo 222 (17.8) 41 (15.3) 5.4
Mgeta 136 (10.9) 42 (15.7) 3.2
Morogoro 358 (28.7) 83 (31.0) 4.3
Lukozi 199 (15.9) 48 (17.9) 4.1
Lwandai 231 (18.5) 49 (18.3) 4.7
Soni 308 (24.7) 47 (17.5) 6.6
Malindi 152 (12.2) 41 (15.3) 3.7
Lushoto 890 71.3 185 (69.0) 4.8
Total 1,248 (100.0) 268 (100.0) 4.7
The results in Table 8.16, namely the producer-transaction ratios and the proportion of the 
overall transactions accounted for by those recorded in Soni, reinforces a previous argument 
stating that Soni has a far more commercially developed village economy. Its high ratio of 
producer transactions (6.6) also points to a high level of crop diversification within the village in 
comparison with the other villages surveyed. It is also interesting to note that the mean ratios 
for both regions are very similar. Both villages which are closest to the main roads to Dar es 
Salaam, Matombo in Morogoro and Soni in Lushoto have the highest ratios reported, and this 
further confirms that the higher level of commercial activity is largely a result of the influence of 
the village's location. On the contrary, Malindi, which is some distance into the Usambara 
Mountains, and Mgeta, which also requires a difficult and sometimes hazardous drive from the 
main road, have lower levels of producer-transaction ratios.
The details of the crop sales required the farmers to list up to nine crops which they produced 
and sold. These crops were ranked by the producers in order of importance. This gave the 
crop types which the farmers considered as most important, which have already been referred 
to. However, a far greater amount of different crops are produced and sold in the areas 
mentioned. In total, 52 different crops were reported. These have been grouped in the same 
way as the most important crop type category used earlier, and are presented Table 8.17.
When all the transactions are aggregated in this way, without weighting for importance, fruit 
plays a far greater role than previously indicated. In Table 8.17, fruit accounts for 33.8 per cent 
of the transactions reported, and makes up the single most important component of all food 
sales reported. Cooking vegetables follow with 25.3 per cent. None of the other food 
categories achieve a greater proportion overall than about 16 per cent. Matombo has the
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highest number of fruit transactions with 134 or 63.8 per cent of the total transactions in 
Matombo, and is the only village where the observed frequency exceeds the expected 
frequency for the number of fruit sales. In Matombo the relative importance of the other 
commodities is low, except in the case of pulses, which seem to be a secondary food type. 
Pulses account for 26.7 per cent of reported sales, most of which are to a co-operative. In 
Mgeta pulse sales account for 40.5 per cent. Clearly, pulses are important to the economy in 
the villages in Morogoro.
Table 8.17 Cross-Tabulation of Crop Transactions according to Crop Type by Village.
Count
Expected Value
Salad
Vegetables
Cooking
Vegetables
Fruit Staples Pulses Row Total
Matombo 6 14 134 0 56 210
33.8 53.2 71.1 19.6 32.3 17.7%
Lukozi 38 58 48 35 16 195
31.4 49.4 66.0 18.2 30.0 16.4%
Lwandai 56 59 61 21 20 217
34.9 55.0 73.4 20.3 44.7 18.3%
Soni 56 78 96 32 28 290
46.6 73.5 98.1 27.1 44.7 24.4%
Malindi 21 46 45 23 10 145
23.3 36.7 49.1 13.5 22.3 122%
Mgeta 14 46 18 0 53 131
21.1 33.2 44.3 12.2 20.2 11.0%
Column 191 301 402 111 183 1188
Percent 16.1% 25.3% 33.8 9.3% 15.4% 100.0%
Degrees of Freedom 20 
Chi Square 308.9916
Significance 0.0000
The importance of cooking vegetables in Lukozi, Malindi and Mgeta is reinforced, and their 
importance in Soni is greatly enhanced, when compared against the cross-tabulation of 
producers' most important crop with the village in which they are interviewed (Table 8.14).
When the the producers' most important crops are compared against their village location, 
Soni's producers appear to favour the production of salad vegetables over that of any of the 
other crop types. In Table 8.17, taking the producers’ other crop choices makes this distinction 
less clear. It does, however, suggest that producers in Soni are more diverse than their 
counterparts in other villages, particularly among fruit and vegetable types. The number of 
transactions in Soni village is far higher than elsewhere, and they account for 24.4 per cent of the 
total number of transactions recorded in the whole survey.
Soni stands out from the other villages, along with its near neighbour Lwandai, in their high 
proportion of sales to consumers. Table 8.18 shows that when the respondents' buyers are 
categorised, consumers and traders each constitute just over 60 per cent of the producers' 
buyers. This figure rises to 84.3 per cent in the case of Lwandai, and to 84.7 per cent in that of 
Soni. The lowest proportion of transactions reported selling directly to consumers were in 
Matombo and Lukozi, where they accounted for 43.9 per cent and 32.3 per cent respectively. 
These two villages, however, have a greater contact with alternative buyers, such as a co­
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operative in Matombo which buys pulses from producers there, in 18.6 per cent of the 
recorded transactions. In Lukozi, on the other hand, 36.9 per cent of transactions involve sales 
to buyers in retail markets in Dar es Salaam, entered in the 'other* category.
Table 8.18 Aggregated Crosstabulation of Crop Buyers per Transaction by Village
Transactions Count 
Row per cent
Consumers Traders Government
Agency
Co­
operative
Other Row
Total
Matombo 97 123 3 41 3 221
43.9 55.7 1.4 18.6 1.4 17.9%
Lukozi 63 112 0 0 72 195
32.3 57.4 0.0 0.0 36.9 15.8%
Lwandai 194 143 0 0 0 230
84.3 62.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.6%
Soni 251 197 0 0 11 308
84.7 64.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 24.9%
Malindi 77 109 1 0 11 148
52.0 73.6 0.7 0.0 7.4 12.0%
Mgeta 78 88 1 0 5 136
57.4 64.7 0.7 0.0 3.7 11.0%
Column 770 772 5 41 136 1238
Percent 62.2% 62.4% 0.4 3.3 10.9% 100.0%
NOTE: The table above is an aggregated crosstabulation of the frequency of all the references 
made to the relevant crop buyer type by each of the respondents in their reporting of crop 
sales transactions. Most producers reported transactions involving more than one buyer each. 
The result is that the row percentages do not add up to exactly one hundred, since they refer 
to the proportion of producers who report sales to each type of buyer and not the proportion 
of transactions reported.
Producers in the other two villages in the survey, namely Malindi and Mgeta, concentrated 
mainly on sales to traders and consumers, as in the cases of Lwandai and Soni. In both of 
these villages approximately 84.5 per cent of producers reported sales to traders. Most other 
producers reported significant proportions of their sales took place with traders, but their sales 
are a little more balanced, for example in the case of Malindi 52.0 per cent of producers 
reported sales to consumers and 73.6 per cent reported sales to traders, and in Mgeta 57.4 
per cent to consumers and 64.7 per cent to traders. These latter two villages are located at 
similar time distances from main national roads, Malindi is approximately 50 km from the main 
Tanga-Moshi highway, which takes about one and a half hours by lorry, while Mgeta is located at 
about 20 km from the Morogoro-lringa highway, which also takes about one and a half hours 
because of the extremely poor condition of the road. Soni and Lwandai, on the other hand, 
are relatively close to national trunk roads, both about half an hour’s drive from the national 
highway (see Figure 8.1).
The location' where the reported transactions take place is also related to the village origin of 
the producer. For example, Lukozi has the highest proportion of transactions which take place 
at the farm (52.1 per cent). It also has the lowest proportion of sales which take place in its 
own village (29.1 per cent), and the highest proportion of sales taking place in Kariakoo market 
in Dar es Salaam (35.7 per cent). It seems most likely that the lack of a well-established market
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in Lukozi has forced producers either to deal with traders who come to seek out purchases at 
their farm, or to take their produce themselves to Kariakoo in order to sell.
Producers in Soni are very fortunate in having one of Lushoto District's largest periodic markets 
in their village. This is reflected in Soni having the second highest proportion of producers 
selling their produce in their own village. The reason for this seems likely to be that the market 
attracts a high level of demand on market days, and means that producers do not have to travel 
to get a price they are happy with. This demonstrates the importance of the periodic market to 
the wholesale trade in fruit and vegetables to the producers of Soni, and suggests that such a 
focussed buying market can have benefits for the producers.
Mgeta also has an important market which serves to focus the wholesale buying activities in the 
village and results in a high proportion of the producers being able to sell within their own 
village. In Mgeta the market takes the form of a purpose-built market building for wholesale 
trading activities, with space available for bulking of lorry loads, providing facilities which attract 
traders and the producers wishing to sell to them. The market building is particularly important 
during the rainy season when most of the villages around Mgeta are inaccessible to vehicles 
and Mgeta becomes a central focus for the buying and selling of produce.
Table 8.19 Cross-Tabulation of Crop Buyers by Study Area
Count
Expected Value
Consumers Traders Government
Agency/Co­
op
Other Row
Total
Morogoro 170 142 40 5 357
216.2 99.7 11.8 26.2 28.8%
Lushoto 589 205 1 86 885
540.8 247.3 29.2 64.8 71.3%
Column 759 347 42 91 1242
Percent 61.1% 27.9% 3.3% 7.3% 100.0%
Degrees of Freedom 3
Chi Square 158.556
Significance 0.0000
The broader pattern of the disaggregated Morogoro data displays a more balanced 
proportion of traders and consumers buying from the respondents (Table 8.19). In Morogoro 
there are 47.6 per cent of transactions reported with consumers buying and 39.8 per cent with 
traders buying. In Lushoto, however, there are 66.2 per cent of consumers buying in the 
reported transactions and 23.2 per cent of traders. This suggests a more externally oriented 
production economy in the Morogoro area, while in Lushoto a greater proportion of the 
reported transactions take place directly with consumers, suggesting a more highly developed 
local demand.
Table 8.20 presents the data on the location of the transactions reported by the respondents, 
crosstabulated with the study area. A greater number of transactions than expected took place
258
in the ‘at farm’ and 'other village’ categories in Lushoto, accounting for 15.9 and 10.4 per cent of 
reported Lushoto transactions respectively, while in Morogoro the producers’ village 
(accounting for 59.1 per cent of Morogoro transactions), or Kariakoo and the 'other' category 
account for a greater number of sales than the expected frequency. There are a low number of 
sales taking place at the farm and in other villages in Morogoro, while in Lushoto there are more 
sales taking place in other villages around the area, reflecting again perhaps the more highly 
developed demand in and around Lushoto. In both cases almost 20 per cent of the sales are 
reported to take place in Kariakoo. The proportion of sales taking place in the Lushoto area (in 
the ‘this village’, 'other village’ and ‘at farm’categories) as opposed to in the urban area, in other 
words, at Kariakoo and the 'other' category (mainly consisting of informal Dar es Salaam sales), 
result in a ratio of 79.7% to 20.2%. The equivalent calculation for Morogoro results in a ratio of 
68.9% to 32.1 %. This may be result of Lushoto’s location at a greater distance from Dar es 
Salaam by comparison with the Morogoro (see Figure 8.1). It may also be explained by the 
strong trading ties between the Waluguru, the tribe inhabiting the Mgeta area, and the trading 
of food in Morogoro town and Dar es Salaam, discussed earlier, encouraging a greater number 
of producers in Morogoro to attempt to trade out of the area themselves, rather than sell to a 
middleman.
Table 8.20 Cross-Tabulation of Location of Sales by Study Area
Count
Expected Value
At Farm Nearest
Village
Other
Village
Kariakoo Other Row
Total
Morogoro 27 201 18 66 45 357
48.3 193.7 31.6 63.2 20.1 28.7%
Lushoto 141 473 92 154 25 885
119.7 480.3 78.4 156.8 49.9 71.3%
Column 168 674 110 220 70 1242
Percent 13.5% 54.3% 8.9% 17.7% 5.6% 100.0%
Degrees of Freedom 4 
Chi Square 65.129
Significance 0.0000
There is little difference between the two areas in terms of the numbers of crops the producers 
sell, since a chi square of the number of crops grown (grouped into three categories) and the 
area did not produce a significant chi square result. However, Table 8.21 displays a 
contingency table of the number of crops against the crop type in the sales transactions. This 
has produced a highly significant chi square result. This shows that there is statistical 
relationship between these two variables. More specifically crops such as the salad 
vegetables and the cooking vegetables appear to involve a greater degree of specialisation, 
with a high proportion and a higher than expected frequency of producers selling these crops, 
concentrating on a small number of crops. In the case of fruits, however, the secondary place 
they have in most producers' priorities is in part confirmed by the higher numbers of types of 
crops farmers selling them are producing and selling. Both staples and pulses have observed 
frequencies higher than expected in the lower crop numbers and in the higher ones. This
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perhaps reflects two different motivations for producing staples for sale. Firstly, there is the 
producer who is concentrating on the staple or pulse as the main cash crop, this is the producer 
concentrating on the small number of crops. Secondly, there is the producer who is producing 
staples and pulses for domestic use, but often produces more than the household requires. 
These he or she then sells, but these crops are secondary to the main purpose of the farmers' 
production.
Table 8.21 Chi Square of the Main Crop Type by the Grouped Number of Crops Produced
Count
Expected Value
1-3 Crops 4-6 Crops 7+ Crops Row Total
Salad Vegetables 138 43 9 190
116.9 59.0 14.1 16.1%
Cooking Vegetables 215 68 17 300
184.5 93.1 223 25.4%
Fruit 175 188 37 400
246.0 124.2 29.8 33.8%
Staples 77 20 13 110
67.7 34.2 8.2 9.3%
Pulses 122 48 12 182
111.9 56.5 13.5 15.4%
Column 721 367 88 1182
Percent 61.5% 31.0% 7.4% 100.0%
Degrees of Freedom 8 
Chi Square 90.5066
Significance 0.0000
The crop types types have also been found to be statistically related to the people to whom 
they are sold. Table 8.22 is a crosstabulation of the main crop types sold by the respondents 
and the categories of buyers to whom they sell. In order to make the table valid for a chi 
square test, the Government Agency and Co-operative categories have been amalgamated. 
This table demonstrates that, on the whole, salad vegetables, cooking vegetables and staples 
conform to the expected frequencies for sales to the consumer and the traders, but they 
exceed the expected frequencies for the sales to 'other* buyers, mainly made up of non- 
Kariakoo urban wholesale market traders in Dar es Salaam. Fruit, on the other hand, exceeds 
expected frequencies of sales to traders and consumers, but is lower than expected in sales 
to 'other* buyers. Finally, although pulses are mainly sold to consumers, this is lower than the 
expected frequency. A higher than expected frequency in pulse sales occurs with co-operative 
buyers, pulses being the only crop which respondents to this questionnaire sell to co­
operatives. This is also already known to only happen in Matombo.
The higher than expected frequencies of sales of vegetables to informal urban wholesalers 
demonstrate the level of informal marketing which exists between the survey villages and the 
urban market. 9.9 per cent and 11.0 per cent of sales of salad vegetables and cooking 
vegetables are producers selling to the ‘other’ category, which are mainly urban traders. This is 
relatively small, but does not include the proportion of sales which take place between the rural 
trader and the urban trader. In addition, this does not take into account the volume of sales
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since this is only a record of the number of sales in which the respondents are regularly involved. 
The proportion of sales which are channelled first through the rural-buying traders is greater and 
amounts to a total of 28.9 per cent of all commodity sales (31.2 per cent of fruit and vegetable 
sales alone). Since producer-to-trader sales always involve far greater volumes than those 
involving producer-consumer transactions, this represents a far greater proportion of the volutne 
of sales which take place. As a result of this survey, it is possible to estimate that 24.1 per 
cent of salad vegetables, 23.0 per cent of cooking vegetables and 14.4 per cent of fruit sales 
transactions, carried out by the respondents, took place in Kariakoo. The smaller proportion of 
fruit sales in Kariakoo gives a further confirmation of the argument in Chapter Five that the 
balance of the crops that arrive at Kariakoo favours vegetables over fruit.
Table 8.22 Aggregated Cross-Tabulation of Crop Buyers by Crop Types
Count
Expected Value
Consumers Traders Governmen
Agency/-
Co-op
Other Row Total
Salad Vegetables 114 57 1 19 191
114.2 55.4 6.6 14.7 16.2%
Cooking Vegetables 175 92 0 33 301
179.4 87.1 10.4 23.1 25.5%
Fruit 254 129 0 16 400
238.7 115.8 13.8 30.7 33.8%
Staples 70 27 0 13 111
65.8 31.9 3.8 8.5 9.3%
Pulses 94 38 40 10 183
108.9 52.8 6.3 14.0 15.4%
Column 707 343 41 91 1182
Percent 59.8% 29.0% 3.5% 7.7% 100.0%
Degrees of Freedom 12 
Chi Square 238.863
Significance 0.0000
8.5 Summary
In conclusion, the average farming household is headed by a farmer of about 45 years, who has 
about 5 years of primary schooling. The farm size is of about 3.2 hectares, divided over 3 
plots of land, on which the farm will be growing between 4 and 5 crops intended for commercial 
sale. The household will have just over seven members, only 3 of whom will be under 12 years 
of age. The household size is likely to be higher in Lushoto District as a result of the frequency 
of the practice of polygamy in these areas.
The producer is less likely to have formal employment, in addition to the farm, so the farm 
forms the main part of the household income. Those who do have employment are most likely 
to be involved in informal market trading, although there is a very wide variety of other forms of 
employment farmers are involved in. The main crop is most likely to be a cooking vegetable 
and least likely to be a staple or pulse, although most producers grow these for subsistence. 
The producer is less likely to have access to credit, while those who do are unlikely to have 
access to large quantities, the majority using less than TShs 5,000. Most farmers rely on the
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trader to whom they sell to get a fair price, as they appear to have little independent 
information on prices and demand in the main consuming areas.
The flows of information are almost entirely dominated by the traders of fruit and vegetables 
who buy from the producers and who clearly have a vested interest in the information which 
reaches the producers. Other independent sources of information, such as relatives or friends, 
who travel to the urban markets are less regularly available and are certainly not as frequently 
used. If producers are to obtain realistic prices for their produce they must have access to and 
use independent market information. This is already provided on a limited basis by the weekly 
radio broadcasts of Kariakoo Wholesale Market prices and delivery reports. In addition, the 
Sunday News began a column reporting similar information in April 1989. This type of 
information must be encouraged and more widely used.
There is a high demand for modest amounts of credit for agricultural purposes on an annual 
basis. The nature of the frequency of demand suggests that it is linked to the crop growing 
seasons, and may therefore not occur at the same time for every household, but will depend 
on the type of crop being produced. The demand is already being met to a limited extent, 
but there clearly remains a high unsatisfied demand. Much of the credit supply is provided by 
the traders who also buy from the producers (28.0 per cent), or from kin (41.0 per cent). In 
addition, the purposes for which the credit is required in the two study areas is relatively similar 
to the national data obtained from the Co-operative Rural Development Bank.
Despite the historical and environmental differences between the two study areas, there is little 
to distinguish them in terms of the responses given to the questionnaire. Three out of the four 
significant differences may be explained by the village differences rather than the study area 
differences. However, the clearest distinctions are in the use of credit, Morogoro respondents 
using credit more for agriculture-related services, such as, for hiring labour, while Lushoto 
respondents purchase agricultural inputs.
A greater number of distinguishing variables exist between the villages. Matombo has the 
highest mean age with 57 years, while Lwandai has the lowest at 39 years. The other villages 
remain between 42 and 49 years on average. There is greater significance in the difference 
between the mean ages of producers broken down into crop types which they produce. Fruit, 
which is an important crop for Matombo, has producers of the highest mean age of 54 years, 
while salad vegetables, the most important crop type for Lwandai, has producers of mean age 
of 38 years. This may be partly because older farmers still have the fruit trees they were told 
to plant by the colonial government, or that fruit trees require less labour to produce.
Market information is also an important distinguishing variable, with none of the respondents in 
either of the Morogoro villages receiving market information. Very few respondents use 
independent information sources such as radio, newspapers or relatives who may live in urban
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areas. The evidence suggests none of the information supplied by such sources would be 
considered as relevant to the rural sales negotiations. The wholesale purchasers buying in the 
rural producing areas are in a strong bargaining position.
The evidence from the questionnaires suggests that the motivations for growing certain crops 
varies between the type crops the producers grow. For example, salad and cooking 
vegetable producers can be described as more economically motivated, while those producing 
pulses may have more ecological, or social or cultural motivations. The pulse producer is likely 
to be concerned to conserve the soil or to produce for the household consumption. On the 
other hand, the salad vegetable producer is more likely to do so in order to earn cash or 
maximise.the farm's financial returns.
The study areas and, more significantly, the villages, are distinguished by their 'farmer-crop 
transaction ratio'. Soni, in Lushoto District stands out, with a ratio of 6.6 transactions per 
producer, indicating a village of highly diversified producers. By contrast, the ratio of 3.2 in 
Mgeta suggests a lower level of diversification, but is more likely to be the result of the high 
level of population pressure and land shortage in Mgeta Division, where producers are limited 
in the land available to them for production. As a result there is very little space in which to 
grow a large number of crops, and there have been frequent legal conflicts between farmers 
(Paul, 1988).
Fruit production is less important on a village or study area scale, particularly when the main 
crops are concentrated on, but a large proportion of households reported producing fruit for 
sale. The reason fruit is important is that it is a secondary crop produced widely in Lushoto 
because of the large number of fruit trees in the area, where as in Matombo most producers 
concentrate on producing citrus fruit for sale. Fruit is likely to be secondary to the main 
household production in Lushoto District, especially in villages such as Soni. Fruit trees require 
little attention to produce, although the results may be of low quality.
Producers are happy to sell to either producers or direct to consumers - each reported as 
buyers by about 62 per cent of the respondents. The consumers are likely to involve small 
sales made at the periodic markets, where socialising function, exchange of information, and 
local news are likely to be more important than economic returns.
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Chapter Nine 
Discussion
9.1 Review of Methods
The supply of food to the urban population of Africa is an issue of immense importance to 
African governments. As the cities of Africa continue to increase in size at alarming rates, the 
question of how to meet the spiralling food requirements of its urban populations becomes 
increasingly complex. This study attempts to redress the curious imbalance of research on 
African urban centres, which has tended to focus more on issues of physical infrastructure, such 
as spatial layout, provision of shelter and in-migration. This study attempts to fill the gap, 
contributing an analysis of the provision of fresh fruit and vegetables for the urban market of 
Dar es Salaam.
The study employed a variety of both primary and secondary data sets and a wide range of 
techniques of data capture in order to cover the range of interests and groups involved in fruit 
and vegetable marketing. These are as follows: the analysis of formal wholesale market price 
and volume data recorded in Kariakoo Wholesale Market; a survey of urban retailers; a survey 
of Lushoto traders; price data recorded by the Marketing Development Bureau; a survey of 
rural traders; and a survey of rural producers.
The Kariakoo data provided an extremely useful indication of changes in the formal sector 
supply of fruit and vegetables. They revealed a number of long term trends and indicated 
seasonal patterns of supply to Kariakoo, which are likely to reflect patterns for the city itself. 
However, one of the main difficulties of these data is that they are only an estimate, although a 
reliable estimate, of what passes through Kariakoo. There are no data collected for wholesale 
transactions outside Kariakoo market. The survey of urban retailers collected data concerning 
trading which occurs in the informal sector, in an attempt to overcome this. A second difficulty 
concerns the accuracy of the Kariakoo data. As has already been reported, there were 
difficulties in eliciting a consistent formula for volume conversions from KMC staff. Producers 
and traders entering the market measure volume in local units, such as baskets or large sacks. 
However, on entry to the market these volumes are converted into metric tonnes by tally clerks, 
who appear to,estimate the conversion based simply on experience, since the facilities for 
weighing produce are limited. In addition, the calculation of the value is based on this 
estimated volume multiplied by the minimum ‘guideline’ price, which is frequently ignored by 
the dealers on the trading floor. Despite these difficulties, clear patterns were produced which 
correspond with the qualitative data collected through interviews and other studies.
The survey of urban retailers is based on a relatively small sample of a population, the size of 
which can only be estimated. This survey had to focus on the most visible and easily accessible 
retailers, those of fixed locations in the urban markets. Sporrek's study (1985) suggests that 
even at during the mid 1970s street vendors played an important role in the supply of fruit and 
vegetables to the urban consumers. The observations of the current study would suggest that 
conditions for street vendors have improved, allowing their numbers to swell around the city, as 
indeed they have in many other cities in the developing world (Paddison, 1990). This is an area 
that is the subject of study in South-East Asia (McGee and Yeung, 1977), but it is a subject 
area of which little is known in Tanzania. So long as unemployment and under-employment 
exist in Dar es Salaam and illegal trading is accepted, or at least not interfered with by the 
authorities, it seems reasonable to assume that such informal trading will continue to exist.
What is not quantified, however, is the importance of this activity to both the supply of fruit and 
vegetables and to the employment and survival strategies of the urban dwellers.
9.2 New Models of Fruit and Vegetable Marketing in Dar es Salaam
At the beginning of this study, a number of approaches to urban food supply were reviewed. 
Among these, Boekholt and van der Veen (1986), in their study of food supply to Mysore City, 
produced a model of the supply system (Figure 1.1). This general model can be modified to 
focus on the role of the markets in the fruit and vegetable supply system for Dar es Salaam 
(Figure 9.1). This model attempts to show the role of each level of the food supply system. 
For example, while in Sporrek’s model C (Figure 3.7), the wholesale market operates as a 
centralising institution, Dar es Salaam traders now have a range of wholesale sources from which 
they can choose. Kariakoo is still an extremely important wholesale market, dealing with 
approximately 50 per cent of deliveries to the city. However, evidence suggests that the role 
of the informal sector is of increasing importance. The markets of Tandika and Tandale (see 
Figure 3.1) were frequently referred to as important sources of vegetables and, more 
importantly, fruit. The evidence suggests that the volume of turnover of supplies to the city will 
increase almost threefold, from the time of the fieldwork to the year 2000. Kariakoo’s volume of 
turnover has not increased since 1983, because it simply cannot handle any more deliveries. 
Unless new market premises are found, the formal sector will still account for 70,000 metric 
tonnes per year, when the city consumes 500,000 metric tonnes in the year 2000, thus reducing 
the formal sector’s share of wholesaling to 14 per cent. Without continuing liberalisation of the 
economy, it is clear that the formal wholesaling of fruit and vegetables, to meet the demand of 
the rapidly expanding urban population, would be inadequate.
The evidence collected from interviews and observations in the city indicate that Kariakoo is 
currently competing with other market locations for wholesaling business. This is reflected in 
Figure 9.1 which shows Kariakoo as one of a number of urban wholesaling markets. The size of
each of the markets reflects their relative importance. The other two markets named in the 
model, Tandale and Tandika, have both retail and informal wholesale functions. Kariakoo has 
advantages, such as its capacity and subsequent large numbers of buyers, security for 
overnight storage and reliability for the buyer, in terms of stock and variety of produce. 
Disadvantages include: extreme congestion, both inside and outside the market building, which 
limits pedestrian and vehicle access, commission charges, and licensing fees. As opposed to 
open air markets, the atmosphere in Kariakoo wholesale market is unpleasant because of a lack 
of ventilation or air conditioning, coupled with high temperatures and humidity and the pervasive 
smell of rotting food. The retail market places have advantages such as their proximity to the 
main residential areas and their distance from the traffic congestion of the city centre. These 
markets are also retail markets and so provide a demand among the retailers, and a relatively 
rapid channel for disposing of produce. The wholesale trading in these markets avoid the 
commission rate which is charged at Kariakoo, although KMC is known to be sending clerks to 
attempt to extract commission from these informal trading channels.
Figure 9.1 Model of Market Relationships in the System of Fruit and Vegetable
Supply for Dar es Salaam
The model in Figure 9.1 begins with rural producers, who have a range of channels open to 
them for selling their produce. Most rural areas have a well-developed periodic marketing 
system for the exchange of goods and services, which are of economic and social significance 
to the rural population. These relate directly to Maliyamkono and Bagachwa’s (1990) ‘traditional1 
market channel and comprise well-developed market systems rotating around a hierarchy of
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several market centres in a similar pattern to that described by the central place theorists 
discussed in chapter 1. These periodic occasions, taking place about once or twice a week, 
have proved ideal for rural and urban based traders to meet rural producers, and negotiate the 
purchase of food commodities for transporting to the urban markets. In some areas the 
production of food for the urban market is of such importance that a wholesale market building 
has been constructed to facilitate the marketing process. For example, the wholesale market 
building in Mgeta forms the focus for the trading of produce from the surrounding area. This is 
particularly important during the rainy season when the villages on the road beyond the market 
building are inaccessible by lorry on the main road through the area. Commodities produced at 
higher altitudes have to be carried down to the market, where traders wait to purchase. A final 
channel comprises itinerant traders travelling out from the city to those areas known to produce 
the commodities sought. This type of trader travels around a rural area negotiating the 
purchase of producers’ commodities. Once he has sufficient volume to fill a truck, he hires the 
truck usually from the nearest town or village and collects the produce from the producers. In 
some cases this type of trader may also arrange the hire of labour to harvest the farmers’ 
produce, although this appears to be common practice only in tree crop producing areas, such 
as the plains of Tanga Region, where citrus fruits, mangoes and coconuts are grown. For 
example, it is common practice around Muheza in Tanga Region for traders to hire a producer’s 
field of orange trees at a rate based on the number of trees in the field. The trader will then 
hire labour to harvest the crop, and load it onto his lorry to take to Dar es Salaam (Seminar fur 
Landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung, 1986). This has the advantage to the farmer of not requiring him 
to make a large capital outlay to pay for harvesting, one of the most expensive parts of 
agricultural production. It has the advantage to the trader that it increases his margin, because 
he can obtain a lower price from the producer.
Each of these three ‘inter-regional’ market channels transport produce to the city and may feed 
into two main channels on entering the city. The evidence from this study suggests that those 
traders entering the city with vegetables are likely to go to the official market, Kariakoo. 
Vegetables, being generally less perishable than fruit, are better suited for Kariakoo’s 
strengths, such as overnight storage and a large number of buyers, particularly institution 
buyers making large purchases. On the other hand, traders bringing fruit into the urban areas 
are more likely to avoid the official market and go direct to a retail market. The two retail 
markets named in the model, Tandika and Tandale, are large retail markets which have also 
developed as,reputable informal wholesale markets for fruits, especially citrus. The result is 
that street traders and retailers from the city’s retail markets go to these two markets, as well as 
Kariakoo, in search of wholesale fruits. The box in the model entitled “other retail markets" 
represents an additional, less important channel, where a trader, or producer, entering Dar es 
Salaam takes his produce to a retail market to sell direct to retailers. This has resulted in some 
of the smaller, more recently established retail markets obtaining a reputation as wholesale 
sources of certain commodities, with street traders and retailers from markets nearby
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occasionally coming to those markets instead of the better established markets. These minor 
wholesale markets have tended to specialise in certain commodities; for example, Ubungo 
market on Morogoro Road has become well-known as a source of different types of bananas, 
while Buguruni market on Nelson Mandela Avenue has become known as a good source of 
citrus fruits, particularly oranges. The final level of the system, before the produce reaches the 
consumers, comprises the retail markets and the street traders. For the purposes of the 
retailers’ survey carried out as part of this study, the retail markets were defined as markets 
maintained by the city council. However, Sporrek (1985) points out that the distinction between 
a group of individual street stalls and a market place is not quite so clearly distinguishable. 
Many of the city council run retail markets referred to in this study began as small groups of 
individual stalls. However the market place retailers tend to have a greater level of capital to 
invest. This is clear because in order to trade in the main retail markets, a trader must pay a 
licence fee and a stall rent. By contrast the street traders generally deal in smaller quantities, in 
some cases they can be seen in the street selling oranges, for example, out of the bags 
{gunia) in which they were purchased and carried to the retail point.
Figure 9.2 presents a model focusing on one commodity type. Designed to present the 
system of supply for citrus fruits, this model shows that the role Kariakoo plays in the system is 
significantly reduced. The three main regions from which citrus fruit are obtained for Dar es 
Salaam are Morogoro, mainly from the eastern Uluguru Mountains; Tanga, mainly from 
Korogwe and Muheza Districts; and Coast Region, from south of the city and from Kisarawe 
District, to the south west. Without records it is impossible to calculate accurately the actual 
levels of importance of the citrus wholesale markets. However, qualitative data, such as 
interviews with Dar es Salaam retailers suggest that the importance of Kariakoo Wholesale 
Market is being undermined by other markets such as Tandale and Tandika. This is reflected in 
the size of the boxes representing each of the markets, although the relative sizes are 
symbolic and not scaled. The physical route by which the fruit is brought into the city 
determines to a great extent which market is predominantly used for wholesaling the deliveries. 
For example, citrus supplied from south of the city favours the use of Tandika market, because 
of its southern location. When fruit from the north or west of the city is in season, Tandale 
market is favoured because of its location on the Morogoro Road, which enters the city from 
the west.
During the sun/ey, reports suggested that Buguruni market is becoming increasingly important 
as a point of entry to the Dar es Salaam marketing system for citrus fruits from Kisarawe. This 
model shows that Kariakoo, because of its central location, congestion and commission charged, 
is by-passed in an attempt to distribute these highly perishable commodities rapidly to the 
retail outlets. Street traders and door-to door sellers are an important element of the 
marketing of citrus fruits the reason being that the highly perishable nature of citrus fruits makes 
it necessary to make frequent small purchases. These traders purchase relatively small
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quantities of fruit and sell them on street corners to passers-by. Although they sell smaller 
quantities, they have no overheads, their costs simply being the price of the produce and the 
cost of the transport, usually a bus fare. Because of the dispersed nature of citrus fruit retailing 
in the city, the wholesaling system has evolved a relatively dispersed geographical pattern 
more appropriate to the needs of all the participants. For example, street traders, in an 
effort to minimise their costs, trade-off lower market prices, which may be available at a more 
distant market in the city, with lower transport costs, obtained by going to a market which is 
nearer their retail point. Under these circumstances it may be entirely inappropriate to 
centralise all Dar es Salaam’s fruit wholesaling on one site, as it will have the result of increasing 
retailers’ costs and, ultimately, these will be transferred on to the consumer.
Figure 9.2 Model of Citrus Fruit Supply Channels For Dar es Salaam
By contrast, Figure 9.3 focuses on the vegetable supply system for Dar es Salaam. This 
model encompasses different areas of the country, and demonstrates that Kariakoo has a far 
greater degree of prominence for vegetables than for citrus fruits. The producers interviewed 
in the rural areas, who were mainly vegetable producers, gave far greater significance to 
Kariakoo as the wholesale market they favour in Dar es Salaam. Analysis of the Kariakoo 
Wholesale Market data suggests that vegetables have increased in relative importance in the 
wholesale market during the 1980s. This change is due to Kariakoo’s advantages, as discussed 
previously. Fruit is highly perishable and usually has to be sold and distributed rapidly. The 
ability to store produce overnight at Kariakoo is unlikely to be perceived as an important 
advantage by citrus fruit traders, unless refrigeration facilities become available. Most 
vegetables, on the other hand, are less perishable and, therefore, they can be stored for 
longer periods, allowing the dealer time to secure an optimum price. Unlike the open air
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markets, Kariakoo has loading and unloading facilities for dealing with bulk deliveries arriving on 
large lorries. These include loading bays and relatively easy access to the trading floor. Its 
size attracts a large number of buyers, including institutional buyers, who are assured a 
relatively large selection of commodities. Few vegetables are produced south of the city, 
making Tandika’s role in this model significantly reduced, in contrast to the model for the citrus 
supply system. Tandale, however, is located on the main route into the city from all of the 
areas producing vegetables, and is considered among retailers to be a market of considerable 
and , significantly, increasing importance in the wholesaling of vegetables. In the case of 
vegetables, therefore, because of their less perishable nature, the pattern of supply is 
different. The more centralised system of wholesaling appears to suit these commodities. 
These retailers do not have the same time constraint due to perishability faced by retailers of 
fruits.
Figure 9.3 Model of Vegetable Marketing Channels Supplying Dar es Salaam
[RuraTProducing Arias 
] Morogoro
i  r-----
i_______________________
Figure 9.4 presents the system in terms of the relationships of each of the groups involved in 
the fruit and vegetable supply system. This is a simpler model than Boekholt and van der 
Veen’s model for the urban food supply system for Mysore, because the supply system for 
fruit and vegetables to Dar es Salaam has no cooperatives, commission agents or government 
organisations directly involved. The rural producers in their search for buyers may sell legally to 
rural-based traders or urban-based wholesalers in Kariakoo Wholesale Market. However, it 
may be more convenient or more profitable for them to sell to informal sector wholesalers, 
retailers or direct to consumers. The latter strategies reduce the proportion of the retail 
margins lost to middle agents.
Lushoto Mbeya Moshi
Figure 9.4 Model of Marketing Channels Supplying Dar es Salaam
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  Informal Sector Channels 
  Formal Sector Channels
The rural-based traders can be divided into two broad groups. Firstly, the “occasional" trader, 
who buys perhaps a sack of a commodity to take on a long journey. This sack will either be 
sold on arrival at a market in order to defray the cost of transport, or presented to a friend or 
relative, with whom the traveller may stay, as payment for accommodation. This form of trade 
falls within Maliyamkono and Bagachwa’s (1990) definition of a ‘shuttle’ marketing channel. The 
second type of rural trader is involved in trading on a full-time, or almost full-time basis. These 
traders usually buy sufficient quantities to fill a hired lorry, either alone or jointly with another 
trader. On entry to the city, the rural trader is obliged to sell produce through the regional 
trading company, which in Dar es Salaam is the Kariakoo Wholesale Market. The evidence 
presented in this study suggests that only about half of the wholesaling at this level takes place 
through the formal marketing channel. This form of trading falls within Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa’s (1990) ‘inter-regional marketing channel. The model in Figure 9.4 distinguishes 
between the channels which are in the formal sector, in other words, produce which is sold 
wholesale in Kariakoo and which is then channelled to retail outlets, and those in the informal 
sector, in other words, produce entering the city marketing system without passing through 
Kariakoo Wholesale Market. The model shows the alternative channels in the informal sector 
through which produce is distributed. The most important channels are where produce is sold 
to informal wholesalers in the main retail markets. For example, this study has presented 
evidence that a proportion of the produce supplied to Dar es Salaam’s market from areas 
south of the city, enters the city’s marketing system through Tandika market. However, some 
traders sell direct to consumers, and some producers bring their own produce into the city and 
either sell to retailers or direct to consumers. This latter alternative is only usually an option
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where the producer is selling small quantities of highly perishable produce, such as spinach, 
tangerines or tomatoes. In the case of spinach, producers are located in and around Dar es 
Salaam and sell the produce to consumers themselves. The highly delicate and perishable 
nature of this leafy vegetable requires that it is consumed within hours of cutting, therefore a 
longer and more complicated marketing channel would result in delays to the speedy 
distribution of the produce.
9.3 Data Analysis and Policy Considerations
One of the main concerns of the retail traders in the urban markets, and many of those who 
operate outside the main retail markets, is the possibility of being caught if and when the 
government or the city authorities decide to act on the existing legislation, which makes it strictly 
illegal to trade without a licence from the city authorities. In addition, by law, all traders should 
purchase their commodities from Kariakoo wholesale market. These laws have been quietly 
ignored but could still be enforced. Lado in his discussion of rural marketing systems in West 
Africa, disagrees with a description of marketing systems as disorganised. He explains that 
they are however subject to overnment restrictions which may impede or influence their 
development. He goes on to say that rural marketing systems, in particular, “transmit the 
impact of macro policy on to farmers’ incentives and, therefore, on to production and 
distribution” (Lado, 1988, p.373). The marketing system, because of its structure, will transmit 
impacts of effects of the government changes in marketing or production policy both up the 
channels, to urban marketing and consumption, and down, to rural trading and production. 
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) argue that many unworkable government policies 
established in the late 1970s and early 1980s spawned the expansion of the informal sector. 
Kariakoo is not capable of handling more than about half of Dar es Salaam’s current fruit and 
vegetable requirement, clearly making the law concerning wholesaling of fruit and vegetables in 
Dar es Salaam unworkable. Immediate clarification of street and informal sector trading is 
therefore necessary, in order to provide an atmosphere of security in which traders can 
operate. A distinction can be made between worthwhile productive informal sector activities 
and commodity specualtion and racketeering. These proposals are in line with the liberalisation 
of the other food marketing systems within the context of the continuing changes in the political 
economy of contemporary Tanzania. In addition, Maliyamkono and Bagachwa argue that far 
from being irrational, agricultural producers have shown themselves to be highly rational, basing 
much of their prpduction decisions on security of income. They therefore argue for a stabilising 
of agricultural policy and realistic pricing to encourage surplus agricultural production 
(Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990).
The analysis of the data collected from Kariakoo Market Corporation on the price and volumes 
of the fruit and vegetables traded there over an eight year period, suggests that Kariakoo 
cannot absorb an increase in volume. This is in spite of the estimated current rate of increase in
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Dar es Salaam’s population of .4.8 per cent per annum and Kariakoo’s role as sole legal 
wholesaler. Indeed, the market has already exceeded its designed capacity by a factor of two, 
and has remained at approximately that level of volume during the latter few years of the data 
series. This would suggest that the increase in the volume of consumption of fruit and 
vegetables in the city since the mid 1980s has been entirely supplied by the informal sector.
Two reports (Abbott, 1986; Marketing Development Bureau, 1985) suggest a relocation of 
Kariakoo’s marketing activities to a more peripheral site, which has the capacity for expansion to 
accommodate future needs. These reports also point out that the commission levy is too high 
and too costly to collect. These conclusions had already been reached by the informal sector, 
which had already avoided the Kariakoo commission charges altogether by established itself on 
several peripheral sites around the city. Moreover, the informal sector is more flexible in 
being able to adapt to seasonal variations in supply. Clearly, for fruit wholesaling, the current 
informal sector conditions, if not ideal, suit present market conditions. However, the increasing 
use of Kariakoo as a wholesale market of certain commodities, such as vegetables, suggests 
that there is still a demand for such a facility. It would seem sensible, therefore, given the 
limited space available on the Kariakoo site, that an additional vegetable wholesaling site is 
constructed on a site owned by the KMC located on Nelson Mandela Avenue (see Figure 3.1). 
Further, since the current low level of success of wholesale levy collections undermines the 
purpose of the market to provide a centralised fruit and vegetable wholesaling and distribution 
system, it is perhaps more appropriate to charge for the use of the market facilities. Abbott 
(1986) suggests a charge on floor space used or on vehicles entering the market. However, 
this may result in the loss of estimates of market throughput, on which the analysis in Chapter 
Four of this study is based and which is currently collected in order to calculate the levy. Abbott 
also suggested that the KMC levy charge of 6 per cent is very high for the wholesalers. Set 
against this is the high cost of collection in terms of time consuming administration, which 
reduces the benefit of the levy.
If Kariakoo is to maintain its current proportion of the Dar es Salaam wholesale market (about 50 
per cent), the construction of the new market must be able to accommodate an increased 
volume of goods, estimated to be 250,000 metric tonnes, or 500,000 metric tonnes for the 
whole city, by the year 2000. This will require an estimated 17,000 square metres of trading 
floor and the capacity of handling over 1,000 delivery vehicles per day. The evidence 
presented in this study suggests that Kariakoo must now consider itself to be operating in 
competition with the other markets carrying out wholesale functions, particularly Tandale and 
Tandika markets. However, some of the more strategically placed markets are relatively 
recently established, such as Ubungo (reportedly a good source for bananas) and Buguruni 
(reported as wholesaling oranges). The importance of these markets as wholesaling markets is 
likely to increase, mainly due to the advantage of their geographic location in relation to the 
points of entry to the city for various commodities. The retail markets are also distinguishable
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by the consumers for which they cater. One market, Kinondoni, has a much higher level of 
quality of produce, and, therefore, a higher price is charged for the commodities sold there. 
This suits the expatriate community and more affluent government employees and business 
people who live near to this market.
The more perishable fruits such as oranges, tangerines, ripe bananas and tomatoes by-pass 
Kariakoo in greater proportions than other commodities such as cabbage, onions and Irish 
potatoes, and some retail markets have already established reputations for wholesaling certain 
commodities. The general trend of the location of wholesale trading activities is outwards, away 
from the city centre and towards the city’s periphery. Therefore, the peripheral location of a 
new wholesaling facility would be an asset to the city’s wholesale system and would 
complement the central location of the Kariakoo wholesale market and the more disparate retail 
markets with wholesaling functions.
A realistic attitude to Kariakoo Market Corporation’s role as provider of wholesale facilities must 
be adopted. This must involve concentration on the market’s strengths; for example, it is 
possible to lock the market overnight, there is a covered trading area, the market attracts 
buyers of large quantities of produce, and there exist bulk loading and unloading facilities. 
Kariakoo still attracts a significant proportion of Dar es Salaam’s fruit and vegetable produce so 
the current service could be maintained, but the market’s sustainability should be reviewed 
regularly. The KMC’s proposed new wholesale market could still be established on the site 
already owned by the corporation, farther out of city, if it incorporated sufficient adjacent space 
for future expansion, for which KMC was negotiating at the time of the survey. One additional 
important consideration must be taken into account. That is a system by which the produce can 
be moved from peripheral wholesale market to retail markets must be planned for. The 
success of the private sector in supplying the transport service to the peripheral retail markets, 
may prove a useful model from which to plan. This network has been established without the 
assistance of the formal sector and could feasibly be expected to provide the service for the 
new wholesale market.
The informal sector, because it involves a large number of small traders is far more flexible than 
a large monopoly marketing organisation. These traders are able to deal in different 
commodities, change location, expand or contract their operations as required, without cost to 
the city or government. Porter (1992) reported that rural production of some luxury fruits as well 
as livestock and poultry can have high returns if carried out on a small scale, especially if 
marketed by the producer. When these commodities are produced in greater quantities 
problems arise because of insufficient market research. The luxury market is severely restricted 
in Tanzania and The high foreign exchange costs involved in producing high quality luxury fresh 
foods make it very difficult for this form of production to succeed. For example, agricultural 
inputs require imported chemicals, irrigation requires pumps, spare parts and fuel and crates
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for transportation often require imported steel for nails or staples. The example of spinach 
production and marketing illustrates this point. The requirement for rapid distribution of this 
vegetable suits the very simple and short producer-seller marketing channel very well. Any 
attempt to produce spinach on a large scale would have to carefully consider the constraints of 
marketing: that the produce must be sold within hours of cutting and that people generally 
purchase small quantities; constraints of transportation: it is a very delicate leafy vegetable 
and would have to be handled with immense care, particularly in bulk quantities, in order to 
avoid it being crushed. Under these circumstances an individual producer-seller, carrying a 
single basket to market every few days to sell directly to consumers ensures that the produce 
can be sold rapidly, that it is handled carefully and that its small scale of production and 
distribution, and direct selling ensures that the producer-seller's costs are minimised.
Retail markets around the city should be prepared to take on the additional role of wholesaling. 
The organisation of the market administration should take this into account and provide facilities, 
where possible, to assist. For example, where a market is acknowledged to have a strength in 
supplying one particular commodity on a wholesale basis, the market administration could 
become actively involved in promoting this, by attempting to provide suitable facilities for 
storage, trading, and commodity handling, at the same time receiving income from the 
wholesale traders, through rents, levies or licence fees, for the use of the facilities. However, 
this should not be seen by the city authorities as a way of obtaining further income. Retailers 
interviewed for this study suspected that any money made by levy collection in a market place, 
over and above running costs were sent to the city authorities. This was not a popular activity, 
particularly where facilities and space in the market place were lacking. Money made should be 
reinvested in the market place, in order to streamline the marketing channels in the market place 
and improve the service to the retailers.
Bucklin (1977), in his review of food retailing in Asian countries, felt that too much emphasis is 
being placed on improving retailing in developing countries through the application of 
inappropriate Western solutions. He suggested that the technology that could appropriately 
be brought to retailing in developing countries was that of market organisation. In other words, 
marketing channels should be organised and coordinated, both horizontally and vertically, in 
order to ensure that the retailers were obtaining the type of assistance and infrastructure they 
felt they required. He gives as examples the increasing the size of individual stalls, increasing 
the space around retailing areas for the circulation of goods and customers, improving the 
design of market places to make them places where people would want to go and where they 
enjoy their experience, where they are bright, well-ventillated, with plenty of provision of 
facilities for disposing of waste. While most markets do not make sufficient margins to consider 
some of these ideas, others are certainly worth consideration for improving the effectiveness of 
the market place. Lado (1988) argues for improved storage and transportation infrastructure, 
particularly in areas of surplus production, and the effective integration of productive areas into
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the national economy, such that more effective broadcasts of market intelligence will be of 
relevance to producers in rural areas. Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) argue for a closer 
examination of the 'second economy’ before legislation or policy is formulated, in order to 
ensure the market or producer response desired. They explain that the purpose of the 
marketing channels are to supply a need and to remunerate the producers of goods. If private 
traders can provide a challenge to the inefficinecies of the state-managed system then it has a 
valid role to play in the economy. However, producers and traders can also be supported and 
influenced by large state-managed agencies who are operating in the market.
By contrast, there is no body of data of fruit and vegetable trading in the rural producing areas, 
so the analysis of this aspect of the supply of these commodities, relies on a survey of traders 
in one of the main producing areas. It can be concluded from this survey that the system of 
purchasing from the producers is extremely flexible and highly varied. It appears to involve 
large numbers of the population to varying degrees. The involvement ranges from full-time 
traders, although these are mainly urban based travelling buyers, through part-time farmers, to 
almost any member of the population who intends to travel to an area where there is a 
shortage of the commodities produced at home. The bulk of fruit and vegetables, however, 
appears to be bought by traders, who are either urban-based, or who also produce part-time, 
but whose main occupation is trading. In Lushoto District, much of the purchasing is focused 
around the village periodic markets, with certain markets appearing to concentrate on supplying 
one destination, for example Soni was found to produce mainly for the Tanga market, whereas 
Lukozi produce tended to go to Dar es Salaam. Other purchasing activities, although less 
common in Lushoto, included contract farming, pre-arranged sales and speculative purchasing 
visits to producers by traders.
The greatest difficulties facing traders interviewed for this study were the high cost of 
transportation and the low level of reliability of the transport services. The main cause is the 
poor condition of the main roads in Tanzania. If the main routes connecting Dar es Salaam with 
its hinterland were to be improved, this would remove the greatest constraint experienced by 
traders involved in transporting food to the city. Improved roads would facilitate the 
distribution system and remove a considerable proportion of the traders’ operating costs and 
uncertainties. It would also make it easier for producers themselves to travel to the urban 
markets. This would also have direct benefits for urban consumers, by reducing retail prices, 
and for produpers by opening up areas, from which, at present, it is currently too expensive or 
too difficult to transport produce. The survey of rural producing areas took place shortly after 
significant improvements had been made to the Mombo to Lushoto road (see Figure 8.1). The 
importance of this improvement is still to be assessed, but all those spoken to in the course of 
the author’s fieldwork were very optimistic about its impact. This recommendation is echoed by 
Porter (1992), suggesting that greater investment in roads would assist producers of food for
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urban markets in the Jos Plateau in Nigeria, and also by Chiteji (1980) in a study of the impact 
of transportation on the Uluguru mountains, in Tanzania.
This study benefitted from the availability of a database of market prices, as reported on a 
monthly basis throughout Tanzania for a selection of commodities. This database has been 
analysed to establish a pattern of price variations on an annual and a monthly basis, between 
Dar es Salaam and its main fruit and vegetable supply areas. This analysis has identified areas 
with comparative advantages in mean monthly price over the time series, as well as areas that 
are at a comparative disadvantage. This exercise has identified economic strengths and 
weaknesses of different geographic areas. However, two considerations must be taken into 
account. Firstly, these are price data and measure prices only, therefore, they can say nothing 
about the marketing systems on their own. They require the integration of the analysis of 
qualitative information, for example regarding the methods of production, trading or 
transportation, in order to interpret the price and volume data patterns. Secondly, these data 
are retail prices in the market towns and not farm gate prices, and they therefore are not a 
direct measurement of trading margins. However, in the absence of any price and volume data 
regarding fruit and vegetable wholesaling in Dar es Salaam’s hinterland, this analysis, integrated 
with interview methods, observations and literature surveys, yields useful indications for future 
development potential of the areas examined.
The analysis of the monthly price data provided by the Marketing Development Bureau 
suggests that certain areas could, in economic terms, have significant potential in the supply of 
fruit and vegetables to the urban market of Dar es Salaam. The maps produced by this 
analysis give indications of the most profitable areas from which to supply certain crops to the 
city at particular times of year. Because this is based on the retail prices of towns in the main 
supply areas, it is a relatively crude measurement. However, in the absence of any other 
attempt of this kind it gives an indication of a geographic pattern of supply and of favourable 
economic marketing conditions. It shows, for example that the real market margins for sweet 
bananas increased over the period from 1981 to 1988 in almost all of the selected market 
towns. It suggests that the supply of cabbage is maintained throughout the year by Lushoto, 
Mbeya and Iringa because they maintain a mean monthly margin of between TShs 15 and TShs 
20. This type of model could also be used to assess the viability of targeting other areas as 
future supply areas. For example, Lindi Region is described by traders and market observers 
as having increasing importance in the supply of citrus fruits, but it has the potential, from an 
ecological point of view, to produce additional crops, such as coconuts and mangoes. In order 
for it to take advantage of this, the road connections must be considerably improved. A price 
model such as has been developed in this study could be used to test the viability of assisting 
this area, through the construction of a new road. Finally, if monitored this type of model may 
help identify areas where the potential for producing certain crops in economic terms has 
increased or decreased. For example, this analysis showed that the price margins for sweet
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bananas in Lushoto were the highest of the six market towns, although Lushoto was not 
reported as being an important producer of sweet bananas. Lushoto is known to have an 
environment suited to successful cooking banana production and it may be possible to take 
advantage of the favourable price margins which have been indicated by this analysis.
The differences between the two selected producing areas examined, namely Lushoto and 
Morogoro, are negligible, the only distinguishing features being the use of credit and access to 
market information. Lushoto producers used credit to purchase inputs and had greater access 
to market information. Morogoro producers used credit to purchase agricultural services, such 
as labour and transportation, while very few of the Morogoro producers appeared to have 
access to accurate market information. The survey identified villages which appeared to be 
more external market oriented, in terms of fruit and vegetables production, than others. The 
villages concentrated on supplying one urban market. While a significant proportion of 
producers selected the crops they would grow for economic reasons, these motivations were 
predominantly to be found among vegetable producers. Producers of other crops gave other 
types of reasons such as ecological or social and cultural.
The most striking result of the survey of rural producers is the low level of use of market 
information, and of the stark difference between the two areas studied. The low level of use of 
market information is perhaps understandable, because it is perceived by many rural producers 
to be broadcasting the typical prices in the city wholesale market, and may be unrelated to the 
prices which they can expect to obtain in their area. This is demonstrated by the large regional 
variations in price recorded by the MDB data in Chapter Seven. These city prices are of little 
relevance to rural producers. Kariakoo Market Corporation should address the fact that almost 
none of the producers interviewed paid any attention to their weekly broadcast of commodity 
deliveries and prices, and instead appeared to rely on traders for their market information. 
Abbott (1986) recommends that any market news service which is established must ensure it is 
catering for the needs of the proposed listening population. For example, he suggests that a 
radio service for farmers be broadcast before 6:30 am and after 7:00 pm, while a service for 
traders could effectively be broadcast at midday. Therefore, in order for such a broadcast 
service to be of relevance to the rural producers, it must broadcast the regional prices on a 
daily basis and at times when the producers are able to listen, otherwise it is of little use. 
Monitoring the usefulness of a market information service to the target audience is also of crucial 
significance. .The service should be flexible enough to adapt to meet the needs of its 
audience.
The evidence in the survey suggests that the producers are a relatively highly educated group 
of the rural population, who are economically motivated. This, however, varies between 
villages and between the two main areas surveyed. Soni and Matombo appear to be more 
commercially oriented than other villages, with producers more involved in selling their crops to
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the market buyers. This variation appears related to the location of the village in relation to the 
main routes to the city markets.
One of the main difficulties reported by the producers and reinforced by the extension 
officers, was that of the difficulty of finding a suitable market. There were frequent reports in 
both Morogoro and Lushoto of crops having to remain in the fields to rot, because it was not 
viable to hire labour to harvest and transport to the point of sale. As has already been 
argued, the improvement of transport links should reduce the costs involved and have the 
knock-on effect of improving the producers prices. Additionally, the producers reported having 
difficulty in obtaining inputs, for example seeds, fertilisers, fungicides. The formal market is the 
main source by which producers are supposed to obtain their supplies of inputs. However, 
they reported that the supplies were infrequent and inadequate. It is possible to obtain 
supplies on the informal market, although they tend to be very highly priced.
In spite of the lack of comprehensive data, this study has been able to establish several 
patterns and trends in the supply of fruit and vegetables to Dar es Salaam. It has described 
the importance of small scale trading to the rural dwellers as being a widespread practice often 
used to defray the cost of a journey. However, two main types of full-time fruit and vegetable 
traders have been distinguished: locally based traders buying from producers at the local 
periodic market or at a local wholesale market building, or traders from the city who make 
speculative trips to farms to arrange for the purchase of commodities direct from the farm. The 
importance of the formal wholesale sector in Dar es Salaam is in decline, because of its inability 
to expand in line with the increasing demand. However, Kariakoo Wholesale Market still 
maintains a central role among an increasingly competitive wholesale sector. This may have 
come about because a more dispersed system of wholesale trading appears to be more 
appropriate to the requirements of the commodities being sold and to the the benefit of the 
consumer. For example, the swing to the informal sector has increased the speed with which 
produce reaches the consumer and reduced the marketing costs. This, in turn, has reduced the 
commodity prices and increased availability. Many of the retail markets have adopted informal 
wholesaling functions, taking advantage of their more favourable locations around the city. For 
example, they are located close to main routes into the city, away from traffic congestion in the 
city centre and close to the residential areas and the consumers. The channelling of food 
marketing is different for different commodities. This is demonstrated in the contrast between 
the citrus and the vegetable marketing models presented.
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Chapter Ten 
Conclusions
1. Previous research in the supply of fruit and vegetables to urban areas in developing 
countries has provided some insights into the marketing process. For example, there is 
a large volume of anthropological material describing the markets, their roles and the 
participants in detail, but with little analysis of the systems and processes of marketing 
themselves. Furthermore, this approach lacks an overall focus or, indeed, definition of 
research priorities. There is also a large volume of literature examining the quantitative 
aspects of food marketing systems and pricing policies, but fruit and vegetables are not 
included in this material. The focus tends to be rather on staple grains. This approach 
concentrates on price changes over time, with little regard to the markets, or the role of 
market participants or the culture of, and the social milieu in which, the systems are 
placed. Alternatively, there has developed an analytical approach which regards food 
marketing as a process of distribution, with an uneven system of entitlement according to 
the allocation of wealth in the society concerned. However, this approach focuses on the 
institutional defects of the society and their relative effects on different groups of the 
population, with little regard to the systems involved. An additional approach to 
marketing within the geographical literature attempts to explain the establishment of rural 
marketing systems in terms of established geographical theories of central place and 
innovation diffusion. Nevertheless, all these approaches have the common element of 
failing to incorporate the fruit and vegetable sector as a central theme. They also fail to 
provide a meaningful analysis of change and development of the food marketing over 
time. This study has adopted a synthesized approach to this problem, examining the 
food supply system from several different perspectives and using a range of 
approaches. A detailed examination was undertaken of price and volume data over 
several years for Kariakoo Wholesale Market, the only legal wholesale market in Dar es 
Salaam. This demonstrated a rise in the vegetable component of the volume of produce 
handed at Kariakoo, at the expense of the fruit component. The liberalisation of the 
Tanzanian economy has encouraged the informal trading of food. This more rapid , small 
scale and dispersed form of trading is better suited to marketing more perishable fruit 
commodities. Market margins for commodities between Dar es Salaam and six market 
towns iti the main areas of supply through the 1980s provided a second perspective.
This showed that the considerable regional variation in market price margins occur 
between Dar es Salaam and its fruit and vegetable supply regions. These variations 
tended to increase during the 1980s and they vary during the course of the year as the 
changing seasons provide different areas with optimal weather for production. Extensive 
interview surveys were undertaken, firstly, of producers in two of the main fruit and 
vegetable producing areas of Tanzania, Morogoro District and Lushoto District, Tanga
Region; secondly, of traders in Lushoto; and, thirdly, of retailers operating in six of Dar 
es Salaam’s main retail markets. A series of in-depth interviews with participants and 
observers at all levels in the system of supply was also conducted. Rather than 
concentrating on one group of the population, or on one type of data, at one period in 
time, this study integrates a wide range of data sources which have been used to 
construct a comprehensive an analysis of a previously neglected sector of the economy, 
integrating both qualitative and quantitative data. This study analyses the various data 
sources emphasising the evolution of the food marketing system in the context of the 
changing political economy of an African country experiencing IMF-imposed liberalisation. 
This shows that the official changes in other sectors of the economy have had profound 
influences on the fruit and vegetable sector. The liberalisation of the grain marketing, for 
example, has resulted in wholesale grain trading legally taking place in Dar es Salaam’s 
retail markets. This has encouraged confidence in fruit and vegetable wholesalers to 
continue and expand their still technically illegal businesses. It provides a framework into 
which aspects of the previous approaches can be integrated. This gives a clearer overall 
picture of the production and distribution of fruit and vegetables for Dar es Salaam and 
how this system has developed over the last decade. This study contributes a 
necessary component in an otherwise ‘patchy’ field of research, and through the 
assessment of a food supply system over a period of time, provides an interpretation 
of its likely future. This latter element is particularly important during present changes in 
the Tanzanian economy due to political and economic liberalisation since the mid-1980s.
The liberalisation of the marketing channels for staple foods, resulting in the open 
wholesaling of these commodities in various locations around the city of Dar es Salaam, 
has been successful in encouraging the informal trading of fruit and vegetables especially 
since the mid-1980s. Kariakoo Wholesale Market nevertheless still remains an important 
focus for urban marketing channels of fruit and vegetables in Dar es Salaam, despite the 
changes brought about by economic liberalisation since the mid 1980s. The marketed 
throughput handled at Kariakoo reached double its designed capacity in the mid 1980s 
and has stabilised at that level. Indeed, Kariakoo Wholesale Market is currently unable to 
increase its volume of turnover above 70,000 metric tonnes, due to severe restrictions of 
space. If Kariakoo Market Corporation is to continue its role of providing facilities for the 
city’s wholesale trading, it must acquire 15,000 square metres of trading space, in addition 
to the current 2,400 square metres in Kariakoo Wholesale Market. The proportion of 
turnover of vegetables at Kariakoo Wholesale Market has increased from 36 per cent of 
all trade in 1981 to almost 60 per cent in 1988. The fruit produce is increasingly channelled 
through other market centres in Dar es Salaam.
The informal wholesaling sector of the peripherally located retail markets now accounts for 
50 per cent of fruit and vegetable wholesaling in Dar es Salaam. This is as a result of its 
capacity to distribute perishable commodities more rapidly than Kariakoo Wholesale
Market. Tandale and Tandika retail markets distinguish themselves from the other retail 
markets in Dar es Salaam, in that they have developed as important informal wholesale 
centres. They have the advantage of being flexible, less congested than Kariakoo, 
being closer to the retail outlets, and because they are unofficial, there is no wholesale 
levy charged. These markets have developed since the mid 1980s as direct competitors 
to Kariakoo for wholesale trading, very much reflecting changing market conditions 
because of liberalisation. Even more recently established, but smaller, markets are 
developing as wholesaling centres of increasing importance, but with marked commodity 
specialisation. Tandale specialises in products from west and north of the city, including 
most fruits and vegetables, but mainly fruits; Tandika specialises in products from the 
area to the south of Dar es Salaam, such as citrus fruits; Ubungo specialises in bananas; 
Buguruni in products from Kisarawe, mainly oranges; Mwenge obtains tomatoes, when 
in season, from around Kunduchi, just north of the city. The type of produce which the 
informal wholesale markets handle depends more on their location in relation to the main 
routes entering the city from the producing areas. Tandika is located on Kilwa Road, the 
main route to Dar es Salaam from the south; Tandale is located on Morogoro Road, the 
main route to the city from Tanga and Morogoro Regions, where oranges are grown; 
Ubungo is also located on Morogoro Road; while Buguruni is located on Nelson 
Mandela Road, near Pugu Road, along which produce coming to the city from Kisarawe 
arrives.
The purchase of commodities in rural areas for re-sale in urban centres is a wide spread 
practice. Three main rural purchasers can be identified: rural-based traders who 
purchase from rural producers to transport into the city’s markets; traders based in the 
urban areas may travel out to the producing areas to purchase produce from producers; 
and people who are travelling may purchase food for sale as a means to subsidise the 
cost of their journey. Large scale fruit and vegetable traders generally find their 
suppliers at:-
(a) periodic rural markets, where the trader can expect to meet a large 
proportion of the rural population because of the social, cultural and 
economic importance it has assumed in rural life in many parts of Tanzania.
Traders in in this channel tend to be based in the rural area;
(b) rural wholesale market buildings, which have been established where 
the cash production is of importance to the area’s economy, and are 
■frequently used as meeting points for producers and buyers. Traders in 
this channel tend to be rural;
(c) farms, where buyers make a speculative visit to producers. Traders in 
this channel tend to be urban-based.
The most important single constraint for the entire supply system is the transport 
infrastructure. This is reflected in high transport costs due to: frequent breakdowns 
because of the poor condition of the main roads in Tanzania; the poor condition of the
roads makes journeys slow and therefore the fuel requirement is high; and the cost of 
importing fuel and spare parts is high. An improved transport system, with good, well 
maintained roads will bring enormous benefits to the transportation of fruit and 
vegetables, reducing the costs to the trader and ultimately to the consumers.
The rural producing areas can be conceptualised as competing to supply the city with 
fresh fruit and vegetables. However, their environmental circumstances mean that each 
has the optimal climate to produce certain crops at different times during the year. The 
result is that the seasonality of the producing areas leads to complementarity, providing 
an almost year-round supply for the Dar es Salaam market. For example, a mean of 
about 70 per cent of the supply of tomatoes to Kariakoo in the first four months of the 
year are from Lushoto and Mbeya. During May to July between 60 and 70 per cent of 
tomatoes supplied came from Iringa, whilst during August to October between 50 and 
65 per cent of tomatoes were supplied from a combination of Morogoro, Ruvu and 
Mkaiye. In the last two months, Iringa, Lushoto and Mbeya supplied the city in 
approximately equal proportions. In planning for improved fruit and vegetable 
provision for the city of Dar es Salaam, therefore, an important factor is the geographic 
variation in the origins of the different commodities, as they change through the year. The 
environmental advantages of each area, in terms of soil and seasonal climate, is reflected 
in a seasonal price pattern for each commodity. For example, there is a clear seasonal 
variation in the price margin of cabbages in Lushoto, however, its seasonal variation is 
complemented by those of Iringa and Mbeya at different times of the year.
The producers interviewed were relatively highly educated, with clear economic 
motivations for being involved in cash production. They tended to work larger than 
average farm sizes, with a lower level of fragmentation of farm plots. Villages varied in 
both their level of production for market, and the market to which their produce would 
ultimately be sent. Reasons for this appear to be the location of the Districts’ 
commercial centres and the geographic location of the villages in relation to the main 
roads running through the area. The closer villages are to the roads in the district, the 
more convenient they are for traders to visit. For example the villages in Lushoto which 
are in a position to take best advantage of cash production, such as Soni and Lukozi, are 
all close to the main road through the district.
The importance of this research is threefold: it meets the need for an integrated 
approach to the main problem of food supply for the urban areas of the developing 
world; it provides an analysis of fruit and vegetable production and marketing in the 
developing world in general, and Tanzania in particular, something which much previous 
research ignores; finally, the comprehensive approach adopted here has demonstrated 
that the sources of data which are available on fruit and vegetable production and 
marketing is relatively sparse and previously unconnected. There is need for more and
better quantitative records of prices, particularly in the rural areas, and for the effective 
communication of this information to traders and producers. For example, farm gate 
prices, instead of urban market prices, could be collected on a frequent basis, and 
quickly reported on the radio at times when farmers can listen and before the prices are 
out of date. Future research, therefore must continue this integrated approach to the 
problem of food supply, approaching the problem from several perspectives, 
incorporating a range of data. This is a particularly important in the fruit and vegetable 
sector, where there is very little data to work with and where consequently research is 
also lacking.
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UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM
FRUIT AND VEGETABLE TRADERS* SURVEY. DAR ES SALAAM 
MARKET DATE /9/89
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Trader
No.
Sex
(m/f)
LENGTH 
OF TIME 
AS A 
TRADER
FRUIT AND 
VEGETABLES 
DEALT WITH
FRUIT AND
VEGETABLES
ONLY?
(y/n)
CUSTOMERS SOURCE TRANSPORT
1. Traders here
2.Traders in other 
markets
3. Consumers
4. Others*
1. Kariakoo
2. DSM* 
3.0/s DSM’
4.brought 
by trader*
5. Other*
1. Lony
2. Pick-up
3. Bus
4. Mkokoteni
5. Train 
6.0ther*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
* Give details of e.g. area where commodiies bought, if a market, give name, region etc.
UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM 
DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY
FRUIT AMD VEGETABLE SUPPLY FOR DAR ES SALAAM
FARMER'S SURVEY
1 . PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
1 .1 How old are you? ..... .
1.2 How many years of schooling have you had? ..........
1.3 Do you have another job? If "yes", v/hat?
286
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1 .4 How many live in your household?
1.5 How many of your household are under
twelve years of age?
2. PRODUCTION
2.1 What is the size of your farm? (In hectares) ....
2.2 How many land parcels do you have? ....
2.3 How many crops do you produce? ....
2.4 What is your most important fruit
or vegetable crop?
2.5 Why would you think of this as your most important one?
1
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3. S E L L IN G
3.1 P l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h i s  t a b l e ,  g i v i n g  d e t a i l s  o f  f r u i t  a n d
v e g e t a b l e  c r o p s  s o ld  from  th e  fa r m ,  u s i n g  th e  code p r o v i d e d .
CROP
SOLD
TO
WHOM
WHERE
SOLD
FREQUENCY 
OF SALE
METHOD OF 
PAYMENT
PRICE/
QUANTITY
1 . 
2 .
/
/
3 . /
4 . /
5. ... /
6 . /
7. /
8 . /
9 . /
1 0 . /
PLEASE 
GIVE 
CROP 
NAME.
1=consumer 
2=trader 
3=govt.
agency 
4 =co-op. 
5=other
1=at farm 
2=in near 
village 
3=other 
village 
4=Kariakoo 
5=other
1=weekly 
2=monthly 
3 = bi -
annually
4=annually
5=other
1=cash 
2=credit 
3=kind 
4 =other
es timate 
Tshs per 
cilo of an 
average 
sale
(Where the "other" option is selected, please specify.)
4. CREDIT
4.1 Do you have access to credit?
4.2 What is the maximum you could use?
4.3 In an average year, how frequently do
you use credit?
2
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4.4 Who do you got credit from?
(1 = trader, 2=co-operative, 3=marketing agency,) 
(4=kin, 5=other, please specify )
4‘. 5 What agricultural purpose do you use credit for
5. INFORMATION AND DECISIONS
5.1 Do you know v/hat crops traders want to buy before you go to 
them to sell your harvest?
5.2 Where does this information come from?
(1=traders, 2=kin/friends, 3=radio,)
(4=newspaper, 5=rumour, 6=other.)
(If reponse is "other", please specify) ..........
5.3 Below are listed a series, of issues involved in decisions 
taken by farmers
A. soil fertility
B. water availability
C. danger of erosion
D. resistance of crop to pests
E. crop requires a lot of work
F. crop requires a lot of inputs
G. I have been trained to grow this crop
H. I have always grown this crop
I. there is always demand for this crop
J. this crop always gets a good price
K. this crop has always been grown here
L. other reason (please specify)
Please select and list, in order of priority , the issues
from this list that you think are important in the following
decision (Write in the letter next to the selection)
(a) The crop'to concentrate on growing for the market.
1................ 5
2 ................ 6
3 ................ 7
4................ 8
3
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(b) The amount of land to devoted to growing the most 
important crop.
 1................  5
 2  6
 3................  7
 4................  8
(c) W h i c h  land parcels to d e v o t e  to g r o w i n g  the most 
important crop.
 1................... 5 .............
 2   6 ...................................
 3................... 7 .............
 4..................  8 ............
4
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UNVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM 
DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY
FRUIT AND VEGETADLE SUPPLY FOR DAR ES SALAAM
TRADERS SURVEY
1. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
1.1 Sex. (Delete where applicable) MALE/FEMALE
1.2 How old are you?  . t.
1.3 How many years of schooling have you had? ..........
1 .4 Do you have another job? If "yes", v/hat is it? ..........
1.5 Where do you normally live?............................ ..........
1.6 Where do you normally buy the produce you deal with?
1.7 V/hat types of produce do you deal with? 
(Please rank in order of importance)
1   2 .
3 ...........................  4.
5 ...................    6.
7 ...............................................................  8 .
9   10
1.8 How long have you been in business
as a trader?
1.9 Do you have anybody working for your
trading business? If yes, how many?
1
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2. BUYING FRUIT AND VEGETABLES
2 .1  P l e a s e  c o m p le t e  th e  f o l l o w i n g  t a b l e ,  g i v i n g  d e t a i l s  o f  y o u r
p r o d u c e  p u r c h a s i n g ,  u s i n g  th e  c o d e s  g i v e n  b e lo w .
CROP
BOUGHT
FROM
WHOM
WHERE
BOUGHT
PRICE/
QUANTITY
METHOD
OF
PAYMENT
FREQUENCY
OF
PURCHASE
1 .
» /
2. /
3. /
4. /
5. /
6. /
7. /
8. /
9. /
10. /
Give
crop
name
1^producer 
2=trader 
3=co-op. 
4=other
1-tarm 
2=village 
market 
3=road- 
side 
4= own 
premises 
5=other
I
Estimate 
Tshs. per 
kilo of 
average 
purchase
1=cash 
2=credit 
3=kind 
4=other
1^weekly 
2=monthly 
3=bi - 
annually 
4=annually 
5=other
(Where response is "other", please specify)
2.2 How do you find a source of produce?
2.3 What is the most important factorin your decision to buy from 
one producer rather than another?
(1= price, 2= quality, 3=ease of access)
(4=friend/kin, 5=always buy from this source)
(6=other, please specify ) ...........
2
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3.STORAGE AND PROCESSING
3.1 Please complete the following table, giving details of the
storage and processing activities you carry out, using the 
codes provided.
CROP
NORMALLY
STORED
QUANTITY
IN
STORAGE
NORMAL
LENGTH
OF
STORAGE
WHY DO
YOU
STORE?
DO YOU 
PROCESS 
THE 
PRODUCE?
1.
2.
3.
4 .
5.
6 .
7.
8.
9.
10.
Give estimate in give 1 =yes
name in weeks brief 2 = no
kilos explanation
3.2 Please use the space below to list the crops you process and 
what the process is.
3
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4 .  TRANSPORT
4.1  P l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  t h e  t a b l e  b e l o w ,  g i v i n g  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e
m ethods o f  t r a n s p o r t  you u s e ,  and u s i n g  th e  c o d e  p r o v id e d  a t
th e  b o tto m .
Produce method
of
transport
distance cost most
important
restraints
1 .
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
give
name
1 =own 
vehicle 
2=hired 
vehicle 
3=rail 
4=other
in
kilometres
in Tshs. 1=breakdowns 
2=fuel cost 
3=hire cost 
4=time 
5=other
(Where selected response is ‘'other'', please•specify)
4.2 What alternative methods of transport are available?
4.3 Why do you not use them?
4
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COSTS AMD CREDIT 
What is the greatest cost your business has to meet?
Do you have access to credit
for trading activities?
V/ho do you get credit from?
(1= trader, 2=co-operative, 3=marketing agency,)
(4=kin, 5=bank, 6=other. )
(If "other", please specify. )
In an average year, how frequently
do you use credit for trading activities?
V/hat is the maximum amount of credit
you could use?
What trading activities do you use credit for?
 1.................  3
 2.................  4
5
295
6 . S E L L IN G
5.1  P l e a s e  c o m p le t e  th e  f o l l o w i n g  t a b l e ,  g i v i n g  d e t a i l s  o f  y o u r
s a l e s  o f  p r o d u c e ,  u s i n g  t h e  c o d e s  p r o v i d e d .
PRODUCE WHERE
SOLD
TO
WHOM
QUANTITY
SOLD
FREQUENCY 
OF SALE
PRICE
1 .
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Give
name
1=Roadside 
2=village 
market 
3=city 
market 
4=own 
premises 
5=other
1=wholesaler 
2=retailer 
3=other 
trader 
4=processor 
5=other
in 
k g ' s
1=weekly 
2=monthly 
3 =bi - 
annually 
4=annually 
5=other
in
Tshs.
(Where response selected is ''other11, please. specify)
6
Key Informant Interview Schedule
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UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM 
DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY
FRUIT AND VEGETA3LE SUPPLY FOR DAR ES SALAAM
KEY INFORMANT’S INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
1. V/hat o rganisa t ion  do you  w ork  for?
2. W h a t  is y o u r  job  in this  organisat ion? 
(Give a brief  de sc r ip t io n . )
W h a t  function,  or  role does y o u r  organisat ion fulfill in the  
food d is t r ibu t ion  c h a in  supplying Dar es S a la am ?
4. Please describe th e  e lem en ts  of the  f ru i t  and vegetables 
d is tr ibu tion  ch a in  supp lying Dar es Sa laam.
5. W h a t  do you see as th e  m a in  s t r en g th s  and weaknesses  of 
t h e  c u r r e n t  f r u i t  an d  vegetable supp ly  sys tem ?
6. W h a t  difficulties do you and yo u r  organisa t ion e n c o u n te r  'in 
c a r ry in g  out  y o u r  role in this s y s tem ?
7. How do you  see th e  s y s tem  developing in th e  fu tu re ?
8. W h a t  would you r e c o m m e n d  for the  f ru i t  and vegetab le  
m a r k e t i n g  s y s t e m ?  W hy?
List of Interviewees
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date ncune organisation
31/5/89
6/6/89
7/6/89
13/6/8919/6/8917/8/89
21/8/8922/8/89
23/8/89
25/8/89
26/8/89
27/8/89
28/8/89
31/8/89
1/9/897/9/89
8/9/89
8/9/89
10/9/89
12/9/89
15/9/89
15/9/89
16/9/89
21/9/8922/9/89
Peter Twyford-Jones
Mr Eliab Chijoriga
Mr J van Donge
Mr Omollo & assistants 
Mr Eliab Chijoriga 
C Mashauri
Mr Matero 
Kime Gadi Petro jnr. 
Jorg Heinrich
Agro-Forestry Project, (SECAP), Lushoto
Marketing Development Bureau,
Dar es Salaam
General Manager, Kariakoo Market 
Corporation (KMC), Dar es Salaam 
Political economist, University of Dar es 
Salaam
Senior tally derk, KMC, Dar es Salaam 
General Manager, KMC, Dar es Salaam 
Magole Farm Enterprises 
private agricultural trading comnpany 
Kilimo Office, Korogwe 
Farmer, Lushoto
Forestry Officer, Soil Erosion Control
2 Farmer's Wives
Farmer/Bwana Shamba
Group of farmers/traders
Mr Mgunga
Kime Gadi Petro snr. 
servant, Lushoto 
(no name given)
Mr Mchara
Mrs Rimoy
(no name given)
S. M. Ukwama
Lawrence Masanja
Amaria
(no name given)
(no name recorded)
Dr Ashimogo 
Mr Majumba 
group discussion
Edward Nyombe 
Zuberi Mwakikumbwa
Thiery Lasalle
(no name given)
Mr Saleko 
Mr Shekelango 
Mr Eliab Chijoriga 
Peter Twyford-Jones
working in field Soni 
(Idi Mfunda translated 1) 
working in field 
(Idi Translated) 
at village Party office 
(H. Gama translated 2)
Head of agricultural Section, SECAP, 
Lushoto
Farmer, entrepreneur and former civil
Revenue collector, Lushoto village market 
Geography Teacher, Shambalai Secondary 
School, nr. Lushoto 
Horticultural Specialist, Kilimo Office, 
Lushoto
farmer on the Tanga-Dar es Salaam bus 
Market Secretary, Mwenge Market,
Dar es Salaam (trans. Gama)
Revenue Collector (wholesale), KMC, 
Tandale Market, Dar es Salaam (tr. Gama) 
Revenue Collector (retail), Tandale Market, 
Dar es Salaam (tr. Gama)
Market Secretary, Ubungo Market,
Dar es Salaam (tr. Gama)
Market Secretary,Tandika Market,
Dar es Salaam (carried out by Gama) 
Department of Rural Economics, Sokoine 
University of Morogoro 
Horticulture Officer, Kilimo Office, Mgeta 
Division
farmers, traders and the village secretary, 
primary co-operative office, Nyandira 
(trans. Idi)
Chairman primary cooperative (trans. Idi) 
Bwana Shamba, Kibuko village (trans. Idi)
Horticulturist for Franco-Tanzanian 
Horticultural Development Project, Nyandira 
vegetable trader, wholesale fruit and 
vegetable market, Langali village (trans. Idi) 
Bwana Shamba, Langali Village (trans. Idi) 
Bwana Shamba, Tchanzema village 
General Manager, KMC, Dar es Salaam 
Marketing Development Bureau,
Dar es Salaam
Footnotes
1 Idi Mfunda, fieldwork assistant, mainly involved in rural fieldwork.
2 H C Gama, fieldwork assistant, mainly involved in market surveys.
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Random Numbers Generated by a Pocket Calculator and Used to Derive a Sampling 
Framework for Kariakoo Daily Delivery Data (Os and number greater than 7 ignored)
Appendix 3.6
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Volume of Deliveries to Kariakoo Market (1981*88) in Metric Tonnes
Vegetables
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Moshi/etc.
Lushoto/etc.
Moro./etc.
Irinqa
419
2,255
1,946
2,668
243
2,341
1,804
4,120
122
3,185
2,067
8,031
342
5,054
2,541
5,633
398
5,475
3,799
5,184
86
4.425
4,183
5,064
.65
4,721
3,031
4,423
151
4,623
3,218
2,689
TOTAL 7,288 8,508 13,405 13,570 14,856 13,757 12,239 10,680
Other Vegetables
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Onions
Cabbages
Peas
Irish Potatoes
3,401
2,527
287
9,497
4,265
3,187
617
11,504
4,286
3,205
544
9,014
5,346
4,441
477
14,278
5,675
3,210
753
15,773
5,112
3,302
694
17,032
5,283
2,923
589
19,095
5,749
3,740
713
21,378
TOTAL 15,712 19,573 17,049 24,542 25,411 26,140 27,890 31,580
Citrus Fruit
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Limes
Oranges
Lemons
189
5,015
249
208
4,820
293
233
3,566
321
554
2,780
242
197
2,229
310
100
1,526
81
220
1,403
117
254
1,576
35
TOTAL 5,453 5,321 4,120 3,576 2,736 1,707 1,740 1,865
Other Fruit
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
G Mangoes 
R Mangoes 
Pineapples 
R Bananas 
Coconuts
2,007
1,134
147
1,898
9,680
1,963
256
171
2,720
10,167
1,647
434
171
5,642
9,100
2,292
957
135
4,348
9,229
1,465
596
108
4,358
6,761
1,148
879
112
2,816
8,305
1,458
1,737
110
2,037
7,201
1,566
558
140
1,818
5,007
Total 14,866 15,277 16,994 16,961 13,288 13,260 12,543 9,089
Overall Total 43,319 48,679 51,568 58,649 56,290 54,864 54,412 53,214
Volume of Deliveries to Kariakoo continued: Percentage of each group
Tomatoes
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Moshi/etc.
Lushoto/etc.
Moro./etc.
Iringa
5.8
30.9
26.7
36.6
2.9
27.5
21.2
48.4
0.9
23.8 
15.4
59.9
2.5
37.2
18.7
41.5
2.7
36.9 
25.6
34.9
0.6
32.2
30.4
36.8
0.5
38.6
24.8
36.1
1.4
43.3
30.1
25.2
Group% 16.8 17.5 26.0 23.1 26.4 25.1 22.5 20.1
Other Vegetables
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1.987 1988
Onions
Cabbages
Peas
Irish Potatoes
21.6
16.1
1.8
60.4
21.8
16.3
3.2
58.8
25.1
18.8
3.2
52.9
21.8
18.1
1.9
58.2
22.3
12.6
3.0
62.1
19.6
12.6 
2.7
65.2
18.9
10.5 
2.1
68.5
18.2
11.8
2.3
67.7
Group% 36.3 40.2 33.1 41.8 45.1 47.6 51.3 59.3
Citrus Fruit
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Limes
Oranges
Lemons
3.5 
92.0
4.6
3.9
90.6
5.5
5.7 
86.6
7.8
15.5
77.7
6.8
7.2
81.5
11.3
5.9
89.4
4.7
12.6
80.6
6.7
13.6
84.5
1.9
Group% 12.6 10.9 8.0 6.1 4.9 3.1 3.2 3.5
Other Fruit
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
G Mangoes 
R Mangoes 
Pineapples 
R Bananas 
Coconuts
13.5
7.6
1.0
12.8
65.1
12.8
1.7
1.1
17.8
66.6
9.7
2.6
1.0
33.2
53.5
13.5 
5.6 
0.8
25.6 
54.4
11.0
4.5
0.8
32.8
50.9
8.7
6.6
0.8
21.2
62.6
11.6
13.8
0.9
16.2
57.4
17.2
6.1
1.5
20.0
55.1
Group®/** 34^3 3T4 33T) 2a9 23^6 2^2. 22A 1771
Mean Monthly Volume of Deliveries at Kariakoo 
Tomatoes
Appendix 4.2
Moshi Lushoto Morogoro Iringa Total
& Dodoma & Mbeya etc.
January 6.2 663.5 58.7 251.3 979.7
February 7.6 702.8 26.5 142.9 879.8
March 12.7 630.2 7.5 205.2 855.6
April 24.4 427.9 2.7 390.5 845.5
May 25.8 268.2 0.9 588.9 883.8
June 48.3 123.8 20.1 721.9 914.1
July 55.2 129.0 145.1 595.0 924.3
August 20.1 83.0 373.6 377.3 854.0
September 4.4 46.5 696.8 226.5 974.2
October 22.6 106.1 768.8 305.1 1202.6
November 9.5 246.3 502.3 434.3 1192.4
December 14.8 442.1 172.6 453.6 1083.1
Other Vegetables
Onions Cabbages Peas I Potatoes Total
January 329.0 285.2 17.5 1280.4 1912.1
February 343.8 266.4 28.0 1289.8 1928.0
March 372.7 285.9 41.6 1462.2 2162.4
April 414.8 265.2 37.0 1399.4 2116.4
May 434.8 255.9 62.0 1451.5 2204.2
June 405.4 237.1 73.6 1304.0 2020.1
July 444.8 256.8 96.5 1265.6 2063.7
August 469.4 268.9 97.1 1043.7 1879.1
September 470.3 287.4 69.3 1248.9 2075.9
October 439.2 310.6 39.5 1155.6 1944.9
November 406.5 299.9 21.8 1002.7 1730.9
December 383.1 276.5 13.5 1113.5 1786.6
Citrus Fruit
Oranges Limes Lemons Total
January 155.7 24.1 2.6 182.4
February 76.2 23.0 1.0 100.2
March 138.0 21.8 1.3 161.1
April 210.8 16.9 4.3 232.0
May 254.7 19.5 8.4 282.6
June 328.5 16.8 14.8 360.1
July 350.6 18.9 21.4 390.9
August 369.7 21.3 31.4 422.4
September 311.1 33.1 48.8 393.0
October 173.1 9.9 41.5 224.5
November 183.7 13.9 26.4 224.0
December 189.8 17.7 12.8 220.3
Other Fruit
G. Mangoes R Mangoes Pineapples R Bananas Coconuts Total
January 240.7 97.3 34.0 213.6 562.8 1148.4
February 202.4 44.5 15.6 271.0 629.5 1163.0
March 184.5 9.1 9.9 260.6 692.2 1156.3
April 55.8 2.0 5.0 220.9 624.3 908.0
May 71.8 3.1 3.8 235.0 638.8 952.5
June 189.7 12.0 3.5 220.9 639.9 1066.0
July 232.4 14.2 3.6 233.9 777.4 1261.5
August 189.7 4.8 2.9 248.1 887.9 1333.4
September 27.4 52.7 2.6 289.6 714.0 1086.3
October 13.8 286.6 4.6 320.1 627.8 1252.9
November 105.1 373.3 14.0 301.4 518.6 1312.4
December 125.1 233.5 33.9 237.5 514.3 1144.3
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% Share of Value of Deliveries
Moshi & Dodoma 
Lushoto & Mbeya 
Morogoro etc. 
Iringa__________
Total
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
6.1 3.2 1 2.4 3.2 0.7 0.4 1.2
33.5 34.4 30.7 45 40.4 37.1 50.2 60.5
28 16.8 13.7 14.8 22.2 25.1 17.1 14.9
32.4 45.6 54.5 37.8 34.2 37 32.3 23.4
23.6 25.9 33.2 30.6 31.7 27.6 26.1 26.6
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Onions 41.3 37.8 39.7 28.2 25 25.3 34.1 28.8
Cabbages 6.6 11.8 15.3 13.3 10.1 10.8 11.6 10.7
Peas 4.6 6.6 6 3.8 5.4 5.7 3.7 4.8
I. Potatoes 47.5 43.8 39 54.6 59.4 58.2 50.6 55.7
Total 38.6 33.9 34.1 42.3 45.2 49.9 54.8 57.5
1981 1982 1983
Limes 9.5 6.5 7.8
Oranges 84.3 88.9 83.7
Lemons 6.2 4.6 8.5
Total 6.2 7 6.8
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
11.2 9.2 9.9 17.3 9.2
86.7 88.2 87.6 77.1 89.8
2.1 2.6 2.5 5.6 1
5.6 4.5 2.4 2.4 2.1
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
G Mangoes 5 6 8.3 11.4 9.8 6.1 5.8 6.6
R Mangoes 4.1 1.6 1.7 3.3 4.3 6 1.5 3.6
Pineapples 2.6 2.4 3.1 3.7 4.1 3.1 1.8 2.3
R Bananas 9.6 12 22.8 18.4 24.7 16.9 16.9 19.7
Coconuts 78.6 78 64.1 63.2 57 67.8 74 67.8
Total 31.6 33.2 25.9 21.5 18.6 20.1 16.6 13.8
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Appendix 4.5
Deflated Mean Annual Price per Metrict Tonne
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Tomatoes 
Moshi/Dodoma 
Lushoto/Mbeya 
Moro./Ruvu/M kaiye 
Iringa
7,472
6,029
7,936
4,645
8,202
7,662
7,820
6,438
7,693
7,233
7,276
6,825
6,659
6,428
4,705
4,802
5,924 
6,009 
4,847 
5,062 .
5,768
6,378
4,942
4,738
7,186
9,533
7,280
7,552
10,496
15,662
11,040
12,569
Onions
Cabbages
Potatoes
Peas
8,013
1,665
3,356
5,873
6,209
2,660
2,849
9,099
10,211
4,383
3,970
9,870
5,362
3,053
4,004
8,877
4,912
3,495
4,132
8,075
6,239
4,133
4,341
11.425
14,116
8,678
5,745
16,687
16,267
9,531
8,348
24,864
Oranges
Limes
Lemons
1,824
5,583
2,682
2,979
5,247
4,998
7,411
6,087
3,718
5,239
4,009
1,362
4,004
5,213
1,035
3,552
5,826
1,738
5,491
6,108
4,375
6,986
4,476
3,800
G Mangoes 
R Mangoes 
Pineapples 
Ripe Bananas 
Coconuts
1,600
1,671
9,188
2,722
4,452
2,922
4,391
10,047
5,520
5,293
5,300
4,278
13,688
2.753
4.753
2,784
3,157
15,426
2,198
3,596
2,974
3,307
16,113
2,572
3,840
2,710
2,903
13,670
3,028
4,144
3,064
3,197
11,542
5,457
7,378
3,447
5,293
15,059
9,370
11,616
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Note Regarding the Criteria for Acceptance of Chi Square Data
Siegel (1956) states quite clearly that the expected frequencies in each contingency table cell should 
not be too small. “When this requirement is violated, the results of the test are meaningless.” (p.
178). Cochran (1954) recommends that “too small" is where fewer than 20 per cent of the cells should 
have an expected frequency of less than 5 and that no cell should have an expected frequency of 
less than 1. Siegel (1956) recomends that where expected frequencies may be too small, adjacent 
categories can be combined until there are sufficient and high enough expected frequencies. 
Alternatively, in order to guard against this eventuality, large samples should be used. However, 
Baker and Lee (1975) conclude that acceptable criteria could be set more liberal than Cochran’s 1954 
criteria, reporting that there is considerable dispute within the literature over the accepted criteria 
regarding the minimum acceptable expected frequencies. Lancaster (1969) applies the chi square 
test where no more than a third of the cells have an expected frequency of less than 5. Chapman and 
Schaufele (1970) set the criteria only that no expected frequency should be less than 1. Ferguson 
(1971) argues that "an expectation of 2 or more in each cell will permit the estimation of roughly 
approximate probabilities” (p. 198). As a result it was decided to set the minimum expected 
frequenies criteria as follows: no cell should have an expected frequeny of less than 1 and that no 
more than a third of all cells should have an expected frequeny of less than 5.
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Appendix 5.1
Mean Anual Real Market Margins (1981 Tanzanian Shillings)
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Appendix 7.1
Cabbage
Moshi Morogoro Tanga Lushoto Mbeya Iringa
1983 1.42 3.57 3.97 7.57 11.32 3.76
1984 -4.04 0.35 -1.97 284 273 210
1985 1.14 201 1.83 5.21 1.16 4.09
1986 219 1.90 240 4.30 3.11 3.84
1987 -0.31 0.25 -0.04 3.64 261 3.09
1988 1.34 1.71 0.24 291 292 296
1989 1.98 -0.06 1.09 3.62 . 234 3.32
Coconut
Moshi Morogoro Tanga Lushoto Mbeya Innga
1983 -1.27 0.25 0.96 -0.90 -5.17 -4.71
1984 -0.48 0.07 0.97 -0.06 -244 -2.13
1985 -0.72 0.58 1.08 -0.17 -1.27 -1.86
1986 0.18 0.87 1.47 -2.89 3.53 -0.90
1987 -0.51 -0.17 0.91 0.34 1.01 -1.69
1988 0.11 0.51 0.47 -0.13 200 -1.71
1989 -0.06 0.85 0.78 0.41 236 -1.94
Irish Potatoes
Moshi Morogoro Tanga Lushoto Mbeya Innga
1983 263 5.85 1.60 4.70 9.89 5.21
1984 -1.32 1.84 -1.54 0.61 3.19 1.53
1985 -1.39 1.92 -0.94 1.67 3.37 1.71
1986 -0.16 1.50 0.54 1.96 3.36 1.45
1987 -0.42 1.11 0.22 271 273 1.12
1988 0.38 1.40 0.33 1.45 213 0.49
1989 0.23 1.62 -0.44 235 235 1.28
Onion
Moshi Morogoro Taiga Lushoto Mbeya Innga
1983 -3.47 267 -5.14 -6.76 -15.79 -5.27
1984 0.64 287 209 1.35 6.88 -0.72
1985 -0.09 0.97 -0.38 3.94 263 -2.57
1986 -1.61 0.13 1.83 1.85 3.26 -3.42
1987 •0.97 226 0.34 0.55 4.92 -2.97
1988 210 3.36 0.91 1.13 4.59 -245
1989 4.38 4.80 3.87 7.39 9.24 -0.88
Oranges
Moshi Morogoro Tanga Lushoto Mbeya Iringa
1983 0.55 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.72 0.13
1984 0.37 -0.17 0.36 0.61 0.13 -0.03
1985 0.11 0.25 0.42 0.32 0.14 -0.14
1986 0.24 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.20 0.08
1987 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.34 0.27 0.16
1988 -0.02 0.19 0.11 0.16 0.29 -0.12
1989 0.13 0.03 0.27 0.34 0.17 -0.06
Ripe Bananas
Moshi Morogoro Tanga Lushoto Mbeya Innga
1983
1984 0.02 -0.75 -0.25 0.50 0.25 -1.00
1985 -0.29 -0.44 -0.10 0.27 0.33 -0.70
1986 -0.08 -0.23 0.07 0.17 0.24 -0.35
1987 0.02 -0.06 0.17 0.35 0.42 0.01
1988 0.36 0.26 0.38 0.40 0.55 0.12
1989 0.37 0.30 0.41 0.57 0.74 0.41
Tomatoes
Moshi Morogoro Tanga Lushoto Mbeya Innga
1983 3.95 0.65 230 11.91 13.15 11.34
1984 252 0.93 -1.56 9.16 8.85 3.07
1985 4.33 -4.24 3.10 8.48 7.36 3.30
1986 239 -0.88 254 6.57 6.22 3.55
1987 1.73 -0.41 217 6.68 6.01 3.13
1988 6.29 5.75 3.44 7.21 7.61 3.79
1989 4.08 268 215 8.11 7.92 3.88
Appendix 7.2
Mean Monthly Real Market Margins (19481 Tanzanian Shillings)
Cabbage
Moshi Morogoro Tanga Lushoto Mbeya Iringa
January 4.50 9.25 236 16.14 15.32 11.64
February 5.71 10.29 11.39 18.59 13.18 13.52
March 13.71 11.18 4.96 16.18 11.07 1218
April 15.39 12.89 5.93 1223 15.93 14.04
May 14.82 7.14 7.75 25.45 20.46 19.89
June 11.00 11.21 5.82 17.00 18.82 17.05
July -1225 -7.07 -9.18 10.61 9.55 8.32
August -3.29 263 •0.46 18.69 17.73 1200
September -1.04 0.08 0.63 1296 15.46 10.46
October 1.75 5.90 3.25 14.90 1225 14.40
November 4.07 7.64 3.68 17.30 13.82 1290
December 1.79 4.86 3.57 13.27 14.61 11.11
Coconut
Moshi Morogoro Tanga Lushoto Mbeya Iringa
January 1.39 3.32 5.89 229 12.00 -7.39
February 1.04 9.46 7.25 4.14 9.89 -6.64
March 0.19 7.96 7.14 261 8.96 -6.54
April 6.57 5.82 4.80 0.39 8.39 -4.68
May -1.38 1.00 1.93 232 6.29 -8.79
June 0.11 -0.82 1.79 3.54 6.29 -8.75
July 0.21 0.00 286 -14.96 5.86 -7.07
August -4.09 0.63 1.50 3.25 5.33 -8.21
September -3.58 0.38 1.88 -1.04 204 -6.00
October -3.30 0.15 1.95 -2.04 9.15 -7.40
November -3.36 0.39 1.64 0.86 8.57 -7.43
December -0.21 3.25 4.98 211 9.32 -6.96
Irish Potato
Moshi Morogoro Tanga Lushoto Mbeya Iringa
January 3.93 7.50 3.21 7.37 13.57 4.71
February -4.57 14.54 1.29 1.29 11.43 3.39
March -1.86 17.00 5.68 5.68 13.11 5.86
April 10.39 9.46 -0.75 -0.75 12.75 5.25
May 3.32 8.89 -0.07 -0.07 12.86 5.86
June 3.93 5.79 -1.25 -1.25 12.00 6.07
July 0.18 3.86 -<3.11 -3.11 14.86 6.71
August -5.82 5.09 -1.70 -1.70 13.01 3.84
September -2.08 4.00 0.38 0.38 12.50 5.00
October -3.35 3.75 0.60 0.60 12.55 3.65
November -3.29 5.50 -0.07 -7.00 8.64 3.36
December -1.79 4.14 2.74 274 11.62 5.21
Onions
Moshi Morogoro Tanga Lushoto Mbeya Iringa
January -0.96 19.04 6.25 3.07 12.21 -10.29
February 0.79 20.07 15.96 8.29 18.36 -7.64
March 30.64 2279 14.46 19.00 31.14 -7.04
April 13.52 21.57 12.46 23.59 36.64 -6.50
May 21.70 20.54 14.29 37.68 42.29 1.50
June 3.25 6.71 -2.29 14.46 28.29 -19.79
July -5.11 9.50 3.46 28.03 28.31 -1225
August -15.54 -1263 -9.88 -8.96 5.00 -25.33
September -3.08 7.04 267 -2.11 19.46 -8.54
October -4.20 19.50 5.45 13.22 17.80 -7.83
November 0.93 8.14 250 274 14.21 -8.07
December 3.47 8.14 4.50 1.42 13.39 -7.75
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Oranges
Moshi Morogoro
January -0.29 204
February -0.32 254
March 243 1.11
April 0.98 1.05
May 1.48 1.07
June 1.27 0.30
July 0.21 0.21
August 0.19 0.94
September -0.65 0.60
October -0.07 1.18
November 0.12 0.14
December 0.46 1.75
Ripe Bananas
Moshi Morogoro
January 0.42 0.29
February -0.17 0.88
March 0.19 0.95
April 1.30 0.73
May 0.85 1.12
June 0.68 -0.50
July 0.98 0.07
August 0.34 0.21
September -0.09 -0.29
October -0.01 -0.23
November 0.19 -0.16
December 0.23 -0.27
Tomatoes
Moshi Morogoro
January 14.31 8.54
February 17.29 8.04
March 19.93 17.88
April 41.01 1.88
May 23.57 -1.63
June 27.92 -8.65
July 17.79 -2.39
August 5.92 -8.38
September 4.68 -1.46
October 271 -5.63
November 250 -4.54
December 7.21 3.75
Tanga Lushoto Mbeya Iringa
0.68 1.63 1.96 0.14
0.59 1.86 0.43 0.29
0.77 1.25 0.87 0.30
0.62 1.37 0.77 -0.89
1.37 200 0.89 0.34
1.80 0.96 1.00 0.29
1.06 1.46 1.04 -0.27
1.37 254 1.13 -0.19
0.63 0.71 1.54 -0.50
1.23 233 3.23 -0.82
1.25 1.55 293 -0.05
1.29 1.36 289 0.93
Tanga Lushoto Mbeya Iringa
0.54 0.64 1.10 0.04
0.23 0.45 0.83 -0.18
0.57 0.83 1.07 -0.12
0.77 1.02 1.56 0.28
0.93 1.16 1.71 -0.80
0.64 1.43 1.47 0.21
1.05 1.41 1.93 0.95
0.45 1.00 1.16 0.04
0.27 0.35 •0.53 0.04
0.62 0.89 1.31 0.18
0.18 0.59 0.58 -0.14
0.11 0.61 1.04 -0.09
Tanga Lushoto Mbeya Iringa
12.44 3287 30.99 16.17
14.16 38.22 33.71 16.40
22.91 41.98 35.21 14.58
24.83 54.54 55.75 31.04
14.29 48.61 54.79 24.54
20.83 53.23 56.46 33.75
12.86 41.04 47.99 28.68
-1.79 25.65 25.03 10.96
1.08 19.44 17.68 8.79
-0.21 14.85 15.10 5.50
4.63 17.23 17.76 8.54
271 22.57 21.21 9.50
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Appendix 8.1
Breakdown of the Employment Categories -
Employment Grouping Frequency Percentage
Business Commercial 25 20.7
Business (Market) Commercial 8 6.6
Business (Hotel) Commercial 7 5.8
Business (Shop) Commercial 7 5.8
'Local Brewing* Business Commercial 5 4.1
Small Petty Business Commercial 15 124
Bicycle Maintenance Trade/Craft 1 0.8
Carpenter Trade/Craft 16 13.2
Driver Trade/Craft 1 0.8
Mechanic Trade/Craft 1 0.8
Plumber Trade/Craft 2 1.7
Shoe Repairer Trade/Craft 2 1.7
Tailor Trade/Craft 5 4.1
Timber Production Trade/Craft 4 3.3
Accounts Clerk Prof./Admin. 1 0.8
Community Devt. Officer Prof. /Admin. 1 0.8
Extension Officer Prof./Admin. 2 1.7
Forestry Officer Prof./Admin. 1 0.8
Levy Collector Prof./Admin. 1 0.8
Medical Assistant Prof./Admin. 1 0.8
Nursery Attendant Prof./Admin. 2 1.7
Teacher Prof./Admin. 4 3.3
Village Secretary Prof./Admin. 1 0.8
Animal Keeper Other 4 3.3
Wage Labourer Other 3 2.5
Witch Doctor Other 1 .8
Total 121 100.0
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Appendix 8.2
Breakdown of the Crop Type Categories
Crop Grouping Frequency Percentage
Cabbage Cooking Veg. 56 21.1
Carrots Cooking Veg. 4 1.5
Onions Cooking Veg. 4 1.5
Leeks Cooking Veg. 4 1.5
Cualiflower Cooking Veg. 3 1.1
Aubergines Cooking Veg. 1 0.4
Tomaotes Salad Veg. 49 18.5
Sweet Pepper Salad Veg. 5 1.9
Cucumber Salad Veg. 4 1.5
Beetroot Salad Veg. 2 0.8
Chinese Cabbage Salad Veg. 1 0.4
Beans Pulses 35 13.2
Pigeon Peas Pulses 8 3.0
Soyabeans Pulses 1 0.4
Bananas Fruit 19 7.2
Jackfruit Fruit 9 3.4
Oranges Fruit 8 3.0
Sugercane Fruit 8 3.0
Pears Fruit 3 1.1
Plums Fruit 3 1.1
Apples Fruit 2 0.7
Peaches Fruit 2 0.8
Pineapple Fruit 2 0.8
Persian Fruit Fruit 2 0.8
Green Gram Fruit 1 0.4
Lemons Fruit 1 0.4
Avocado Fruit 1 0.4
Coconuts Fruit 1 0.4
Irish potatoes Staple 15 5.7
Cassava Staple 6 2.3
Sweet Potatoes Staple 3 1.1
Yams Staple 1 0.4
Peas Pulses 1 0.4
Total 265 100.0
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Appendix 8.3
Producers' Decision Making Factors
Decision Making Factors Group Frequency Percentage
To obtain cash Economic 100 38.5
Doesn't require a lot of labour Economic 15 5.8
Major source of income Economic 15 5.8
Helps in food shortage Economic •. 11 4.2
Consistent demand Economic 7 2 7 '
Consistent price Economic 5 1.9
Greater profit margin Economic 5 1.9
Less competition to sell 
Doesn't require a lot of inputs
Economic 5 1.8
Economic 3 1.2
No other economic activity Economic 3 1.2
Contributes to other business Economic 2 0.8
Wide market for selling Economic 2 0.8
Versatility of crop Ecologic 19 7.3
Helps with soil erosion Ecologic 4 1.5
Short growing season Ecologic 4 1.5
Non-perishable crop Ecologic 2 0.8
Drought resistant Ecologic 1 4.0
Easy to manage Ecologic 1 0.4
For domestic use Social/Cultutral 17 6.5
Crop (trees) inherited Social/Cultutral 11 4.2
Planted by order of government Social/Cultutral 1 0.4
For Ramadan fast Social/Cultutral 1 0.4
Crops important to the area Geographic 14 5.4
Well suited to area Geographic 9 3.5
Given land with crop (trees) Geographic 2 0.8
Survey Total 271 100.0
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